The Economics of Rocket and Spacecraft Development: What Followed From Obama’s Push for Competition

A.  Introduction

The public letter was scathing, and deliberately so.  Made available to the news media in April 2010 just as President Obama was preparing to deliver a major speech on his administration’s strategy to put the US space program back on track, the letter bluntly asserted that the new approach would be “devastating”.  Signed by former astronauts Neil Armstrong (Commander of Apollo 11, and the first man to walk on the moon), Jim Lovell (Commander of the ill-fated Apollo 13 mission), and Eugene Cernan (Commander of Apollo 17, and up to now the last man to walk on the moon), the letter said that reliance on commercially contracted entities to carry astronauts to orbit “destines our nation to become one of second or even third rate stature”.  The three concluded that under such a strategy, “the USA is far too likely to be on a long downhill slide to mediocrity”.

What was the cause of this dramatic concern?  Upon taking office in January 2009, the Obama administration concluded that a thorough review was needed of NASA’s human spaceflight program.  Year’s earlier, following the breakup of the Columbia Space Shuttle as it tried to return from orbit – with the death of all on board – the Bush administration had decided that the Space Shuttle was not only expensive but also fundamentally unsafe to fly.  Due to its cost while still flying the Shuttle, NASA did not have the funds to develop alternatives.  The Bush administration therefore decided to retire the then remaining Space Shuttles by 2010.  The Obama administration later added two more Space Shuttle flights to allow the completion of the International Space Station (ISS), but the final Space Shuttle flight was in 2011.  The Bush administration plan was that the funds saved by ending the Space Shuttle flights would be used to develop what they named the Constellation program.  Under Constellation, two new space boosters would be developed – Ares I to launch astronauts to the ISS in low earth orbit and Ares V to launch astronauts to the moon and possibly beyond.  A new spacecraft, named Orion, to carry astronauts on these missions would also be developed.

To fund Constellation, the Bush administration plan was also to decommission the ISS in 2015, just five years after it would be completed.  Work on the ISS had begun in 1985 – when Reagan was president -, the first flight to start its assembly was in 1998, and assembly was then expected to be completed in 2010 (in the end it was in 2011).  The total cost (as of 2010) had come to $150 billion.  But in order to fund Constellation, the Bush administration plan was to shut down the ISS just five years later, and then de-orbit it for safety reasons to burn it up in the atmosphere.

The Obama administration convened a high-level panel to review these plans.  Chaired by Norman Augustine, the former CEO of Lockheed Martin (and commonly referred to as the Augustine Commission), the committee issued its report in October 2009.  They concluded that the Constellation program was simply not viable.  Their opening line in the Executive Summary read “The U.S. human spaceflight program appears to be on an unsustainable trajectory.”  Mission plans (including the time frames) were simply unachievable given the available and foreseeable budgets.  There would instead be billions of dollars spent but with the intended goals not achieved for decades, if ever.  A particularly glaring example of the internal inconsistencies and indeed absurdities was that the Aries I rocket, being developed to ferry crew to the ISS, would not see its first flight before 2016 at the earliest.  Yet the ISS would have been decommissioned and de-orbited by then.

The Augustine Commission recommended instead to shift to contracting with private entities to ferry astronauts to orbit.  Such a program for the ferrying of cargo supplies to the ISS had begun during the Bush administration.  By 2009 this program was already well underway, and the first such flight, by SpaceX using its Falcon 9 rocket, was successfully completed in May 2012.  The commission also recommended that work be done to develop the technologies that could be used to determine how a new heavy-lift launch vehicle should best be designed.  For example, would it be possible to refuel vehicles in orbit?  If so, the overall size of the booster could be quite different, as there would no longer be a need to lift both the spacecraft and the fuel to send it on to the Moon or to Mars or to wherever, all on one launch.  And the commission then laid out a series of options for exploration that could be done with a new heavy-lift rocket (whether a new version of the Ares V or something else), including to the Moon, to Mars, to asteroids, and other possibilities.  It also recommended that the life of the ISS be extended at least to 2020.

And it was not just the Augustine Commission expressing these concerns.  Earlier, in a report issued in August 2009, the GAO stated that “NASA is still struggling to develop a solid business case … needed to justify moving the Constellation program forward into the implementation stage”.  It also noted that NASA itself, in an internal review in December 2008 (i.e. before Obama was inaugurated) had “determined that the current Constellation program was high risk and unachievable within the current budget and schedule”.  The GAO also noted that Ares I was facing important technical challenges as well (including from excessive vibration and from its long narrow design, where there was concern this might cause it to drift into the launch tower when taking off).  While it might well be possible to resolve these and other such technical challenges given sufficient extra time and sufficient extra money, it would require that extra time and extra money.

President Obama’s strategy, as he laid out in a speech at the Kennedy Space Center on April 15, 2010 (but which was already reflected in his FY2011 budget proposals that had been released in February), was built on the recommendations of the Augustine Commission.  The proposal that received the most attention was that to end the Ares I program and to contract instead with competing commercial providers to ferry crews to the ISS.  And rather than continue on the Ares V launch vehicle (on which only $95 million had been spent by that point, in contrast to $4.6 billion on Ares I), the proposal was first to spend significant funds (more than $3 billion over five years) to develop and test relevant new technologies (such as in-orbit refueling) to confirm feasibility before designing a new heavy-lift launch vehicle.  That design would then be finalized no later than 2015.  Third, work would continue on the Orion spacecraft, but with a focus on its role to carry astronauts beyond Earth orbit, as well as to serve as a rescue vehicle should one be needed in an emergency for the ISS.  Fourth, the life of the ISS itself would be extended to at least 2020 from the Bush plan to close and destroy it in 2015.  And fifth, Obama proposed that the overall NASA budget be increased by $6 billion over five years over what had earlier been set.

While the proposal was well received by some, there were also those who were vociferously opposed – Armstrong, Lovell, and Cernan, for example, in the letter quoted at the top of this post.  But perhaps the strongest, and most relevant, opposition came from certain members of congress.  Congress would need to approve the new strategy and then back it with funding.  Yet several key members of Congress, with positions on the committees that would need to approve the new plans and budgets, were strongly opposed.  Indeed, this opposition was already being articulated in late 2009 and early 2010 as the direction the Obama administration was taking (following the issuance of the Augustine Commission report) was becoming clear.

Perhaps most prominent in opposition was Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama, who repeatedly spoke disparagingly of the commercial competitors (meaning SpaceX primarily) who would be contracted to ferry astronauts to the ISS.  In a January 29, 2010, statement, for example (released just before the FY2011 budget proposals of the Obama administration were to be issued), Shelby asserted “China, India, and Russia will be putting humans in space while we wait on commercial hobbyists to actually back up their grand promises”.  Shelby called it “a welfare program for amateur rocket companies with little or nothing to show for the taxpayer dollars they have already squandered”.

Shelby was not alone.  Other senators and congressmen were also critical.  Most, although not all, were Republicans, and one might question why those who on other occasions would articulate a strong free-market position, would on this issue argue for what was in essence a socialist approach.  The answer is that under the traditional NASA process, much of the taxpayer funds that would be spent (many billions of dollars) would be spent on federal facilities and on contractors in their states or congressional districts.  The Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, was the lead NASA facility for the development of the Ares I and Ares V rockets, and Senator Shelby of Alabama was proud of the NASA money he had directed to be spent there.  Senators and congressmen from other states with the main NASA centers involved or with the major contractors (Texas, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, Utah) were also highly critical of the Obama initiative to introduce private competition.

The outcome, as reflected in the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 (passed in October 2010) and then in the FY2011 budget passed in December, was a compromise.  The administration was directed basically to do both.  The legislation required that a new heavy-lift rocket be designed immediately, with the key elements similar to and taken from the Ares V design (and hence employ the same contractors as for the Ares V).  It was eventually named the Space Launch System (or SLS – or as wags sometimes called it “the Senate Launch System” since the key design specifics were spelled out and mandated in the legislation drafted in the Senate).  It also directed that the cost should be no more than $11.5 billion and that it would be in operation no later than the end of 2016.  (As we will discuss below, the SLS has yet to fly and is unlikely to before 2022 at the earliest, and over $32 billion will have been spent on it before it is operational.)

The compromise also allowed the administration to proceed with the development of commercial contracts to ferry astronauts to the ISS, but with just $307 million allocated in FY2011 rather than the $500 million requested.  For FY2011 to FY 2015, only $2,725 million of funding was eventually approved by congress, or well less than half of the $5,800 million originally requested by the Obama administration in 2010 for the program.  As a result, the commercial crew program, as it was called, was delayed by several years.  The first substantial contracts (aside from smaller amounts awarded earlier to various contractors to develop some of the technologies that would be used) were signed only in August 2012.  At that time, $440 million was awarded to SpaceX, $460 million to Boeing, and $212.5 million to Sierra Nevada Corporation, to develop the specifics of their competing proposals to ferry astronauts to the ISS.

The primary contracts were then awarded to SpaceX and to Boeing in September 2014.  NASA agreed to pay SpaceX a fixed total of $2,600 million, and Boeing what was supposed to be a fixed total of $4,200 million (but with an additional $287.2 million added later, when Boeing said they needed more money).  Each of these contracts would cover the full costs of developing a new spacecraft (Crew Dragon for SpaceX and Starliner for Boeing) and then of flying them on the rockets of their choice (Falcon 9 for SpaceX and the Atlas V for Boeing) to the ISS for six operational missions (with an expected crew of four on each, although the capsules could hold up to seven).  The contracts would cover not only the cost of the rockets used, but also the costs of an unmanned test flight to the ISS and then a manned test flight to the ISS with a crew of two or more.  If successful, the six operational missions would then follow.

We now know what has transpired in terms of missions launched.  While the SLS is still to fly on even a first test mission (the current schedule is for no earlier than November 2021, but many expect it will be later), SpaceX successfully carried out an unmanned test of its spacecraft (Crew Dragon) in a launch and docking with the ISS in March 2019, a successful test launch with a crew of two to the ISS in May 2020, an operational launch with a NASA crew of four to the ISS in November 2020, and a second operational launch with a NASA crew of four to the ISS in April 2021 (where I have included under “NASA” crews from space agencies of other nations working with NASA).  The April 2021 mission also reused both a Crew Dragon capsule from an earlier mission (the one used on the two-man test flight in May 2020) and a previously used first stage booster for the Falcon 9 rocket.  Previously, out of caution, NASA would only allow a new Falcon 9 booster to be used on these manned flights – not one that had been flown before.  They have now determined that the reused Falcon 9 boosters are just as safe.

As I write this, the plans are for a third operational flight of the Crew Dragon, again carrying four NASA astronauts to the ISS, in late October or November 2021.  And as I am writing this, SpaceX has just launched (on September 15) a private, all-civilian, crew of four for a three-day flight in earth orbit.  They are scheduled to return on September 18.  And there may be a second such completely commercial flight later in 2021.

Boeing, in contrast, has not yet been successful.  While Boeing was seen as the safe, traditional, contractor (in contrast to the “amateur hobbyists” of SpaceX), and received substantially higher funding than SpaceX did for the same number of missions, its first, unmanned, test launch in December 2019, failed.  The upper stage of the rocket burned for too long due to a software issue, and the spacecraft ended up in the wrong orbit.  While they were still able to bring the spacecraft back to earth, later investigations found that there were a number of additional, possibly catastrophic, software problems.  After a full investigation, NASA called for 61 corrective actions, a number of them serious, to be taken before the spacecraft is flown again.

As I write this, there have been further delays with the Boeing Starliner.  After several earlier delays, a re-run of the unmanned test mission of the capsule was scheduled to fly on July 30, 2021.  However, on July 29, a newly arrived Russian module attached to the ISS began to fire its thrusters due to a software error, causing the ISS to start to spin.  While it was soon brought under control, the decision was made to postpone the flight test of the Boeing Starliner by a few days, to August 3, to allow time for checks to the ISS to make sure there was no serious damage from the Russian module mishap.  But then, in the countdown on August 3 problems were discovered in the Starliner’s control thrusters.  Many of the valves were stuck.  On August 13, the decision was made to take down the capsule from the booster rocket, return it to a nearby facility, confirm the cause of the problem (it appears that Teflon seals failed), and fix it.  There will now be a delay of at least two months, and possibly into 2022.

Thus the unmanned test flight of the Boeing Starliner will only be flown at least two and a half years (and possibly three years, or more) after the successful unmanned test flight of the SpaceX Crew Dragon capsule in March 2019.  And as noted before, Boeing was supposed to be the safe choice of a traditional defense and space contractor, in contrast to the hobbyists at SpaceX.

While flight success is, in the end, the most important and easy to observe metric, also important is how much these alternative approaches cost.  That will be the focus of this post.  The cost differences are huge.  While not always easy to measure (this will be discussed below), the differences in the costs between the traditional NASA contracting and the more commercial contracts that paid for the services delivered are so large that any uncertainty in the cost figures is swamped by the magnitude of the estimated differences.

We will first look at the costs of developing and flying the principal heavy-lift rockets now operational in the US.  While they have different capabilities, which I fully acknowledge, the differences in the costs cannot be attributed just to that.  We will then look at the costs of developing and flying the three capsule spacecraft we now have (or will soon have) in the US:  the SpaceX Crew Dragon, the Boeing Starliner (more properly, the Boeing CST-100 Starliner), and the Orion being built under contract to NASA by Lockheed Martin.  The differences in capabilities here are also significant, but one cannot attribute the huge cost differences just to that.

This blog post is relatively long, with a good deal of discussion on the underlying basis of the estimates for the various figures as well as on the capabilities (and comparability) of the various rockets and spacecraft reviewed.  For those not terribly interested in such aspects of the US space program, the basic message of the post can be seen simply by focussing on the charts.  They are easy to find.  And the message is that NASA contracting on the commercial basis that the Obama administration proposed for the carrying of crew to the ISS (and which the Bush administration had previously initiated for the carrying of cargo to the ISS) has been a tremendous success.  SpaceX is now routinely delivering both cargo and crews to orbit, and at a cost that is a small fraction of what is found with the traditional NASA approach.  One sees this in both the development and operational costs, and the differences are so large that one cannot attribute this simply to differing missions and capabilities.

B.  The Rockets Reviewed and Their History

The chart at the top of this post shows the cost per kilogram to launch a payload to low earth orbit by the primary heavy-lift launch vehicles currently being used (or soon to be used) in the US.  This is only for the cost of an additional rocket launch – what economists call the marginal cost.  The cost to develop the rocket itself is not included here, as that cost is fixed and largely the same whether there is only one launch of the vehicle or many.  We will look at those development costs separately in the discussion below.

To get to the cost per kilogram, one must start with what each rocket is capable of carrying to low earth orbit and then couple this with the (marginal) cost of an additional launch.  We will review all that below.  But first a note on the data underlying these figures.

For a number of reasons, comparable data on the costs and even the maximum lift capacities of these various rockets are not readily available.  One has to use a wide range of sources.  Among the primary ones I used (for both the payload capacities and the costs of the rockets discussed in this and in the following sections, as well as for the costs for the spacecraft discussed further below), one may look here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and here.

There will, however, be issues with the precision of any such estimates, in particular for the costs.  For a number of reasons, such comparisons (again especially of the costs) are difficult to make.  Several of those reasons are discussed in an annex at the end of this post.  Due to the difficulties in making such comparisons, differences in costs per kilogram of payload lifted to orbit of 10 or 20% certainly, but also even of 40 or 50%, should not be viewed as necessarily significant.  However, we will see that the differences in costs between developing and launching rockets and spacecraft with the traditional NASA approach and the approach based on competition that Obama introduced to manned space flight are far greater than this.  Indeed, we will see that the costs are several times higher, and often even an order of magnitude or more higher.  Differences of such magnitude are certainly significant.

To start, rockets differ in capabilities, and one must adjust for that.  The most important measure is lifting capacity – how many kilograms of payload can be carried into orbit:

The rockets to be examined here are limited to US vehicles (hence none of those from China, Russia, Europe, and elsewhere) and to heavier boosters sizeable enough to carry manned vehicles.  Ares I is included even though it flew on only one test flight (and only a partial one at that) before its development was ended, in order to show how its capacity would have compared to other launchers.  It would be similar in size to the alternatives.  But its (incomplete) development costs were already more than an order of magnitude higher than that of the Falcon 9, as we will discuss below.

The other boosters to be examined here are the Falcon 9 (of which there are two versions – with the first stage booster either expended or recovered), the Atlas V and Delta IV Heavy (both made by the United Launch Alliance – a 50/50 joint venture of Boeing and Lockheed Martin that, when formed in 2006, had a monopoly on heavy launch vehicles in the US), the Space Launch System (still to be tested in its first launch), and the Falcon Heavy (of which there are also two versions, with the first stage boosters either expendable or recoverable).

As noted, the Falcon 9 can be flown in two versions – with the first stage booster either expended (allowed to fall into the ocean) or recovered.  Since the first stage of a rocket will normally be the most expensive part of a rocket, Elon Musk sought to develop a booster where the first stage could be recovered.  And he did.  (He also, for a time, sought to recover similarly the second stage of the Falcon 9, but ultimately abandoned this.  The cost of a second stage is less, so there is less benefit in recovering it, while the difficulty, and hence the cost, is greater.  He eventually concluded it was not worth it.)

The Falcon 9 first stage is recovered by flying it back either to the launch site or to a floating platform in the ocean, where it slows down and lands by re-igniting its engines.  The videos can be spectacular.  But this requires that a portion of the fuel be saved for the landing, and hence the maximum payload that can be carried is less.  However, the cost savings (discussed below) are such that the cost per kilogram to orbit will be lower.

I have not been able to find, however, a precise figure for what the payload penalty will be when the first stage is recovered.  SpaceX may be keeping this confidential.  SpaceX does provide, at its corporate website, a figure for the maximum payload on a Falcon 9.  It is 22,800 kilograms, but this has been interpreted to be what the payload will be when the first stage uses 100% of its fuel to launch the payload into orbit, with that booster then allowed to fall into the ocean.  But a figure for what the maximum payload can be when the booster is recovered is not provided.  The Wikipedia entry for the Falcon 9, for example, only provides a figure for what was a heavy load on an actual launch (with the booster recovered).  This does not mean this would be the maximum possible load.

For the calculations here, I therefore used the payload capacity figures for the Falcon Heavy, taking the ratio between the payload that can be carried in the fully recoverable version to the payload in the expended version.  Elon Musk has indicated that this payload penalty on the Falcon Heavy is about 10%.  Applying this ratio to the Falcon 9 full capacity figure of 22,800 kg, and rounding down to 20,000 kg, should be a reasonable estimate of the maximum payload on the recoverable version of the rocket, and close enough for the purposes here.  The ratios for the Falcon Heavy and the Falcon 9 should be similar, as the first stage of the Falcon Heavy is essentially three first stages of the Falcon 9 strapped together (with the second stage the same in each), and the fuel that would be needed to be saved to allow for the recoveries and landings of the first stage boosters should be similar.

With this configuration where the Falcon Heavy is essentially three Falcon 9 first stage boosters strapped together, SpaceX was able to build an extremely large booster.  It is currently by far the largest operational such vehicle in the US stable, and indeed is currently the largest in the world.  The SLS will be larger if it becomes operational, but it is not at that point yet.  By building on the Falcon 9, the development costs of the Falcon Heavy were relatively modest, although Elon Musk has noted it turned out to be more complicated than they had at first thought it would be.  And with the three boosters that make up the first stage of Falcon Heavy similarly recoverable, one has even more spectacular videos of pairs of the boosters landing together back at the launch site (the third is recovered on a barge in mid-ocean). There is some penalty in the maximum payload weight that can be carried (about 10% as noted above), but the cost savings far exceed this (discussed below), leading to a cost per kilogram of payload that is almost a third less than when these first-stage boosters are not recovered.

The Atlas V and the Delta IV Heavy are both produced by the United Launch Alliance, the 50/50 joint venture of Boeing and Lockheed.  Its creation in 2006 by bringing together into one company the sole two providers in the US at that time of large launch vehicles was questioned by many.  The first launch of the Falcon 9 came only later, in 2010.  But the primary customer was and is the US Department of Defense, and they approved it (and may indeed have encouraged it) as their primary concern was to preserve an assured ability to fly their payloads into orbit rather than the cost of doing so.

The Atlas series of vehicles were brought to the ULA from Lockheed (via a string of corporate mergers – the Atlas rocket was first developed by General Dynamics), and have a long history stretching back to the initial Mercury orbital launches (of Glenn in 1962) and indeed even before that.  The models have of course changed completely over the years, and importantly since the year 2000 with the first launch of the Atlas III model which used Russian-made RD-180 engines.  The RD-180 engines are now being phased out for national security reasons, but the planned follow on rocket (named the Vulcan, or more properly the Vulcan Centaur), has yet to fly.  The Vulcan will use engines made by Blue Origin, and there have been delays in getting those engines delivered for the initial test flights.

There are ten different models of the Atlas V that have flown, and several more were available if a customer was interested.  For the charts here, version #551 of the Atlas V has been used, as it has the heaviest lift capacity of the various versions and has flown at least ten times (as I write this in September 2021).

The Delta rocket also has a long history, with variants dating back to 1960.  it was originally built by Douglas Aircraft, which after a merger became McDonnell-Douglas, which was later acquired by Boeing.  Boeing then brought the Delta to the United Launch Alliance.  There are also several variants of Delta rockets that have been available, but the Delta IV Heavy version will be used in the charts here as it can carry the heaviest payload among them.  Until the first launch of the Falcon Heavy in 2018, the Delta IV Heavy had the greatest lift capacity of any rocket in the US stable.  But as one can see in the chart, the payload capacity of the Falcon Heavy is double that of the Delta IV Heavy.

The Space Launch System (SLS) dates to 2011, when the basic design was announced by NASA.  Key design requirements had been set, however, in congressional legislation drafted originally in the Senate and incorporated into the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 that was signed into law in October 2010.  As was discussed above, NASA was instructed by Congress to develop the SLS and in doing so that it should use the rocket technology that had been developed for the Space Shuttle and which would have been used for the Ares V.  The Space Shuttle technology dates from the 1970s with a first flight of the Shuttle in 1981.  Its main rocket engines (three at the rear of the Orbiter) were the RS-25, which burns liquid hydrogen and oxygen.  The Shuttle also had two solid rocket boosters attached, each of four segments.

The SLS design, following the mandates of Congress, uses four RS-25 engines in its core first stage.   Two solid rocket boosters, of the same type also as used for the Shuttle, are attached on the sides (although with five segments each rather than the four for the Shuttle).  The second stage of the SLS will use the RL-10 liquid-fueled engine – a design that dates to the 1950s and first flew in 1959.  Indeed, for the initial (Block 1) model of the SLS, the second stage is in essence the second stage that has been used for some time on the Delta III and Delta IV boosters.

The SLS design shares many elements with the Ares V booster that would have been part of the Constellation program begun by the Bush administration.  The first stage booster of the Ares V would have had five RS-25 rockets in its core (versus four of the RS-25s in the SLS) and also with two of the strap-on solid rocket boosters from the Shuttle (but with 5.5 segments each instead of the five on the SLS).  While work on the Ares V never progressed far beyond its design, with NASA spending only $95 million on it before it was canceled, the SLS is very much based on the design of the Ares V and with similar ties to the Space Shuttle.

The engine technologies have of course evolved substantially over time, with upgrades and refinements as more was learned.  And using existing designs should certainly have saved both time and money.  But neither happened.  Congress directed that the SLS should be operational by 2016, and early NASA plans were for it to be flying by 2017, but as of this writing it has yet to have had even a test flight.  As noted previously, the first test launch is currently scheduled for November 2021, but many expect this will be further delayed.  And as we will see below, despite the use of previously developed technology for most of the key components (in particular the rocket engines), the costs have been quite literally astronomical.

Finally, the Ares I booster is included here for comparison purposes.  Its first stage would have been the same solid rocket booster used for the Space Shuttle (but just one booster rather than two, and of five segments), while the second stage would have used a version of the J-2 liquid-fueled engine.  This engine was originally developed in the early 1960s for use in the upper stages of the Saturn 1B and Saturn V rockets then being developed for the Apollo program.  There have been numerous upgrades since, of course, and some would say the J-2 version developed for the Ares I (named the J-2X) was close to a new design.

There was only one, partial, test flight of the Ares I before the program was canceled.  That flight, in October 2009, was of the first stage only (the solid rocket booster derived from the Space Shuttle), with just dummies of the second stage and payload to simulate the flight dynamics of that profile.  It reached a height (as planned) of less than 30 miles.  While deemed a “success” by NASA, the launch caused substantial unanticipated damage to the launch pad, plus the parachutes designed to return the first stage partially failed.

As will be discussed below, while the Ares I never became operational, the amount spent on its (partial) development had already far exceeded that of comparable rockets.  It was also facing substantial technical issues that could be catastrophic unless solved (including from excessive vibration and a concern that with its tall, thin, design it might drift into the launch tower on lift-off).  Finally, as noted before, the rocket’s mission would be to ferry astronauts to the ISS, yet under the Bush administration’s plan to abandon and de-orbit the ISS by 2015 (in order to free up NASA funds for the Constellation program), the first operational flight (as forecast in 2009) would not be until 2016.  Nonetheless, Obama’s decision to cancel the program was severely criticized.

C.  The Cost of Developing the Rockets

In considering the costs of any vehicle, including rockets and spacecraft, one should distinguish between the cost of developing the technology and the cost of using it.  Development costs are upfront and fixed, regardless of whether one then uses the rocket for one launch or many.  Operational costs per launch are then a measure of what it would cost for an additional launch – what economists call the marginal cost.

While the concepts are clear, the distinction can be difficult to estimate.  The costs may often be mixed, and one must then try to separate out what the costs of just the launches were from the cost of developing the system.  But reasonable estimates are in general possible.

To start with development costs:

First, in the case of Ares I all the costs incurred were development costs as there were no operational launches.  Figures on this are provided in the NASA budget documents for each fiscal year.  A total of $4.6 billion was spent on the program between fiscal years 2005 (when the program was launched) and 2010 (when it was canceled).

But at that point the program was far from operational.  The first operational flight was not going to be before 2016 at the earliest, and very likely later.  To make the comparison similar to the costs of other rocket programs (which have reached operational status), one should add an estimate of what the additional costs would have been to reach that same point.  But there is only a partial estimate of what those additional development costs would have been.  As is standard, the FY2010 NASA budget had five-year cost forecasts (i.e. for the next four years following the request for the upcoming fiscal year) for each of the budget line items, and at that point the forecast was that the Ares I program would cost an additional $8.1 billion in fiscal years 2011 through 2014.  Furthermore, this expected expense of over $2 billion per year would not be declining over time but in fact rising a bit, and would likely continue for several years more at a similar rate or higher until Ares I was operational.

Even leaving out what the additional development costs would have been beyond FY2014 (probably an additional $2 billion per year for several more years), the expected costs through FY2014 would have already been huge, at $12.7 billion.  This is incredibly high for what should have been a relatively simple rocket (based on components that were already well used), although we will see similarly high costs in the development of the SLS.  Why they are so high is difficult to understand, particularly as the Ares I is a booster whose first stage is simply one of the solid rocket boosters from the Shuttle program (and indeed initially physically taken from the excess stock of such boosters left over at the end of the Shuttle program, although modified with an extra segment added in the middle to bring it to five segments from four).  And the second stage was to be built around an upgraded model of the old J-2 engine.

In sharp contrast to these costs for the Ares I, the development costs of the similarly sized Falcon 9 rocket as well as the far larger Falcon Heavy are tiny, at just $300 million and $500 million respectively.  Are those figures plausible?  Since SpaceX is not a publicly listed company, its financial statements are not published.  However, it does have funders (both banks and others providing loans, as well as those taking a private equity position) so financial information is made available to them.  While confidential, it often leaks out.  Plus there are public statements that Elon Musk and others have made.  And importantly, as a start-up founded in 2002, it was a small company without access to much in the way of funding in the period.  They could not have spent billions.

One should acknowledge, however, as Elon Musk repeatedly has, that NASA provided financial assistance at a critical point.  SpaceX, Tesla, and Elon Musk personally, were all running low on cash in 2006, were burning through it quickly, and would soon be out of funds.  Then, in late 2006, NASA awarded SpaceX a $278 million contract under its new COTS (Commercial Orbital Transportation Services) program, to be disbursed as identified milestones were reached.  SpaceX was among more than 20 competitors for funds under this program, with SpaceX and one other (Orbital Sciences, with its own launch vehicle and spacecraft) winning NASA support.  The funding to SpaceX was later raised to $396 million (with additional milestones added) and was used to support the development of the Falcon 9 rocket, of the original version of the Dragon capsule to ferry cargo to the ISS, and the cost then to fly three demonstration flights (later collapsed to two) showing that the systems worked.  The second (and final) demonstration mission was a fully successful launch in May 2012 of the Falcon 9 carrying the Dragon capsule with cargo for the ISS, which successfully docked with the ISS and later returned to earth.  Following this, NASA has contracted with SpaceX for a series of cargo resupply missions to the ISS under follow-on contracts (under CRS, for Commercial Resupply Services) where it is paid for each successful mission.  As of this writing, SpaceX is now at the 23rd flight under this program.

NASA funds were important.  But they were only partial and not large, at less than $400 million to support the development of the Falcon 9, the Dragon capsule for cargo, and the initial demonstration flights.  They are consistent with a cost of developing the Falcon 9 alone of about $300 million.

The specific figure of $300 million to develop the Falcon 9 comes from a statement Elon Musk made in May 2011 on SpaceX’s history to that point.  He wrote that total SpaceX expenditures up to that point had been “less than $800 million”, with “just over $300 million” for the development of the Falcon 9.  The rest was for the development of the Dragon spacecraft (used to deliver cargo to the ISS) for $300 million, the cost of developing and testing in five flights SpaceX’s initial rocket the Falcon 1 (which had a single Merlin engine newly developed by SpaceX – the Falcon 9 uses nine Merlin engines), the costs of building launch sites for the Falcon rockets at Cape Canaveral, Vandenberg, and Kwajalein in the Pacific, as well as the cost of building all the corporate manufacturing facilities for the Falcon rockets and the Dragon.  Musk noted that the financial accounts are confirmed by external auditors, as they would be for any sizeable firm.

Separately, in 2017 a Senior Vice President of SpaceX (Tim Hughes), in testimony to Congress, noted that the development cost of Falcon 9 had been $300 million and $90 million for the earlier Falcon 1 rocket, and that NASA had independently verified these figures (in the report here, as updated).

The $300 million cost estimate looks plausible.  Unlike NASA (as well as firms such as Boeing), as a new start-up SpaceX simply would not and did not have the funding to spend much more.  But even if it were several times this, it would still be far less than what the cost of the similarly sized Ares I had been.

The estimate of $500 million to develop the Falcon Heavy also comes from statements made by Musk.  It is also plausible.  As noted above, the Falcon Heavy is basically a set of three Falcon 9 first-stage boosters strapped together, topped by a second stage (as well as payload fairing) that is the same as that on the Falcon 9.  Musk has noted that it was not as easy to do develop the Falcon Heavy as they had initially expected (there are many complications, including the new aerodynamics of such a design), but even at $500 million the cost is a bargain compared to what NASA has spent to develop boosters.

The Space Launch System (SLS) has yet to fly.  As noted before, this will take place no earlier than November 2021, but many expect there will be further delays.  Furthermore, the plan is for only one test flight to be made.  It is not clear what will happen if this test flight is not successful.

One has in NASA budget documents how much has been spent each year for the SLS thus far, and what is anticipated will be required for the next several years.  A total of $26.3 billion will have been spent through FY2021 (i.e. to September 30, 2021).  But the SLS is not yet operational, and the NASA budgets do not provide a breakdown between the cost of developing the SLS and the cost of launching it.  And there is not a clear distinction between the two.  Indeed, even the initial test flight has been labeled the Artemis 1 mission.  It will not be manned, but it will carry the Orion spacecraft (also being tested) on a month-long flight that will take it to the moon, go into lunar orbit, and then leave lunar orbit to return to earth with a splashdown and recovery of the Orion.

If successful, the second launch of the SLS will not be until September 2023 at the earliest.  While this flight would be manned and would loop around the Moon, some, at least, consider it also a test flight – testing all the systems under the conditions of a crew on board.

In part this is semantics, but treating the period until the end of FY2023 as the SLS still in the development phase, the total NASA is expected to have spent developing the SLS will be $32.4 billion.  While its payload capacity is 50% larger than that of the Falcon Heavy, it would have cost 65 times as much to bring it to the point of being operational.  While there are of course important differences, it is difficult to understand why the development of the SLS will have cost 65 times, and possibly more, than the cost of developing the Falcon Heavy.  It is especially difficult to understand as the rocket engines (the main cost for a booster) of the SLS are models used on the Space Shuttle, the strap-on solid rockets are also from the Space Shuttle, and the RL10 engine used on the second stage is derived from that used on earlier US rockets, dating all the way back to the 1950s.

D.  The Cost of Launching the Rockets

Once developed, there is a cost for each launch.  One wants to know the pure marginal cost of an additional launch, excluding all of the development costs, as those costs are in the past and will be the same regardless of what is now done with the newly developed rocket (economists refer to those past costs as sunk costs).

In practice the costs can be difficult to separate.  For private, commercial, vehicles, there may be some public information on what the firm providing the launch services is charging, but the price being charged for any specific flight is often treated as private and confidential, where the agreed upon price was reached through a negotiations process.  And the price paid will presumably include some margin above the pure marginal costs to help cover (when summed across all the launches that will be done) the original cost of developing the rockets plus some amount for profits.  It is even more difficult to determine for the SLS, as one only has what is published in the NASA budget documents for the amount being spent on the overall SLS program, where that total combines the cost of both developing and then launching the vehicle.  NASA has not provided a break-down, and deliberately so.  But one does have in the budget numbers a year-by-year breakdown, which one can use as the development costs (for the initial version of the SLS) will largely be incurred before the vehicle becomes operational, and the operational costs after.  This will be used below.

Even with such provisoes, reasonable estimates of the costs are so hugely different that the basic message is clear:

SpaceX is most transparent on its costs.  Standard prices are given on its corporate website, of $62 million for a Falcon 9 launch and $90 million for a Falcon Heavy.  The site does not specify whether these are for the expendable or recoverable versions, but based on other information, it appears that the $62 million for the Falcon 9 reflects the cost of an expendable Falcon 9, while the $90 million for the Falcon Heavy is for the recoverable version.  The $62 million for the Falcon 9 is similar to what was charged in the early years for the Falcon 9 before the ability to recover its first stage booster was developed.  And Elon Musk has said that the cost of the fully expendable version of the Falcon Heavy maxes out at $150 million, which implies that the $90 million figure shown on its website is for the version where all three of the first stage boosters are recovered.

The $35 million figure for the cost of the Falcon 9 when its first stage is recovered is then an estimate based on a $62 million cost which is assumed to apply when the first stage cannot be recovered.  In an interview in 2018, Musk said that the cost of the first stage booster is about 60% of the cost of a Falcon 9 launch, with 20% for the second stage, 10% for the payload fairing, and 10% for the operations of the launch itself.  These are clearly rounded numbers, but based on them, 60% of $62 million is $37 million, with the remaining 40% then $25 million.  Assuming, generously, that the cost to refurbish the booster for a new flight, plus some amortization cost (e.g. $3.7 million per flight if it can be reused for 10 flights), would be $10 million, then a cost per flight with recovered first stage boosters would be about $35 million per flight.  This is broadly consistent with a statement made by Christopher Couluris (director of vehicle integration at SpaceX) in 2020 that SpaceX can bring down the cost per flight to “below $30 million per launch”, and that “[The rocket] costs $28 million to launch it, that’s with everything”.  The $35 million figure for the recoverable version of the Falcon 9 might well be on the high side, but as was noted previously, I am deliberately erring on the high side for the cost estimates of SpaceX and on the low side for the NASA vehicles.

Thus a figure of $35 million per launch of a Falcon 9 with the first stage booster recovered is a reasonable (and likely high) figure for what the cost is to SpaceX for such a launch.  The $62 million “list price” on the SpaceX website would then include what would be a generous (in relative terms) profit margin for SpaceX, covering the development costs and more.  According to the SpaceX website, as I write this there have been 125 launches of the Falcon 9 since its first flight in 2010, on 85 of these they have recovered the first stage booster, and on 67 flights they have reflown a recovered booster.  The first successful recovery of a first stage booster was in December 2015.

Competition matters, and following the more transparent prices being charged customers by SpaceX for the Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy (at least transparent in terms of “list prices”), ULA in December 2016 set up a website called “RocketBuilder.com” where anyone can work out which model of the Atlas V they will need.  There are ten models available, carrying payloads to low earth orbit from a low of 9,800 kg for the Atlas V model 401, up to 18,850 kg for the Atlas V model 551.  As noted before, we are examining the model 551 here as its payload is closest to what the Falcon 9 can carry (22,800 kg in the expendable version and 20,000 kg in the recoverable version).  The RocketBuilder.com website was “launched” with substantial publicity on December 1, 2016, accompanied by an announcement of substantial cuts in their prices for the Atlas V.  The CEO of ULA, Tony Bruno, announced that prices for the Atlas V model 401 would start at $109 million – down from $191 million before.  The price of the Atlas V model 551 would be $179 million when combined with a “full spectrum” of additional ULA services.

When set up, the RocketBuilder.com website included, importantly, what the list price would be of the Atlas V rocket model chosen.  Unfortunately, the RocketBuilder.com website as currently posted does not show this.  The reason might be that the CEO of ULA recently announced, on August 26, that ULA will take no more orders for flights of the Atlas V.  The Atlas V uses the Russian-made RD-180 rocket engine (two for each booster), and for national security reasons ULA has been required to cease purchasing these engines.  It must instead develop a new booster with key components all made in the US.  The RD-180 is an excellent engine technically, and is also both highly reliable and relatively inexpensive.  The decision to purchase it, from Russia, was made in the 1990s, and its first flight (on an Atlas III booster) was made in May 2000.  But political conditions have changed, and the most important client for ULA is the US Defense Department.

ULA has now received its final shipment of six RD-180 engines from Russia, and there will be a further 29 Atlas V flights (of all models, not just the model 551) up to the mid-2020s, using up the stock of RD-180 engines ULA has accumulated.  They have now all been booked.  ULA now hopes to launch next year, in 2022, its first test flight of the rocket it has been developing to replace both the Atlas V series as well as the Delta IV Heavy, which it has named the Vulcan Centaur.  It will use the new BE4 engines being developed by Blue Origin.  But that first test flight has been repeatedly delayed.  The first test flight was originally planned for 2019.

However, while the current RocketBuilder.com website of ULA no longer shows the cost to a customer of a launch of an Atlas V, one can find the former prices at an archived version of the RocektBuilder.com website.  While these are prices from a few years ago, they do not appear to have changed (at least as list prices).

The selection is much like that of finding the list price of a new car by going to the manufacturer’s website, selecting the model, adding various options, and then additional services one might want.  For the Atlas V, one can choose various levels of services, from a “Core” option to “Signature”, “Signature pro”, “Full Spectrum”, and “other customization”.  These appear to relate mostly to the division of responsibilities between ULA and the customer on various aspects of integrating the payload with the rocket.  ULA also offers two service packages it calls “Mission Insight” (things such as special access to ULA facilities) and “Rocket Marketing” (pre-launch events, press materials, videos, even “mission apparel”) that provide different levels of services and access.  It is sort of like the higher levels of benefits granted by airlines to their frequent flyers, although here they charge an explicit price for the package.

On the archived website, selecting the payload capacity and orbit that will lead to an Atlas V model 551 being required, the base cost (in 2016) shows as $153 million (as I write this in September 2021).  However, with a “Signature” level of service (which might be the base level required, as the “Core” option is not being allowed for some reason), the cost will be $163 million.  And $173 million for the “Full Spectrum” package.

The website also prominently displays a line for “ULA Added Value” which is then subtracted from that cost.  This does not reflect an actual price reduction by ULA, but rather savings that ULA claims the customer will benefit from if they choose an Atlas V launch by ULA.  The base (default) value of these savings that ULA claims the customer will benefit from is $65 million.  A breakdown shows this is made up of a claimed reduction in insurance costs of $12 million (what it otherwise would have been is not shown – just the “savings”), $23 million because ULA claims they will launch when it is scheduled to be launched and not several months later (which is more than a bit odd – one could produce whatever “savings” one wants by assuming some degree of delay in launch otherwise), and $30 million for what they call “orbit optimization”, which is a claim that the orbit they will place it in will lead to a lifetime for the satellite that is 17 rather than 15 years.

With such “savings” of $65 million (in a base case), ULA claims the actual cost for an Atlas V model 551 launch would not be $163 million, say (in the case considered above), but $65 million less, and thus only $98 million.  While still more than 50% higher, this brings it closer to the Falcon 9 list price of $62 million.  But this all looks like a marketing ploy – indeed rather like a juvenile charade – as that number depends on supposed savings from hypothetical levels.  The amount paid to ULA would still be the $163 million in this example.  And Elon Musk, among others, have questioned the assumptions.

The commonly cited $165 million cost of a launch of an Atlas V is therefore a reasonable estimate.  One should, however, keep in mind that this is both a “list price” subject to negotiation and that depending on the specific options chosen, the price could easily vary by $10 or $20 million around this.  The “savings” figures of ULA should not be taken too seriously, however.  There will be specific factors affecting costs and possible savings with any given payload, for other rockets as well as the Atlas V, and comparisons to some hypothetical will depend on whatever is chosen for that hypothetical.

ULA has provided less public material on the cost of a Delta IV Heavy launch.  This is in part as all of the customers, since the initial test flight in 2004, have been US government entities, and in particular the US Department of Defense.  There have only been 12 launches since that initial test flight, with ten of these classified missions for the Defense Department and two for NASA.  Furthermore, only three more are planned (two in 2022 and one in 2023), with ULA offering the planned Vulcan Centaur rocket (of which there will be a series of models that can carry progressively larger payloads, like for the Atlas V) as a substitute that can carry payloads of a similar size.

Both the Defense Department (especially) and NASA are less than fully transparent on what they have paid for these Delta IV Heavy launches.  The specific costs of the launches can be buried in the broader costs of the overall programs.  But the figures cited for a Delta IV heavy launch have typically been either $400 million (in a statement by ULA in 2015) or $350 million more recently.  It may well have been that, under pressure from the far lower costs of SpaceX, ULA has reduced its price over time.  For the purposes here, and erring on the side of being generous to ULA, I have used for the calculations a price of $350 million for a launch of an additional Delta IV Heavy.

The cost of an additional SLS launch is an estimated $2 billion, but there are conceptual as well as other issues with this figure.  First of all, NASA refused to release to Congress, nor to anyone else for that matter, what the cost of an additional launch would be.  Rather, one only had a single line item in the budget for the combined year-by-year cost of developing and testing the SLS, and also for building and then flying it.  That cost reached $3.1 billion in FY2020, $3.1 billion also in FY2021 and again in FY2022, and with it then forecast to decline slowly but remain at $2.8 billion in FY2026.  The SLS has not yet flown, and its first (uncrewed and the only planned) test flight is now scheduled for November 2021.  The first operational flight (with a crew of four) would not be until 2023 at the earliest, with the second in 2024 at the earliest.  The NASA plan is that there would then be one flight per year starting in 2026 and continuing on into the indefinite future.

But an estimate of the cost of an additional launch of the SLS leaked out, possibly due to an oversight but possibly not, in a letter sent to Congress in October 2019 from OMB. The letter addressed a range of budget issues for all agencies of the government, and set out the position of OMB and hence the administration on matters then being debated.  One was on use of the SLS.  Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama, who was then chair of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, had included in the language of the draft budget bill a requirement that NASA use the SLS for the launch of the planned NASA Europa Clipper mission (a satellite to Europa, a moon of Jupiter).  In a paragraph on page 7 of the letter, OMB recommended against this, as there is “an estimated cost of over $2 billion per launch for the SLS once development is complete”.  The letter noted that a commercial launch vehicle could be used instead for a far lower cost.

NASA later admitted (or at least would not deny) that this would be a reasonable estimate of the additional cost of such a launch.  And it is consistent with the budget forecasts that the SLS program would continue to require funding of close to $3 billion each year once flights had begun (at a pace of one per year, or less).  While the $3 billion is still greater than a figure of $2 billion per flight, the development costs for the SLS program will not end when the first SLS booster is operational.  The initial SLS, while a sizeable rocket, would still not have the lifting capacity that would be needed (under current NASA plans) for the planned lunar landings following the very first.

Specifically, the initial model of the SLS (scheduled to be tested this November 2021) is labeled the Block 1, and has a lifting capacity of 95,000 kg to low earth orbit.  The figures for the Block 1 are the ones that are being used in the charts in this post.  However, its capacity would only be sufficient for the first three flights (including the test flight), where the third flight would support the first landing of a crew on the moon under the Artemis program.  Following that, a higher capacity model, labeled the SLS Block 1B, would need to be developed, with a lifting capacity to low earth orbit of 105,000 kg.  To achieve that, a new second stage would be developed using four of the RS-10 rocket engines (versus a second stage with just a single RS-10 engine in the Block 1 version).

Under current NASA plans the Block 1B version of the SLS would then be used only for four flights.  For missions after that an even heavier lift version of the SLS would be needed, with two, more powerful, solid rocket boosters strapped on to the first stage (instead of the solid rocket boosters derived from those used on the Space Shuttle).  These would increase the lifting capacity to 130,000 kg to low earth orbit.  Part of the reason for developing the Block 2, with the new solid rocket side boosters, is that NASA will have used up by then its excess inventory of solid rocket booster segments (from the Space Shuttle program) for the planned launches of the Block 1 and Block 1B versions of the SLS (with one set in reserve).  Using up the existing inventory makes sense.  It should save money – although those savings are difficult to see given the expense of this program.  But that inventory is limited and will suffice only for up to eight flights of the SLS.  Hence the need for a replacement following that, which led to the design for the Block 2.

There will be development costs for the new second stage (with four RS-10 engines rather than one) for the Block 1B and then for the new, more powerful, strap-on solid rocket boosters for the Block 2.  What share of the approximately $3 billion that would be spent each year for the development of these new models of the SLS has not been broken out in the NASA budget – at least not in what has been made public.  But given that only very limited work has been done thus far on the new second stage for the Block 1B and even less on the new solid rocket boosters to be used for the Block 2, continuing development costs of $1 billion per year looks plausible.

At $2 billion per flight, the cost of a SLS launch is huge.  And this does not include any amortization to cover the development costs.  As noted above, those costs are expected to reach over $32 billion by FY2023.  The costs per launch for the other rockets shown on the chart, including the Falcon Heavy, will include in the prices charged some margin to cover the original development costs.  Commercial companies must do this to recover the costs of their investments.  That amount would be gigantic if added for the SLS in order to make its cost figure more comparable to that of the alternatives.

The question is how many flights of the SLS there will be before a more cost-effective alternative starts to be used.  Note that the alternative need not be limited to another giant rocket with a similar lift capacity.  The SLS itself will not be large enough to carry in a single launch all that will be required on the Artemis missions to the moon.  Rather, there would be separate launches on a range of boosters to carry what would be required.  Indeed, a NASA plan developed in 2019 for the launches that will be necessary through to 2028 as part of the Artemis missions to the Moon envisaged 37 separate launches, of which only 8 would be of the SLS (including its initial test launch).  One can break up the cargoes in many different ways.

While speculative, and really only for the point of illustration, one might assume that there will be perhaps 10 flights of the SLS before more cost-effective alternatives are pursued.  If so, then to cover the over $32 billion development cost one would need to add over $3 billion per flight to make the figures comparable to the costs of the other, commercial, launchers.  That is, the cost would then be over $5 billion per flight for the SLS rather than $2 billion.  This would, however, now be more of an average cost per flight than a true marginal cost, and speculative as we do not know how many flights of the SLS there will ultimately be (other than that it will not likely be many, given its huge cost).  Hence I have kept to the $2 billion figure, which is already plenty high.

Even at $2 billion per flight for the SLS, the cost is over 13 times the cost of a Falcon Heavy (in the version where the boosters are all thrown into the ocean rather than recovered).  The lift capacity of the SLS is 50% more, but it is difficult to imagine that that extra capacity could only be achieved at a cost (even ignoring the huge development cost) that is more than 13 times as much.

What has happened on the Europa Clipper mission provides a useful lesson.  Following a review and consultations with Congress, the Biden administration on July 23, 2021, announced that the Europa Clipper would be flown on a Falcon Heavy instead of the SLS.  The total contract amount with SpaceX for all the launch services is just $178 million (which will include the special costs of this unique mission).  There were several reasons to make the change, in addition to the savings from a cost of $178 million rather than $2 billion.  One is simply that by using the Falcon Heavy they will be able to launch in October 2024.  No SLS will be available by that time, nor indeed for several years after.  While a more direct route to Jupiter would have been possible with the heavier lift capacity of the SLS, the Europa Clipper would have had to be kept in storage for several years until a SLS rocket became available.  Separately, NASA discovered there would be a severe vibration issue due to the solid rocket boosters on the SLS, which the delicate spacecraft would have not have been able to handle.  To modify the Europa Clipper to make it able to handle those vibrations would have cost an additional $1 billion.

Finally, it is clear that the politics has changed.  Senator Shelby of Alabama has been the figure most insistent on requiring use of the SLS to launch the Europa Clipper.  With the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (located in Huntsville, Alabama) the lead NASA office responsible for the SLS, a significant share of what is being spent on the SLS is being spent in Alabama.  And as Chair of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Senator Shelby was in a powerful position to determine what the NASA budget would be.  But as a Republican, Senator Shelby lost the chairmanship when the Senate came under Democratic control in January 2021, plus he has announced he will not run for re-election in 2022. His influence now is thus not what it was before, and NASA can now pursue a more rational course on the launch vehicle.

E.  The Cost of Developing and Operating Spacecraft for Crews

NASA has also used its new, more commercial, contracting approach for the development and then use of private spacecraft to carry crew to the ISS.  This was indeed the proposal of President Obama in 2010 that was so harshly criticized, as discussed at the beginning of this post.  We now know how that has worked out:  SpaceX is flying crews to the ISS routinely, while Boeing, a traditional aerospace giant which was supposed to be the safe choice, has had issues.  We also can compare the costs under this program (for both SpaceX and Boeing) to that of developing the Orion spacecraft, where Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor operating under the more traditional NASA contracting approach.

There are, of course, important differences between the Orion and the spacecraft developed by SpaceX (its Crew Dragon, sometimes referred to as the Crew variant of the Dragon 2 as the capsule is a model derived from the original Dragon capsule used for ferrying cargo to the ISS), and by Boeing (which it calls the CST-100 Starliner, or just Starliner for short).  The SpaceX Crew Dragon and the Boeing Starliner will both be used to ferry astronauts to the ISS in low earth orbit, while the Orion is designed to carry astronauts to the Moon and possibly beyond.

But there are important similarities.  They are all capsules, use heat shields for re-entry, and can seat up to six astronauts (Orion) or seven (Crew Dragon and Starliner), even though NASA plans so far have always been for flights of just four astronauts each time.  They are all, in principle, reusable spacecraft. The interior volume (habitable space for the astronauts) is 9 cubic meters on Orion, 9.3 cubic meters on Crew Dragon, and 11 cubic meters on Starliner.

Orion will also be launched with a Service Model attached, which is being built by Airbus under contract to the European Space Agency.  This Service Module will have the fuel and engines required to help send Orion from earth orbit to the moon, and then fully into lunar orbit and back, as well as power (from solar panels) and supplies of certain consumable items required for longer space flight durations.  With this, Orion will be able to undertake missions of up to 21 days.  The self-contained Crew Dragon can carry out missions of up to 10 days, while the Starliner has the capacity of just 2 1/2 days – providing time to reach the ISS and later return, but not much else.

The cost of developing and building the European Service Module for Orion is being covered by the European Space Agency as its contribution to the program.  For better comparability to the Crew Dragon and Starliner spacecraft, the costs of the Service Module for Orion have been excluded from the cost of Orion in the charts below, as it is primarily the Service Module that will give the Orion the capabilities to go beyond earth orbit – capabilities that the Crew Dragon and Starliner do not have.  Had the costs of the Service Module been included (as the Orion is, after all, dependant on it), the disparity in costs between it and the Crew Dragon or Starliner would have been even larger.

The development of Orion began in 2004, as part of the Constellation program of the Bush administration, and has continued ever since.  NASA spent $1.4 billion on it in FY2020, again in FY2021, and the budget proposal is to do so again in FY2022.  Aside from an uncrewed flight in 2014 that was principally to test its heat shield design, the Orion has yet to fly.  Its first real test, still unmanned, will be as part of the first test flight of the SLS, which as noted above is now scheduled for November 2021.

SpaceX and Boeing were awarded the new form of competitive contracts by NASA to build their new spacecraft, demonstrate that they work (with a successful unmanned test flight to the ISS and then a manned flight test), and then fly them on six regular missions carrying NASA astronauts to the ISS.  The designs were by the companies – NASA was only interested in safe and successful flights ferrying crew to the ISS.

Each contractor could use whatever booster they preferred (SpaceX chose the Falcon 9 and Boeing the Atlas V), with the costs of those rocket launches included in the contracts.  The contract awards were announced in September 2014, several years later than the Obama administration had initially proposed due to lack of congressional funding.  The original contracts provided awards of up to $4.2 billion to Boeing and $2.6 billion to SpaceX, a discrepancy that reflected not that SpaceX would provide a lesser service, but rather that SpaceX offered in their contract bid a lower price.  Boeing was later granted an extra $287.2 million by NASA, in a decision that was criticized by the Office of the Inspector General of NASA, as Boeing (as well as SpaceX) had committed to provide the services agreed to under the contracts for the fixed, agreed upon, price.  Any cost overruns should then have been the responsibility of the contractor.  While Boeing argued it was not really a cost overrun under their contract, others (including the NASA Inspector General) disagreed.

Before the main contracts under the program had been approved, Boeing and SpaceX (along with others) had received smaller contracts to develop their proposals as well as to develop certain technologies that would be needed.  Including those earlier contracts (as well as the extra $287.2 million for Boeing), the total NASA would pay (provided milestones are reached) is $5,108.0 million to Boeing and $3,144.6 million to SpaceX.  For this, each contract provided that the new spacecraft would be developed and tested, with this then followed by six crewed flights of each to the ISS.  Thus the contracts include a combination of development and operational costs, which will be separated in the discussion below.

First, the development costs:

The estimates of the development costs for the SpaceX Crew Dragon and Boeing Starliner were made by subtracting, from the overall program costs, estimates made in the November 2019 report of the NASA Inspector General’s Office of the costs of the operational (flight) portions of the contracts.  Included in the development costs are the costs of the earlier contracts with SpaceX and Boeing to develop their proposals, as well as the extra $287.1 million that was later provided to Boeing.  Based on this, the total cost (to NASA) of supporting the development of the SpaceX Crew Dragon has been $1.845 billion, while the cost to NASA of the Boeing Starliner (assuming Boeing is ultimately successful in getting it to work properly) will be a bit over $3.0 billion.

The costs assume that the contractors will carry out their contractual commitments in full.  SpaceX so far has (the Crew Dragon is fully operational, and indeed SpaceX is now in its second operational flight, with a crew of four now at the ISS who are scheduled to return in November).  But Boeing has not.  As noted before, its initial unmanned test flight in December 2019 of the Boeing Starliner failed.  The planned re-try was on the pad in late July of this year and expected to fly within days when problems with stuck valves were discovered.  The Starliner had to be taken down and moved to a facility to identify the cause of the problem and fix it, with the flight not now expected until late this year at the earliest.  The extra costs are being borne by Boeing and have not been revealed, but in principle should be added to the $3,008 million cost figure in the chart above.  But they have been kept confidential, so we do not know what that addition would be.

In contrast to the cost to NASA of $1.845 billion for the SpaceX Crew Dragon and $3.0 billion to Boeing for its Starliner (under the new, competition-based, contractual approach), the amount NASA has spent on the Lockheed Orion spacecraft (under its traditional contractual approach) has been far higher.  More than $19.0 billion has already been spent through FY2021, and Orion is still in development.  Other than the early and partial test in 2014, the Orion has yet to be fully tested in flight.  The first such test is currently scheduled, along with the first test of the SLS, for later this year.  At best, it will not be operational until 2023, although more likely later.  Just adding what is anticipated will be needed to continue the development of Orion through FY2023, the total that NASA will spend on it will have reached $21.8 billion.  But the FY2023 cut-off date is in part arbitrary.  While the Orion capsule should be flying by then, there will still be additional expenditures to finalize its design and for further development.  These would add to the overall cost, but we do not know what those are expected to be.

Including costs just through FY2023, the cost of developing Orion is already close to 12 times what it has cost to develop the SpaceX Crew Dragon, and over 7 times what it has cost NASA to develop the Boeing Starliner.  While there are of course differences between the spacecraft, and it may be argued that the Orion is more capable, it is hard to see that such differences account for a cost that is 12 times that of the SpaceX Crew Dragon, or even 7 times the cost of the Boeing Starliner.  And as noted above, the greater capabilities of the Orion derive primarily from the European Service Module, whose costs are not included in the $21.8 billion figure for Orion.

The operational costs of the Orion will also be higher, using for comparability what it would be for a flight to earth orbit.  The most relevant figure is the cost per seat, and the calculations assume four seats will be filled on each flight (as NASA in fact plans, for both the missions to take astronauts to the ISS as well as for the Orion missions):

The costs include not only the cost of using the spacecraft itself, but also, and importantly, the cost of the rocket used to launch the spacecraft into orbit.  The costs of the rockets were included in the NASA contracts with SpaceX and Boeing, as the contracts were for the delivery of crews to the ISS.

The per-seat costs for the SpaceX Crew Dragon and Boeing Starliner contracts were calculated following the approach the NASA Inspector General used in its November 2019 report, using its estimate of the operational portion of the contracts with SpaceX and Boeing.  They come to $54.2 million per seat on the SpaceX Crew Dragon and $87.5 million on the Boeing Starliner (before rounding – in the Inspector General’s report one will see rounded figures of $55 million and $90 million, respectively).

The costs of building a new Orion capsule (which can then be reused to some degree) and flying it can be estimated from the announced NASA contracts with Lockheed for future missions.  In September 2019, NASA announced that it had awarded Lockheed an “Orion Production and Operations Contract”, where NASA would pay Lockheed for the Orion spacecraft for use on planned Artemis missions, but where the Orion spacecraft themselves would be reused to a varying degree that will rise over time.  The contracts for the Orions to be used in the first two flights (Artemis I and II) were signed some time before, and one can view these as part of the development costs (as these will be missions testing the Orion capsules).  The September 2019 announcement was that Lockheed would be paid a total of $2.7 billion for the next three missions (Artemis III, IV, and V), with re-use started to a limited degree.  Some high-value electronics, primarily, from the Orion used on the Artemis II mission would be re-used in the capsule for Artemis V.  Future costs would then fall further with greater re-use, but this should still be seen as speculative at this point.

Based on the $2.7 billion figure for the three Artemis missions following the first two, and with four seats on each of those three flights, the per-seat cost for the Orion alone would be $225 million.  To this one would need to add, for comparability, the cost of the rocket launcher.  The Artemis missions would use the SLS, which as discussed above, will cost $2.0 billion per flight.  This would add $500 million per seat (with the four seats per flight), bringing the total to $725 million per seat.

While that is indeed what the cost would be for the lunar missions, it is not an appropriate comparator to the costs of the Crew Dragon and Spaceliner capsules as the rockets they need are just for earth orbit.  For this reason, for the figure in the chart I have used the per-seat cost of what a launch on an Atlas V would be.  The Atlas V is the vehicle that will be used for the Boeing Starliner, and it has a comparable weight to the Orion (excluding the Orion European Service Module).  That per-seat cost, for a launch to earth orbit, would be $266.25 million.

Based on these figures, the operational cost per seat of an Orion capsule is almost 5 times what the per-seat cost is for the SpaceX Crew Dragon, and 3 times the cost on a Boeing Starliner.  These are huge differences.

F.  Conclusion

There was vehement opposition to Obama’s proposal to follow a more commercial approach to ferry crew to the ISS.  This came not only from former astronauts – who as pilots and engineers were taking a position on an issue they really did not know much about, but who were comfortable with the traditional approach.  Of more immediate importance, it came from certain politicians – in particular in the Senate.  The politicians opposed to the Obama proposals, led by Senator Shelby of Alabama, were also mostly (although not entirely) conservative Republican politicians who on other issues claimed to be in favor of free-market approaches.  Yet not here.

We now know that SpaceX delivered on the contracts, with now routine delivery of both cargo and crew to the ISS. Indeed, as I complete this post, an all-private crew of four have just returned from a three-day flight to earth orbit on a SpaceX Crew Dragon spacecraft (launched on a Falcon 9).  The flight was a complete success, and showed that flights of people to orbit are no longer restricted to a very small number of large nation-states (specifically Russia, the US, and China).  NASA certainly played an important role in supporting the development of the Falcon 9 and the Crew Dragon, as discussed above, but these flights are now private.  If Senator Shelby and his (mostly) Republican colleagues had gotten their way, this never would have happened.  The hope that this would follow was, however, an explicit part of the plan when the Obama administration proposed that NASA contract with private providers to bring crew to the ISS.  And it has.

Boeing is not yet at the point that SpaceX has reached, with its Starliner capsule still to be proven, but it appears likely that they will have worked through their problems by sometime next year (approximately three years after SpaceX succeeded with its first tests).  Meanwhile, even though work on the Orion spacecraft began in 2005 and work on the SLS began in 2011, both the SLS and Orion are still to be tested.  The SLS was supposed to be operational in 2016, but its first operational flight is now scheduled for 2023 and will almost certainly be later.  The key components of the SLS (the engines and the strap-on solid rocket boosters) were all taken from the Space Shuttle or even earlier designs.  It is not at all clear why this should have taken so long.

We also can now work out reasonable estimates of the costs, and can compare them to the costs under the more commercial approach.  In terms of the development costs (planned through FY2023), the SLS will cost an astonishing 65 times what it cost to develop the Falcon Heavy.  The SLS will be able to carry a heavier load, but only about 50% more than what a Falcon Heavy can carry.  It is difficult to see why this would cost 65 times as much.  And it is not just the SLS.  The cost of developing the Ares I, including what had been planned to be spent through FY2014 (when it still would not have been fully ready) would have been 42 times what the similarly sized Falcon 9 cost to develop.  These are mind-boggling high multiples.

The operational costs per launch are also high multiples of what the costs are for commercially developed rockets.  The cost of a launch of the SLS will be 22 times the cost of the recoverable Falcon Heavy.  While it can carry more, the cost per kilogram to low earth orbit will be 13 times higher for the SLS (excluding its development costs) compared to that for the recoverable version of the Falcon Heavy, and 9 times higher when compared to the expendable version.

Similarly, it is expected that development of the Orion capsule (not counting the cost of the Service Module, that the Europeans are developing as their contribution to the program) will by FY2023 have cost almost 12 times the cost of developing the SpaceX Crew Dragon.  And the operational cost per seat will be 5 times higher for the Orion than the cost for the Crew Dragon flights, and 3 times higher than for the Boeing Starliner.

The evidence is clear.  Why then, are the conservative Republican Senators and Members of Congress (as well as a few Democrats, including, significantly, Representative Eddie Bernice Johson, D-Texas, who is the current Chair of the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology) so opposed to NASA entering into commercial contracts with SpaceX and others?  The answer, clearly, is the politics of it.  Spending billions of dollars on such hardware keeps many employed, and many of those jobs are in high-wage engineering and technical positions.  From this perspective, the high costs are not a flaw but a feature.

This is not only a waste.  Since budgets are not unlimited such waste has also meant long delays in achieving the intended goals.  The space program has traditionally enjoyed much goodwill in the general population.  But such waste, as well as the resulting long delays in achieving the intended aims, could destroy that goodwill.

That would be unfortunate, although not the end of the world.  One does, however, see the same issues with the military budget, where the stakes are higher.  And the costs are also much higher, with major military programs now costing in the hundreds of billions of dollars rather than the tens of billions for the space program.  An example has been the development of the F-35 fighter jet.  The program began in 1992, the first prototypes (of Lockheed and Boeing) flew in 2000, Lockheed won the contract in 2001, the first planes were manufactured in 2011, and the first squadron became operational in 2015.  That is, it took 23 years to go from the initial design and conceptual work to the first operational unit.  Furthermore, it is expected to be the most expensive military program in history, with over $400 billion expected to be spent to acquire the planes and a further $1.1 trillion to keep them operational over a 50-year life cycle for the program.  That is a total cost of $1.5 trillion, and other estimates place the cost at $1.6 or even $1.7 trillion (and no one will know for sure what it will be until this is all history).

The factors driving such high costs as well multi-decade time frames to go from concept to operations are undoubtedly similar to those that have driven this for major NASA programs such as the Orion and the SLS.  Spending more is politically attractive to those politicians that represent the states and districts where the spending will be done.  But for the military, the stakes (and not simply the dollar amounts) are a good deal higher than they are for the space program.

But it should also be recognized that the cure for this is likely to be more complicated and difficult than what NASA has been able to achieve through changes to its traditional contracting and procurement model.  Industry capabilities will need to be developed, with greater competition introduced.  In major areas there are now often only two or three manufacturers, and sometimes only one, with the capabilities required.

We do, however, now have examples of what can be done.  ULA (United Launch Alliance) had a monopoly on heavy-lift launch vehicles following its creation in 2006 by combining what had been the competing launch divisions of Boeing and Lockheed.  SpaceX entered that market, and we saw above what resulted.  If such progress is possible with something as complex as a heavy-lift rocket, it should be possible in at least some other areas of military procurement as well.

 

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Annex:  Why Cost Comparisons of Rockets and Spacecraft are Difficult to Make

One might think that comparisons of costs of rockets as well as spacecraft would be straightforward.  But they are not, for a number of reasons:

a)  First, different sources will often provide different estimates.  There is no single, authoritative, source that one can cite, and one will often see differing estimates in different sources.  Recognizing this, for the purposes here – which are to compare the costs where there is competition (primarily SpaceX) to the costs under NASA procurement from the traditional contractors – I have sought to use estimates that are on the high side of what has been published for the costs of the SpaceX vehicles, and on the low side for the costs of the traditional NASA contractors.  Despite this, the SpaceX costs are still far lower.

b)  An important reason there are these different cost estimates from different sources is that the information on what the costs actually are have often been kept confidential.  SpaceX is the most transparent, but even here what they publish on their website ($62 million for a Falcon 9 launch, and $90 million for a Falcon Heavy) should really be viewed more as a “list price” that will be negotiated.  For NASA, full transparency on the costs can be embarrassing.  For commercial providers, less-than-transparent cost figures may be seen as helpful when they engage in negotiations with those who would purchase their services.

c)  Which brings us to a third factor, which is negotiating power.  Just like when buying a car, the price that will be paid will depend in part on the relative negotiating powers of the parties.  When there is a low-cost competing supplier (such as SpaceX), there will be pressure on higher-cost suppliers to lower their prices.  One has seen this with the prices being charged for launches of the Delta IV Heavy and Atlas V rockets.  Negotiating power will also depend on whether one will be a repeat customer or just a one-time user.  For these reasons there will not be one, unique, price that can be cited as the “cost” of launching a particular rocket.  It will depend on the negotiations.

d)  And this also leads to the distinction between the cost of a rocket launch and the price charged.  Ideally, what one wants as the basis for comparison is the cost.  However, the best information available will often be the price that some customer paid.  But that price may include a substantial profit margin if that customer did not have much negotiating power to bargain down the price.  It might also work the other way.  The cost of developing and launching the Boeing Starliner capsule, which was discussed above, is based on what NASA is paying.  Yet because of the repeated problems with the development of the Starliner, Boeing is certainly losing money on that fixed-price contract.  How much Boeing is losing has not been disclosed, and indeed since there are continued problems they do not yet know themselves how much it will have cost in the end.  Hence, in a comparison of the cost of delivering astronauts to the ISS the true cost of the Boeing Starliner will be something more than what NASA is paying, and it is that higher cost which really should be the basis for comparison with the cost of the SpaceX Crew Dragon alternative.

e)  The common basis for comparison is also inherently problematic.  While the standard measure for a rocket (and the one used here) is how many kilograms of payload can be lifted to low earth orbit, specific situations are more complicated.  Depending on the mission, one will want to place the payload into different types of orbits, including different altitudes (from 100 miles to several hundred miles, and still be considered “low”), different angles to the equator (the higher the angle, the higher the share of the world’s land area that would be covered by the satellite over some period, such as a month), and perhaps different requirements on how circular the orbit needs to be (the difference between the highest point in the orbit and the lowest).  There will be different thrust (hence fuel) requirements for each of these, possibly different payload weights that can be handled, and possibly other differences, all of which would end up being reflected in the negotiated price for the launch.

f)  Different payloads also have different requirements on how they must be handled, how they need to be attached to the rocket, the requirements on the fairings (the nose cone shell surrounding the payload to protect it at launch, which is jettisoned once orbital altitude is reached), and so on.  Military launches are also more expensive (and charged accordingly) due to the secrecy arrangements the Defense Department requires.

g)  Different boosters will also have different capabilities.  For a launch into low earth orbit these capabilities might not all be needed, but they may still be reflected in the costs.  The most obvious is the size of the payload.  If the weight is more than a smaller rocket can handle (and the payload cannot be divided into two or more smaller satellites), then they will have to use a larger booster even if the cost per kilogram is higher.

h)  The calculations of the cost per kilogram of payload are also based on the maximum payload each rocket can handle.  But it would be coincidental that any particular payload will be exactly at this maximum weight.  The cost per kilogram will then be higher for a payload that weighs less than this maximum.  While there may be some savings in total costs in launching a payload that is less than the maximum a rocket can handle (somewhat less fuel will be needed, for example), such savings will be modest.  For this reason, SpaceX and others will typically offer to sell, at a low price, such extra space to those with just small satellites, piggy-backing on larger satellites that do not need to use up the full payload capacity of the rocket.  The entity with the larger satellite might then receive a discount from what the cost otherwise would have been.

i)  Finally, one should recognize that there are normally several variants of each launch vehicle, with somewhat different capabilities and costs.  To the extent possible, all the cost estimates in this post are for a single, recent, variant of the vehicles.  The Falcon 9 launch vehicle, for example, is now at what they have named the “Block 5” variant, and the costs of that version are what have been used here.  Earlier versions of the Falcon 9 were labeled v1.0, v1.1, v1.2 or “Full Thrust” (and sometimes referred to as Block 3), and Block 4.

 

There are therefore a number of reasons why one needs to be cautious in judging reported cost differences between various rockets as well as spacecraft.  As noted in the text, cost differences of 10 or 20% certainly, and indeed even 40 or 50%, should not be seen as necessarily significant.  But as the charts show, the cost differences are far higher than this, with the costs of the traditional contractors following the traditional NASA procurement processes many times the costs obtained under the more competitive process the Obama administration introduced to manned space flight (at substantial political cost).

Jobs Due to Biden’s Infrastructure Plan: What is Being Discussed is Not What You Think

A.  Introduction

Politicians have always been eager to announce that a program they have proposed will “create jobs”.  The Biden administration is no exception.  Indeed, President Biden has titled his $2.2 trillion proposal to rebuild America’s infrastructure the “American Jobs Plan”.  And all this is understandable, given the politics.  You would be forgiven, however, for assuming that what is being discussed on the additional jobs that would follow from Biden’s infrastructure proposals has something to do with jobs such as those depicted in the picture above.  They don’t.  The numbers on “new jobs created” that are being bandied about are on something else entirely.

There has also been some confusion on how many jobs that might be.  In remarks made on April 2, soon after his initial announcement of the proposed $2.2 trillion infrastructure initiative, Biden said:  “Independent analysis shows that if we pass this plan, the economy will create 19 million jobs — good jobs, blue-collar jobs, jobs that pay well.”  The estimate is from an analysis made by Mark Zandi, Chief Economist of Moody’s Analytics (a subsidiary of Moody’s, the bond credit rating agency).  Zandi is a well-respected economist, who was an economic advisor to John McCain during his 2008 campaign for the presidency and who has advised both Democrats and Republicans.

The 19 million jobs figure is an estimate made by Zandi and his team at Moody’s Analytics of how many more jobs there would be in the US (or, more precisely, non-farm employees) in 2030 as compared to the average number in 2020, in a scenario where Biden’s infrastructure plan is approved as proposed and then implemented.  But it is important to note that this is an estimate of the total number of jobs that “the economy will create” over the decade if the plan is passed (which is what Biden specifically said), and not an estimate of the extra number of jobs that can be attributed to the American Jobs Plan itself.  But it would be easy to miss this distinction.  The Moody’s Analytics estimates are that the number of jobs in the economy would rise between 2020 and 2030 by 19.0 million if the plan is passed as proposed, but by 16.3 million if only the covid-relief plan (Biden’s $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan) is passed (as it has been), and by 15.7 million in a scenario where neither plan was passed.  Thus in the Moody’s Analytics forecasts, the number of jobs in 2030 would be 2.7 million higher than otherwise if the infrastructure plan is now passed (on top of the extra 0.6 million if only the covid-relief plan were passed).

But it is easy to misstate these distinctions, and some of the administration appointees discussing the proposal with the press at first did so.  In particular, Pete Buttigieg, the Transportation Secretary, and Brian Deese, the head of the National Economic Council in the White House, at first used wording that implied that the full 19 million additional jobs would be due to the infrastructure plan itself.  They later clarified that they had misspoke, and that the Moody’s Analytics estimates were of 2.7 million additional jobs due to the infrastructure plan.  However, this did not keep various news media fact-checkers (including at CNN and at the Washington Post) from taking them to task on it (and for the Washington Post to award Biden “two Pinocchios” in their fact-checking scoring system for being, in their view, misleading).

One can question whether this is quibbling over language that was not fully clear.  But what is of far greater importance is that it misses the fundamental question of what any of these employment forecasts (whether of 19 million, or 2.7 million, or 0.6 million from the $1.9 trillion covid-relief plan) actually mean.  Keep in mind that they are all estimates of how many more people will be employed in 2030 compared to the number employed in 2020, or in a comparison of one scenario for 2030 compared to another.  They are specifically not estimates of the number of jobs of primarily construction workers who would be employed as a direct result of the new infrastructure investments being built.  Yet the wording of Biden, stating that these would be well-paying blue-collar jobs, would appear to indicate that that is what he had in mind when citing the figures.

Furthermore, if the job figures were intended to refer to the blue-collar construction workers who would be hired to build these projects, it does not make much sense to base a comparison on 2030.  By that point the infrastructure plan would be essentially over, with just a small residual amount still to be spent as the program is tailing off (of the $2.2 trillion total, just $81 billion in 2030 and a final $35 billion in 2031 would remain to be spent in the Moody’s estimates).  Few construction workers would still be employed on those projects by that point.  Rather, what may be of interest is not some relatively small change in the overall number of people employed at some end-point, but rather the number of person-years of employment of such workers during the full period of the infrastructure plan.  But the Moody’s estimates are specifically not that.

This then brings up the question of what is Moody’s in fact estimating?  That will be the focus of this blog post.  It is not the number of jobs in construction that will be created as a result of the new work on infrastructure, as these will be down to a fairly minor level by 2030.  As we will see, it is rather an estimate resulting from some secondary aspects of the Moody’s model, and it is not even clear whether the differences were intended to be meaningful.

To start, this post will review how estimates of future employment are traditionally made – for example by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  In brief, they are based on population estimates and on forecasts of what share of different population groups will seek to be part of the labor force (the labor force participation rates), with then the assumption that the economy will be at full employment at that future date.  The full employment assumption is made not because the forecaster is confident the economy will in fact be at full employment in that forecast year.  Rather, they do not really know what the short-term conditions will be in that future year, and assuming full employment is just for setting a benchmark.  Unemployment depends on how successful monetary and fiscal policies would have been in that future year to bring the economy to full employment.  Such policies are short-term, depend on the immediate situation, and we have no way of knowing now (in 2021) what shocks or surprises the economy will be facing in 2030.

With this the case, why is Moody’s forecasting any difference at all in the 2030 employment numbers?  The differences are in fact not large when compared to what overall employment will be in that year.  But there is some, and we will discuss why that is.

The post will then look at what one might say on jobs in the intervening years.  While Moody’s has produced year-by-year estimates, its approach for those years (after the next couple of years, as they forecast the economy moves to full employment) is fundamentally similar to what they assume for 2030.  What Moody’s specifically did not do in its analysis was try to estimate the direct number of jobs (or more precisely, person-years of employment) of those employed on the infrastructure projects in Biden’s plan.  Someone will likely do that at some point, but it was not done here.  The question I will then look at it is whether this should be seen as “job creation”.  I will argue that it would be more appropriate to look at it as job shifting rather than job creation, as the total number of jobs in the economy (the number employed) will likely not be all that much different.  And there is nothing wrong with that.  The primary objective, after all, is to build and maintain our badly needed infrastructure.  And on the employment that would follow, providing more attractive jobs that workers will seek to shift into is a good thing.  But the total number employed may not change, and if that is the metric one tries to use, one will likely be disappointed.  Many, including politicians, are often confused about this.

None of this should be taken to imply that the infrastructure plan is not warranted.  It desperately is, as will be discussed in the penultimate section of this post.  The US has underinvested in public infrastructure for decades, and what we have is an embarrassment compared to what is seen in Europe or East Asia.  And it has direct implications for productivity.  Truck drivers are not productive when they are sitting in traffic jams due to our poor highways.  But it is wrong to assess the value of an infrastructure investment program by some estimate of the number of jobs created.  Yes, there will be workers employed on the projects, in likely well-paid jobs.  But that should not be the objective – better public infrastructure should be the objective, achieved as efficiently as possible.  A focus on “jobs created” is instead likely to lead to confusion, as it has with the Moody’s numbers.

We will then end with a short summary and conclusions section.

Finally, note that the version of Biden’s infrastructure plan examined by Zandi and his team was estimated to cost $2.2 trillion over ten years.  However, one will see references to Biden’s plan as costing $2.0 trillion, or $2.3 trillion, or some other amount.  The final amount will depend, of course, on whatever Congress approves, but for consistency I will focus here on the plan as assessed by Zandi, at an estimated cost of $2.2 trillion.

B.  Forecasting Future Employment Levels

Yogi Berra purportedly said:  “It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future”.  Whether he actually said that is not so clear, but it is certainly true.  And this is especially true of predictions of future employment.  But some things are more predictable than others, and the trick is to make use of factors that change only slowly over time.

In particular, population forecasts for periods of a decade or so are relatively reliable.  Those in a particular age bracket now will be ten years older a decade from now, and all one needs then to adjust for are mortality rates (which are known and change only slowly over time) and net migration rates (which are relatively small in magnitude).  Thus the Census Bureau can produce fairly reliable population forecasts for periods of a decade, and can provide these for groups broken down by age bracket as well as sex, race, and ethnicity.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics starts from such Census Bureau forecasts to produce its projections of the labor force and employment.  The BLS does this annually, with the most recent such projections from September 2000 covering the period 2019 to 2029.  The BLS takes the Census Bureau forecasts for the adult population (age 16 and above), with these broken up into age groups (mostly 10-year groups, i.e. aged 25 to 34, 35 to 44, etc.) and by sex, with overriding checks based on race (white, black, other) and ethnic (Hispanic and non-Hispanic) classifications.  For each of these groups, it estimates, based on a statistical analysis of historical trends, what its labor force participation rate can be expected to be in the projection year.  The labor force participation rate is the share of the population within each group who choose to be part of the labor force (i.e. either employed or, if unemployed, seeking a job).  Labor force participation rates change only slowly over time (as was discussed in this earlier post on this blog), so this is a reasonable approach for estimating what the labor force might be in a decade’s time.

Employment will then be the labor force minus the number who are unemployed.  But there is no way to know beyond the next few years what the unemployment rate might then be.  It will depend on what shocks or surprises there might have been to the economy at that time, and these are by definition not predictable.  If they were, they would not be surprises.  While active monetary and fiscal policy would then seek to bring unemployment down to just frictional levels, how long this will take depends on many factors, including political ones.  And the problem is one that can only be addressed in the near term, as it depends on when the shock came. Thus the Fed’s Board of Governors meets as a group every six weeks throughout the year to monitor the situation, and to decide based on what they know at the time whether to tweak monetary policy through some instrument (normally short-term interest rates, which they may adjust up or, when they can, down, to affect growth).

There is thus no way to know now, in 2021, what the rate of unemployment will be in 2030.  For this reason, to set a benchmark to which comparisons under different scenarios can be made, the BLS and others following this approach assume the economy will be operating at full employment in that projection year.  That is, the benchmark sets unemployment at some specific, low, rate to reflect just frictional unemployment.  While there has been debate on what that specific rate might be (different analysts generally peg it at between 4 and 5% currently), a specific rate would be chosen for the comparisons.  Employment will then be equal to the labor force in that forecast year minus the number unemployed at this assumed rate of unemployment.

[MInor technical note:  The employment figure arrived at in this way will be employment as measured at the individual level, and will include the self-employed as well as on-farm employment.  It will also count as one person employed even if the individual holds multiple jobs.  The employment figures normally cited (and used by Moody’s) are of non-farm payroll employment, which comes from surveys of establishments, excludes the self-employed and on-farm employment, and counts each job even if one person might hold more than one job (as the establishment will only know who they employ, and will not know if some of their employees might hold second jobs).  But the differences due to these factors are small, and adjustments can be made.]

Thus, for any given set of forecast population figures (by age group, etc.), employment will follow from the labor force participation rate and the assumed rate of frictional unemployment (i.e. unemployment when the economy is assumed to be operating at full employment).  Forecast employment in any future year under different scenarios will therefore only differ if either the labor force participation rate, or the unemployment rate (or both), differ for some reason.

C.  The Moody’s Employment Scenarios for 2030

Moody’s Analytics examined three scenarios for 2030 (and the path to it):  A base case where neither the infrastructure plan of Biden nor the covid-relief plan of Biden existed, a scenario where only the covid-relief plan was in place, and a scenario where both are in place.  In the first (base case) scenario it forecasts that employment in the US would rise to 157.9 million in 2030 from an average of 142.2 million in 2020, or an increase of 15.7 million.  In the scenario with only the covid-relief plan, Moody’s forecasts that employment in 2030 would then total 158.5 million, or 0.6 million more than in the base case.  And in the scenario where the infrastructure plan is also passed and implemented, Moody’s forecasts that employment in 2030 would total 161.2 million, or 2.7 million more than in the scenario with only the covid-relief plan passed and 19.0 million more than average total employment in 2020.

But why would employment levels in 2030 differ at all between these scenarios?  As discussed above, they can only differ if labor force participation rates differ or the assumed unemployment rates in that forecast year differ.  (The basic population numbers for that year should certainly not differ.)  In the Moody’s numbers they both do, but it is not clear why.

It is in particular difficult to understand why Moody’s allowed the assumed unemployment rates in 2030 to differ across their scenarios.  The scenario with just the covid-relief plan, which will be over by 2023 at the latest, should in particular not have an impact on the unemployment rate in 2030.  But in the Moody’s figures it does, albeit by only a minor amount (with unemployment at 4.5% in 2030 in the base scenario, and 4.4% in the scenario with the covid-relief plan).

The difference is larger in the scenario with both the covid-relief plan and the infrastructure plan.  Moody’s forecasts that unemployment in 2030 would then be just 3.8%, or well less than the 4.5% rate in the base scenario.  Why would that be?  While there would still be a small amount of spending under the infrastructure plan in 2030 (Moody’s uses a figure of $81 billion in its scenario), the impact of such spending in that year would be small (just 0.2% of forecast GDP in that year) and would in any case have been diminishing over time as the infrastructure plan was being phased down.  That is, the reductions in spending under the infrastructure plan in the outer years, relative to what they would have been a few years before, would (if not offset by other actions) be deflationary at that point, not expansionary.  But regardless of whether Biden’s infrastructure plan had been passed in 2021 or not, one would assume that fiscal and monetary policy would have sought in that future year (2030) to bring the economy to full employment, at whatever the assumed rate of (frictional) unemployment that it then is. There is no rationale for assuming the rate of unemployment in 2030 will differ across the scenarios.

The other difference in the Moody’s forecasts for 2030 under the different scenarios is in the labor force participation rates.  One can work out from the numbers Moody’s provided in its document (coupled with the BLS numbers for the adult population) that the labor force participation rate would be 58.5% in the base scenario, 58.7% in the scenario where only the Biden covid-relief package was passed, and 59.3% if the Biden infrastructure plan is also passed.  (More precisely, these are the Moody’s figures for non-farm payroll employment as a share of the population, not the overall labor force, with the small differences noted above between those two concepts).  Compared to the scenario of the covid-relief plan only, two-thirds (66%) of the extra 2.7 million in employment in 2030 is due to the higher labor force participation rates Moody’s forecasts for that year, and one-third (34%) is due to its forecast of a lower unemployment rate in that year.

Why should the labor force participation rate be higher in 2030 if Biden’s infrastructure plan is passed?  One could postulate a connection, but it would be tenuous and it is not clear if this was in fact intended by Moody’s or was just an outcome following from other relationships in its model.  I do not know enough about the structure of its model to say.  But one can speculate that the model may have linked the labor force participation rate in a forecast year to real wages in that year, with a higher real wage leading to a higher labor force participation rate.  Furthermore, the model might link greater infrastructure investment (or greater investment generally) to higher productivity, and higher productivity to higher wages.  In that case, the higher investment might lead, by such a route, to a higher labor force participation rate.  But this would require estimation of the responses in a series of steps, each of which might be tenuous.  It is difficult to forecast how much economy-wide productivity might rise as a result of such investment; difficult to forecast how much real wages would rise if productivity rises (real wages have been flat since around 1980, even though overall productivity rose by almost 80%); and difficult to forecast how much a rise in real wages might then raise the labor force participation rate.

But this is conceivable.  Whether it was an intended relationship in the Moody’s model is not so clear.  Such models are large and complicated, with a focus on particular issues.  Certain results might then follow, but those constructing the model might not have paid much attention to such outcomes when constructing the model, as the focus was on something else.

In any case, one has to be careful in interpreting the results as implying there would be 2.7 million additional jobs “created” in 2030 as a consequence of the Biden infrastructure plan.  There would, in the model, be 2.7 million more people employed, but this would mostly be due to a higher proportion of the population seeking employment in that year (a higher labor force participation rate).  And assuming an economy at full employment in that year, the additional number seeking employment would translate into that additional number being employed.  But it would be a stretch to interpret this as the infrastructure plan “creating” those additional jobs.  Rather, a higher share of the population are looking for work (a higher labor force participation rate), and are assumed to be able to find it.

D.  The Jobs Directly Created by the Infrastructure Plan

The Biden infrastructure plan would certainly create a huge number of jobs while the infrastructure is being built.  There would be jobs such as depicted in the photo at the top of this post, and with $2.2 trillion being spent there would be a large number of them (even with a share of the $2.2 trillion being spent in high priority areas outside of what is traditionally considered “hard” infrastructure, such as for labor training and health infrastructure).

These would, however, be jobs for a fixed period.  Once the particular projects are finished, those jobs would end.  Thus one should think of these as being so many person-years of employment (employment of one person for one year).  These are not permanent jobs being “created”, but rather workers being employed for a period of time to build a project or to complete a specific maintenance or repair task (e.g. repaving a road).

While not permanent jobs, it would still be important to have good estimates of how many there would be.  Moody’s did not do that, nor was it their intention, but one needs to be clear about that.  It will be important, however, that there be a serious effort at some point to work out such estimates, and I would guess that someone in government is working on this now.  They are needed precisely because there will be a large number who will be employed on these infrastructure projects, and workers with the necessary skills for such work are limited, in part because the US has so woefully underinvested in its infrastructure in recent decades (as will be discussed in the next section below).  It will thus be important to pay attention to the phasing of the individual projects, both over time and geographically, to ensure there will be sufficient capacity (both in terms of the workers needed and the firms that manage such projects) to build the projects at a given place and at a particular time.  It does not help much that there might be workers with the requisite skill in New York, say, when the need is for a project in California.

This will therefore need to be worked out, and I suspect it will be.  This will also guide what workforce development and training needs there will need to be, and the BLS routinely provides such estimates (at least at a broad, economy-wide, level).  But while it is correct to term jobs (or more precisely person-years of jobs) as being “created” under such an infrastructure plan, this does not necessarily mean that the total number of jobs in the economy will be higher.  If the economy is at full employment (and the labor force participation rate otherwise unchanged), the total number employed in the economy will be unchanged.  It is just that some share of those employed will be working on these infrastructure projects.  And that means fewer will be working in other jobs.

That is not a bad thing.  While the overall number employed will be the same, there will be jobs in the infrastructure projects which will have been attractive enough (either due to higher wages that they pay or for some other reason) to draw workers to those jobs.  Those who shift to those new jobs will then be better off, which is good.  Furthermore, the workers shifting to those new jobs would then have left positions that others may find attractive enough to move into (due to a higher wage, or whatever).  Thus there would be shifts across the economy.  Some less attractive jobs would cease to be filled, with employers forced to learn how to make do with less, but that is how competition works.

It is thus not correct to assert the total number employed in the economy will be higher as a consequence of the infrastructure investment plan (aside from during an initial few years as the economy moves to full employment – and Moody’s forecasts that this will be complete by 2022 with the covid-recovery and infrastructure plans enacted and even by 2024 without them).  The total number employed in such forecasts will be largely the same with or without the plans.  But that does not mean they are not without value to workers.  There will be new jobs to be filled, which will need to be attractive enough to draw workers to them.  And that helps workers.

E.  Public Infrastructure Investment in the US

Public infrastructure in the US is an embarrassment.  And it has a direct impact on productivity.  As was noted before, a truck driver sitting in a traffic jam is not terribly productive.  Similarly, exporters of soybeans who have to wait weeks to ship their product due to inadequate capacity at the ports cannot be terribly competitive in global markets (and will have to accept a price cut in order to sell their product).  And so on.

The major reason public infrastructure in the US is so poor is that the US has simply underinvested in it.  Using a broad definition of all government investment excluding that for the military, as a share of GDP, one has (calculated from BEA NIPA statistics):

Government investment peaked in the mid-1960s (as a share of GDP) and has declined ever since.  In gross terms it has been lower in recent years than in any time since the early 1950s.  Net of depreciation, it has been a good deal lower over the last half-decade (to 2019 – the 2020 figure is not yet available) than it has ever been in the last 70 years at least.  (And note that the blip up in the GDP share in 2020 was not because public investment rose.  The rate of growth of gross government investment in 2020 was in fact less than in 2019 and about the same as in 2018.  Rather it was because GDP collapsed in 2020, in the last year of the Trump administration, which pushed the share higher.)

What is of most interest for the state of public infrastructure is such investment net of depreciation.  That is shown as the curve in red in the chart, and it has fallen from a peak of 3.0% of GDP in 1966 to just 0.7% of GDP in recent years (up to 2019), a fall of 77%.  And at such a pace of adding to the net stock of public capital (infrastructure), the stock of such capital as a share of GDP will be falling.  By simple arithmetic, the ratio will be falling if the stock of that capital as a share of GDP is greater than the net investment share of GDP (0.7% here) divided by the rate of growth of nominal GDP.  Taking a nominal growth rate for GDP of, say, 4% (i.e. a real growth rate of 2% and a growth in prices of 2%), then the stock of public capital as a share of GDP will fall if the current stock of that capital is 17.5% of GDP or more (where 17.5% is equal to 0.7% / 4%).  The stock of public capital will certainly be well more than that in any modern economy, including the US.  And that underinvestment is why our highways are becoming increasingly subject to traffic jams, for example.  Our infrastructure is simply not keeping up.

Major public investment will be needed to reverse this, and the Biden infrastructure plan will be a start.  To put things in perspective, I have taken what would be spent annually under the Biden Plan (as estimated by Moody’s), as a share of GDP, and added this to a base amount where I simply assume other government investment in gross terms will remain at the average share it was between 2013 and 2019 (when it was quite steady at about 2.65% of GDP).  The figures for real GDP used for these calculations were those forecast by Moody’s under the scenario that the Biden infrastructure plan goes ahead, with these converted to nominal GDP (for the shares) using the forecast GDP deflators of the Congressional Budget Office.  Spending under the Biden Plan alone would start at 0.5% of GDP in 2023, rise to a peak of 1.3% of GDP in 2025, and then fall to 0.2% of GDP in 2030 and 0.1% in 2031.  Adding these figures to a base level of 2.65%, one would have:

A $2.2 trillion infrastructure investment plan is certainly large.  But the chart puts this in perspective.  Even with such an investment program, public investment would still not rise to as high as it was in the mid-1960s, nor would it last nearly as long.  Public investment had been relatively high (compared to later periods) from the mid-1950s to around 1980 – almost a quarter-century.  The $2.2 trillion Biden plan would raise public investment, but only for about eight years.  A question that will need to be addressed later is what happens after that.  Reverting to the recent, low, levels of infrastructure investment, would eventually lead back to the problems we have now.

F.  Summary and Conclusions

Politicians will always tout the jobs that will be “created” if their programs are approved.  If they didn’t, they likely would not hold office for long.  President Biden is no exception.  And the administration has cited independent estimates made by Mark Zandi’s team at Moody’s Analytics to say that Biden’s “American Jobs Plan” would indeed create a large number of jobs.  They cite Moody’s estimates that the number of jobs in 2030 would be 19 million higher than in 2020 if the infrastructure plan (as well as the covid-relief plan) are approved, and 2.7 million higher in 2030 if that infrastructure plan is approved as compared to a scenario where it is not.

These are, indeed, the Moody’s numbers.  But one should be careful in the interpretation of what they in fact mean, and Moody’s can be criticized for not being fully clear on this.  These are not jobs, generally in construction, that would follow directly from the infrastructure investment program (which should be counted as person-years of employment in any case, as such jobs are not permanent).  Rather, what Moody’s has done has been to use its model of the US economy to examine what overall employment levels would be in 2030 under the various scenarios.  It found that the number employed would be 2.7 million higher in 2030 (1.7% of forecast employment in that year) in the scenario with the infrastructure plan as compared to a scenario without it.  One can calculate that roughly two-thirds of this would be due to a higher labor force participation rate, and one-third due to a lower unemployment rate in that year.

It is not clear, however, why forecasts of either of those two variables – participation rates and the unemployment rate – should differ at all across the scenarios.  I would not be surprised if these were simply unintended consequences in a complex model.  In any case the differences in employment in that forecast year of 2030 are small, as one would expect.  Furthermore, by 2030 the infrastructure plan would be winding down, with only small residual amounts remaining to be spent.

During the course of the 2020s, however, a very significant number of people will be employed on these infrastructure investments.  They will be employed for limited periods until the projects are completed (and hence should be counted in person-years of employment), but this would still be significant.  It will be important to estimate not just how many will be employed and for what periods, but also what skills will be required and where and when they will be required.  This is probably now being done somewhere in government.  But Moody’s did not attempt to do that.

And while such jobs, mostly in construction, can be correctly termed as “created” under the infrastructure investment plan, this does not necessarily mean the overall number of people employed in the economy will be higher.  Unless labor force participation rates would then be higher for some reason (and it is difficult to see why that would be the case) or the unemployment rate is lower (which it cannot be if the economy is already at full employment), the overall number employed in the economy will be unchanged.  What would happen, rather, would be shifts in the job structure, not in the number of jobs overall.  Some workers would shift into the construction jobs needed to build the infrastructure, and others would shift into the jobs these workers had occupied before.  That is all good – the new jobs will need to be more attractive in terms of pay and/or for other reasons for workers to shift to them – but the total number employed (the total number of “jobs”) would largely be the same.

The public infrastructure is certainly needed.  The US has been underinvesting in its public infrastructure for decades, and when account is taken for depreciation it is clear that the net stock of public capital has not kept up with the overall growth of the economy.  That is why roads, for example, are now so often jammed.  The Biden Plan would bring public investment up to levels not seen for decades, although still not matching (even at $2.2 trillion) the public investment levels of the 1960s as a share of GDP.  It is also a time-limited program, which would phase down in the second half of the 2020s.  At some point, this will need to be addressed.  Bringing public investment levels back down to the far from adequate levels of recent decades will lead to the same problems again.  But that will likely be an issue that will not be seriously considered until the next presidential term.

Trump’s Economic Record in Charts

A.  Introduction

Donald Trump has repeatedly asserted that he built “the greatest economy in history”.  A recent example is in his acceptance speech for the Republican nomination to run for a second term.  And it is not a surprise that Trump would want to claim this.  It would be nice, if true.  But what is surprising is that a number of election surveys have found that Trump polls well on economic issues, with voters rating Trump substantially above Biden on who would manage the economy better.

Yet any examination of Trump’s actual record, not just now following the unprecedented economic collapse this year resulting from the Covid-19 crisis, but also before, shows Trump’s repeated assertion to be plainly false.

The best that can be said is that Trump did not derail, in his first three years in office, the economic expansion that began with the turnaround Obama engineered within a half year of his taking office in 2009 (when Obama had inherited an economy that was, indeed, collapsing).  But the expansion that began under Obama has now been fully and spectacularly undone in Trump’s fourth year in office, with real GDP in the second quarter of 2020 plummeting at an annualized rate of 32% – to a level that is now even well below what it was when Trump took office.  The 32% rate of decline is by far the fastest decline recorded for the US since quarterly data on GDP began to be recorded in 1947 (the previous record was 10%, under Eisenhower, and the next worst was an 8.4% rate of decline in the last quarter of 2008 at the very end of the Bush administration.

This post will look at Trump’s record in comparison to that not just of Obama but also of all US presidents of the last almost 48 years (since the Nixon/Ford term).  For his first three years in office, that Trump record is nothing special.  It is certainly and obviously not the best in history.  And now in his fourth year in office, it is spectacularly bad.

The examination will be via a series of charts.  The discussion of each will be kept limited, but the interested reader may wish to study them more closely – there is a lot to the story of how the economy developed during each presidential administration.  But the primary objective of these “spaghetti” charts is to show how Trump’s record in his first three years in office fits squarely in the middle of what the presidents of the last half-century have achieved.  It was not the best nor the worst over those first three years – Trump inherited from Obama an expanding and stable economy.  But then in Trump’s fourth year, it has turned catastrophic.

Also, while there is a lot more that could be covered, the post will be limited to examination of the outcomes for growth in overall output (GDP), for the fiscal accounts (government spending, the fiscal deficit, and the resulting public debt), the labor market (employment, unemployment, productivity, and real wages), and the basic trade accounts (imports, exports, and the trade balance).

The figures for the charts were calculated based on data from a number of official US government sources.  Summarizing them all here for convenience (with their links):

a)  BEA:  Bureau of Economic Analysis of the US Department of Commerce, and in particular the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA, also commonly referred to as the GDP accounts).

b)  BLS:  Bureau of Labor Statistics of the US Department of Labor.

c)  OMB Historical Tables:  Office of Management and Budget, of the White House.

d)  Census Bureau – Foreign Trade Data:  Of the US Department of Commerce.

It was generally most convenient to access the data via FRED, the Federal Reserve Economic Database of the St. Louis Fed.

B.  Real GDP

Trump likes to assert that he inherited an economy that was in terrible shape.  Larry Kudlow, the director of the National Economic Council and Trump’s principal economic advisor recently asserted, for example in his speech to the Republican National Convention, that the Trump administration inherited from Obama “a stagnant economy that was on the front end of a recession”.  While it is not fully clear what a “front end” of a recession is (it is not an economic term), the economy certainly was not stagnant and there was no indication whatsoever of a recession on the horizon.

The chart at the top of this post shows the path followed by real GDP during the course of Obama’s first and second terms in office, along with that of Trump’s term in office thus far.  Both are indexed to 100 in the first calendar quarter of their presidential terms.  Obama inherited from Bush an economy that was rapidly collapsing (with a banking system in ruin) and succeeded in turning it around within a half year of taking office.  Subsequent growth during the remainder of Obama’s first term was then similar to what it was in his second term (with the curve parallel but shifted down in the first term due to the initial downturn).

Growth in the first three years of Trump’s presidency was then almost exactly the same as during Obama’s second term.  There is a bit of a dip at the start of the second year in Obama’s second term (linked to cuts in government spending in the first year of Obama’s second term – see below), but then a full recovery back to the previous path.  At the three-year mark (the 12th quarter) they are almost exactly the same.  To term this stagnation under Obama and then a boom under Trump, as Kudlow asserted, is nonsensical – they are the same to that point.  But the economy has now clearly collapsed under Trump, while it continued on the same path as before under Obama.

Does Trump look better when examined in a broader context, using the record of presidents going back to the Nixon/Ford term that began almost 48 years ago?  No:

The best that can be said is that the growth of real GDP under Trump in his first three years in office is roughly in the middle of the pack.  Growth was worse in a few administrations – primarily those where the economy went into a recession not long after they took office (such as in the first Reagan term, the first Bush Jr. term, and the Nixon/Ford term).  But growth in most of the presidential terms was either similar or distinctly better than what we had under Trump in his first three years.

And now real GDP has collapsed in Trump’s fourth year to the absolute worst, and by a very significant margin.

One can speculate on what will happen to real GDP in the final two quarters of Trump’s presidency.  Far quicker than in earlier economic downturns, Congress responded in March and April with a series of relief bills to address the costs of the Covid-19 crisis, that in total amount to be spent far surpass anything that has ever been done before.  The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the resulting spending increases, tax cuts, and new loan facilities of measures already approved will cost a total of $3.1 trillion.  This total approved would, by itself, come to 15% of GDP (where one should note that not all will be spent or used in tax cuts in the current fiscal year – some will carry over into future years).  Such spending can be compared to the $1.2 trillion, or 8.5% of the then GDP, approved in 2008/09 in response to that downturn (with most of the spending and tax cuts spread over three years).  Of this $1.2 trillion, $444 billion was spent under the TARP program approved under Bush and $787 billion for the Recovery Act under Obama).

And debate is currently underway on additional relief measures, where the Democratic-controlled Congress approved in May a further $3 trillion for relief, while leaders in the Republican-controlled Senate have discussed a possible $1 trillion measure.  What will happen now is not clear.  Some compromise in the middle may be possible, or nothing may be passed.

But the spending already approved will have a major stimulative effect.  With such a massive program supporting demand, plus the peculiar nature of the downturn (where many businesses and other centers of employment had to be temporarily closed as the measures taken by the Trump administration to limit the spread of the coronavirus proved to be far from adequate), the current expectation is that there will be a significant bounceback in GDP in the third quarter.  As I write this, the GDPNow model of the Atlanta Fed forecasts that real GDP in the quarter may grow at an annualized rate of 29.6%.  Keep in mind, however, that to make up for a fall of 32% one needs, by simple arithmetic, an increase of 47% from the now lower base.  (Remember that to make up for a fall of 50%, output would need to double – grow by 100% – to return to where one was before.)

Taking into account where the economy is now (where there was already a 5% annualized rate of decline in real GDP in the first quarter of this year), what would growth need to be to keep Trump’s record from being the worst of any president of at least the last half-century?  Assuming that growth in the third quarter does come to 29.6%, one can calculate that GDP would then need to grow by 5.0% (annualized) in the fourth quarter to match the currently worst record – of Bush Jr. in his second term.  And it would need to grow by 19% to get it back to where GDP was at the end of 2019.

C.  The Fiscal Accounts

Growth depends on many factors, only some of which are controlled by a president together with congress.  One such factor is government spending.  Cuts in government spending, particularly when unemployment is significant and businesses cannot sell all that they could and would produce due to a lack of overall demand, can lead to slower growth.  Do cuts in government spending perhaps explain the middling rate of growth observed in the first three years of Trump’s term in office?  Or did big increases in government spending spur growth under Obama?

Actually, quite the opposite:

Federal government spending on goods and services did rise in the first year and a half of Obama’s first term in office, with this critical in reversing the collapsing economy that Obama inherited.  But the Republican Congress elected in 2010 then forced through cuts in spending, with further cuts continuing until well into Obama’s second term (after which spending remained largely flat).  While the economy continued to expand at a modest pace, the cuts slowed the economy during a period when unemployment was still high.  (There is also government spending on transfers, where the two largest such programs are Social Security and Medicare, but spending on such programs depends on eligibility, not on annual appropriations.)

Under Trump, in contrast, government spending has grown, and consistently so.  And indeed government spending grew under Trump at a faster pace than it had almost any other president of the last half-century (with even faster growth only under Reagan and Bush, Jr., two presidents that spoke of themselves, as Trump has, as “small government conservatives”):

The acceleration in government spending growth under Trump did succeed, in his first three years in office, in applying additional pressure on the economy in a standard Keynesian fashion, which brought down unemployment (see below).  But this extra government spending did not lead to an acceleration in growth – it just kept it growing (in the first three years of Trump’s term) at the same pace as it had before, as was seen above.  That is, the economy required additional demand pressure to offset measures the Trump administration was taking which themselves would have reduced growth (such as his trade wars, or favoritism for industries such as steel and aluminum, which harmed the purchasers of steel and aluminum such as car companies and appliance makers).

Trump has also claimed credit for a major tax cut bill (as have Reagan and Bush, Jr.).  They all claimed this would spur growth (none did – see above and a more detailed analysis in this blog post), and indeed such sufficiently faster growth, they predicted, that tax revenue would increase despite the reductions in the tax rates.  Hence fiscal deficits would be reduced.  They weren’t:

Fiscal deficits were large and sustained throughout the Reagan/Bush Sr. years.  They then moved to a fiscal surplus under Clinton, following the major tax increase passed in 1993 and the subsequent years of steady and strong growth.  The surplus was then turned back again into a deficit under Bush Jr., with his major tax cuts of 2001 and 2003 coupled with his poor record for economic growth.  Obama then inherited a high fiscal deficit, which grew higher due to the economic downturn he faced on taking office and the measures that were necessary to address it.  But with the economic recovery, the deficit under Obama was then reduced (although at too fast a pace –  this held back the economy, especially in the early years of the recovery when unemployment was still high).

Under Trump, in contrast, the fiscal deficit rose in his first three years in office, at a time when unemployment was low.  This was the time when the US should have been strengthening rather than weakening the fiscal accounts.  As President Kennedy said in his 1962 State of the Union Address: “The time to repair the roof is when the sun is shining.”  Under Trump, in contrast, the fiscal deficit was reaching 5% of GDP even before the Covid-19 crisis.  The US has never before had such a high fiscal deficit when unemployment was low, with the sole exception of during World War II.

This left the fiscal accounts in a weak condition when government spending needed to increase with the onset of the Covid-19 crisis.  The result is that the fiscal deficit is expected to reach an unprecedented 16% of GDP this fiscal year, the highest it has ever been (other than during World War II) since at least 1930, when such records began to be kept.

The consequence is a public debt that is now shooting upwards:

As a share of GDP, federal government debt (held by the public) is expected to reach 100% of GDP by September 30 (the end of the fiscal year), based on a simple extrapolation of fiscal account and debt data currently available through July (see the US Treasury Monthly Statement for July, released August 12, 2020).  And with its momentum (as such fiscal deficits do not turn into surpluses in any short period of time), Trump will have left for coming generations a government debt that is the highest (as a share of GDP) it has ever been in US history, exceeding even what it was at the end of World War II.

When Trump campaigned for the presidency in 2016, he asserted he would balance the federal government fiscal accounts “fairly quickly”.  Instead the US will face this year, in the fourth year of his term in office, a fiscal deficit that is higher as a share of GDP than it ever was other than during World War II.  Trump also claimed that he would have the entire federal debt repaid within eight years.  This was always nonsense and reflected a basic lack of understanding.  But at least the federal debt to GDP ratio might have been put on a downward trajectory during years when unemployment was relatively low.  Instead, federal debt is on a trajectory that will soon bring it to the highest it has ever been.

D.  The Labor Market

Trump also likes to assert that he can be credited with the strongest growth in jobs in history.  That is simply not true:

Employment growth was higher in Obama’s second term than it ever was during Trump’s term in office.  The paths were broadly similar over the first three years of Trump’s term, but Trump was simply – and consistently – slower.  In Obama’s first term, employment was falling rapidly (by 800,000 jobs a month) when Obama took his oath of office, but once this was turned around the path showed a similar steady rise.

Employment then plummeted in Trump’s fourth year, and by a level that was unprecedented (at least since such statistics began to be gathered in 1947).  In part due to the truly gigantic relief bills passed by Congress in March and April (described above), there has now been a substantial bounceback.  But employment is still (as of August 2020) well below what it was when Trump took office in January 2017.

Even setting aside the collapse in employment this year, Trump’s record in his first three years does not compare favorably to that of other presidents:

A few presidents have done worse, primarily those who faced an economy going into a downturn as they took office (Obama) or where the economy was pushed into a downturn soon after they took office (Bush Jr., Reagan) or later in their term (Bush Sr., Nixon/Ford).  But the record of other presidents was significantly better, with the best (which some might find surprising) that of Carter.

Trump also claims credit for pushing unemployment down to record low levels.  The unemployment rate did, indeed, come down (although not to record low rates – the unemployment rate was lower in the early 1950s under Truman and then Eisenhower, and again in the late 1960s).  But one cannot see any significant change in the path on the day Trump was inaugurated compared to what it had been under Obama since 2010:

And of course now in 2020, unemployment has shot upwards to a record level (since at least 1948, when these records began to be kept systematically).  It has now come down with the bounceback of the economy, but remains high (8.4% as of August).

Over the long term, nothing is more important in raising living standards than higher productivity.  And this was the argument Trump and the Republicans in Congress made to rationalize their sharp cuts in corporate tax rates in the December 2017 tax bill.  The argument was that companies would then invest more in the capital assets that raise productivity (basically structures and equipment).  But this did not happen.  Even before the collapse this year, private non-residential investment in structures and equipment was no higher, and indeed a bit lower, as a share of GDP than what it was before the 2017 tax bill passed.

And it certainly has not led to a jump in productivity:

Productivity growth during Trump’s term in office has been substantially lower (by 3%) than what it was during Obama’s first term, although somewhat better than during Obama’s second term (by a cumulative 1% point at the same calendar quarter in their respective terms).

And compared to that of other presidents, Trump’s record on productivity gains is nothing special:

Finally, what happened to real wages?  While higher productivity growth is necessary in the long term for higher wages (workers cannot ultimately be paid more than what is produced), in the short term a number of other factors (such as relative bargaining strength) will dominate.  When unemployment is high, wage gains will typically be low as firms can hire others if a worker demands a higher wage.  And when unemployment is low, workers will typically be in a better bargaining position to demand higher wages.

How, then, does Trump’s record compare to that of Obama?:

During the first three years of Trump’s tenure in office, real wage gains were basically right in the middle of what they were over the similar periods in Obama’s two terms.  But then it looks like real wages shot upwards at precisely the time when the Covid-19 crisis hit.  How could this be?

One needs to look at what lies behind the numbers.  With the onset of the Covid-19 crisis, unemployment shot up to the highest it has been since the Great Depression.  But two issues were then important.  One is that when workers are laid off, it is usually the least senior, least experienced, workers who are laid off first.  And such workers will in general have a lower wage.  If a high share of lower-wage workers become unemployed, then the average wage of the workers who remain employed will go up.  This is a compositional effect.  No individual worker may have seen an increase in his or her wage, but the overall average will go up if fewer lower-wage workers remain employed.

Second, this downturn was different from others in that a high share of the jobs lost were precisely in low-wage jobs – workers in restaurants, cafeterias, and hotels, or in retail shops, or janitors for office buildings, and so on.  As the economy shut down, these particular businesses had to close.  Many, if not most, office workers could work from home, but not these, commonly low-wage, workers.  They were laid off.

The sharp jump in average real wages in the second quarter of 2020 (Trump’s 14th quarter in office) is therefore not something to be pleased about.  As the lower-wage workers who have lost their jobs return to being employed, one should expect this overall average wage to fall back towards where it was before.

But the path of real wages in the first three years of Trump’s presidency, when the economy continued to expand as it had under Obama, does provide a record that can be compared.  How does it look relative to that of other presidents of the last half-century?:

Again, Trump’s record over this period is in the middle of the range found for other presidents.  It was fairly good (unemployment was low, which as noted above would be expected to help), but real wages in the second terms of Clinton and Obama rose by more, and performance was similar in Reagan’s second term.

E.  International Trade Accounts

Finally, how does Trump’s record on international trade compare to that of other presidents?  Trump claimed he would slash the US trade deficit, seeing it in a mercantilistic way as if a trade deficit is a “loss” to the country.  At a 2018 press conference (following a G-7 summit in Canada), he said, for example, “Last year,… [the US] lost  … $817 billion on trade.  That’s ridiculous and it’s unacceptable.”  And “We’re like the piggybank that everybody is robbing.”

This view on the trade balance reflects a fundamental lack of understanding of basic economics.  Equally worrisome is Trump’s view that launching trade wars targeting specific goods (such as steel and aluminum) or specific countries (such as China) will lead to a reduction in the trade deficit.  As was discussed in an earlier post on this blog, the trade balance ultimately depends on the overall balance between domestic savings and domestic investment in an economy.  Trade wars may lead to reductions in imports, but then there will also be a reduction in exports.  If the trade wars do not lead to higher savings or lower investment, such trade interventions (with tariffs or quotas imposed by fiat) will simply shift the trade to other goods or other nations, leaving the overall balance where it would have been based on the savings/investment balance.

But we now have three and a half years of the Trump administration, and can see what his trade wars have led to.  In terms of imports and exports:

Imports did not go down under Trump – they rose until collapsing in the worldwide downturn of 2020.  Exports also at first rose, but more slowly than imports, and then leveled off before imports did.  They then also collapsed in 2020.  Going back a bit, both imports and exports had gone up sharply during the Bush administration.  Then, after the disruption surrounding the economic collapse of 2008/9 (with a fall then a recovery), they roughly stabilized at high levels during the last five years of the Obama administration.

In terms of the overall trade balance:

The trade deficit more than doubled during Bush’s term in office.  While both imports and exports rose (as was seen above), imports rose by more.  The cause of this was the housing credit bubble of the period, which allowed households to borrow against home equity (which in turn drove house prices even higher) and spend that borrowing (leading to higher consumption as a share of current income, which means lower savings).  This ended, and ended abruptly, with the 2008/9 collapse, and the trade deficit was cut in half.  After some fluctuation, it then stabilized in Obama’s second term.

Under Trump, in contrast, the trade deficit grew compared to where it was under Obama.  It did not diminish, as Trump insisted his trade wars would achieve, but the opposite.  And with the growing fiscal deficit (as discussed above) due to the December 2017 tax cuts and the more rapid growth in government spending (where a government deficit is dis-saving that has to be funded by borrowing), this deterioration in the trade balance should not be a surprise.  And I also suspect that Trump does not have a clue as to why this has happened (nor an economic advisor willing to explain it to him).

F.  Conclusion

There is much more to Trump’s economic policies that could have been covered.  It is also not yet clear how much damage has been done to the economic structure from the crisis following the mismanagement of Covid-19 (with the early testing failures, the lack of serious contact tracing and isolation of those who may be sick, and importantly, Trump’s politicizing the wearing of simple masks).  Unemployment rose to record levels, and this can have a negative impact (both immediate and longer-term) on the productivity of those workers and on their subsequent earnings.  There has also been a jump in bankruptcies, which reduces competition.  And bankrupt firms, as well as stressed firms more generally, will not be able to repay their loans in full.  The consequent weakening of bank balance sheets will constrain how much banks will be able to lend to others, which will slow the pace of any recovery.

But these impacts are still uncertain.  The focus of this post has been on what we already know of Trump’s economic record.  It is not a good one. The best that can be said is that during his first three years in office he did not derail the expansion that had begun under Obama.  Growth continued (in GDP, employment, productivity, wages), at rates similar to what they were before.  Compared to paths followed in other presidencies of the last half-century, they were not special.

But this growth during Trump’s tenure in office was only achieved with rapid growth in federal government spending.  Together with the December 2017 tax cuts, this led to a growing, not a diminishing, fiscal deficit.  The deficit grew to close to 5% of GDP, which was indeed special:  Never before in US history has the fiscal deficit been so high in an economy at or close to full employment, with the sole exception of during World War II.

The result was a growing public debt as a share of GDP, when prudent fiscal policy would have been the reverse.  Times of low unemployment are when the country should be reducing its fiscal deficit so that the public debt to GDP ratio will fall.  Reducing public dis-saving would also lead to a reduction in the trade deficit (other things being equal).  But instead the trade deficit has grown.

As a consequence, when a crisis hits (as it did in 2020) and government needs to spend substantial sums for relief (as it had to this year), the public debt to GDP ratio will shoot upwards from already high levels.  Republicans in Congress asserted in 2011 that a public debt of 70% of GDP was excessive and needed to be brought down rapidly.  Thus they forced through spending cuts, which slowed the recovery at a time when unemployment was still high.

But now public debt under Trump will soon be over 100% of GDP.  Part of the legacy of Trump’s term in office, for whoever takes office this coming January 20, will therefore be a public debt that will soon be at a record high level, exceeding even that at the end of World War II.

This has certainly not been “the greatest economy in history”.