Delusional: Is This What We Are to Expect from the New Trump Administration?

Definition of delusional in English:

delusional

ADJECTIVE

Characterized by or holding idiosyncratic beliefs or impressions that are contradicted by reality or rational argument, typically as a symptom of mental disorder:

‘hospitalization for schizophrenia and delusional paranoia’

‘he was diagnosed with a delusional disorder’

 Based on or having faulty judgement; mistaken:

‘their delusional belief in the project’s merits never wavers’

‘I think the guy is being a bit delusional here’

 

Donald J. Trump was inaugurated as President of the United States at 12:00 noon on January 20.  A day later, his new White House Press Secretary and Communications Director Sean Spicer in his very first press briefing of the new administration, launched a tirade against the press, for reporting (falsely he claimed) that attendance at the inauguration was less than the number who had attended Obama’s inauguration in 2009 (or indeed any prior inauguration). And he was visibly angry about this, as can be seen both in the transcript of the press briefing, and in a video of it.  He charged that “some members of the media were engaged in deliberately false reporting” and claimed that “This was the largest audience to ever witness an inauguration — period — both in person and around the globe.”

Furthermore, after many reports challenged Spicer’s assertions, the new administration doubled down on the charges.  Reince Priebus, the new White House Chief of Staff, vowed on Sunday that the new administration will fight the media “tooth and nail every day and twice on Sunday” over what they see as unfair attacks on Trump (by claiming, falsely they say, that the crowds had been larger at Obama’s inauguration).  And Kellyanne Conway, a spokesman for the White House and Counselor to the President, said on Sunday that what Press Secretary Spicer had asserted was not wrong but rather “alternative facts”.

Finally, one has Donald Trump himself, who claimed that he saw what “looked like a million, a million and a half people” present at his inauguration as he took the oath of office. One does not know how he was able to make such a count, and perhaps he should not be taken too seriously, but his administration’s senior staff appear to be obliged to back him up.

What do we know on the size of the crowds?  One first has to acknowledge that any crowd count is difficult, and that we will never know the precise numbers.  Unless each person has been forced to pass through a turnstile, all we can have are estimates.  But we can have estimates, and they can give some sense as to the size.  Most importantly, while we might not know the absolute size, we can have a pretty good indication from photos and other sources of data what the relative sizes of two crowds likely were.

So what do we know from photos?  Here we have a side-by-side photo (taken at Obama’s first inauguration and then at Trump’s) from the top of the Washington Monument, of the crowd on the Mall witnessing the event.  They were both taken at about the same time prior to the noon swearing-in of the new president, where the ceremony starts at 11:30:


inaugeration-attendance-2017-vs-2009

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The crowd in 2017 is clearly far smaller.  This has nothing to do with the white mats laid down to protect the grass (which was also done in 2013 for Obama’s second inauguration).  There are simply far fewer attendees.

There is also indirect evidence from the number of Metrorail riders that day.  Spicer said in his press briefing “We know that 420,000 people used the D.C. Metro public transit yesterday, which actually compares to 317,000 that used it for President Obama’s last inaugural.”  Actually these numbers are wrong, as well as misleading (since the comparison at issue is to Obama’s first inauguration in 2009, not to his second in 2013). As the Washington Post noted (with this confirmed by CNN) the correct numbers from the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (which operates the Metro system) are that there were 570,500 riders on Metro on Trump’s inauguration day, 1.1 million riders in 2009 on Obama’s first inauguration day, and 782,000 riders in 2013 on Obama’s second inauguration day.  What Trump’s press secretary said “we know” was simply wrong.

It is also simply not true that Trump drew a larger estimated TV audience than any president before.  Nielsen, the TV ratings agency, estimated that Trump drew 30.6 million viewers, while Obama drew 38 million viewers at his first inauguration.  And Reagan drew more, at 42 million viewers, for his first inauguration.  Furthermore, both Nixon (in 1973) and Carter (in 1977) drew more viewers than Trump, at 33 million and 34 million respectively. The Trump figure was far from a record.

So how many people attended Trump’s inauguration, and how does that figure compare to the number that Obama drew for his first inauguration?  A widely cited figure is that Obama drew an estimated 1.8 million for his first inauguration, but, as noted above, any such estimate must be taken as approximate.  But based on a comparison of the photos, experts estimate that Trump drew at most one-third of the Obama draw in terms of the number in attendance just on the Mall.  There were in addition many others at the Obama inaugural who were not on the Mall because they could not fit due to the crowding.

Why does this matter?  It matters only because the new Trump administration has made it into an issue, and in doing so, has made assertions that are clearly factually wrong.  Trump did not draw a record number to his inauguration, nor a record number of viewers, nor were there a record number of riders on the Washington Metro system.  These are all numbers, and they can be checked.  While we may not be able to know the precise number of those who attended, we can come to a clear conclusion on the relative size of those who attended this year versus previous recent inaugurations.  And Trump’s attendance was not at all close to the number who attended Obama’s first inaugural.

What is disconcerting is that Trump, his new Press Secretary, his Chief of Staff and others in his administration, should feel compelled to make assertions that are clearly and verifiably wrong, and then to attack the press aggressively for pointing out what we know. And this on his second day in office.  While this is not inconsistent with what the Trump team did during his campaign for the presidency, one would have hoped for more mature behavior once he took office.  And especially so for an issue which is fundamentally minor. It really does not matter much whether the number attending Trump’s inauguration was more or less than the number who had attended prior inaugurations.

Presumably (and assuming thought was given to this) they are setting a marker for what they intend to do during the course of the presidential term, with aggressive attacks on the press for reporting errors in their assertions or on contradictions with earlier statements.  If so, such a strategy, including denial of facts that can readily be verified, is truly worrisome. Facts should matter.  Not all that we will hear from the new administration will be so easy to check, and the question then is what can be believed.

Perhaps, and more worrying, they really believe their assertions on the numbers attending. If so, they are truly delusional.

Why It Is Important to Vote This November 8

trump-and-clinton-picture2-001

There is little need to repeat here the many reasons why the election of Donald Trump to the presidency (or indeed any position of authority) would be a disaster.  He has eminently disqualified himself by both his words and his actions, and I have little to add.  And there are many reasons why Hillary Clinton should be elected, not simply in order not to elect Trump.  Even her critics admit that she has the background and experience in both the executive and legislative branches of government – as First Lady (with an active role in policy discussions), as Senator from New York, and as Secretary of State for four years under President Obama –  that few candidates for the presidency could match.

Furthermore, even Donald Trump has said she is a fighter, and that is precisely what is needed if the policies that Obama has championed are to continue to move forward.  A Clinton administration will fight for action to address global warming, to moderate health care costs, to improve education, to reform immigration, to re-build our infrastructure, and more, just in the domain of domestic policy.  A Trump administration would move us backwards on each.  And I far prefer an administration that takes pride in making decisions based on what is in their head, as Obama has done, rather than based on what is in their gut, as Obama’s predecessor was proud to brag of.

As I write this, the polls indicate Hillary Clinton holds a substantial lead.  That may unfortunately have the effect of leading some share of Clinton supporters (and Trump opposers) not to bother to vote on November 8.  They may feel it would not matter, so why bother.  But there are important reasons why all those supporting Clinton, who want the country to move forward rather than backward, need to make the effort to vote.  This blog post will outline a few.

a)  Trump’s share in the vote might well be higher than what the polls indicate:  As of October 23, an average of recent polls indicates that Clinton leads Trump by about 7 percentage points nationally.  While in the US system the candidate receiving the most votes nationally is not necessarily the one elected (due to the electoral college system, so only the votes in a limited number of swing states decide the outcome, as discussed in this earlier blog post), a national margin of 7 percentage points is substantial and reflective of what is happening in the key states.

But the final vote may well be different.  First, it is common that there is a tightening in the race in the last few weeks of most American elections.  There is a good chance this might happen again here.  But second, and more fundamentally, it is important to recognize that the polls may not be assessing accurately the extent of Trump’s support.  This is not due to any kind of conspiracy, or incompetence, but rather because polling this year is particularly difficult to do well.  Trump is an especially controversial candidate, known for his racist as well as misogynist remarks in this campaign.  Some Trump supporters might not admit to a pollster that they support him.  His true support might be several percentage points higher than what the polls indicate, and there are indications that this may have been an issue during the polling for the primaries in at least some of the states. I am not saying that it necessarily is now, but rather that we just do not know.

b)  A focus by Trump on high turnout of his base, instead of a broadening of his base, is not an unreasonable strategy:  Most major party candidates for the presidency seek to broaden their base of support as the election approaches by appealing to the middle.  Trump has not done this.  His focus has been and continues to be on energizing his base, with a continued use of extremist remarks to stoke concerns (the election is rigged, Hillary is a crook whom I will throw into jail, I won’t necessarily accept the results of the election unless they show I won, and so on).

With a base of support that is well less than 50% (even if one discounts the polls to a significant extent; see above), such a strategy might be seen as making it impossible to win.  The moderate middle is not attracted, but indeed repelled.  But it is not necessarily an unreasonable strategy.

The key is to recognize that a very high share of eligible Americans do not vote.  In the 2012 presidential election, only 58% of the population that were eligible to vote in fact cast a ballot for the presidency.  If Trump is able to energize his base and get a high share of them to vote, they can end up winning.

This can be illustrated with some numbers.  Using the polling averages as worked out by the Huffington Post, and rescaling to remove the undecideds, then as of October 23, polling indicated that Clinton would receive 48% of the vote and Trump 41% (with others receiving 11%, primarily Gary Johnson of the Libertarians and Jill Stein of the Greens).  To arrive at these numbers, pollsters used various methods to try to take into account the likelihood that those being polled would actually vote.  But none of these methods are very good.  Some pollsters ask the individual whether they voted in the previous election. However, the share saying they voted is always substantially higher than the share we know actually did vote.  Or some pollsters adjust the figures based on patterns for the share of those who voted in the past who have a similar income or education level, or are of the same ethnic group, or some other such grouping (using exit polling).  But this also does not work very well since the share of different groups who vote changes from election to election depending on the candidates and other issues.

For the purposes here, which are simply illustrative, let’s assume that these polling numbers reflect accurately the share of the population who prefer each of the candidates, but not necessarily the shares of those who actually will vote.  Furthermore, let’s assume that 53% of Clinton’s supporters will actually vote while 63% of Trump’s supporters will (recall the actual average in 2012 was 58%).  Multiplying out the numbers to get those who actually will vote, one finds that Trump in such a scenario would receive a higher share of the vote than Clinton:

Supporters

Turnout

Voters

Share of Vote

Clinton

48%

53%

25.44

44.1%

Trump

41%

63%

25.83

44.8%

Other

11%

58%

6.38

11.1%

All

100%

 

57.65

100.0%

Turnout matters.  A strategy focussed on turning out a high share of your base supporters, by energizing them through extremist rhetoric with no suggestion of compromise, is not necessarily an irrational one, even if it means losing the more moderate voters.  You could end up with more votes than your opponent.

c)  The winning margin matters for Trump to accept the result of the election:  If Hillary Clinton wins the election, but by a relatively narrow margin, Trump has said that he will not necessarily accept the result.  Trump made this clear in the third presidential debate, and has repeated his remarks since then despite of, and in the face of, strong criticism.  An important strength of American democracy, which distinguishes it from what is seen in a number of other countries around the world, is that the loser of the election concedes and accepts the result.  It might take some time (and court challenges) to determine the winner, but in the end the loser has always graciously accepted the decision (as Al Gore did in 2000).

Trump has been intentionally ambiguous on whether he will.  But the larger the margin by which he loses, the more difficult it will be for him to contest the results.

d)  The winning margin matters for the Republicans to move on:  Trump has upended the national Republican Party by capturing a base, primarily of angry white males with less than a college education, who have said they are willing to take extreme measures to get what they want.  If Trump loses, but by a relatively narrow margin, one can be sure that there will be Trump-like candidates seeking the Republican nomination in 2020, and perhaps even Trump himself.

Strong supporters of the Democrats might feel that this may not be so bad.  Such a candidate would likely lose again.  But that would be short-sighted.  Democracies need a multi-party system, with at least two responsible parties that can each govern responsibly. One-party states, whether in Japan or elsewhere, end up in difficulty.  And one-party states are indeed rare.  Eventually, an opposition party wins, as the electorate tires of those in power and as those long in power become increasingly ineffective.

American democracy needs a responsible opposition party.  Republicans at the national level are not providing that now, and that is a problem for all of us.

e)  The winning margin matters for Clinton to govern effectively:  Everyone agrees that there is much that needs to be done.  But opponents of the measures a Clinton administration would promote to move the  country forward would be emboldened in their opposition should Clinton win by a relatively narrow margin.  The larger the margin, the more difficult it will be for her opponents to block her proposals.

f)  There is an innate inconsistency to be opposed to Washington gridlock, but also to be in favor of divided government:  Everyone agrees that gridlock in Washington is bad.  The country needs to move forward in numerous areas, but gridlock is blocking it.  At the same time, political scientists have long observed (and backed up in their research) that voters often prefer “balanced” government, where the executive branch is controlled by one party with the legislature by the other.

This arrangement may have worked well in periods in the past.  With the system of checks and balances built in to the US Constitution, one branch of government cannot change much alone, but must also receive the support of the other branches (with the judiciary playing an essential, but separate, role as well).

This changed, however, over the last two decades.  Rather than seek common ground on measures, with compromises in order to move things forward, Republicans in Congress decided to adopt a position of opposition.  As documented in the excellent book of Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein, It’s Even Worse Than It Looks, Republicans decided that if the administration supported something, they would be opposed.  This applied even on measures that they themselves had originally proposed.  The authors, one based at the left-of-center Brookings Institution and one at the right-of-center American Enterprise Institute, provide numerous examples.

Such opposition continues.  Last week, Senator John McCain (who at one time was considered a relative moderate among Republicans) said on a radio talk show that he and his colleagues will oppose any Supreme Court nominee of Hillary Clinton.  He said “I promise you that we will be united against any Supreme Court nominee that Hillary Clinton, if she were president, would put up. … I promise you.”  While a spokeswoman later sought to moderate his position, it does not appear that his views had in fact changed.

Such an approach to government, of united opposition to any proposals put forward by the chief executive, can work in a different form of government.  In parliamentary systems (such as in the UK), the opposition party will typically oppose any measures put forward by the prime minister.  But the prime minister represents a majority in parliament, and hence with party line votes the measure will pass.

But the US Constitution did not establish a parliamentary form of government.  Rather, the system set up by the US Constitution has an independently elected president, along with certain powers assigned to the legislature (such as to make laws, pass a budget, provide “advice and consent” on judicial and senior executive branch appointments, and more).  It is a system of checks and balances, and does not work well when one party decides to act like the opposition in a parliamentary system and routinely oppose measures proposed by the chief executive.

A large winning margin by Hillary Clinton will make it more difficult for a Republican majority to continue to act in this way, at least at the start of the new administration.  And while it is conceivable that the Democrats might win control of the Senate (they need to pick up a net of four seats, assuming Clinton wins so that Vice President Tim Kaine will have the tie-breaking vote), it is doubtful they will pick up the net of 30 seats required to win control of the House.  Too many seats have been gerrymandered.

Voters can resolve this by not voting for divided government, but rather for one party.  And if that party is not to be the one with Trump as president, that means the Democrats. What will not resolve the issues would be to vote for Clinton, but then vote for Republican candidates for the House and the Senate, including those who have sought to keep their distance from Trump, with a number saying they will not themselves vote for Trump.  But it is not really that vote that matters.  What matters is the vote they will take for the leadership of the House or the Senate, and whether that leadership says that they will oppose anything being proposed by Clinton, as they have for Obama.  If so, then gridlock will continue.

Conclusion

It would be surprising if Hillary Clinton were not to win this election.  I do not expect her to lose.  But it should be recognized that it is possible.  While the polls put her comfortably ahead as I write this, polls can be wrong, for reasons discussed above.  And we have seen two major such cases already this year.  Most expected British voters would reject the proposal in the June referendum to leave the European Union (Brexit).  Most polls indicated the vote would be in favor of staying.  Instead, it lost, and by the substantial margin of 52% to leave and 48% to stay.

To be fair, the polls in the Brexit referendum were relatively close, especially just before the day of the vote.  A better example of how the polls can be wrong in a major way was the vote in Colombia on October 2 on whether to accept the peace accord the government had negotiated with the FARC rebel army.  The war had been going on for decades, and about 220,000 Colombians had died over the years.  Polls before the vote indicated that over 60% of Colombians would vote in favor of the accord.  But it narrowly lost, by 50.2% to 49.8%.  It is not clear why, although there are many theories.  But one important factor was turnout.  Only 37% of eligible Colombian voters actually voted, perhaps because they believed the peace accord would win easily.  Voter turnout was especially hurt along the country’s Caribbean coast, where a hurricane, while it remained off shore, nonetheless delivered heavy rains on the day of the vote.  Support for the peace accord was especially high in that region, but turnout was low.

I would not predict that the polls in the US presidential elections are wrong, but that there can be uncertainties.  This is especially so this year.  And, for reasons discussed above, the issue is not only who will win or lose, but also what the winning margin will be.  So vote this November 8, and vote for Hillary Clinton.

 

Health Insurance Coverage is Improving, Especially in States that Have Not Tried to Block It

health-insurance-cover-2008-to-2015-by-medicaid-states-census-bureau-sept-2016

 

A.    Introduction

The US Census Bureau released on September 13 this year’s editions of three reports which normally come out at about this time:  Its report on Income and Poverty in the United States, its report on Health Insurance Coverage, and its Supplemental Poverty Measure report, which provides figures on poverty when government transfer programs are taken into account.  They all cover the period through 2015.

The reports show exceptionally strong improvements in a range of measures of income and well-being.  To start, real median household incomes rose by an estimated 5.2% in 2015. There has never before been such a large jump in real incomes since this series first started being reported in 1967.  Perhaps more importantly than the overall gains, the Census Bureau data also show that the gains were widespread across income groups (with the poorest 10% decile in fact seeing the largest gains) as well as across race and ethnic groups.  It was not only the rich who saw an improvement.

I should hasten to add that these results are from just one year, and that they follow far less satisfactory results over the last several years.  Real household incomes plummeted in the 2008 downturn in the last year of the Bush administration, and were flat or fell further in most years since.  It should also be recognized that the Census Bureau figures are based on household surveys, and thus that there will be statistical noise (as the Census Bureau emphasizes).  It remains to be seen whether the positive news will continue.  But with labor markets now at or close to levels generally considered to be full employment, and with real wages now rising, it is likely there has been an improvement also in 2016. But we will only know a year from now what the survey results will be.

The Health Insurance Coverage report found that health insurance coverage also improved significantly in 2015, as it had also in 2014 but importantly not in the years before.  The big change in 2014 was of course the coming into effect of the Affordable Care Act (ACA, or ObamaCare) reforms, with the introduction of the market exchanges on which the previously uninsured could purchase insurance at a reasonable price, as well as the expansion of Medicaid coverage in a number of states (but not all).  There are now over 20 million more Americans who have health insurance coverage than had it in 2013, before ObamaCare went into effect.

Not surprisingly, the reports received a good deal of news coverage.  It was the lead front page article of the Washington Post the next day, for example.  Not surprisingly also, the White House released a summary of some of the key, highly positive, findings.  But while the news reports focussed on the strong income gains, and many also noted the health insurance gains, I have not seen a chart such as that above which shows the gains in historical context, and with the Medicaid expansion states and non-expansion states shown separately.  This post will discuss that chart and what is going on behind it.

B.  The Gains in Health Insurance Coverage Under ObamaCare

The chart above shows the percentage share of the population without health insurance coverage in each year from 2008 to 2015, with this shown separately for those states where Medicaid was permitted to expand (27 states plus Washington, DC, with the status taken as of January 1, 2015) and for those states that did not allow Medicaid to expand (23 states). The figures were calculated from the underlying data tables (the “HIC” series) used in the Census Bureau Health Insurance Coverage report.  The data series used here comes from the American Community Survey (ACS), which has an extremely large sample size which permits a meaningful state by state breakdown.  It asks whether the individual was uninsured at the time of the interview.

The Health Insurance Coverage report also presents figures at the national level obtained from a different survey called the Current Population Survey – Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS ASEC), which is undertaken each Spring. This survey has a smaller sample size than the ACS, which is fine for national level estimates but which does not suffice for state by state breakdowns (as one needs when looking at Medicaid coverage by state).  It also asks the somewhat different question of whether the individual had health insurance cover for the entire previous year, rather than on the date of the interview.

The share of the US population without health insurance coverage fell sharply in 2014 and again in 2015.  Using figures from the ACS, it had fluctuated modestly in the period from 2008 through 2013, rising from 14.6% of the population in 2008 to 15.5% as unemployment hit its peak in 2010, and then recovering slowly to 14.5% by 2013.  It then dropped sharply to 11.7% in 2014 and to 9.4% in 2015.  Critics of ObamaCare asserted at the start that the reforms did not and would not lead to more Americans being covered by health insurance.  That was certainly not the case.  By 2015, there were 20.7 million more Americans with health insurance cover than had it in 2013.  This is far from minor, and can make an immense difference in a family’s life.

The CPS ASEC figures also show a sharp drop in the share of the population without health insurance, with these figures quoted in many of the news reports one might see. With its differing definition of who is not covered (for the entire year, rather than on the date of the interview as in the ACS), the shares are somewhat lower, at 9.1% in 2015.  It fell from a 13.3% share in 2013 and a 10.4% share in 2014 in these estimates of the share of the population who did not have health insurance over the entire year.

By whichever measure, health insurance cover expanded sharply once the ObamaCare reforms entered into effect.  By the ACS measure, the share of the population without health insurance fell from 14.5% of the population in 2013 to 9.4% two years later, or by 5.1% points.  It can be expected to fall further, although not to zero.  Certain groups in the population (including certain immigrant groups) are not eligible for purchasing insurance through the ObamaCare market exchanges, and thus the non-insured rate will never go to zero.  While the floor is not certain, many analysts set the figure at perhaps 4 or 5% of the population.  If so, then the improvement seen so far is approximately half of what might ultimately be achievable, provided politically imposed roadblocks are all removed.

C.  Medicaid Expansion

The chart also shows the shares of the population without health insurance separately for the states that expanded Medicaid coverage (supported by the ACA and an integral part of it) and those that did not. The system as designed under the ACA has that the working poor and lower income classes would obtain health insurance under Medicaid, with eligibility expanded from those with income up to generally 100% of the federal poverty line previously, to 133% from 2014 onwards.  Those with incomes higher than this would purchase insurance from the market exchanges, with a subsidy that phases out as incomes grow and is phased out entirely at 400% of the federal poverty line.  Thus the entire population, no matter how poor, would be able to obtain health insurance.

However, the Supreme Court decided that Medicaid expansion could not be made obligatory on the states even if the federal government is paying for it (as it is here). Rather, the states could choose whether or not to allow Medicaid to expand cover to include those making up to 133% of the federal poverty line.  It would be financially foolish for the states not to, as the federal government would cover 100% of the cost of the expanded coverage in the first several years, with this then phasing down to 90% of the additional cost from 2020 onwards.  But even with the states covering 10% of the cost from 2020, a net gain can be expected for the state budget due to the increased incomes of hospitals, doctors, nurses, and other health car suppliers who would now be providing care to the poor when they need it (and be compensated for it), and the state tax revenues that would be generated by such higher incomes. The states would also save by being able to reduce state payments made to cover a portion of the costs incurred by hospitals to provide health services to patients who were not able to pay for their treatments, due to a lack of health insurance.

Despite this, 23 states (as of January 2015) decided that the low income earners in their states would not be allowed to receive health insurance cover from Medicaid.  Note that these families must indeed be working to be able to have an income of 100% of the federal poverty line (of $24,300 in 2016 for a household of four).  Assuming one wage earner, working 40 hours a week for 52 weeks a year (no vacations), they would need to earn a wage of $11.68 per hour to earn this much, or well above the minimum wage of $7.25 per hour.  More likely there would be two income earners in such a household, each earning a wage rate of closer to the minimum wage, but likely not able to obtain full time employment of 40 hours a week for 52 weeks a year.  These households are not slackers, but rather are working hard to get by.

Yet these states are refusing to allow such households to obtain health insurance cover from Medicaid, despite a net financial benefit to their state budgets.  And since the Affordable Care Act was structured that such families would obtain health insurance coverage from Medicaid, and not purchased (with a partial subsidy assistance) through the health insurance market exchanges, they are now left with nothing.  These states have deliberately created a gap where their low income workers are effectively denied access to health insurance.

The reason these states have done this is of course political.  The 23 states (as of January 1, 2015) that had not permitted Medicaid to expand were states with Republican governors or Republican legislatures (or mostly both) that refused to allow Medicaid in their states to serve such families.  And as noted above, this was done even at financial cost to themselves.  Nebulous arguments were given that while the federal government would be paying for most or all of the costs in the near term, the federal government might reverse this later, due perhaps to budget pressures.  But there is no reason why such a reversal should be expected, nor why, if there were indeed such budget pressures, it would apply to Medicaid but not to other federally funded programs that those states are taking advantage of.  Furthermore, if this did indeed happen at some uncertain point in the future, the Medicaid programs in the state could be cut then, rather than now in anticipation that this might somehow happen at some unknown point in the unknown future.

As shown in the chart at the top of this post, the share of the population without health insurance cover fell to just 7.2% in 2015 in the 27 states (plus Washington, DC) that allowed Medicaid to expand, far below the 12.3% in those states that blocked that expansion.  Compared to 2013, before the ObamaCare reforms went into effect, this was a reduction of 5.6% points in the states that allowed Medicaid to expand, versus a reduction of 4.5% points in the states where the expansion was blocked.  Put another way, the share of the population without health insurance fell by 43% in the states that allowed Medicaid to expand, versus a fall of just 27% in the states that blocked it.

Furthermore, the far better improvement in the Medicaid expansion states was from a lower starting point in 2013 (of 12.8% of their population without health insurance, versus 16.7% in the states blocking Medicaid expansion).  One should expect that improvement becomes more difficult as one comes closer to the achievable ceiling in coverage.

But the chart also serves to show that the states blocking Medicaid expansion historically had a high share of their populations without health insurance.  These were conservative states, often relatively poor, with political establishments that did not exhibit great concern over the fact that a high share of their population could not get health insurance.  But not all were poor.  Indeed, the state with the absolute worst share of any state was oil-rich Texas, with 22.1% of its population without health insurance in 2013, and still 17.1% without it in 2015 (where both figures were the highest in the US in the respective years). Out of 50 states (plus Washington, DC), Texas was the worst.  This was a political choice, not an economic one.

It should also be noted that the reduction in the shares of uninsured in those states that allowed Medicaid to expand was not due solely to the increased number of Medicaid enrollees.  Between 2013 and 2015, those states saw 12.2 million of their citizens obtain health insurance cover.  Of these, 7.6 million came from increased enrollment under Medicaid, while 4.5 million came from other health insurance cover (including through the ObamaCare market exchanges).  And as noted above, they were starting from a point where a relatively high share of their citizens (compared to the states where Medicaid expansion was blocked) enjoyed some form of health insurance cover previously.

D.  The States That Allowed Medicaid to Expand Also Had Lower Premiums on ObamaCare Health Insurance Plans than on Company-Based Plans

There is also an interesting finding that the states that allowed Medicaid to expand not only saw greater improvements in the shares of their citizens who enjoyed health insurance cover, but also saw insurance premiums on their ObamaCare exchanges (as of 2016) which were lower than comparable company-sponsored plans in those states.

recent study by the Urban Institute (a non-profit think tank) found that for similar health insurance cover, the full prices (before subsidies) of health insurance purchased through the ObamaCare exchanges were 10% lower on average (at the national level), than the full prices of similar health insurance plans provided through employers. The calculations were made state by state, as costs varied by state, and varied widely.  But on average, the ObamaCare plans cost 10% less.

This may be come as a surprise to many.  The issue is that most employees do not know what the full cost of their company-sponsored health insurance plans in fact is.  The full cost includes not only what they pay directly, but also what they pay indirectly through the employer (which they typically never see) as part of their overall labor compensation package.  But it is part of their wages and a cost that must be covered.

The 10% lower cost is an average at the national level.  But the Urban Institute figures are calculated at the state level, and one can calculate from this how they vary between those states that expanded their Medicaid coverage and those states that blocked it. The results are interesting.  The simple unweighted averages (I did not have the underlying data necessary to calculate a weighted average properly) were:

Health Insurance Plan Costs:  ObamaCare Exchanges vs. Company Based

Unweighted averages

All States      

 -8%

Medicaid Expanded

-15%

Medicaid Not Expanded

   0%

The unweight average lower cost of the ObamaCare plans was 8% nationally.  This is different from the 10% figure the Urban Institute cited because the lower costs were especially large in some of the larger states, such as New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Ohio (all of which had lower costs of 18% or more).  In the unweighted averages, these larger states are weighted the same as smaller states.

But what is especially interesting is that the (unweighted) average lower cost of the ObamaCare plans compared to company based plans was 15% in the states that approved Medicaid expansion but was no different on average in the states that blocked Medicaid expansion.

Why would this be?  It was probably not due to the Medicaid expansion itself.  One would expect Medicaid expansion would lead to lower health insurance costs for those obtaining health insurance.  The reason is that hospitals and other health service providers will have lower costs due to less uncompensated care of patients without health insurance coverage (as more would have Medicaid coverage), and one can expect that these lower costs would then be reflected in lower health insurance costs for those who do pay. However, this should affect health insurance costs of policies purchased through the ObamaCare exchanges and company-based policies similarly, and hence would not likely affect the ratio in cost between the two.

However, the Medicaid expansion states were also the ones that encouraged competitive ObamaCare market exchanges to be established.  They did not seek to block these markets or keep them from functioning well.  They encouraged competition rather than did whatever they could to hinder it.

It was likely due to this greater degree of competition in those states that supported, rather than hindered, the ObamaCare exchanges that explains the lower costs in those states. This is also consistent with the fact noted above that many of the larger states saw especially low costs (relative to company-based plans) than were observed among the relatively smaller states.  The larger states will in general see greater competition, and competition drives down prices.

E.  ObamaCare Issues Remain

One can no longer dispute that ObamaCare has succeeded in its primary goal of making it possible for a higher share of the population to obtain the security of health insurance coverage.  But this certainly does not mean there are no issues with ObamaCare.

Republicans openly acknowledge that they continue to do whatever they can to block the expansion of access to health insurance under ObamaCare.  And these efforts to hinder ObamaCare have achieved some success.  As noted above, states that blocked Medicaid expansion have seen less of a reduction in their uninsured populations than was achieved in the states that allowed that expansion.  But the efforts to block access to ObamaCare went beyond blocking Medicaid.  Most of these states also decided not to implement directly the ObamaCare market exchanges in their states.  The Affordable Care Act envisioned that to best allow local control and adaptation to a state’s particular circumstances, state level authorities would be allowed and indeed encouraged to establish such exchanges.  Fortunately, the law also included a back-up provision that should a state choose not to establish such an exchange, the federal government could do it to allow the citizens of that state access to an affordable health insurance plan.  This was not without difficulties; recall the initial failure of the federal level computer systems when enrollment opened in October 2013 and the system was overwhelmed.

More recently, several of the larger health insurers have decided to withdraw from some of the markets in which they had previously offered health insurance plans on the ObamaCare market exchanges.  Most recently, Aetna announced in August that it would withdraw in 2017 from 11 of the 15 states where it had been offering such plans.  This followed earlier announcements by UnitedHealth and Humana that they also would be scaling back offerings significantly.  This will reduce competition among the insurers in a number of markets around the country, limiting the options enrollees in those markets will have.  Indeed, in some counties around the country there will be only one insurer offering coverage through the exchanges, and (unless something is now done) one county in Arizona where there will be no such insurer offering coverage through the exchanges.

The issues could certainly be addressed, if there is the will.  All major new social programs, including Medicare and Social Security were fine-tuned through new legislation following their launch to address issues that developed.  And this was done on a bipartisan basis. The problem now is that the Republican Party, for political reasons, is doing what it can to block any such adjustments, with the openly stated aim of trying to destroy ObamaCare.

It is still to be seen whether these efforts will succeed.  If they do, the US will revert to its previous system, with millions of Americans denied access to health insurance and with sharply rising health care costs that outpaced general inflation for decades.

Bringing Democracy to America: The Popular Vote Should Determine Who Wins the Presidency

Map of Battleground States in 2012

A.  Introduction

The US is once again in the middle of a presidential election, with possible consequences this time that are more worrying than ever.  And once again it is an election where the candidates focus their attention on a limited sub-set of US states – those states where the result is expected to be relatively close and winnable by a candidate if given sufficient attention. This is a consequence of the unique US system where presidents are selected not by who receives the most votes in the nation, but rather by who wins a plurality of votes in individual states whose electoral college votes sum to 270 or more (i.e. more than half of the total 538 electoral votes allocated across the nation).  It does not matter if the candidate wins the state by a little or a lot; they receive the same number of electoral votes from the state regardless.

Hence if a candidate is almost certain to win a state, as well as if they are almost certain to lose a state, it makes no sense to campaign there.  They gain nothing by winning by somewhat more, or by losing by somewhat less.  Total votes in the nation by the population do not count; only electoral votes count, and these are won at the state level.

This is not a democratic system, and no other democratic country in the world with a president with substantial real powers selects their president this way.  There are systems in some countries with a parliamentary form of government (where the party with a majority of seats in the parliament selects the prime minister) that might be seen as somewhat similar to an electoral college.  But in such situations, the president is largely or totally a figurehead.  In no other democratic country where the president is the head of the executive branch, other than the US, does one select that president other than through a popular vote of the entire nation.

Until recently, I had thought there was nothing one could do about this in the US other than through a constitutional amendment.  And a constitutional amendment on such an issue with divided interests, especially in the current political environment, is a non-starter. But there is in fact an initiative, already well underway, that would resolve this problem through a compact being reached across states that have at least 270 electoral votes between them.  It is actually pretty ingenious, and might well pass.  It is certainly in the interest of the three-quarters of the states that are not swing states to see it approved.

This blog post will first review some of the problems that come out of the current electoral college system.  It will then describe the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, where an agreement would be reached to ensure electoral votes are cast for the candidate receiving the most votes nationally, and not necessarily the most votes in the individual state.  The benefits of such a system will then be examined, as well as the politics of whether or not it will ultimately be approved.

B.  The Problems With the Current Electoral College System

a)  It is Not Democracy

To start, the current system is not democratic.  Electoral votes are allocated by state to be equal to the number of congressmen from that state plus two (equal to the number of senators from each state).  There are 538 electoral votes, the sum of 435 Congressmen, 100 Senators, and 3 electoral votes granted to Washington, DC, by the 23rd amendment to the Constitution (ratified in 1961).

The result is that voters in a state like Wyoming, a small state with fewer voters even than Washington, DC, have a disproportionate share of influence in the electoral college and hence in the selection of the president.  In 2012, the voting-eligible population (VEP, equal to the voting age population of the state, less non-citizens and felons ineligible to vote) of Wyoming was 425,142.  With 3 electoral votes, Wyoming had 141,714 voters per electoral vote.

In contrast, the voting-eligible population of California in 2012 was 23,681,837 for 55 electoral votes.  Thus there were 430,579 voters in California for each of its electoral votes. That is, there were almost exactly 3 times as many voters in California per electoral vote as there were in Wyoming.  Each vote in California counted only one-third as much.  This is not democracy.  In a democracy, each vote counts the same.

It should be noted that the framers of the Constitution in 1787 never presented the selection of the US President via the electoral college as being democratic.  Congressmen were selected democratically, by popular vote.  But senators were appointed by state legislatures not by popular vote (until the 17th amendment to the Constitution was ratified in 1913) and presidents were chosen through the electoral college process.  There was an open and explicit decision to by-pass a popular vote for the president as a requirement (although that remained as an option within each state), where it was left up to each state to decide how the electors representing that state would be chosen.  Article II, Section 1, Paragraph 2, of the Constitution reads:

“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.”

That is, it leaves the method to be used in a state up to the legislature of that state, with the only constraint being that the electors may not be a US Senator, a US Congressman, or a federal government official.

Not surprisingly, the states used a variety of ways initially to choose their electors.  In 1789 (when George Washington was ultimately chosen as president), there were direct popular at-large votes within a state to choose the electors in only two of the states (Maryland and Pennsylvania), and popular votes but by specially drawn districts within the states in two more (Delaware and Virginia).  The electors were simply chosen directly by the state legislatures in four of the states, and two states had hybrid systems where the voters chose a list of possible electors and the state legislatures then chose the specific electors from those lists.  Finally, one state (New York) could not decide in time what to do, and hence did nothing.  Two more (North Carolina and Rhode Island), did not accede to the Constitution until after the process was over.

In the early years of the republic, states frequently changed their system of choosing electors.  But over time, states shifted to systems where their state population would vote for their electors, as is now the case in all states (with Maine and Nebraska choosing them by votes in individual congressional districts, plus two for the winner of the state-wide vote).  The election of 1824 is generally taken as the first election where the popular vote totals were meaningful (even though in that year, 6 of the then 24 states still had their electors chosen by their legislatures).  Indeed, it appears that there is not even any record of what the vote totals were (in the states where votes were used) in the elections before 1824.

As noted, the framers of the Constitution never viewed this system as democratic.  It was only later that the myth grew that the US is a great democracy, including in how it elects the most important official in the land.  We don’t, and this should be recognized.

b)  A Candidate Can Be Elected President Even Though He or She Received Fewer Votes

Directly following from the fact the current system is not democratic, is the possible consequence that whomever receives the most votes might not win the presidency.  It is worth flagging this separately only because many believe that while this is theoretically possible, in practice it has been and would be so rare that we should not worry about it.

The results of the 2000 election between George Bush and Al Gore did serve to wake people up that this result is indeed possible in modern times.  Al Gore won the nation-wide popular vote over Bush by a not so small 0.5% points (544,000 votes), but lost due to a loss in Florida.

Furthermore, the loss in Florida was by just 537 votes, or 0.01% of the votes cast in that state.  But this loss was due to the use of the terribly designed and now infamous “butterfly ballot” in Palm Beach County (and only that county), where to vote for Al Gore, whose name appeared second on the ballot, one had to punch the third hole in the column to the right of his name.  Punching the second hole would be a vote for Pat Buchanan, a minor third party candidate who received only 0.4% of the votes in the country.  A careful statistical analysis of the Palm Beach County results indicate that at least 2,000 votes intended for Al Gore mistakenly went to Buchanan.  This was far more than the 537 vote state-wide margin.  Without this confusing ballot in just one county, Al Gore would have won Florida and the presidency.

The impact of the Florida result on the 2000 election is well known.  And if it were not for the electoral college system, where electoral votes are allocated by state and with winner-take-all in each individual state or district, there would not have been such an impact from one poorly designed ballot in one county of one state.  Al Gore won the popular vote in the country by over a half million votes, and a badly designed ballot in one jurisdiction would not have mattered.

And it is in fact not so rare that there might be an election where the winner of the electoral vote lost the popular vote.  Aside from the 2000 election, there were three other such cases in American history (although all were in the 1800s).  Thus in the 48 presidential elections since 1824 (the first election where, as discussed above, the popular vote at the state level was meaningful), there have been four cases where the person elected president received fewer votes than his opponent.  That is, in one of 12 cases (4 in 48) the loser of the popular vote still became president.  One in 12 cases means, on average, that one might expect there to be such a case every 48 years or so, given the four-year presidential terms.  That is, each voter should expect this to happen about once in their voting lifetimes.  That is not uncommon.

c)  Focus Only on the Swing States

Beyond any statement of principle, there are also other, and highly important, problems stemming from the current system.  As a direct consequence of the current system, presidential candidates and their campaigns will focus their efforts and policy commitments not on the nation as a whole, but only on the limited number of swing states (also referred to as battleground states) where the race is so tight that the victor is not clear.

While most are aware of this focus, the extent of the focus may be surprising.  While the definition of precisely which states might be considered swing states will differ a bit between analysts, and especially for those states near the margin between being considered a swing state or not, there is actually a surprising degree of consensus.  For the 2012 presidential election, 11 states were considered by most as swing states.  They are shown in brown in the map at the top of this post.  The only real debate is whether Michigan should be included, thus leading to 10 swing states.  And some might have substituted Minnesota for Michigan.

These 11 states made up 22% of the voting jurisdictions (50 states plus DC) in the nation, 27% of the voting eligible population, and also 27% of the electoral votes:

11 Swing States

Shares in Nation in 2012:

% Share

Number of States (and DC)

22%

Voting Eligible Population

27%

Electoral Votes

27%

Campaign Events

99.6%

TV Ad Spending

99.8%

But these 11 states accounted for 99.6% of the campaign events held in the presidential campaigns in 2012, and 99.8% of the TV ad spending!  The rest of the country simply did not matter, and was ignored.

This also had consequences for voter turnout.  For the largely same set of 10 swing states considered to be battlegrounds in 2012 (the list of 11 above less Michigan), voter turnout has increased steadily over time relative to turnout in the non-swing 40 states plus DC:

10 Swing States of 2012 vs. Rest:

Difference in Turnout in % Points

1996

0.1%

2000

1.2%

2004

4.4%

2008

5.2%

2012

7.4%

In 1996, when a number of the states considered to be battlegrounds in 2012 were not so before (as the list evolves, but slowly, over time), voter turnout was essentially the same as in the rest of the country (51.5% in this set of 10 states vs. 51.4%).  But as these states became increasingly seen as competitive, with increased attention then afforded to them and with voters increasingly recognizing that their votes there could indeed matter, the turnout differential grew steadily, reaching a difference of 7.4% points in 2012.  This is a big difference.

A different study made use of the fact that the states considered to be swing or battleground states do evolve over time, and looked at how much voter turnout then shifted based on whether the states gained or lost battleground status:

Difference in % Points

Shifts in Voter Turnout:

2004 to 2008

2008 to 2012

Gained Battleground Status

+5.2%

no cases

Lost Battleground Status

-2.0%

-4.9%

Stayed Battleground

+1.0%

-1.0%

Stayed Spectator

+1.0%

-3.7%

Nation as a Whole

+1.5%

-3.6%

States that gained battleground status in the 2008 election saw their turnout jump by 5.2% points, when national turnout rose by only 1.5% points.  There were no such cases in 2012.  States that lost battleground status saw their turnout drop by 2% points in 2008 and by 4.9% points in 2012.  Other states had smaller changes.

It should not be surprising that fewer people vote if they believe their vote does not count. And for a presidential election, if you do not live in a battleground state, it most certainly does not matter:  One candidate or the other is certain to win that state.  But while this is a problem in itself, there are important implications for the other offices up for election in that year.  Fewer people will vote in the non-battleground states in the congressional and senate races, and for the various state and local offices and referenda that might also be on the ballot.

d)  People Want the President to be Selected by Popular Vote

Finally, doing away with the electoral college and selecting the president by popular vote is overwhelmingly favored by the population.  For example, a Gallup Poll from January 2013 found that 63% are in favor of such a reform:

Gallup Poll, January 2013

Do Away With Electoral College

In Favor

Opposed

No Opinion

All

63%

29%

8%

Republicans

61%

30%

9%

Independents

63%

29%

8%

Democrats

66%

30%

4%

What is perhaps surprising is that such support is basically identical between Republicans, Independents, and Democrats.  This is not a partisan issue.

Other polls have found similar results (see for example this poll, specifically question # 22).

C.  The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact

While the problems with the electoral college system have long been recognized, most (including myself) thought until recently that a constitutional amendment would be required to change it.  But in fact that is not so.  Following the 2000 election debacle, Professor Roger Bennett of Northwestern University Law School pointed out that the US Constitution (in its Article II, Section 1, Paragraph 2, quoted above) gives state legislatures the power to decide how electors will be chosen in their state.  States could use this power to choose a slate of electors pledged not to the presidential candidate who received the most votes within their own state, but rather pledged to the presidential candidate who received the most votes in the nation.

This is simple and clear, and provided states with electoral votes that sum to 270 or more agree, we could have the democratic election of the president where the candidate who gets most votes nationally, will win.  The mechanism is the approval in each state of legislation that would commit that state, provided other states holding 270 or more electoral votes also agree, to select electors from the slate committed to the candidate that wins the most votes nationally.  So far ten states plus Washington, DC, have approved and signed such legislation.  They hold 165 electoral votes between them, and approvals include from such large states as California and New York.

Not only does this approach by-pass the need for a new constitutional amendment, but it also does not give a veto right to the small number of states who benefit from the current system.  For a swing state, and particularly for a small swing state, the current system has its advantages.  Presidential candidates are forced to pay special attention to you, and to grant you special favors that others may not enjoy and which could indeed cost others. But the system effectively ignores the voters in more than three-quarters of the states, and the National Popular Vote initiative is a mechanism to restore their democratic rights.  One should not want to grant a veto right to this to a small number of swing states who benefit from the current system.

D.  The Benefits of a Selecting the President by National Popular Vote

The benefits of selecting the president by a national popular vote are clear, and include:

  1. It is democratic.
  2. Votes would count the same across the nation.  Currently, a vote in California counts only one-third as much as a vote in Wyoming in terms of electoral votes.
  3. It would end the possibility that a candidate receiving more votes than another would nonetheless lose the election, as happened in Bush vs. Gore in 2000 and three other times in US history.
  4. There would be less incentive than now for states like North Carolina, Florida, and Pennsylvania to try to introduce measures to selectively disenfranchise targeted voters (such as the poor or from minority groups) through voter ID and similar restrictions.  Such voter disenfranchisement measures can be effective at the margin, where by shifting voting shares by a few percentage points in the state the favored candidate might win that state.  But if what now matters is the total votes cast in the nation, a swing of a few percentage points in a few states such as Florida are less likely to decide the outcome.  I should add, however, that while there would be less of an incentive to introduce such voting measures for elections for the president, the incentive would remain for state and local offices.

But perhaps the biggest concrete impact would be the impact of such a reform on how candidates run for office.  Instead of focusing almost all of their attention on a limited number of swing states, they would now have a reason to campaign across the entire nation.  Their aim would be to pick up votes wherever they can.  Thus a Republican would want to campaign in states like California, New York, and Massachusetts.  While he might not expect to win a majority in such a state, there are a large number of potential Republican voters in such states whom he would want to encourage to go out and vote. Similarly, a Democrat would have an incentive to campaign in states like Texas and Alabama.  Their aim would be to campaign wherever they might gain a significant number of votes, including in states where they might well still expect not to receive a majority overall.

This would change the dynamics of US presidential campaigns, and in a good way. Three-quarters of the nation would not be neglected.

E.  The Politics of the Proposal

As noted above the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact has now seen legislation passed and signed in ten states plus Washington, DC, who between them have 165 electoral votes. Maryland was the first (in 2007) and New York the most recent (in 2014).   Unfortunately for the politics of this, all the states (including DC) who have passed this are strong “blue” (Democratic leaning) states.  No red states have as yet passed it, although such legislation has been passed in one but not both of the legislative chambers in red states such as Arizona, Arkansas, and Oklahoma.

Many Republicans appear to believe that selection of the president by popular vote would not be of benefit to them.  But this is not at all clear.  First, it is quite possible that more Republican votes would be gained on a net basis in states like California, New York, Illinois, and others, than would be gained on a net basis by Democrats in states like Texas. It is very difficult to predict what the net impact on votes will be because, as noted above, the focus of attention of the election campaigns would then be totally different than what it is now.  While one could safely predict that voter turnout will rise (it is abysmally poor in the US), whether the fact that all votes would count (and count equally) would favor one party or the other is not at all clear.

But what is clear is that under the current electoral college system, many observers have concluded that the Democrats have a clear electoral vote advantage over the Republicans. While there are various ways that they have come to this conclusion, one example is based on an examination of which states have voted for the Democrat in every one of the six presidential elections since 1992, in comparison to the states that have every time voted for the Republican.  The Democrats have a huge electoral college advantage by this measure, with 19 states plus Washington, DC, having always voted for the Democratic candidate since 1992, with 242 electoral votes between them.  This has been called the “Blue Wall”.  Starting from this as a base, a win just in also Florida (with its 29 electoral votes) will hand the election to the Democrat (with a minimum of 271 electoral votes, even if no other state is won).  The Republicans, in contrast, have consistently won only 13 states since 1992, with just 102 electoral votes.  It is a far bigger reach for them to get to 271 electoral  votes from this base.

While there are also critics of this specific measure of the Blue Wall, most commentators agree the Democrats do have a major electoral college advantage.  It is then not at all clear that Republicans should oppose a reform where the president would be chosen by a nation-wide popular vote instead.  Presidential elections have generally been won or lost by only a few percentage points when measured in terms of the popular vote (in years other than when there was a major third party candidate, such as Ross Perot in 1992).

Tellingly, even Newt Gingrich, the former Speaker of the House, former presidential candidate, and close advisor to Donald Trump, has endorsed the National Popular Vote initiative.  Newt Gingrich is highly political.  One would not expect him to do this if he saw it to be other than an advantage for the Republicans.

F.  Conclusion

The electoral college system might well have made sense in 1788, when the US Constitution was ratified.  But that does not mean it makes sense now.  While a formal constitutional amendment might well be a preferable solution, the current politics in Washington means that any amendment process would not go far.

But the US Constitution does specifically provide the state legislatures the flexibility to decide how their electors are to be chosen.  States can use that flexibility to direct that the slate of electors for that state will be the slate committed to the candidate who receives the most votes in the nation, rather than in the individual state.  And the states can agree that they will begin to abide by this process when, and only when, states with a minimum of 270 electoral college votes have agreed.

This is thus eminently doable.  However, while states with 165 electoral votes have already approved this initiative, there is a need for states with a further 105 electoral votes also to agree.  This will not happen until Republican controlled states recognize that this reform is as much in their interest as it is for others.

Bernie Sanders and His $27 Average Campaign Donation

Sanders $27 Money

Bernie Sanders is certainly to be commended for leading a modern US political campaign funded almost in its entirety by campaign contributions from individuals.  According to the Center for Responsive Politics, the Sanders campaign (through June 30) raised $226 million in individual contributions, with this accounting for 99% of the total money raised by or for the campaign (including outside groups).  This is impressive, and hopefully will serve as a model for future political campaigns.

Famously, the Sanders campaign touted that the average contribution came out to just $27, thus highlighting the grass roots nature of his support.  And this has been widely quoted.  Even President Obama got in on this.  In his remarks at this year’s White House Correspondents’ Dinner, he noted:

“What an election season.  For example, we’ve got the bright new face of the Democratic Party here tonight  –-  Mr. Bernie Sanders!   There he is  —  Bernie! Bernie, you look like a million bucks.  Or to put it in terms you’ll understand, you look like 37,000 donations of 27 dollars each!”

But listening to Sanders’ speech to the Democratic Convention on Monday, a point bothered me.  And being a numbers person, I had to look it up.  Sanders noted right at the beginning of his remarks that he wanted to:

“thank the 2 1/2 million Americans who helped fund our campaign with an unprecedented 8 million individual campaign contributions – averaging $27 a piece.”

This was the first time I realized that the $27 individual contribution may not be referring to what an average person contributed, but rather to what the average donation was, where they are counting separately each donation from an individual contributor making multiple donations.

And it does appear that this is the case.  The $226 million figure noted above for total contributions divided by 8 million individual campaign contributions comes to a bit over $28 per contribution – close enough to the $27 number; it is within round-off.  But per individual, it comes to over $90 per person over the 2 1/2 million individuals who contributed to the Sanders campaign.  On average, each donor contributed 3.2 times.

This is a quibble, to be sure.  But an average contribution of $90 (per donor) does not sound as democratic as $27 (per donation).