Jon Huntsman for Speaker of the House!

Jon Huntsman.001

 

Congress should elect Jon Huntsman for its next Speaker.  Well, perhaps not Jon Huntsman specifically, but some moderate Republican (there are a few) who would appeal not only to those in the Republican Party who want to get things done in Washington, but also to most Democrats, who also want to get things done.  Perhaps Ray LaHood, a former Republican congressman who served as Secretary of Transportation under President Obama, would be a good choice, or even former New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg.  But we are getting ahead of ourselves.  First, we need to discuss why this has come up.

Under pressure from the far right in his party, Speaker of the House John Boehner announced on September 25 that he would resign as Speaker effective the end of October.  Boehner still clearly enjoyed the support of a substantial majority of his party’s members in the House.  But to understand why he ultimately decided he would need to resign or face an embarrassing vote that would remove him, one must understand the rules and customs followed in the House.

Traditionally, the congressional members of each party (Democrats and Republicans) vote in a unified fashion for whomever has been elected the leader of their respective party in the House.  The election of party leader might well be subject to a competitive election among the party members.  But once a party leader is chosen, 100% of the congressional members from that party have traditionally then voted for that leader in the election for the Speaker position.  Thus whichever party has a majority in the House, will elect its leader to the Speaker post.

But there is no rule that one must follow this tradition.  Members of a party can vote for someone else as leader.  And that has become increasingly common in recent years.  Ten Republicans did not vote for Boehner as Speaker in January 2013, and 25 did not in January 2015.  While those numbers seem small, and indeed are small, not many are necessary.  By House rules, the person to be voted Speaker must receive an absolute majority of the “votes cast for a person by name” (thus excluding those absent, as well as excluding those voting “present”).  If the majority party in the House has a majority of only a relatively small number of seats, then a few renegades who decide not to vote for their party’s chosen leader can deny that person the Speakership.

In the current 114th Congress, which was elected in November 2014 and took office in January 2015, Republicans enjoy a quite substantial majority, with 247 seats vs. 188 seats for the Democrats, or a majority of 30 seats.  This is indeed the largest Republican majority in Congress since 1929, when Herbert Hoover was elected president.  But had just 30 Republican members decided not to vote for their party leader (Boehner) to become the Speaker, then he would have been denied the position (assuming all House members are present and vote for a person).

Thus the revolt that led to 24 Republican members to vote for someone other than Boehner (plus one voting “present”) in the January 2015 vote for the Speakership, was significant.  It was, and was clearly intended to be, a warning to Boehner that the minority of the Republican members on the far right of the party were willing to vote against their own leader, if that leader did not act as they wished.

Following up on this threat, Representative Mark Meadows of North Carolina (one of the Republicans who voted for someone other than Boehner) introduced a motion on July 28 to “vacate the chair”.  This could have acted as a vehicle to force a vote on Boehner as Speaker.

Faced with this, Boehner faced the choice of either caving into the demands of the extreme right in his party, or gotten critical legislation passed to allow the government to continue to function from October 1.  Failure to pass such legislation would have been an embarrassment.  The legislation was necessary so that government departments could continue to spend funds with the start of the new fiscal year (as the Congress has not yet passed a budget for the year – a common occurrence).  Democrats supported keeping the government open, as did a substantial share of the Republican majority.  Together they could pass such a bill.  But they are only allowed to vote on measures in Congress that the Speaker chooses to bring up for a vote.  This is what makes the Speakership such a powerful position.  But if Boehner brought up such a bill, members on the extreme right wing of his party made clear that they would vote against Boehner in a vote on the Speakership.  With only 30 such votes necessary for Boehner to lose such a vote (amounting to just 12% of the 247 Republican held seats in the Congress), Boehner was in a bind.  He was being held hostage by a small minority within his party.

Boehner has of course faced this dilemma before.  So far he has chosen to try to work with the extreme right wing.  But as this became more and more difficult, as their demands became more extreme and as their criticism of Boehner grew, ultimately Boehner decided all he could do was resign.  Losing such a vote for the Speakership would be terribly embarrassing.  Better to resign first, and at least go out on your own terms.

Following his resignation, Boehner did indeed bring to a vote a bill to fund the government for almost two and a half months (until December 11).  And it passed easily, by a majority of 277 in favor and 151 opposed.  It received 186 votes in favor from the Democrats (all Democrats who voted) and 91 votes in favor from the Republicans (with 151 opposed).

It appears now that the current Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy will succeed Boehner, through the traditional process.  McCarthy appears in most respects to be similar to Boehner in his approach, although somewhat closer to the right-wing of his party than Boehner was.  But Boehner’s resignation and the expected selection of McCarthy to the Speakership changes little if anything.  There will be the need to pass a budget to fund the government by December 11, or we will once again be in the same situation as this past week.  The extreme right of the Republican members have made clear that they still want what they want, and that if that means shutting down the government, then that is a price they are willing to pay.

Even before December 11, it appears that the government will hit the debt ceiling. Congress sets the debt ceiling, and Treasury Secretary Lew stated in a letter to Congressional leaders on October 1 that they now expect to hit the current ceiling on or about November 5.  Unless Congress acts by then, the US would be forced to default on its financial obligations.  Once again, a broad majority in the Congress, made up of Republicans and Democrats together, would certainly vote in favor of a bill to address this. But they can vote on such a bill only if the Speaker allows a vote on it, and the extreme right wing of the Republican members see this as leverage to get what they want.  By threatening to vote out the Speaker if he does bring up such a bill, they can hold the Speaker hostage to their demands.

Thus there is every reason to expect gridlock to continue, despite Boehner’s resignation and the election of a new speaker such as McCarthy.  Can anything be done?

Yes, the members of congress have it within their power to address this.  Platitudes (such as we will all work together, or will work harder together) will not suffice.  Rather, one needs to address the traditional practices of the current system that empower a small minority within the majority party to hold hostage the Speaker to their demands.

This can be done by going outside the traditional system in the choice for Speaker. There is nothing in the Constitution that requires the Speaker to be a member of Congress.   While the Speaker has historically always been a member, the Constitution does not require this.  All the Constitution says on the institution is in one line at the end of Article I, Section 2, where it states the “House shall choose their Speaker and their Officers”. Anyone can be so chosen.

To change the dynamics, one needs a Speaker who will draw support from the large majority of members who do not represent the extremes of either party.  The Speaker role would change from highly partisan party leader, to a more balanced mediator who seeks a consensus that may well cross party lines to move needed legislation forward.  With Republicans in the majority, the person chosen should be a Republican.  But he or she should be someone who can work with both sides to try to reach a consensus that spans the broad middle ground, thus ending the current system that allows a small minority to hold the Speaker hostage to their demands.

Jon Huntsman might be such a candidate.  He might in particular be appropriate given his recent work as Co-Chair of “No Labels”, a bipartisan group that has proposed a set of process reforms not only to get congress to work, but also the presidency and government more broadly.  I would not necessarily endorse all of these proposals (and some are pretty broad and vague), but thinking along such lines will be necessary if we are to see an end to gridlock in Washington.

The new role of the Speaker would be to seek a broad consensus on issues, crossing party lines, and bringing to the floor measures that will be endorsed by a majority rather than voted up or down on strict party lines.  Voting solely on party lines is a characteristic of parliamentary systems, such as that of the UK.  Such a system works fine to move an agenda forward when the chief executive (the Prime Minister in a parliamentary system) is the head of the majority party in the parliament (or of a coalition that constitutes a majority). But the US Constitution did not establish a parliamentary system.  Rather, it established a system with a separately elected chief executive (the president), who runs the executive branch of government and where the government is made up of three equal and separate branches:  the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary.

Voting solely along party lines, as has become common in recent years in the Congress, works fine in a parliamentary system but not in the system of government established by the US Constitution.  This will not change as long as the Speaker sees his role as primarily that of a partisan leader of his party, rather than as a mediator seeking to produce a consensus on needed legislation with this then passed by a majority of members from both parties representing the middle rather than the extremes.  As long as an extreme can hold the Speaker hostage, he or she will not be able to act as such a mediator spanning the parties.

With such a change to this new type of Speaker, one can foresee a large set of measures passing soon, as a majority in the Congress have been in support.  These include not only necessary upcoming legislation such as for the budget and a bill to raise the debt ceiling, but other items as well.  For example, the previous federal highway funding bill expired in 2009, but since then Congress has not been able to pass any long term extension. Rather, Congress has passed 34 different short term extensions to keep road funding going, and with just these numerous short term extensions, states and localities could not plan in any reasonable way.  The Senate finally passed a longer term (six year) reauthorization this past summer, but the House has yet to act.  There is also a broad consensus on the need for immigration reform, and the Senate passed such a bill in 2013. And if one aimed at achieving a consensus in the middle, rather than appealing solely to one side or the other, one could envisage progress on bills that would address the underfunding and poor management of the VA health system.  One could even see measures to address the high cost of health care (instead of seeking to score political points by calling Obamacare an abomination despite its success in extending insurance cover).

None of this is realistic, of course.  I have no expectation that Washington will change. The point, rather, is that gridlock is not a necessary outcome of the system, but rather a choice that has been made.  Members of Congress have it within their power to change how their Speaker is chosen, and thus ensure the Speaker will abide by the interests of a majority in the Congress rather than a minority in one party.

 

The Success of Obamacare: A Sharp Reduction in the Number of Americans Without Health Insurance

Health Insurance, % Without Coverage, 1999 to 2014, with 2013 -2014 scaled to US totals, ver 2 with gapA)  Introduction

The US Census Bureau released on September 16 its 2014 report on “Health Insurance Coverage in the United States”.  It provides the best estimate available on the share of the US population that is covered by health insurance, drawing on figures from both its Current Population Survey and its American Community Survey. The graph above was calculated from the underlying data used in the report (released by the Census Bureau along with it).

The new figures confirm that Obamacare has succeeded in sharply reducing the number of Americans who must suffer from lack of health insurance.  The results are consistent with those released earlier by other organizations, including from the commercial polling firm Gallup and from the non-profit Health Policy Center of the Urban Institute.  But the Census Bureau results are derived from larger and more comprehensive surveys than a commercial outfit such as Gallup or a nonprofit such as the Urban Institute can mount.

Gallup, the Urban Institute, and now the Census Bureau, have all found that health insurance coverage improved sharply in 2014, the first year in which the health insurance exchanges set up under Obamacare came into operation.  Also important was the expansion from the start of 2014 of Medicaid coverage in 26 of the 51 states plus Washington, DC.  The expansion, an integral part of the Obamacare reforms, raised eligibility from what had previously generally been 100% of the poverty line (there was some variation across states), to now include also the working close-to-poor who earn between 100% and 138% of the poverty line. Those earning more than 138% of the poverty line are eligible for federal subsidies (phased out with rising income) to purchase privately provided health insurance on the Obamacare market exchanges.

The improvement in health insurance coverage in 2014 (the decrease in the share with no insurance) is clear from these multiple sources.  And it should not be a surprise: The primary purpose of Affordable Care Act (aka Obamacare) was precisely to make affordable health insurance available to all.  Yet prominent political figures opposed to the act (such as the Republican Speaker of the House John Boehner, and Florida Senator Marco Rubio, now a candidate seeking the Republican presidential nomination) claimed that the Affordable Care Act had actually increased the net number of uninsured.  It was clear at the time that they did not understand some basics of insurance enrollment, and it is absolutely clear now that they were dramatically wrong in their assessments.  But I am not aware that any of these political critics have had the courage to admit that they had in fact been wrong.

There are some technical issues that arise in the Census Bureau numbers that should be understood, and these will be discussed below.  But the basic numbers are clear. Between 2013, before the Obamacare exchanges were in operation, and 2014, there was a sharp reduction in the share of the American population who had no health insurance cover.

This blog post will first review the basic results on improved health insurance cover with the start of the Obamacare reforms, and will then discuss some of the technical issues behind the numbers.

B)  The Reduction in the Number of Americans Without Health Insurance Following the Start of the Obamacare Reforms

The graph at the top of this post shows the Census Bureau numbers, as percentage shares of the population with no health insurance over the period 1999 to 2014. Unfortunately (and as will be discussed further below), the Census Bureau changed its methodology in 2013, so the 2013 and 2014 figures are not directly comparable with the figures for 1999 to 2012.  However, the 2013 and 2014 figures are directly comparable to each other, and show the sharp drop in the share of the population without health insurance in 2014 (the first year of the Obamacare market exchanges) compared to what it was before.

The share of the population without health insurance cover at any point in the calendar year fell from 13.3% in 2013 to 10.4% in 2014.  In terms of absolute numbers, the number of Americans without health insurance cover fell from 41.8 million in 2013 to 33.0 million in 2014, a reduction of 8.8 million or 21%.  The number of Americans with health insurance cover rose by 11.6 million, with this number different from the reduction in the number with no insurance cover (the 8.8 million) because the overall US population is growing. Furthermore, this was not (as some politicians have charged) solely a result of the Medicaid expansion.  While the Medicaid expansion was important, with an increase of 6.7 million enrolled in Medicaid (both under its prior program conditions, as well as under the expanded eligibility rules), the total number of Americans with some form of health insurance rose by well more than this.

The chart also shows the shares without health insurance separately for the group of states that as of January 1, 2014, had chosen not to take the federal money to expand Medicaid coverage to include the working close-to-poor (those earning between 100% and 138% of the poverty line).  Twenty-six states (all with a Republican governor or state legislature or usually both) decided not to expand Medicaid coverage to allow this segment of the population to obtain health insurance, despite the fact the additional costs would be covered 100% by the federal government for the first several years, with this then phased down to a still high 90% ultimately.  Even at the 90% federal cost share, the net cost to the state would not simply be small, but in fact negative.  Due to the higher state tax revenues that would be gained from what Medicaid would be paying hospitals, doctors, and nurses to provide health services to these close-to-poor, plus the lower state subsidies that would be needed at hospitals to cover a share of the cost of emergency room care that the uninsured must use when they have no alternative, the states would in fact come out ahead financially by accepting the Medicaid expansion.  Yet for purely political reasons, the Republican governors and legislators in these states refused to permit this Medicaid expansion, leaving this segment of the population with no health insurance cover.

It is also interesting to note from the chart at the top of this post that actions in this group of states to limit (or at least not facilitate access to) health insurance cover appear to have begun much earlier.  The shares of the population without access to any health insurance cover in those 26 states which as of January 1, 2014, had chosen not to expand Medicaid coverage, are shown as the red line in the chart.  The shares in the 25 states plus Washington, DC, that did decide to expand Medicaid coverage are shown in the blue line. In 1999 (the first year with comparable data in this series) and 2000, there was no such a discrepancy in health insurance cover between these two groups of states.  Indeed, in 1999 a slightly smaller share of the population had no insurance cover in the red states than in the blue states.  In 2000 the shares were almost identical.

But this then changed.  Starting in 2001, a consistent gap started to open up in the shares between the two groups of states, with fewer covered by insurance in the red states than in the blue.  The overall national trend for the share of those with no insurance cover was also upwards.  Why the gap between the two groups of states started to open up in 2001 and remain to this day is not fully clear, but it may reflect the trend to more conservative politics that started at that point (including the start of the Bush administration in 2001). The refusal to accept the Medicaid expansion (even at a cost to themselves), and other measures aimed at blocking Obamacare or at least make access more difficult (such as refusal to operate market exchanges at the state level), is in keeping with the observed deterioration in access to health cover in these states well prior to Obamacare ever being debated.

C.  Some Technical Notes

Estimates of the share of the population with or without health insurance cover come from surveys, and thus have the strengths and weaknesses of any surveys.  The accuracy of the results will depend on how well those being surveyed recall and answer correctly what they were asked.  The results will often depend on the way the questions are worded, and sometimes even on the sequence in which the questions are asked.  The Census Bureau recognizes this, continually tests its questionnaires, and periodically will change the way they ask their questions in a survey in an effort to obtain more accurate results.

Unfortunately, when there is such a change the new survey results will not be strictly and directly comparable with the responses provided in the past.  Often the Census Bureau will use various methods to try to link the different data series into one consistent whole, but this is not always done.  One way to do this, for example, would be to conduct two parallel surveys when there is to be a change, one following the old method and one following the new, and then with statistical methods to control for sample characteristics, seek to determine by how much the old series would likely need to be adjusted to become consistent with the new.

The Census Bureau did this when methodological changes were made in the series tracking health insurance coverage in 2007 and again in 2011.  When the 2007 changes were made, they went back and adjusted figures from 1999 onwards to approximate what they would be following the 2007 approach.  And when the 2011 changes were made, they again went back, to 1999 again, to produce a consistent series that eventually covered the period 1999 to 2012.

However, when the changes implemented in 2013 were made, the Census Bureau did not go back to adjust previous figures for consistency with the new approach.  I have found no explanation for why they have not, but would guess it might well be linked to budget cuts.  But for this reason, one cannot assume that the figures showing a reduced share of the population without health insurance in the 2013 figures compared to those in 2012, are necessarily due to more people enrolling in health insurance in 2013 relative to 2012. Hence the gaps in the lines in the graph as drawn above.

Indeed, other evidence suggests that coverage in 2013 was similar to that in 2012. Specifically, the Gallup numbers  previously cited indicate that share of uninsured in 2013 was actually a bit higher than where they were in 2012 (averaging what are quarterly estimates).  There was then a sharp fall in 2014 in the Gallup figures following the start of the Obamacare exchanges and the Medicaid expansion, consistent with the Census Bureau numbers.

It is unfortunate the Census Bureau did not try to work out a consistent series of estimates for health insurance coverage for this critical period.  But for whatever reason they did not (at least not yet).  But what we do know from the Census figures is that the share of the uninsured in the population was trending upwards over the 1999 to 2012 period, and that there was a sharp reduction in the share uninsured in 2014 compared to what it was in 2013.  And that is therefore all we could work with in this post.

Another issue is that the state by state figures were determined by the Census Bureau under one survey for the 1999 to 2012 period (the Annual Social and Economic Supplement to its Current Population Survey, or CPS-ASEC), but then a different survey for 2013 and 2014 (the American Community Survey, or ACS).  Both are large surveys, asking questions on a variety of issues.  But they ask somewhat different questions on the issue of health insurance coverage.  Specifically, the CPS-ASEC, which is undertaken between February and April of each year, asks the respondents whether they had had health insurance coverage at any point in the previous calendar year (separately for each household member).  The ACS survey, in contrast, is undertaken on a rolling basis throughout the year, and the question asked in that survey is whether each household member had health insurance cover at the time they were being interviewed.

These are of course different questions.  And by simple arithmetic, it should be clear that the responses to whether they had insurance at any point in the year will, for the sample as a whole, always be a higher figure than the share in response to the question of whether they have health insurance at the time of the interview.  Someone might not have health insurance at the time of the interview, but could have had it earlier in the year (or will obtain it later in the year).  The shares uninsured will be the mirror images of this.

The national figures for 2013 and 2014 were:

CPS-ASEC

ACS

No insurance at any

time in the calendar year

No insurance at the

time of the interview

2013

13.3%

14.5%

2014

10.4%

11.7%

The figures in the graph at the top of this post are based on the estimates of coverage at any point in the calendar year.  There was, however, a problem in determining on a consistent basis the underlying state figures, from which one could compute the shares for the states that had expanded Medicaid coverage and for those who had not.  The figures at the state level that the Census Bureau made available on its web site for the 1999 to 2012 period were from the CPS-ASEC series.  However, for some unexplained reason, but as part of the changes introduced with the new 2013 numbers, the state level figures for 2013 and 2014 were only made available under the ACS series.  I do not know why they did this, as it introduces another element of inconsistency when making comparisons across time.

Since the bulk of the state level series, for 1999 through to 2012, were published under the CPS-ASEC series, I used those as published.  But for 2013 and 2014, I determined the state totals for the Medicaid expansion and Medicaid non-expansion groups based on the ACS numbers (as they were the only ones available), and then rescaled the figures to fit the published national totals (working in terms of the underlying numbers, and then computing the shares).  The figures should be very close to what would have been worked out directly from the CPS-ASEC figures if they had been made available at the state level. One would expect the ratio of the figures of those without health insurance under the two different definitions (throughout the year or at the time of the interview) would not differ significantly between the two groups of states (those with and without the Medicaid expansion).

D)  Conclusion

Technical issues exist with any data set, and it is important to recognize what limitations such issues place on what one can infer from the figures.  Unfortunately, the Census Bureau numbers as published do not permit us to compare directly the 2013 and 2014 results to those of 1999 to 2012.  However, the 2013 and 2014 results are directly comparable to each other, and they clearly show that there has been a major improvement in health insurance coverage in 2014 after the Obamacare exchanges and Medicaid expansion came into effect.

How Much Was Bank Regulation Weakened in the New Budget Bill? And What Can Be Done Now?

A.  Introduction

In a rare, late-night and weekend, session, the US Senate on Saturday night passed a $1.1 trillion government funding bill to keep the government running through to the end of fiscal year 2015 (i.e. until September 30, 2015).  The House had passed the bill on Thursday, and it has now gone to Obama for his expected signature.  Had it not been passed, the government would once have been forced to shut down due to lack of budget authority.  It was a “must-pass” bill, and as such, was a convenient vehicle for a number of provisions which stood little chance to pass on their own, but which could only be blocked by opponents now at the cost of forcing a government shutdown.  The specific provisions included were worked out in a series of deals and compromises between the leadership of the Republican-controlled House and the now Democrat-controlled (but soon to be Republican-controlled) Senate.

One such provision was an amendment to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street reform bill, originally passed in July 2010, which enacted a series of measures to strengthen the regulatory framework for our financial sector.  The failure of this framework had led to the 2008 economic and financial collapse in the last year of the Bush administration.  The amendment in the new budget bill addressed just one, and some would say relatively minor, provision in Dodd-Frank.  But its inclusion drew heavy criticism from liberal Democrats, led by Senator Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts.  Senator Warren argued that the amendments to Section 716 of Dodd-Frank would “would let derivatives traders on Wall Street gamble with taxpayer money and get bailed out by the government when their risky bets threaten to blow up our financial system.”  The amendments were reportedly first drafted by lobbyists for Citibank, and would benefit primarily a very small group of large Wall Street banks.

The amendments do reflect a backwards step from the tighter controls on risk that Dodd-Frank had provided for.  In my view, it would have been better to have kept the original provisions on the issue in Dodd-Frank.  But with a positive response now by the regulators to the reality of this new provision, the impact could be negated.  This blog post will discuss what was passed, what could be done now by bank regulators to address the change, and the politics of it all.

B.  The Amendment to Dodd-Frank, and the Economics of Derivatives

The amendment to Dodd-Frank addresses one specific provision in a very large and comprehensive bill.  An important link in the 2008 financial collapse was the risk major banks had carried on their books from certain financial derivative instruments.  “Derivatives” are financial instruments that derive their price or value from the price or value of some other product.  For example, oil derivatives derive their value from the price of oil (perhaps the price of oil at some future date), foreign exchange derivatives are linked to foreign exchange rates, credit default swaps are linked to whether there is a default on some bond or mortgage or other financial instrument, and so on.

Derivatives can be quite complicated and their pricing can be volatile.  And they can lead to greater, or to reduced, financial risk to those who hold them, depending on their particular situation.  For example, airlines must buy fuel to fly their planes, and hence they will face oil price risk.  They can hedge this risk (i.e. face reduced risk) by buying an oil derivative that locks in some fixed price for oil for some point in the future.  An oil producer similarly faces an oil price risk, but a bad risk for it is the opposite of what the airline faces:  The oil producer gains when the price of oil goes up and loses when it goes down.  Hence both the airline and the oil producer can reduce the adverse risk each faces by entering into a contract that locks in some future price of oil, and derivative instruments are one way to do this.  Banks will often stand in the middle of such trades, as the buyer and the seller of such derivative instruments to the airlines and the oil producers (in this example), and of course to many others.

Derivatives played an important role in the 2008 collapse.  As the housing bubble burst and home prices came down, it became clear that the assumptions used for the pricing of credit default swaps on home mortgages (derivatives which would pay to the holder some amount if the underlying mortgages went into default) had been badly wrong.  Credit default swaps had been priced on the assumption that some mortgages here and there around the US might go into default, but in a basically random and uncorrelated manner.  That had been the case historically in the US, for at least most of the time in the last few decades (it had not always been true).  But this ignored that a bubble could develop and then pop, with many mortgages then going into default together.  And that is what happened.

Dodd-Frank in no way prohibits such derivative instruments.  They can serve a useful and indeed important purpose.  Nor did Dodd-Frank say that bank holding companies could no longer operate in such markets.  But what Section 716 of Dodd-Frank did say was that banks that took FDIC-insured deposits and which had access to certain credit windows at the Federal Reserve Board, would not be allowed, in those specific corporate entities, also to trade in a specifically defined set of derivatives.  That list included, most notably, credit default swaps that were not traded through an open market exchange, as well as equity derivatives (such as on IBM and other publicly traded companies) and commodity derivatives (such as for oil, or copper, or wheat).  The bank holding companies could still set up separate corporate entities to trade in such derivatives.  Thus while Citigroup, for example, could set up a corporate entity owned by it to trade in such derivatives, Citibank (also owned by Citigroup), with its FDIC-insured deposits and with its access to the Fed, would not be allowed to trade in such derivatives.  That will now change.

It is also worth highlighting that under Dodd-Frank, banks with FDIC-insured deposits could still directly trade in such derivatives as interest rate swaps, foreign exchange derivatives, and credit default swaps that were cleared through an organized public exchange.  That had always been so, and will remain so.  The banks could also always hedge their own financial positions.  But they will now be allowed to trade directly (and not simply via an associated company under the same holding company) also in the narrow list of derivative instruments described above.

It is arguable that this is not a big change.  All it does is allow bank holding companies to keep their trading in such derivative instruments in the banks (with FDIC-insured deposits) that they own, rather than in separately capitalized entities that they also own.  The then Chairman of the Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke noted in testimony in front of a House panel in 2013 that “It’s not evident why that makes the company as a whole safer.”

So why do banks (or at least certain banks) want this?  Banks with FDIC-insured deposits and who also have access to certain credit windows at the Fed, are seen in the market as enjoying a degree of support from the government, that other financial entities do not enjoy.  The very largest of these banks may be viewed as “too-big-to-fail”, since the collapse of one or more of them in a financial crisis would in turn lead to a financial cataclysm for the country.  Thus depositors and other lenders are willing to place their money with such institutions at a lower rate of interest than they would demand in other financial institutions.

Thus Senator Warren and others charge that the amendments to Dodd-Frank “would let derivatives traders on Wall Street gamble with taxpayer money and get bailed out by the government when their risky bets threaten to blow up our financial system”, as quoted above.  To be more precise (and less eloquent), any bank with FDIC-insured deposits will make investments with those deposits, those investments will have varying degrees of risk, and if there is a threat that they will fail, the government may decide that it is better for the country to extend a financial lifeline to such banks (as they did in 2008) rather than let them fail.  The amendments to Dodd-Frank will allow these banks to invest in a broader set of derivative contracts directly (rather than only at the holding company level) than they could have before.  Thus they could end up investing directly in a riskier set of assets than they could have before without this amendment, and all else being equal, there could then be a higher risk that they will fail.

Finally, it should be noted that the amendments to Dodd-Frank will benefit largely only four very large banks.  The most recent quarterly report from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency indicates that just four big banks (Citibank, JP Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, and Bank of America) account for 93% of derivative contract exposure among banks (as of June 30, 2014).  While this figure includes all types of derivatives, and not just those on the list that is at issue here, it is clear that trading in such instruments is highly concentrated.

C.  What Can Be Done Now? 

Over the objections of Senator Warren and others, the amendments to Section 716 of Dodd-Frank have been passed as part of the budget bill.  Banks, and in practice a limited number of very large banks, will now be able to take on a riskier set of assets on their balance sheets.  But Dodd-Frank, and indeed previous bank regulation, has established a bank regulatory and supervision regime that requires that banks hold capital sufficient, under reasonable estimates of the risks they face, to keep them out of insolvency and an inability then to repay their depositors.  The bank regulatory and supervision framework was clearly inadequate before, as the 2008 collapse showed.  Dodd-Frank has strengthened it considerably.  The specific rules are now being worked out, and like all such rules will evolve over time as experience dictates.

The amendments to Section 716 of Dodd-Frank will now change the set of risks the banks will possibly face.  I would suggest that now would be a good time for current Fed Chair Janet Yellen, or one of the other senior bank regulators heading up the process or even President Obama himself, to make a statement that they will of course follow the dictate of the law (as spelled out in Dodd-Frank, as it still stands) to take into account these possible new risks as they work out the capital adequacy ratios for the banks that will be required.

Specifically, the statement should make clear that the capital ratios required of banks that trade in these newly allowed instruments will now have to be set at some higher level than would previously have been required, due to the higher risks of such assets now in their portfolio.  It could and should be made clear that the law requires this:  The regulators are required to determine what the capital ratios must be on the basis of the risks being held by the banks in their portfolios.  How much higher the capital ratios will need to be will depend on the riskiness of these new assets compared to what the banks previously invested in, and how significant such new assets will be in their portfolios.  It is quite possible that faced with such higher capital requirements, the banks that had pushed for this new latitude will decide that it would be wiser not to enter into those new markets after all.  They may well come to regret that they pushed so strongly for these amendments to Dodd-Frank.

This is perhaps not the best solution.  The prohibition on direct trading in the proscribed list of certain financial derivative instruments is cleaner and clearer.  Most importantly, while current bank regulators may use their authority to ensure banks hold sufficient capital to reflect the greater risk in their portfolio, there is the danger that regulators appointed by some future president may not exercise that authority as wisely or as carefully.  This was indeed the fundamental underlying problem leading up to the 2008 collapse.  The Bush administration was famously anti-regulation, and Bush appointed officials who were often opposed to the regulations they were in office to enforce.  In at least some cases, the officials appointed who were not even competent to carry out their enforcement obligations.  For example, Bush famously appointed former Congressman Christopher Cox as head of the SEC.  The SEC at the time had the obligation to regulate investment banks such as Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley.  As Lehman Brothers collapsed, with worries that Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and others would soon be next, Christopher Cox was at a loss on what to do, and was largely by-passed.  Dodd-Frank changed regulatory responsibility (the Fed and other financial regulators are now clearly responsible, where Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley had already been “encouraged” to become formal banks and as such subject to Fed oversight), but there is the risk that some future president will choose, like Bush, to put in place figures who either do not believe in, or are not capable of, serious financial supervision and oversight.

In addition, financial crises are always a surprise.  They occur for some unexpected reason.  If they were expected, actions could be taken to address the causes, and they would not happen and hence not be observed.  But surprises happen.  Hence Dodd-Frank, and indeed all financial regulation, includes an overlapping and mutually reinforcing set of measures to try to ensure crises will not occur and that banks will not become insolvent should they occur.  One does not know beforehand which of the regulatory measures might be the critical one for some future and unforeseen set of circumstances leading to a crisis.  it is therefore wise to include what others might call redundancies.  The amendment to Dodd-Frank will remove one of the possibly redundant measures to ensure bank safety.  The remaining measures (e.g. the capital adequacy requirements) may well suffice to address the safety issue, but in cases like this, redundancy is better.

D.  The Politics of It All

While the economics may suggest that the change resulting from the amendment to Dodd-Frank need not be catastrophic if regulators respond wisely, and hence that the amendment is not such a big deal, the politics might be different.

The biggest concern is that many see this as possibly the opening round of a series of amendments to Dodd-Frank and other laws identified with the Obama administration, that a Republican Congress and now Senate will push through on “must-pass” legislation such as budget bills.  Particularly if this had slipped through quietly, with little public attention until after the bill had been passed, the bankers and their Republican representatives could have seen this as a model of how to pass changes to legislation that would not otherwise have gone through.  While the model is certainly not a new one, its affirmation in this instance would have strengthened their case.

The loud objections by Senator Warren and others has served to bring daylight to the changes in financial regulation being proposed.  This will hopefully make it more difficult to push through further, possibly much more damaging, changes to Dodd-Frank at the behest of the banks.

Ensuring attention was paid to the issue also served to make clear who in the House and the Senate are in fact in favor of bank bailouts.  Weakening Dodd-Frank will increase the likelihood (even if only marginally so) that bank bailouts will be necessary in some future crisis to protect FDIC insured deposits and to protect the economy from a full financial collapse.  Republicans, including in particular Tea Party supported Republicans, have asserted they are against bank bailouts.  But their actions here, with the Dodd-Frank amendments inserted into the budget bill at the insistence of the House Republican leadership, belies that.

The actual economic substance of the Dodd-Frank amendments might therefore be limited, especially if there is now the regulatory response that should be required in the environment of certain banks holding more risky assets.  But the politics may be quite different, and could explain why there was such a vociferous response by Senator Warren and others to this ultimately successful effort to weaken a provision in Dodd-Frank.