Social Security Could be Saved With the Revenues Lost Under the Trump Tax Plan

As is well known, the Social Security Trust Fund will run out in about 2034 (plus or minus a year) if nothing is done.  “Running out” means that the past accumulated stock of funds paid in through Social Security taxes on wages, plus what is paid in each year, will not suffice to cover what is due to be paid out that year to beneficiaries.  If nothing is done, Social Security payments would then be scaled back by 23% (in 2034, rising to 27% by 2091), to match the amount then being paid in each year.

This would be a disaster.  Social Security does not pay out all that much:  An average of just $15,637 annually per beneficiary for those in retirement and their survivors, and an average of just $12,452 per beneficiary for those on disability (all as of August 2017).  But despite such limited amounts, Social Security accounts for almost two-thirds (63%) of the incomes of beneficiaries age 65 or older, and 90% or more of the incomes of fully one-third of them.  Scaling back such already low payments, when so many Americans depend so much on the program, should be unthinkable.

Yet Congress has been unwilling to act, even though the upcoming crisis (if nothing is done) has been forecast for some time.  Furthermore, the longer we wait, the more severe the measures that will then be necessary to fix the problem.  It should be noted that the crisis is not on account of an aging population (one has pretty much known for 64 years how many Americans would be reaching age 65 now), nor because of a surprising jump in life expectancies (indeed, life expectancies have turned out to be lower than what had been forecast).  Rather, as discussed in an earlier post on this blog, the crisis has arisen primarily because wage income inequality has grown sharply (and unexpectedly) since around 1980, and this has pulled an increasing share of wages into the untaxed range above the ceiling for annual earnings subject to Social Security tax ($127,200 currently).

But Congress could act, and there are many different approaches that could be taken to ensure the Social Security Trust Fund remains adequately funded.  This post will discuss just one.  And that would be not to approve the Trump proposal for what he accurately calls would be a huge cut in taxes, and use the revenues that would be lost under his tax plan instead to shore up the Social Security Trust Fund.  As the chart at the top of this post shows (and as will be discussed below), this would more than suffice to ensure the Trust Fund would remain in surplus for the foreseeable future.  There would then be no need to consider slashing Social Security benefits in 2034.

The Trump tax plan was submitted to Congress on September 27.  It is actually inaccurate to call it simply the Trump tax plan as it was worked out over many months of discussions between Trump and his chief economic aides on one side, and the senior Republican leadership in both the Senate and the Congress on the other side, including the chairs of the tax-writing committees.  This was the so-called “Gang of Six”, who jointly released the plan on September 27, with the full endorsement of all.  But for simplicity, I will continue to call it the Trump tax plan.

The tax plan would sharply reduce government revenues.  The Tax Policy Center (TPC), a respected bipartisan nonprofit, has provided the most careful forecast of the revenue losses yet released.  They estimated that the plan would reduce government revenues by $2.4 trillion between 2018 and 2027, with this rising to a $3.2 trillion loss between 2028 and 2037.  The lost revenue would come to 0.9% of GDP for the 2018 to 2027 period, and 0.8% of GDP for the 2028 to 2037 period (some of the tax losses under the Trump plan are front-loaded), based on the GDP forecasts of the Social Security Trustees 2017 Annual Report (discussed below).  While less than 1% of GDP might not sound like much, such a revenue loss would be significant.  As we will see, it would suffice to ensure the Social Security Trust Fund would remain fully funded.

The chart at the top of this post shows what could be done.  The curve in green is the base case where nothing is done to shore up the Trust Fund.  It shows what the total stock of funds in the Social Security Trust Fund have been (since 1980) and would amount to, as a share of GDP, if full beneficiary payments would continue as per current law.  Note that I have included here the trust funds for both Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) and for Disability Insurance (DI).  While technically separate, they are often combined (and then referred to as OASDI).

The figures are calculated from the forecasts released in the most recent (July 2017) mandated regular annual report of the Board of Trustees of the Social Security system.  Their current forecast is that the Trust Fund would run out by around 2034, as seen in the chart.

But suppose that instead of enacting the Trump tax plan proposals, Congress decided to dedicate to the Social Security Trust Funds (OASDI) the revenues that would be lost as a consequence of those tax cuts?  The curve in the chart shown in red is a forecast of what those tax revenue losses would be each year, as a share of GDP.  These are the Tax Policy Center estimates, although extrapolated.  The TPC forecasts as published showed the estimated year-by-year losses over the first ten years (2018 to 2027), but then only for the sum of the losses over the next ten years (2028 to 2037).  I assumed a constant rate of growth from the estimate for 2027 sufficient to generate the TPC sum for 2028 to 2037, which worked out to a bit over 6.1%.  I then assumed the revenue losses would continue to grow at this rate for the remainder of the forecast period.

Note this 6.1% growth is a nominal rate of growth, reflecting both inflation and real growth.  The long-run forecasts in the Social Security Trustees report were for real GDP to grow at a rate of 2.1 or 2.2%, and inflation (in terms of the GDP price index) to grow at also 2.2%, leading to growth in nominal GDP of 4.3 or 4.4%.  Thus the forecast tax revenue losses under the Trump plan would slowly climb over time as a share of GDP, reaching 2% of GDP by about 2090.  This is as one would expect for this tax plan, as the proposals would reduce progressivity in the tax system.  As I noted before on this blog and will discuss further below, most of the benefits under the Trump tax plan would accrue to those with higher incomes.  However, one should also note that the very long-term forecasts for the outer years should not be taken too seriously.  While the trends are of interest, the specifics will almost certainly be different.

If the tax revenues that would be lost under the Trump tax plan were instead used to shore up the Social Security Trust Fund, one would get the curve shown in blue (which includes the interest earned on the balance in the Fund, at the interest rates forecast in the Trustees report).  The balance in the fund would remain positive, never dipping below 12% of GDP, and then start to rise as a share of GDP.  Even if the TPC forecasts of the revenues that would be lost under the Trump plan are somewhat off (or if Congress makes changes which will reduce somewhat the tax losses), there is some margin here.  The forecast is robust.

The alternative is to follow the Trump tax plan, and cut taxes sharply.  As I noted in my earlier post on this blog on the Trump tax plan, the proposals are heavily weighted to provisions which would especially benefit the rich.  The TPC analysis (which I did not yet have when preparing my earlier blog post) has specific estimates of this.  The chart below shows who would get the tax cuts for the forecast year of 2027:

The estimate is that 87% of the tax revenues lost under the Trump plan would go to the richest 20% of the population (those households with an income of $154,900 or more in 2027, in prices of 2017).  And indeed, almost all of this (80% of the overall total) would accrue just to the top 1%.  The top 1% are already pretty well off, and it is not clear why tax cuts focused on them would spur greater effort on their part or greater growth.  The top 1% are those households who would have an annual income of at least $912,100 in 2027, in prices of 2017.  Most of them would be making more than a million annually.

The Trump people, not surprisingly, do not accept this.  They assert that the tax cuts will spur such a rapid acceleration in growth that tax revenues will not in fact be lost.  Most economists do not agree.  As discussed in earlier posts on this blog, the historical evidence does not support the Trumpian view (the tax cuts under Reagan and Bush II did not lead to any such acceleration in growth; what they did do is reduce tax revenues); the argument that tax cuts will lead to more rapid growth is also conceptually confused and reveals a misunderstanding of basic economics; and with the economy having already reached full employment during the Obama years, there is little basis for the assertion that the economy will now be able to grow at even 3% a year on average (over a mulit-year period) much less something significantly faster.  Tax cuts have in the past led to cuts in tax revenues collected, not to increases, and there is no reason to believe this time will be different.

Thus Congress faces a choice.  It can approve the Trump tax plan (already endorsed by the Republican leadership in both chambers), with 80% of the cuts going to the richest 1%.  Or it could use those revenues to shore up the Social Security Trust Fund.  If the latter is done, the Trust Fund would not run out in 2034, and Social Security would be able to continue to pay amounts owed to retired senior citizens and their survivors, as well as to the disabled, in accordance with the commitments it has made.

I would favor the latter.  If you agree, please call or write your Senator and Member of Congress, and encourage others to do so as well.

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Update, October 22, 2017

The US Senate passed on October 19 a budget framework for the FY2018-27 period which would allow for $1.5 trillion in lost tax revenues over this period, and a corresponding increase in the deficit, as a consequence of new tax legislation.  It was almost fully a party line vote (all Democrats voted against it, while all Republicans other than Senator Rand Paul voted in favor).  Importantly, this vote cleared the way (under Senate rules) for it to pass a new tax law with losses of up to $1.5 trillion over the decade, and pass this with only Republican votes.  Only 50 votes in favor will be required (with Vice President Pence providing a tie-breaking vote if needed).  Democrats can be ignored.

The loss in tax revenues in this budget framework is somewhat less than the $2.4 trillion that the Tax Policy Center estimates would follow in the first decade under the Trump tax plan.  But it is still sizeable, and it is of interest to see what this lesser amount would achieve if redirected to the Social Security Trust Fund instead of being used for tax cuts.

The chart above shows what would follow.  It still turns out that the Social Security Trust Fund would be saved from insolvency, although just barely this time.

One has to make an assumption as to what would happen to tax revenues after 2027, as well as for what the time pattern would be for the $1.5 trillion in losses over the ten years from FY2018 to 27.  With nothing else available, I assumed that the losses would grow over time at the same rate as what is implied in the Tax Policy Center estimates for the losses in the second decade of the Trump tax plan as compared to the losses in the final year of the first decade.  As discussed above, these estimates implied a nominal rate of growth of 6.1% a year.  I assumed the same rate of growth here, including for the year to year growth in the first decade (summing over that decade to $1.5 trillion).

The result again is that the Social Security Trust Fund would remain solvent for the foreseeable future, although now just marginally.  The Trust Fund (as a share of GDP) would just touch zero in the years around 2080, but would then start to rise.

We therefore have a choice.  The Republican-passed budget framework has that an increase in the fiscal deficit of $1.5 trillion over the next decade is acceptable.  It could be used for tax cuts that would accrue primarily to the rich.  Or it could be used to ensure the Social Security system will be able, for the foreseeable future, to keep to its commitments to senior citizens, to their survivors, and to the disabled.

 

An Analysis of the Trump Tax Plan: Not a Tax Reform, But Rather a Massive Tax Cut for the Rich

A.  Introduction

The Trump administration released on September 27 its proposed tax plan.  It was exceedingly skimpy (only nine pages long, including the title page, and with all the white space could have been presented on half that number of pages).  Importantly, it was explicitly vague on many of the measures, such as what tax loopholes would be closed to partially pay for the tax cuts (simply saying they would do this somehow).  One can, however, examine measures that were explicitly presented, and from these it is clear that this is primarily a plan for massive tax cuts for the rich.

It is also clear that this is not a tax reform.  A tax reform would be revenue neutral.  The measures proposed would not be.  And a reform would focus on changes in the structure of the tax system.  There is little of that here, but rather proposals to cut various tax rates (including in several cases to zero), primarily for the benefit of those who are well off.

One can see this in the way the tax plan was approached.  In a true tax reform, one would start by examining the system, and whether certain deductions and tax exemptions are not warranted by good policy (but rather serve only certain vested interests).  Closing such loopholes would lead to higher revenues being collected.  One would then determine what the new tax rates could be (i.e. by how much they could be cut) to leave the overall level of tax collection the same.

But that was not done here.  Rather, they start with specific proposals on what the new tax rates “should” be (12%, 25%, and 35% for individuals, and 20% for corporations), and then make only vague references to certain, unspecified, deductions and tax exemptions being eliminated or reduced, in order not to lose too much in revenues (they assert).  They have the process backward.

And it is clear that these tax cuts, should they be enacted by Congress, would massively increase the fiscal deficit.  While it is impossible to come up with a precise estimate of how much the tax plan would cost in lost revenues, due to the vagueness on the parameters and on a number of the proposals, Republicans have already factored into the long-term budget a reduction in tax revenues of $1.5 trillion over ten years.  And estimates of the net cost of the Trump plan range from a low of $2.2 trillion over ten years ($2.7 trillion when additional interest is counted, as it should be), to as high as $5 trillion over ten years.  No one can really say as yet, given the deliberate lack of detail.

But any of these figures on the cost are not small.  The total federal debt held by the public as of the end of September, 2017, was $14.7 trillion.  The cost in lost revenue could equal more than a third of this.  Yet Republicans in Congress blocked the fiscal expenditures we desperately needed in the years from 2010 onwards during the Obama years, when unemployment was still high, there was excess capacity in our underutilized factories, and the country needed to rebuild its infrastructure (as we still do).  The argument then was that we could not add to our national debt.  But now the same politicians see no problem with adding massively to that debt to cover tax cuts that will primarily benefit the rich.  The sheer hypocrisy is breath-taking.

Not surprisingly, Trump officials are saying that there will be no such cost due to a resulting spur to our economic growth.  Trump himself asserted that his tax plan would lead the economy to grow at a 6% pace.  No economist sees this as remotely plausible.  Even Trump’s economic aides, such as Gary Cohn who was principally responsible for the plan, are far more cautious and say only that the plan will lead to growth of “substantially over 3 percent”.  But even this has no basis in what has been observed historically after the Reagan and Bush tax cuts, nor what one would expect from elementary economic analysis.

The lack of specificity in many of the proposals in the tax plan issued on September 27 makes it impossible to assess it in full, as major elements are simply only alluded to.  For example, it says that a number of tax deductions (both personal and corporate) will be eliminated or reduced, but does not say which (other than that they propose to keep the deductions for home mortgage interest and for charity).  As another example, the plan says the number of personal income tax brackets would be reduced from seven currently to just three broad ones (at 12%, 25%, and 35%), but does not say at what income levels each would apply.  Specifics were simply left out.

For a tax plan where work has been intensively underway for already the eight months of this administration (and indeed from before, as campaign proposals were developed), such vagueness must be deliberate.  The possible reasons include:  1) That the specifics would be embarrassing, as they would make clear the political interests that would gain or lose under the plan; 2) That revealing the specifics would spark immediate opposition from those who would lose (or not gain as others would); 3) That revealing the specifics would make clear that they would not in fact suffice to achieve what the Trump administration is asserting (e.g. that ending certain tax deductions will make the plan progressive, or generate revenues sufficient to offset the tax rate cuts); and/or 4) That they really do not know what to do or what could be done to fix the issue.

One can, however, look at what is there, even if the overall plan is incomplete.  This blog post will do that.

B.  Personal Income Taxes

The proposals are (starting with those which are most clear):

a)  Elimination of the Estate Tax:  Only the rich pay this.  It only applies to estates given to heirs of $10.98 million or more (for a married couple).  This only affects the top 0.2%, most wealthy, households in the US.

b)  Elimination of the Alternative Minimum Tax:  This also only applies to those who are rich enough for it to apply and who benefit from a range of tax deductions and other benefits, who would otherwise pay little in tax.  It would be better to end such tax deductions and other special tax benefits that primarily help this group, thus making the Alternative Minimum Tax irrelevant, than to end it even though it had remained relevant.

c)  A reduction in the top income tax rate from 39.6% to 35%:  This is a clear gain to those whose income is so high that they would, under the current tax brackets, owe tax at a marginal rate of 39.6%.  But this bracket only kicks in for households with an adjusted gross income of $470,700 or more (in 2017).  This is very close to the minimum income of those in the top 1% of the income distribution ($465,626 in 2014), and the average household income of those in that very well-off group was $1,260,508 in 2014.  Thus this would be a benefit only to the top 1%, who on average earn over $1 million a year.

The Trump plan document does include a rather odd statement that the congressional tax-writing committees could consider adding an additional, higher, tax bracket, for the very rich, but it is not at all clear what this might be.  They do not say.  And since the tax legislation will be written by the congressional committees, who are free to include whatever they choose, this gratuitous comment is meaningless, and was presumably added purely for political reasons.

d)  A consolidation in the number of tax brackets from seven currently to just three, of 12%, 25%, and 35%:  Aside from the clear benefit to those now in the 39.6% bracket, noted above, one cannot say precisely what the impact the new tax brackets would have for the other groups since the income levels at which each would kick in was left unspecified.  It might have been embarrassing, or contentious, to do so.  But one can say that any such consolidation would lead to less progressivity in the tax system, as each of the new brackets would apply to a broader range of incomes.  Instead of the rates rising as incomes move up from one bracket to the next, there would now be a broader range at which they would be kept flat.  For example, suppose the Trump plan would be for the new 25% rate to span what is now taxed at 25% or 28%.  That range would then apply to household incomes (for married couples filing jointly, and in 2017) from $75,900 on the low end to $233,350 at the high end.  The low-end figure is just above the household income figure of $74,869 (in 2016) for those reaching the 60th percentile of the income distribution (see Table A-2 of this Census Bureau report), while the top-end is just above the $225,251 income figure for those reaching the 95th percentile.  A system is not terribly progressive when those in the middle class (at the 60th percentile) pay at the same rate as those who are quite well off (in the 95th percentile).

e)  A ceiling on the tax rate paid on personal income received through “pass-through” business entities of just 25%:  This would be one of the more regressive of the measures proposed in the Trump tax plan (as well as one especially beneficial to Trump himself).  Under current tax law, most US businesses (95% of them) are incorporated as business entities that do not pay taxes at the corporate level, but rather pass through their incomes to their owners or partners, who then pay tax on that income at their normal, personal, rates.  These so-called “pass-through” business entities include sole proprietorships, partnerships, Limited Liability Companies (LLCs), and sub-chapter S corporations (from the section in the tax code).  And they are important, not only in number but also in incomes generated:  In the aggregate, such pass-through business entities generate more in income than the traditional large corporations (formally C corporations) that most people refer to when saying corporation.  C corporations must pay a corporate income tax (to be discussed below), while pass-through entities avoid such taxes at the company level.

The Trump tax plan would cap the tax rate on such pass-through income at 25%.  This would not only create a new level of complexity (a new category of income on which a different tax is due), but would also only be of benefit to those who would otherwise owe taxes at a higher rate (the 35% bracket in the Trump plan).  If one were already in the 25% bracket, or a lower one, that ceiling would make no difference at all and would be of no benefit.  But for those rich enough to be in the higher bracket, the benefit would be huge.

Who would gain from this?  Anyone who could organize themselves as a pass-through entity (or could do so in agreement with their employer).  This would include independent consultants; other professionals such as lawyers, lobbyists, accountants, and financial advisors; financial entities and the partners investing in private-equity, venture-capital, and hedge funds; and real estate developers.  Trump would personally benefit as he owns or controls over 500 LLCs, according to Federal Election Commission filings.  And others could reorganize into such an entity when they have a tax incentive to do so.  For example, the basketball coach at the University of Kansas did this when Kansas created such a loophole for what would otherwise be due under its state income taxes.

f)  The tax cuts for middle-income groups would be small or non-existent:  While the Trump tax proposal, as published, repeatedly asserts that they would reduce taxes due by the middle class, there is little to suggest in the plan that that would be the case.  The primary benefit, they tout (and lead off with) is a proposal to almost double the standard deduction to $24,000 (for a married couple filing jointly).  That standard deduction is currently $12,700.  But the Trump plan would also eliminate the personal exemption, which is $4,050 per person in 2017.  Combining the standard deduction and personal exemptions, a family of four would have $28,900 of exempt income in 2017 under current law ($12,700 for the standard deduction, and personal exemptions of four times $4,050), but only $24,000 under the Trump plan.  They would not be better off, and indeed could be worse off.  The Trump plan is also proposing that the child tax credit (currently a maximum of $1,000 per child, and phased out at higher incomes) should be raised (both in amount, and at the incomes at which it is phased out), but no specifics are given so one cannot say whether this would be significant.

g)  Deduction for state and local taxes paid:  While not stated explicitly, the plan does imply that the deduction for state and local taxes paid would be eliminated.  It also has been much discussed publicly, so leaving out explicit mention was not an oversight.  What the Trump plan does say is the “most itemized deductions” would be eliminated, other than the deductions for home mortgage interest and for charity.

Eliminating the deduction for state and local taxes appears to be purely political.  It would adversely affect mostly those who live in states that vote for Democrats.  And it is odd to consider this tax deduction as a loophole.  One has to pay your taxes (including state and local taxes), or you go to jail.  It is not something you do voluntarily, in part to benefit from a tax deduction.  In contrast, a deduction such as for home mortgage interest is voluntary, one benefits directly from buying and owning a nice house, and such a deduction benefits more those who are able to buy a big and expensive home and who qualify for taking out a large mortgage.

h)  Importantly, there was much that was not mentioned:  One must also keep in mind what was not mentioned and hence would not be changed under the Trump proposals.  For example, no mention was made of the highly favorable tax rates on long-term capital gains (for assets held one year or more) of just 20%.  Those with a high level of wealth, i.e. the wealthy, gain greatly from this.  Nor was there any mention of such widely discussed loopholes as the “carried interest” exception (where certain investment fund managers are able to count their gains from the investment deals they work on as if it were capital gains, rather than a return on their work, as it would be for the lawyers and accountants on such deals), or the ability to be paid in stock options at the favorable capital gains rates.

C.  Corporate Income Taxes

More than the tax cuts enacted under Presidents Reagan and Bush, the Trump tax plan focuses on cuts to corporate income (profit) taxes.  Proposals include:

a)  A cut in the corporate income tax rate from the current 35% to just 20%:  This is a massive cut.  But it should also be recognized that the actual corporate income tax paid is far lower than the headline rate.  As noted in an earlier post on this blog, the actual average rate paid has been coming down for decades, and is now around 20%.  There are many, perfectly legal, ways to circumvent this tax.  But setting the rate now at 20% will not mean that taxes equal to 20% of corporate profits will be collected.  Rather, unless the mechanisms used to reduce corporate tax liability from the headline rate of 35% are addressed, those mechanisms will be used to reduce the new collections from the new 20% headline rate to something far less again.

b)  Allow 100% of investment expenses to be deducted from profits in the first year, while limiting “partially” interest expense on borrowing:  This provision, commonly referred to as full “expensing” of investment expenditures, would reduce taxable profits by whatever is spent on investment.  Investments are expected to last for a number of years, and under normal accounting the expense counted is not the full investment expenditure but rather only the estimated depreciation of that investment in the current year.  However, in recent decades an acceleration in what is allowed for depreciation has been allowed in the tax code in order to provide an additional incentive to invest.  The new proposal would bring that acceleration all the way to 100%, which as far as it can go.

This would provide an incentive to invest more, which is not a bad thing, although it still would also have the effect of reducing what would be collected in corporate income taxes.  It would have to be paid for somehow.  The Trump proposal would partially offset the cost of full expensing of investments by limiting “partially” the interest costs on borrowing that can be deducted as a cost when calculating taxable profits.  The interest cost of borrowing (on loans, or bonds, or whatever) is currently counted in full as an expense, just like any other expense of running the business.  How partial that limitation on interest expenses would be is not said.

But even if interest expenses were excluded in full from allowable business expenses, it is unlikely that this would come close to offsetting the reduction in tax revenues from allowing investment expenditures to be fully expensed.  As a simple example, suppose a firm would make an investment of $100, in an asset that would last 10 years (and with depreciation of 10% of the original cost each year).  For this investment, the firm would borrow $100, on which it pays interest at 5%.  Under the current tax system, the firm in the first year would deduct from its profits the depreciation expense of $10 (10% of $100) plus the interest cost of $5, for a total of $15.  Under the Trump plan, the firm would be able to count as an expense in the first year the full $100, but not the $5 of interest.  That is far better for the firm.  Of course, the situation would then be different in the second and subsequent years, as depreciation would no longer be counted (the investment was fully expensed in the first year), but it is always better to bring expenses forward.  And there likely will be further investments in subsequent years as well, keeping what counts as taxable profits low.

c)  Tax amnesty for profits held abroad:  US corporations hold an estimated $2.6 trillion in assets overseas, in part because overseas earnings are not subject to the corporate income tax until they are repatriated to the US.  Such a provision might have made sense decades ago, when information systems were more primitive, but does not anymore.  This provision in the US tax code creates the incentive to avoid current taxes by keeping such earnings overseas.  These earnings could come from regular operations such as to sell and service equipment for foreign customers, or from overseas production operations.  Or such earnings could be generated through aggressive tax schemes, such as from transferring patent and trademark rights to overseas jurisdictions in low-tax or no-tax jurisdictions such as the Cayman Islands.  But whichever way such profits are generated, the US tax system creates the incentive to hold them abroad by not taxing them until they are repatriated to the US.

This is an issue, and could be addressed directly by changing the law to make overseas earnings subject to tax in the year the earnings are generated.  The tax on what has been accumulated in the past could perhaps be spread out equally over some time period, to reduce the shock, such as say over five years.  The Trump plan would in fact start to do this, but only partially as the tax on such accumulated earnings would be set at some special (and unannounced) low rates.  All it says is that while both rates would be low, there would be a lower rate applied if the foreign earnings are held in “illiquid” assets than in liquid ones.  Precisely how this distinction would be defined and enforced is not stated.

This would in essence be a partial amnesty for capital earnings held abroad.  Companies that have held their profits abroad (to avoid US taxes) would be rewarded with a huge windfall from that special low tax rate (or rates), totalling in the hundreds of billions of dollars, with the precise gain on that $2.6 trillion held overseas dependant on how low the Trump plan would set the tax rates on those earnings.

It is not surprising that US corporations have acted this way.  There was an earlier partial amnesty, and it was reasonable for them to assume there would be future ones (as the Trump tax plan is indeed now proposing).  In one of the worst pieces of tax policy implemented in the George W. Bush administration, an amnesty approved in 2004 allowed US corporations with accumulated earnings abroad to repatriate that capital at a special, low, tax rate of just 5.25%.  It was not surprising that the corporations would assume this would happen again, and hence they had every incentive to keep earnings abroad whenever possible, leading directly to the $2.6 trillion now held abroad.

Furthermore, the argument was made that the 2004 amnesty would lead the firms to undertake additional investment in the US, with additional employment, using the repatriated funds.  But analyses undertaken later found no evidence that that happened.  Indeed, subsequent employment fell at the firms that repatriated accumulated overseas earnings.  Rather, the funds repatriated largely went to share repurchases and increased dividends.  This should not, however, have been surprising.  Firms will invest if they have what they see to be a profitable opportunity.  If they need funds, they can borrow, and such multinational corporations generally have no problem in doing so.  Indeed, they can use their accumulated overseas earnings as collateral on such loans (as Apple has done) to get especially low rates on such loans.  Yet the Trump administration asserts, with no evidence and indeed in contradiction to the earlier experience, that their proposed amnesty on earnings held abroad will this time lead to more investment and jobs by these firms in the US.

d)  Cut to zero corporate taxes on future overseas earnings:  The amnesty discussed above would apply to the current stock of accumulated earnings held by US corporations abroad.  Going forward, the Trump administration proposes that earnings of overseas subsidiaries (with ownership of as little as 10% in those firms) would be fully exempt from US taxes.  While it is true that there then would be no incentive to accumulate earnings abroad, the same would be the case if those earnings would simply be made subject to the same current year corporate income taxes as the US parent is liable for, and not taxable only when those earnings are repatriated.

It is also not at all clear to me how exempting these overseas earnings from any US taxes would lead to more investment and more jobs in the US.  Indeed, the incentive would appear to me to be the opposite.  If a plant is sited in the US and used to sell product in the US market or to export it to Europe or Asia, say, earnings from those operations would be subject to the regular US corporate income taxes (at a 20% rate in the Trump proposals).  However, if the plant is sited in Mexico, with the production then sold in the US market or exported from there to Europe or Asia, earnings from those operations would not be subject to any US tax.  Mexico might charge some tax, but if the firm can negotiate a good deal (much as firms from overseas have negotiated such deals with various states in the US to site their plants in those states), the Trump proposal would create an incentive to move investment and jobs to foreign locations.

D.  Conclusion

The Trump administration’s tax plan is extremely skimpy on the specifics.  As one commentator (Allan Sloan) noted, it looks like it was “written in a bar one evening over a batch of beers for a Tax 101 class rather than by serious people who spent weeks working with tax issues”.

It is, of course, still just a proposal.  The congressional committees will be the ones who will draft the specific law, and who will then of necessity fill in the details.  The final product could look quite different from what has been presented here.  But the Trump administration proposal has been worked out during many months of discussions with the key Republican leaders in the House and the Senate who will be involved.  Indeed, the plan has been presented in the media not always as the Trump administration plan, but rather the plan of the “Big Six”, where the Big Six is made up of House Speaker Paul Ryan, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Kevin Brady, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch, plus National Economic Council Director Gary Cohn and Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin of the Trump administration.  If this group is indeed fully behind it, then one can expect the final version to be voted on will be very similar to what was outlined here.

But skimpy as it is, one can say with some certainty that the tax plan:

a)  Will be expensive, with a ten-year cost in the trillions of dollars;

b)  Is not in fact a tax reform, but rather a set of very large tax cuts;

and c)  Overwhelmingly benefits the rich.

Delusional: Is This What We Are to Expect from the New Trump Administration?

Definition of delusional in English:

delusional

ADJECTIVE

Characterized by or holding idiosyncratic beliefs or impressions that are contradicted by reality or rational argument, typically as a symptom of mental disorder:

‘hospitalization for schizophrenia and delusional paranoia’

‘he was diagnosed with a delusional disorder’

 Based on or having faulty judgement; mistaken:

‘their delusional belief in the project’s merits never wavers’

‘I think the guy is being a bit delusional here’

 

Donald J. Trump was inaugurated as President of the United States at 12:00 noon on January 20.  A day later, his new White House Press Secretary and Communications Director Sean Spicer in his very first press briefing of the new administration, launched a tirade against the press, for reporting (falsely he claimed) that attendance at the inauguration was less than the number who had attended Obama’s inauguration in 2009 (or indeed any prior inauguration). And he was visibly angry about this, as can be seen both in the transcript of the press briefing, and in a video of it.  He charged that “some members of the media were engaged in deliberately false reporting” and claimed that “This was the largest audience to ever witness an inauguration — period — both in person and around the globe.”

Furthermore, after many reports challenged Spicer’s assertions, the new administration doubled down on the charges.  Reince Priebus, the new White House Chief of Staff, vowed on Sunday that the new administration will fight the media “tooth and nail every day and twice on Sunday” over what they see as unfair attacks on Trump (by claiming, falsely they say, that the crowds had been larger at Obama’s inauguration).  And Kellyanne Conway, a spokesman for the White House and Counselor to the President, said on Sunday that what Press Secretary Spicer had asserted was not wrong but rather “alternative facts”.

Finally, one has Donald Trump himself, who claimed that he saw what “looked like a million, a million and a half people” present at his inauguration as he took the oath of office. One does not know how he was able to make such a count, and perhaps he should not be taken too seriously, but his administration’s senior staff appear to be obliged to back him up.

What do we know on the size of the crowds?  One first has to acknowledge that any crowd count is difficult, and that we will never know the precise numbers.  Unless each person has been forced to pass through a turnstile, all we can have are estimates.  But we can have estimates, and they can give some sense as to the size.  Most importantly, while we might not know the absolute size, we can have a pretty good indication from photos and other sources of data what the relative sizes of two crowds likely were.

So what do we know from photos?  Here we have a side-by-side photo (taken at Obama’s first inauguration and then at Trump’s) from the top of the Washington Monument, of the crowd on the Mall witnessing the event.  They were both taken at about the same time prior to the noon swearing-in of the new president, where the ceremony starts at 11:30:


inaugeration-attendance-2017-vs-2009

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The crowd in 2017 is clearly far smaller.  This has nothing to do with the white mats laid down to protect the grass (which was also done in 2013 for Obama’s second inauguration).  There are simply far fewer attendees.

There is also indirect evidence from the number of Metrorail riders that day.  Spicer said in his press briefing “We know that 420,000 people used the D.C. Metro public transit yesterday, which actually compares to 317,000 that used it for President Obama’s last inaugural.”  Actually these numbers are wrong, as well as misleading (since the comparison at issue is to Obama’s first inauguration in 2009, not to his second in 2013). As the Washington Post noted (with this confirmed by CNN) the correct numbers from the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (which operates the Metro system) are that there were 570,500 riders on Metro on Trump’s inauguration day, 1.1 million riders in 2009 on Obama’s first inauguration day, and 782,000 riders in 2013 on Obama’s second inauguration day.  What Trump’s press secretary said “we know” was simply wrong.

It is also simply not true that Trump drew a larger estimated TV audience than any president before.  Nielsen, the TV ratings agency, estimated that Trump drew 30.6 million viewers, while Obama drew 38 million viewers at his first inauguration.  And Reagan drew more, at 42 million viewers, for his first inauguration.  Furthermore, both Nixon (in 1973) and Carter (in 1977) drew more viewers than Trump, at 33 million and 34 million respectively. The Trump figure was far from a record.

So how many people attended Trump’s inauguration, and how does that figure compare to the number that Obama drew for his first inauguration?  A widely cited figure is that Obama drew an estimated 1.8 million for his first inauguration, but, as noted above, any such estimate must be taken as approximate.  But based on a comparison of the photos, experts estimate that Trump drew at most one-third of the Obama draw in terms of the number in attendance just on the Mall.  There were in addition many others at the Obama inaugural who were not on the Mall because they could not fit due to the crowding.

Why does this matter?  It matters only because the new Trump administration has made it into an issue, and in doing so, has made assertions that are clearly factually wrong.  Trump did not draw a record number to his inauguration, nor a record number of viewers, nor were there a record number of riders on the Washington Metro system.  These are all numbers, and they can be checked.  While we may not be able to know the precise number of those who attended, we can come to a clear conclusion on the relative size of those who attended this year versus previous recent inaugurations.  And Trump’s attendance was not at all close to the number who attended Obama’s first inaugural.

What is disconcerting is that Trump, his new Press Secretary, his Chief of Staff and others in his administration, should feel compelled to make assertions that are clearly and verifiably wrong, and then to attack the press aggressively for pointing out what we know. And this on his second day in office.  While this is not inconsistent with what the Trump team did during his campaign for the presidency, one would have hoped for more mature behavior once he took office.  And especially so for an issue which is fundamentally minor. It really does not matter much whether the number attending Trump’s inauguration was more or less than the number who had attended prior inaugurations.

Presumably (and assuming thought was given to this) they are setting a marker for what they intend to do during the course of the presidential term, with aggressive attacks on the press for reporting errors in their assertions or on contradictions with earlier statements.  If so, such a strategy, including denial of facts that can readily be verified, is truly worrisome. Facts should matter.  Not all that we will hear from the new administration will be so easy to check, and the question then is what can be believed.

Perhaps, and more worrying, they really believe their assertions on the numbers attending. If so, they are truly delusional.

Why It Is Important to Vote This November 8

trump-and-clinton-picture2-001

There is little need to repeat here the many reasons why the election of Donald Trump to the presidency (or indeed any position of authority) would be a disaster.  He has eminently disqualified himself by both his words and his actions, and I have little to add.  And there are many reasons why Hillary Clinton should be elected, not simply in order not to elect Trump.  Even her critics admit that she has the background and experience in both the executive and legislative branches of government – as First Lady (with an active role in policy discussions), as Senator from New York, and as Secretary of State for four years under President Obama –  that few candidates for the presidency could match.

Furthermore, even Donald Trump has said she is a fighter, and that is precisely what is needed if the policies that Obama has championed are to continue to move forward.  A Clinton administration will fight for action to address global warming, to moderate health care costs, to improve education, to reform immigration, to re-build our infrastructure, and more, just in the domain of domestic policy.  A Trump administration would move us backwards on each.  And I far prefer an administration that takes pride in making decisions based on what is in their head, as Obama has done, rather than based on what is in their gut, as Obama’s predecessor was proud to brag of.

As I write this, the polls indicate Hillary Clinton holds a substantial lead.  That may unfortunately have the effect of leading some share of Clinton supporters (and Trump opposers) not to bother to vote on November 8.  They may feel it would not matter, so why bother.  But there are important reasons why all those supporting Clinton, who want the country to move forward rather than backward, need to make the effort to vote.  This blog post will outline a few.

a)  Trump’s share in the vote might well be higher than what the polls indicate:  As of October 23, an average of recent polls indicates that Clinton leads Trump by about 7 percentage points nationally.  While in the US system the candidate receiving the most votes nationally is not necessarily the one elected (due to the electoral college system, so only the votes in a limited number of swing states decide the outcome, as discussed in this earlier blog post), a national margin of 7 percentage points is substantial and reflective of what is happening in the key states.

But the final vote may well be different.  First, it is common that there is a tightening in the race in the last few weeks of most American elections.  There is a good chance this might happen again here.  But second, and more fundamentally, it is important to recognize that the polls may not be assessing accurately the extent of Trump’s support.  This is not due to any kind of conspiracy, or incompetence, but rather because polling this year is particularly difficult to do well.  Trump is an especially controversial candidate, known for his racist as well as misogynist remarks in this campaign.  Some Trump supporters might not admit to a pollster that they support him.  His true support might be several percentage points higher than what the polls indicate, and there are indications that this may have been an issue during the polling for the primaries in at least some of the states. I am not saying that it necessarily is now, but rather that we just do not know.

b)  A focus by Trump on high turnout of his base, instead of a broadening of his base, is not an unreasonable strategy:  Most major party candidates for the presidency seek to broaden their base of support as the election approaches by appealing to the middle.  Trump has not done this.  His focus has been and continues to be on energizing his base, with a continued use of extremist remarks to stoke concerns (the election is rigged, Hillary is a crook whom I will throw into jail, I won’t necessarily accept the results of the election unless they show I won, and so on).

With a base of support that is well less than 50% (even if one discounts the polls to a significant extent; see above), such a strategy might be seen as making it impossible to win.  The moderate middle is not attracted, but indeed repelled.  But it is not necessarily an unreasonable strategy.

The key is to recognize that a very high share of eligible Americans do not vote.  In the 2012 presidential election, only 58% of the population that were eligible to vote in fact cast a ballot for the presidency.  If Trump is able to energize his base and get a high share of them to vote, they can end up winning.

This can be illustrated with some numbers.  Using the polling averages as worked out by the Huffington Post, and rescaling to remove the undecideds, then as of October 23, polling indicated that Clinton would receive 48% of the vote and Trump 41% (with others receiving 11%, primarily Gary Johnson of the Libertarians and Jill Stein of the Greens).  To arrive at these numbers, pollsters used various methods to try to take into account the likelihood that those being polled would actually vote.  But none of these methods are very good.  Some pollsters ask the individual whether they voted in the previous election. However, the share saying they voted is always substantially higher than the share we know actually did vote.  Or some pollsters adjust the figures based on patterns for the share of those who voted in the past who have a similar income or education level, or are of the same ethnic group, or some other such grouping (using exit polling).  But this also does not work very well since the share of different groups who vote changes from election to election depending on the candidates and other issues.

For the purposes here, which are simply illustrative, let’s assume that these polling numbers reflect accurately the share of the population who prefer each of the candidates, but not necessarily the shares of those who actually will vote.  Furthermore, let’s assume that 53% of Clinton’s supporters will actually vote while 63% of Trump’s supporters will (recall the actual average in 2012 was 58%).  Multiplying out the numbers to get those who actually will vote, one finds that Trump in such a scenario would receive a higher share of the vote than Clinton:

Supporters

Turnout

Voters

Share of Vote

Clinton

48%

53%

25.44

44.1%

Trump

41%

63%

25.83

44.8%

Other

11%

58%

6.38

11.1%

All

100%

 

57.65

100.0%

Turnout matters.  A strategy focussed on turning out a high share of your base supporters, by energizing them through extremist rhetoric with no suggestion of compromise, is not necessarily an irrational one, even if it means losing the more moderate voters.  You could end up with more votes than your opponent.

c)  The winning margin matters for Trump to accept the result of the election:  If Hillary Clinton wins the election, but by a relatively narrow margin, Trump has said that he will not necessarily accept the result.  Trump made this clear in the third presidential debate, and has repeated his remarks since then despite of, and in the face of, strong criticism.  An important strength of American democracy, which distinguishes it from what is seen in a number of other countries around the world, is that the loser of the election concedes and accepts the result.  It might take some time (and court challenges) to determine the winner, but in the end the loser has always graciously accepted the decision (as Al Gore did in 2000).

Trump has been intentionally ambiguous on whether he will.  But the larger the margin by which he loses, the more difficult it will be for him to contest the results.

d)  The winning margin matters for the Republicans to move on:  Trump has upended the national Republican Party by capturing a base, primarily of angry white males with less than a college education, who have said they are willing to take extreme measures to get what they want.  If Trump loses, but by a relatively narrow margin, one can be sure that there will be Trump-like candidates seeking the Republican nomination in 2020, and perhaps even Trump himself.

Strong supporters of the Democrats might feel that this may not be so bad.  Such a candidate would likely lose again.  But that would be short-sighted.  Democracies need a multi-party system, with at least two responsible parties that can each govern responsibly. One-party states, whether in Japan or elsewhere, end up in difficulty.  And one-party states are indeed rare.  Eventually, an opposition party wins, as the electorate tires of those in power and as those long in power become increasingly ineffective.

American democracy needs a responsible opposition party.  Republicans at the national level are not providing that now, and that is a problem for all of us.

e)  The winning margin matters for Clinton to govern effectively:  Everyone agrees that there is much that needs to be done.  But opponents of the measures a Clinton administration would promote to move the  country forward would be emboldened in their opposition should Clinton win by a relatively narrow margin.  The larger the margin, the more difficult it will be for her opponents to block her proposals.

f)  There is an innate inconsistency to be opposed to Washington gridlock, but also to be in favor of divided government:  Everyone agrees that gridlock in Washington is bad.  The country needs to move forward in numerous areas, but gridlock is blocking it.  At the same time, political scientists have long observed (and backed up in their research) that voters often prefer “balanced” government, where the executive branch is controlled by one party with the legislature by the other.

This arrangement may have worked well in periods in the past.  With the system of checks and balances built in to the US Constitution, one branch of government cannot change much alone, but must also receive the support of the other branches (with the judiciary playing an essential, but separate, role as well).

This changed, however, over the last two decades.  Rather than seek common ground on measures, with compromises in order to move things forward, Republicans in Congress decided to adopt a position of opposition.  As documented in the excellent book of Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein, It’s Even Worse Than It Looks, Republicans decided that if the administration supported something, they would be opposed.  This applied even on measures that they themselves had originally proposed.  The authors, one based at the left-of-center Brookings Institution and one at the right-of-center American Enterprise Institute, provide numerous examples.

Such opposition continues.  Last week, Senator John McCain (who at one time was considered a relative moderate among Republicans) said on a radio talk show that he and his colleagues will oppose any Supreme Court nominee of Hillary Clinton.  He said “I promise you that we will be united against any Supreme Court nominee that Hillary Clinton, if she were president, would put up. … I promise you.”  While a spokeswoman later sought to moderate his position, it does not appear that his views had in fact changed.

Such an approach to government, of united opposition to any proposals put forward by the chief executive, can work in a different form of government.  In parliamentary systems (such as in the UK), the opposition party will typically oppose any measures put forward by the prime minister.  But the prime minister represents a majority in parliament, and hence with party line votes the measure will pass.

But the US Constitution did not establish a parliamentary form of government.  Rather, the system set up by the US Constitution has an independently elected president, along with certain powers assigned to the legislature (such as to make laws, pass a budget, provide “advice and consent” on judicial and senior executive branch appointments, and more).  It is a system of checks and balances, and does not work well when one party decides to act like the opposition in a parliamentary system and routinely oppose measures proposed by the chief executive.

A large winning margin by Hillary Clinton will make it more difficult for a Republican majority to continue to act in this way, at least at the start of the new administration.  And while it is conceivable that the Democrats might win control of the Senate (they need to pick up a net of four seats, assuming Clinton wins so that Vice President Tim Kaine will have the tie-breaking vote), it is doubtful they will pick up the net of 30 seats required to win control of the House.  Too many seats have been gerrymandered.

Voters can resolve this by not voting for divided government, but rather for one party.  And if that party is not to be the one with Trump as president, that means the Democrats. What will not resolve the issues would be to vote for Clinton, but then vote for Republican candidates for the House and the Senate, including those who have sought to keep their distance from Trump, with a number saying they will not themselves vote for Trump.  But it is not really that vote that matters.  What matters is the vote they will take for the leadership of the House or the Senate, and whether that leadership says that they will oppose anything being proposed by Clinton, as they have for Obama.  If so, then gridlock will continue.

Conclusion

It would be surprising if Hillary Clinton were not to win this election.  I do not expect her to lose.  But it should be recognized that it is possible.  While the polls put her comfortably ahead as I write this, polls can be wrong, for reasons discussed above.  And we have seen two major such cases already this year.  Most expected British voters would reject the proposal in the June referendum to leave the European Union (Brexit).  Most polls indicated the vote would be in favor of staying.  Instead, it lost, and by the substantial margin of 52% to leave and 48% to stay.

To be fair, the polls in the Brexit referendum were relatively close, especially just before the day of the vote.  A better example of how the polls can be wrong in a major way was the vote in Colombia on October 2 on whether to accept the peace accord the government had negotiated with the FARC rebel army.  The war had been going on for decades, and about 220,000 Colombians had died over the years.  Polls before the vote indicated that over 60% of Colombians would vote in favor of the accord.  But it narrowly lost, by 50.2% to 49.8%.  It is not clear why, although there are many theories.  But one important factor was turnout.  Only 37% of eligible Colombian voters actually voted, perhaps because they believed the peace accord would win easily.  Voter turnout was especially hurt along the country’s Caribbean coast, where a hurricane, while it remained off shore, nonetheless delivered heavy rains on the day of the vote.  Support for the peace accord was especially high in that region, but turnout was low.

I would not predict that the polls in the US presidential elections are wrong, but that there can be uncertainties.  This is especially so this year.  And, for reasons discussed above, the issue is not only who will win or lose, but also what the winning margin will be.  So vote this November 8, and vote for Hillary Clinton.

 

Health Insurance Coverage is Improving, Especially in States that Have Not Tried to Block It

health-insurance-cover-2008-to-2015-by-medicaid-states-census-bureau-sept-2016

 

A.    Introduction

The US Census Bureau released on September 13 this year’s editions of three reports which normally come out at about this time:  Its report on Income and Poverty in the United States, its report on Health Insurance Coverage, and its Supplemental Poverty Measure report, which provides figures on poverty when government transfer programs are taken into account.  They all cover the period through 2015.

The reports show exceptionally strong improvements in a range of measures of income and well-being.  To start, real median household incomes rose by an estimated 5.2% in 2015. There has never before been such a large jump in real incomes since this series first started being reported in 1967.  Perhaps more importantly than the overall gains, the Census Bureau data also show that the gains were widespread across income groups (with the poorest 10% decile in fact seeing the largest gains) as well as across race and ethnic groups.  It was not only the rich who saw an improvement.

I should hasten to add that these results are from just one year, and that they follow far less satisfactory results over the last several years.  Real household incomes plummeted in the 2008 downturn in the last year of the Bush administration, and were flat or fell further in most years since.  It should also be recognized that the Census Bureau figures are based on household surveys, and thus that there will be statistical noise (as the Census Bureau emphasizes).  It remains to be seen whether the positive news will continue.  But with labor markets now at or close to levels generally considered to be full employment, and with real wages now rising, it is likely there has been an improvement also in 2016. But we will only know a year from now what the survey results will be.

The Health Insurance Coverage report found that health insurance coverage also improved significantly in 2015, as it had also in 2014 but importantly not in the years before.  The big change in 2014 was of course the coming into effect of the Affordable Care Act (ACA, or ObamaCare) reforms, with the introduction of the market exchanges on which the previously uninsured could purchase insurance at a reasonable price, as well as the expansion of Medicaid coverage in a number of states (but not all).  There are now over 20 million more Americans who have health insurance coverage than had it in 2013, before ObamaCare went into effect.

Not surprisingly, the reports received a good deal of news coverage.  It was the lead front page article of the Washington Post the next day, for example.  Not surprisingly also, the White House released a summary of some of the key, highly positive, findings.  But while the news reports focussed on the strong income gains, and many also noted the health insurance gains, I have not seen a chart such as that above which shows the gains in historical context, and with the Medicaid expansion states and non-expansion states shown separately.  This post will discuss that chart and what is going on behind it.

B.  The Gains in Health Insurance Coverage Under ObamaCare

The chart above shows the percentage share of the population without health insurance coverage in each year from 2008 to 2015, with this shown separately for those states where Medicaid was permitted to expand (27 states plus Washington, DC, with the status taken as of January 1, 2015) and for those states that did not allow Medicaid to expand (23 states). The figures were calculated from the underlying data tables (the “HIC” series) used in the Census Bureau Health Insurance Coverage report.  The data series used here comes from the American Community Survey (ACS), which has an extremely large sample size which permits a meaningful state by state breakdown.  It asks whether the individual was uninsured at the time of the interview.

The Health Insurance Coverage report also presents figures at the national level obtained from a different survey called the Current Population Survey – Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS ASEC), which is undertaken each Spring. This survey has a smaller sample size than the ACS, which is fine for national level estimates but which does not suffice for state by state breakdowns (as one needs when looking at Medicaid coverage by state).  It also asks the somewhat different question of whether the individual had health insurance cover for the entire previous year, rather than on the date of the interview.

The share of the US population without health insurance coverage fell sharply in 2014 and again in 2015.  Using figures from the ACS, it had fluctuated modestly in the period from 2008 through 2013, rising from 14.6% of the population in 2008 to 15.5% as unemployment hit its peak in 2010, and then recovering slowly to 14.5% by 2013.  It then dropped sharply to 11.7% in 2014 and to 9.4% in 2015.  Critics of ObamaCare asserted at the start that the reforms did not and would not lead to more Americans being covered by health insurance.  That was certainly not the case.  By 2015, there were 20.7 million more Americans with health insurance cover than had it in 2013.  This is far from minor, and can make an immense difference in a family’s life.

The CPS ASEC figures also show a sharp drop in the share of the population without health insurance, with these figures quoted in many of the news reports one might see. With its differing definition of who is not covered (for the entire year, rather than on the date of the interview as in the ACS), the shares are somewhat lower, at 9.1% in 2015.  It fell from a 13.3% share in 2013 and a 10.4% share in 2014 in these estimates of the share of the population who did not have health insurance over the entire year.

By whichever measure, health insurance cover expanded sharply once the ObamaCare reforms entered into effect.  By the ACS measure, the share of the population without health insurance fell from 14.5% of the population in 2013 to 9.4% two years later, or by 5.1% points.  It can be expected to fall further, although not to zero.  Certain groups in the population (including certain immigrant groups) are not eligible for purchasing insurance through the ObamaCare market exchanges, and thus the non-insured rate will never go to zero.  While the floor is not certain, many analysts set the figure at perhaps 4 or 5% of the population.  If so, then the improvement seen so far is approximately half of what might ultimately be achievable, provided politically imposed roadblocks are all removed.

C.  Medicaid Expansion

The chart also shows the shares of the population without health insurance separately for the states that expanded Medicaid coverage (supported by the ACA and an integral part of it) and those that did not. The system as designed under the ACA has that the working poor and lower income classes would obtain health insurance under Medicaid, with eligibility expanded from those with income up to generally 100% of the federal poverty line previously, to 133% from 2014 onwards.  Those with incomes higher than this would purchase insurance from the market exchanges, with a subsidy that phases out as incomes grow and is phased out entirely at 400% of the federal poverty line.  Thus the entire population, no matter how poor, would be able to obtain health insurance.

However, the Supreme Court decided that Medicaid expansion could not be made obligatory on the states even if the federal government is paying for it (as it is here). Rather, the states could choose whether or not to allow Medicaid to expand cover to include those making up to 133% of the federal poverty line.  It would be financially foolish for the states not to, as the federal government would cover 100% of the cost of the expanded coverage in the first several years, with this then phasing down to 90% of the additional cost from 2020 onwards.  But even with the states covering 10% of the cost from 2020, a net gain can be expected for the state budget due to the increased incomes of hospitals, doctors, nurses, and other health car suppliers who would now be providing care to the poor when they need it (and be compensated for it), and the state tax revenues that would be generated by such higher incomes. The states would also save by being able to reduce state payments made to cover a portion of the costs incurred by hospitals to provide health services to patients who were not able to pay for their treatments, due to a lack of health insurance.

Despite this, 23 states (as of January 2015) decided that the low income earners in their states would not be allowed to receive health insurance cover from Medicaid.  Note that these families must indeed be working to be able to have an income of 100% of the federal poverty line (of $24,300 in 2016 for a household of four).  Assuming one wage earner, working 40 hours a week for 52 weeks a year (no vacations), they would need to earn a wage of $11.68 per hour to earn this much, or well above the minimum wage of $7.25 per hour.  More likely there would be two income earners in such a household, each earning a wage rate of closer to the minimum wage, but likely not able to obtain full time employment of 40 hours a week for 52 weeks a year.  These households are not slackers, but rather are working hard to get by.

Yet these states are refusing to allow such households to obtain health insurance cover from Medicaid, despite a net financial benefit to their state budgets.  And since the Affordable Care Act was structured that such families would obtain health insurance coverage from Medicaid, and not purchased (with a partial subsidy assistance) through the health insurance market exchanges, they are now left with nothing.  These states have deliberately created a gap where their low income workers are effectively denied access to health insurance.

The reason these states have done this is of course political.  The 23 states (as of January 1, 2015) that had not permitted Medicaid to expand were states with Republican governors or Republican legislatures (or mostly both) that refused to allow Medicaid in their states to serve such families.  And as noted above, this was done even at financial cost to themselves.  Nebulous arguments were given that while the federal government would be paying for most or all of the costs in the near term, the federal government might reverse this later, due perhaps to budget pressures.  But there is no reason why such a reversal should be expected, nor why, if there were indeed such budget pressures, it would apply to Medicaid but not to other federally funded programs that those states are taking advantage of.  Furthermore, if this did indeed happen at some uncertain point in the future, the Medicaid programs in the state could be cut then, rather than now in anticipation that this might somehow happen at some unknown point in the unknown future.

As shown in the chart at the top of this post, the share of the population without health insurance cover fell to just 7.2% in 2015 in the 27 states (plus Washington, DC) that allowed Medicaid to expand, far below the 12.3% in those states that blocked that expansion.  Compared to 2013, before the ObamaCare reforms went into effect, this was a reduction of 5.6% points in the states that allowed Medicaid to expand, versus a reduction of 4.5% points in the states where the expansion was blocked.  Put another way, the share of the population without health insurance fell by 43% in the states that allowed Medicaid to expand, versus a fall of just 27% in the states that blocked it.

Furthermore, the far better improvement in the Medicaid expansion states was from a lower starting point in 2013 (of 12.8% of their population without health insurance, versus 16.7% in the states blocking Medicaid expansion).  One should expect that improvement becomes more difficult as one comes closer to the achievable ceiling in coverage.

But the chart also serves to show that the states blocking Medicaid expansion historically had a high share of their populations without health insurance.  These were conservative states, often relatively poor, with political establishments that did not exhibit great concern over the fact that a high share of their population could not get health insurance.  But not all were poor.  Indeed, the state with the absolute worst share of any state was oil-rich Texas, with 22.1% of its population without health insurance in 2013, and still 17.1% without it in 2015 (where both figures were the highest in the US in the respective years). Out of 50 states (plus Washington, DC), Texas was the worst.  This was a political choice, not an economic one.

It should also be noted that the reduction in the shares of uninsured in those states that allowed Medicaid to expand was not due solely to the increased number of Medicaid enrollees.  Between 2013 and 2015, those states saw 12.2 million of their citizens obtain health insurance cover.  Of these, 7.6 million came from increased enrollment under Medicaid, while 4.5 million came from other health insurance cover (including through the ObamaCare market exchanges).  And as noted above, they were starting from a point where a relatively high share of their citizens (compared to the states where Medicaid expansion was blocked) enjoyed some form of health insurance cover previously.

D.  The States That Allowed Medicaid to Expand Also Had Lower Premiums on ObamaCare Health Insurance Plans than on Company-Based Plans

There is also an interesting finding that the states that allowed Medicaid to expand not only saw greater improvements in the shares of their citizens who enjoyed health insurance cover, but also saw insurance premiums on their ObamaCare exchanges (as of 2016) which were lower than comparable company-sponsored plans in those states.

recent study by the Urban Institute (a non-profit think tank) found that for similar health insurance cover, the full prices (before subsidies) of health insurance purchased through the ObamaCare exchanges were 10% lower on average (at the national level), than the full prices of similar health insurance plans provided through employers. The calculations were made state by state, as costs varied by state, and varied widely.  But on average, the ObamaCare plans cost 10% less.

This may be come as a surprise to many.  The issue is that most employees do not know what the full cost of their company-sponsored health insurance plans in fact is.  The full cost includes not only what they pay directly, but also what they pay indirectly through the employer (which they typically never see) as part of their overall labor compensation package.  But it is part of their wages and a cost that must be covered.

The 10% lower cost is an average at the national level.  But the Urban Institute figures are calculated at the state level, and one can calculate from this how they vary between those states that expanded their Medicaid coverage and those states that blocked it. The results are interesting.  The simple unweighted averages (I did not have the underlying data necessary to calculate a weighted average properly) were:

Health Insurance Plan Costs:  ObamaCare Exchanges vs. Company Based

Unweighted averages

All States      

 -8%

Medicaid Expanded

-15%

Medicaid Not Expanded

   0%

The unweight average lower cost of the ObamaCare plans was 8% nationally.  This is different from the 10% figure the Urban Institute cited because the lower costs were especially large in some of the larger states, such as New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Ohio (all of which had lower costs of 18% or more).  In the unweighted averages, these larger states are weighted the same as smaller states.

But what is especially interesting is that the (unweighted) average lower cost of the ObamaCare plans compared to company based plans was 15% in the states that approved Medicaid expansion but was no different on average in the states that blocked Medicaid expansion.

Why would this be?  It was probably not due to the Medicaid expansion itself.  One would expect Medicaid expansion would lead to lower health insurance costs for those obtaining health insurance.  The reason is that hospitals and other health service providers will have lower costs due to less uncompensated care of patients without health insurance coverage (as more would have Medicaid coverage), and one can expect that these lower costs would then be reflected in lower health insurance costs for those who do pay. However, this should affect health insurance costs of policies purchased through the ObamaCare exchanges and company-based policies similarly, and hence would not likely affect the ratio in cost between the two.

However, the Medicaid expansion states were also the ones that encouraged competitive ObamaCare market exchanges to be established.  They did not seek to block these markets or keep them from functioning well.  They encouraged competition rather than did whatever they could to hinder it.

It was likely due to this greater degree of competition in those states that supported, rather than hindered, the ObamaCare exchanges that explains the lower costs in those states. This is also consistent with the fact noted above that many of the larger states saw especially low costs (relative to company-based plans) than were observed among the relatively smaller states.  The larger states will in general see greater competition, and competition drives down prices.

E.  ObamaCare Issues Remain

One can no longer dispute that ObamaCare has succeeded in its primary goal of making it possible for a higher share of the population to obtain the security of health insurance coverage.  But this certainly does not mean there are no issues with ObamaCare.

Republicans openly acknowledge that they continue to do whatever they can to block the expansion of access to health insurance under ObamaCare.  And these efforts to hinder ObamaCare have achieved some success.  As noted above, states that blocked Medicaid expansion have seen less of a reduction in their uninsured populations than was achieved in the states that allowed that expansion.  But the efforts to block access to ObamaCare went beyond blocking Medicaid.  Most of these states also decided not to implement directly the ObamaCare market exchanges in their states.  The Affordable Care Act envisioned that to best allow local control and adaptation to a state’s particular circumstances, state level authorities would be allowed and indeed encouraged to establish such exchanges.  Fortunately, the law also included a back-up provision that should a state choose not to establish such an exchange, the federal government could do it to allow the citizens of that state access to an affordable health insurance plan.  This was not without difficulties; recall the initial failure of the federal level computer systems when enrollment opened in October 2013 and the system was overwhelmed.

More recently, several of the larger health insurers have decided to withdraw from some of the markets in which they had previously offered health insurance plans on the ObamaCare market exchanges.  Most recently, Aetna announced in August that it would withdraw in 2017 from 11 of the 15 states where it had been offering such plans.  This followed earlier announcements by UnitedHealth and Humana that they also would be scaling back offerings significantly.  This will reduce competition among the insurers in a number of markets around the country, limiting the options enrollees in those markets will have.  Indeed, in some counties around the country there will be only one insurer offering coverage through the exchanges, and (unless something is now done) one county in Arizona where there will be no such insurer offering coverage through the exchanges.

The issues could certainly be addressed, if there is the will.  All major new social programs, including Medicare and Social Security were fine-tuned through new legislation following their launch to address issues that developed.  And this was done on a bipartisan basis. The problem now is that the Republican Party, for political reasons, is doing what it can to block any such adjustments, with the openly stated aim of trying to destroy ObamaCare.

It is still to be seen whether these efforts will succeed.  If they do, the US will revert to its previous system, with millions of Americans denied access to health insurance and with sharply rising health care costs that outpaced general inflation for decades.