The Ridership Forecasts for the Baltimore-Washington SCMAGLEV Are Far Too High

The United States desperately needs better public transit.  While the lockdowns made necessary by the spread of the virus that causes Covid-19 led to sharp declines in transit use in 2020, with (so far) only a partial recovery, there will remain a need for transit to provide decent basic service in our metropolitan regions.  Lower-income workers are especially dependent on public transit, and many of them are, as we now see, the “essential workers” that society needs to function.  The Washington-Baltimore region is no exception.

Yet rather than focus on the basic nuts and bolts of ensuring quality services on our subways, buses, and trains, the State of Maryland is once again enamored with using the scarce resources available for public transit to build rail lines through our public parkland in order to serve a small elite.  The Purple Line light rail line was such a case.  Its dual rail lines will serve a narrow 16-mile corridor, passing through some of the richest zip codes in the nation, but destroying precious urban parkland.  As was discussed in an earlier post on this blog, with what will be spent on the Purple Line one could instead stop charging fares on the county-run bus services in the entirety of the two counties the Purple Line will pass through (Montgomery and Prince George’s), and at the same time double those bus services (i.e. double the lines, or double the service frequency, or some combination).

The administration of Governor Hogan of Maryland nonetheless pushed the Purple Line through, although construction has now been halted for close to a year due to cost overruns leading the primary construction contractor to withdraw.  Hogan’s administration is now promoting the building of a superconducting, magnetically-levitating, train (SCMAGLEV) between downtown Baltimore and downtown Washington, DC, with a stop at BWI Airport.  Over $35 million has already been spent, with a massive Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) produced.  As required by federal law, the DEIS has been made available for public comment, with comments due by May 24.

It is inevitable that such a project will lead to major, and permanent, environmental damage.  The SCMAGLEV would travel partially in tunnels underground, but also on elevated pylons parallel to the Baltimore-Washington Parkway (administered by the National Park Service).  The photos at the top of this post show what it would look like at one section of the parkway.  The question that needs to be addressed is whether any benefits will outweigh the costs (both environmental and other costs), and ridership is central to this.  If ridership is likely to be well less than that forecast, the whole case for the project collapses.  It will not cover its operating and maintenance costs, much less pay back even a portion of what will be spent to build it (up to $17 billion according to the DEIS, but likely to be far more based on experience with similar projects).  Nor would the purported economic benefits then follow.

I have copied below comments I submitted on the DEIS forecasts.  Readers may find them of interest as this project illustrates once again that despite millions of dollars being spent, the consulting firms producing such analyses can get some very basic things wrong.  The issue I focus on for the proposed SCMAGLEV is the ridership forecasts.  The SCMAGLEV project sponsors forecast that the SCMAGLEV will carry 24.9 million riders (one-way trips) in 2045.  The SCMAGLEV will require just 15 minutes to travel between downtown Baltimore and downtown Washington (with a stop at BWI), and is expected to charge a fare of $120 (roundtrip) on average and up to $160 at peak hours.  As one can already see from the fares, at best it would serve a narrow elite.

But there is already a high-speed train providing premier-level service between Baltimore and Washington – the Acela service of Amtrak.  It takes somewhat longer – 30 minutes currently – but its fare is also somewhat lower at $104 for a roundtrip, plus it operates from more convenient stations in Baltimore and Washington.  Importantly, it operates now, and we thus have a sound basis for forecasts of what its ridership might be in the future.

One can thus compare the forecast ridership on the proposed SCMAGLEV to the forecast for Acela ridership (also in the DEIS) in a scenario of no SCMAGLEV.  One would expect the forecasts to be broadly comparable.  One could allow that perhaps it might be somewhat higher on the SCMAGLEV, but probably less than twice as high and certainly less than three times as high.  But one can calculate from figures in the DEIS that the forecast SCMAGLEV ridership in 2045 would be 133 times higher than what they forecast Acela ridership would be in that year (in a scenario of no SCMAGLEV).  For those going just between downtown Baltimore and downtown Washington (i.e. excluding BWI travelers), the forecast SCMAGLEV ridership would be 154 times higher than what it would be on the comparable Acela.  This is absurd.

And it gets worse.  For reasons that are not clear, the base year figures for Acela ridership in the Baltimore-Washington market are more than eight times higher in the DEIS than figures that Amtrak itself has produced.  It is possible that the SCMAGLEV analysts included Acela riders who have boarded north of Baltimore (such as in Philadelphia or New York) and then traveled through to DC (or from DC would pass through Baltimore to ultimate destinations further north).  But such travelers should not be included, as the relevant travelers who might take the SCMAGLEV would only be those whose trips begin in either Baltimore or in Washington and end in the other metropolitan area.  The project sponsors have made no secret that they hope eventually to build a SCMAGLEV line the full distance between Washington and New York, but that would at a minimum be in the distant future.  It is not a source of riders included in their forecasts for a Baltimore to Washington SCMAGLEV.

The Amtrak forecasts of what it expects its Acela ridership would be, by market (including between Baltimore and Washington) and under various investment scenarios, come from its recent NEC FUTURE (for Northeast Corridor Future) study, for which it produced a Final Environmental Impact Statement.  Using Amtrak’s forecasts of what its Acela ridership would be in a scenario where major investments allowed the Acela to take just 20 minutes to go between Baltimore and Washington, the SCMAGLEV ridership forecasts were 727 times as high (in 2040).  That is complete nonsense.

My comment submitted on the DEIS, copied below, goes further into these results and discusses as well how the SCMAGLEV sponsors could have gotten their forecasts so absurdly wrong.  But the lesson here is that the consultants producing such forecasts are paid by project sponsors who wish to see the project built.  Thus they have little interest in even asking the question of why they have come up with an estimate that 24.9 million would take a SCMAGLEV in 2045 (requiring 15 minutes on the train itself to go between Baltimore and DC) while ridership on the Acela in that year (in a scenario where the Acela would require 5 minutes more, i.e. 20 minutes, and there is no SCMAGLEV) would be about just 34,000.

One saw similar issues with the Purple Line.  An examination of the ridership forecasts made for it found that in about half of the transit analysis zone pairs, the predicted ridership on all forms of public transit (buses, trains, and the Purple Line as well) was less than what they forecast it would be on the Purple Line only.  This is mathematically impossible.  And the fact that half were higher and half were lower suggests that the results they obtained were basically just random.  They also forecast that close to 20,000 would travel by the Purple Line into Bethesda each day but only about 10,000 would leave (which would lead to Bethesda’s population exploding, if true).  The source of this error was clear (they mixed up two formats for the trips – what is called the production/attraction format with origin/destination), but it mattered.  They concluded that the Purple Line had to be a rail line rather than a bus service in order to handle their predicted 20,000 riders each day on the segment to Bethesda.

It may not be surprising that private promoters of such projects would overlook such issues.  They may stand to gain (i.e. from the construction contracts, or from an increase in land values next to station sites), even though society as a whole loses.  Someone else (government) is paying.  But public officials in agencies such as the Maryland Department of Transportation should be looking at what is the best way to ensure quality and affordable transit services for the general public.  Problems develop once the officials see their role as promoters of some specific project.  They then seek to come up with a rationale to justify the project, and see their role as surmounting all the hurdles encountered along the way.  They are not asking whether this is the best use of scarce public resources to address our very real transit needs.

A high-speed magnetically-levitating train (with superconducting magnets, no less), may look attractive.  But officials should not assume such a shiny new toy will address our transit issues.

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May 22, 2021

Comment Submitted on the DEIS for SCMAGLEV

The Ridership Forecasts Are Far Too High

A.  Introduction

I am opposed to the construction of the proposed SCMAGLEV project between Baltimore and Washington, DC.  A key issue for any such system is whether ridership will be high enough to compensate for the environmental damage that is inevitable with such a project.  But the ridership forecasts presented in the DEIS are hugely flawed.  They are far too high and simply do not meet basic conditions of plausibility.  At more plausible ridership levels, the case for such a project collapses.  It will not cover its operating costs, much less pay back any of the investment (of up to $17 billion according to the DEIS, but based on experience likely to be far higher).  Nor will the purported positive economic benefits then follow.  But the damage to the environment will be permanent.

Specifically, there is rail service now between Baltimore and Washington, at three levels of service (the high-speed Acela service of Amtrak, the regular Amtrak Regional service, and MARC).  Ridership on the Acela service, as it is now and with what is expected with upgrades in future years, provides a benchmark that can be used.  While it could be argued that ridership on the proposed SCMAGLEV would be higher than ridership on the Acela trains, the question is how much higher.  I will discuss below in more detail the factors to take into account in making such a comparison, but briefly, the Acela service takes 30 minutes today to go between Baltimore and Washington, while the SCMAGLEV would take 15 minutes.  But given that it also takes time to get to the station and on the train, and then to the ultimate destination at the other end, the time savings would be well less than 50%.  The fare would also be higher on the SCMAGLEV (at an average, according to the DEIS, of $120 for a round-trip ticket but up to $160 at peak hours, versus an average of $104 on the Acela).  In addition, the stations the SCMAGLEV would use for travel between downtown Baltimore and downtown Washington are less conveniently located (with poorer connections to local transit) than the Acela uses.

Thus while it could be argued that the SCMAGLEV would attract more riders than the Acela, even this is not clear.  But being generous, one could allow that it might attract somewhat more riders.  The question is how many.  And this is where it becomes completely implausible.  Based on the ridership forecasts in the DEIS, for both the SCMAGLEV and for the Acela (in a scenario where the SCMAGLEV is not built), the SCMAGLEV in 2045 would carry 133 times what ridership would be on the Acela.  Excluding the BWI ridership on both, it would be 154 times higher.  There is no way to describe this other than that it is just nonsense.  And with other, likely more accurate, forecasts of what Acela ridership would be in the future (discussed below) the ratios become higher still.

Similarly, if the SCMAGLEV will be as attractive to MARC riders as the project sponsors forecast it will be, then most of those MARC riders would now be on the modestly less attractive Acela.  But they aren’t.  The Acela is 30 minutes faster than MARC (the SCMAGLEV would be 45 minutes faster), yet 28 times as many riders choose MARC over Acela between Baltimore and Washington.  I suspect the fare difference ($16 per day on MARC, vs. $104 on the Acela) plays an important role.  The model used could have been tested by calculating a forecast with their model of what Acela ridership would be under current conditions, with this then compared this to what the actual figures are.  Evidently this was not done.  Had they, their predicted Acela ridership would likely have been a high multiple of the actual and it would have been clear that their modeling framework has problems.

Why are the forecasts off by orders of magnitude?  Unfortunately, given what has been made available in the DEIS and with the accompanying papers on ridership, one cannot say for sure.  But from what has been made available, there are indications of where the modeling approach taken had issues.  I will discuss these below.

In the rest of this comment I will first discuss the use of Acela service and its ridership (both the actual now and as projected) as a basis for comparison to the ridership forecasts made for the SCMAGLEV.  They would be basically similar services, where a modest time saving on the SCMAGLEV (15 minutes now, but only 5 minutes in the future if further investments are made in the Acela service that would cut its Baltimore to DC time to just 20 minutes) is offset by a higher fare and less convenient station locations.  I will then discuss some reasons that might explain why the SCMAGLEV ridership forecasts are so hugely out-of-line with what plausible numbers might be.

B.  A Comparison of SCMAGLEV Ridership Forecasts to Those for Acela  

The DEIS provides ridership forecasts for the SCMAGLEV for both 2030 (several years after the DEIS says it would be opened, so ridership would then be stable after an initial ramping up) and for a horizon year of 2045.  I will focus here on the 2045 forecasts, and specifically on the alternative where the destination station in Baltimore is Camden Yards.  The DEIS also has forecasts for ridership in an alternative where the SCMAGLEV line would end in the less convenient Cherry Hill neighborhood of Baltimore, which is significantly further from downtown and with poorer connections to local transit options.  The Camden Yards station is more comparable to Penn Station – Baltimore, which the Acela (and Amtrak Regional trains and one of the MARC lines) use.  Penn Station – Baltimore has better local transit connections and would be more convenient for many potential riders, but this will of course depend on the particular circumstances of the rider – where he or she will be starting from and where their particular destination will be.  It will, in particular, be more convenient for riders coming from North and Northeast of Baltimore than Camden Yards would be.  And those from South and Southwest of Baltimore would be more likely to drive directly to the DC region than try to reach Camden Yards, or they would alight at BWI.

The DEIS also provides forecasts of what ridership would be on the existing train services between Baltimore and Washington:  the Acela services (operated by Amtrak), the regular Amtrak Regional trains, and the MARC commuter service operated by the State of Maryland.  Note also that the 2045 forecasts for the train services are for both a scenario where the SCMAGLEV is not built and then what they forecast the reduced ridership would be with a SCMAGLEV option.  For the purposes here, what is of interest is the scenario with no SCMAGLEV.

The SCMAGLEV would provide a premium service, requiring 15 minutes to go between downtown Baltimore and downtown Washington, DC.  Acela also provides a premium service and currently takes 30 minutes, while the regular Amtrak Regional trains take 40 to 45 minutes and MARC service takes 60 minutes.  But the fares differ substantially.  Using the DEIS figures (with all prices and fares expressed in base year 2018 dollars), the SCMAGLEV would charge an average fare of $120 for a round-trip (Baltimore-Washington), and up to $160 for a roundtrip at peak times.  The Acela also has a high fare for its also premium service, although not as high as SCMAGLEV, charging an average of $104 for a roundtrip (using the DEIS figures).  But Amtrak Regional trains charge only $34 for a similar roundtrip, and MARC only $16.

Acela service thus provides a reasonable basis for comparison to what SCMAGLEV would provide, with the great advantage that we know now what Acela ridership has actually been.  This provides a firm base for a forecast of what Acela ridership would be in a future year in a scenario where the SCMAGLEV is not built.  And while the ridership on the two would not be exactly the same, one should expect them to be in the same ballpark.

But they are far from that:

  DEIS Forecasts of SCMAGLEV vs. Acela Ridership, Annual Trips in 2045

Route

SCMAGLEV Trips

Acela Trips

Ratio

Baltimore – DC only

19,277,578

125,226

154 times as much

All, including BWI

24,938,652

187,887

133 times as much

Sources:  DEIS, Main Report Table 4.2-3; and Table D-4-48 of Appendix D.4 of the DEIS

Using estimates just from the DEIS, the project sponsor is forecasting that annual (one-way) trips on the SCMAGLEV in 2045 would be 133 times what they would be in that year on the Acela (in a scenario where the SCMAGLEV is not built).  And it would be 154 times as much for the Baltimore – Washington riders only.  This is nonsense.  One could have a reasonable debate if the SCMAGLEV figures were twice as high, and maybe even if they were three times as high.  But it is absurd that they would be 133 or 154 times as high.

And it gets worse.  The figures above are all taken from the DEIS.  But the base year Acela ridership figures in the DEIS (Appendix D.4, Table D.4-45) differ substantially from figures Amtrak itself has produced in its recent NEC FUTURE study.  This review of future investment options in Northeast Corridor (Washington to Boston) Amtrak service was concluded in July 2017.  As part of this it provided forecasts of what future Acela ridership would be under various alternatives, including one (its Alternative 3) where Acela trains would be substantially upgraded and require just 20 minutes for the trip between downtown Baltimore and downtown Washington, DC.  This would be quite similar to what SCMAGLEV service would be.

But for reasons that are not clear, the base year figures for Acela ridership between Baltimore and Washington differ substantially between what the SCMAGLEV DEIS has and what NEC FUTURE has.  The figure in the NEC FUTURE study (for a base year of 2013) puts the number of riders (one-way) between Baltimore and Washington (and not counting those who boarded north of Baltimore, at Philadelphia or New York for example, and then rode through to Washington, and similarly for those going from Washington to Baltimore) at just 17,595.  The DEIS for the SCMAGLEV put the similar Acela ridership (for a base year of 2017) at 147,831 (calculated from Table D.4-45, of Appendix D.4).  While the base years differ (2013 vs. 2017), the disparity cannot be explained by that.  It is far too large.  My guess would be that the DEIS counted all Acela travelers taking up seats between Baltimore and Washington, including those who alighted north of Baltimore (or whose destination from Washington was north of Baltimore), and not just those travelers traveling solely between Washington and Baltimore.  But the SCMAGLEV will be serving only the Baltimore-Washington market, with no interconnections with the train routes coming from north of Baltimore.

What was the source of the Acela ridership figure in the DEIS of 147,831 in 2017?  That is not clear.  Table D.4-45 of Appendix D.4 says that its source is Table 3-10 of the “SCMAGLEV Final Ridership Report”, dated November 8, 2018.  But that report, which is available along with the other DEIS reports (with a direct link at https://bwmaglev.info/index.php/component/jdownloads/?task=download.send&id=71&catid=6&m=0&Itemid=101), does not have a Table 3-10.  Significant portions of that report were redacted, but in its Table of Contents no reference is shown to a Table 3-10 (even though other redacted tables, such as Tables 5-2 and 6-3, are still referenced in the Table of Contents, but labeled as redacted).

One can only speculate on why there is no Table 3-10 in the Final Ridership Report.  Perhaps it was deleted when someone discovered that the figures reported there, which were then later used as part of the database for the ridership forecast models, were grossly out of line with the Amtrak figures.  The Amtrak figure for Acela ridership for Baltimore-Washington passengers of 17,595 (in 2013) is less than one-eighth of the figure on Acela ridership shown in the DEIS or 147,831 (in 2017).

It can be difficult for an outsider to know how many of those riding on the Acela between Washington and Baltimore are passengers going just between those two cities (as well as BWI).  Most of the passengers riding on that segment will be going on to (or coming from) cities further north.  One would need access to ticket sales data.  But it is reasonable to assume that Amtrak itself would know this, and therefore that the figures in the NEC FUTURE study would likely be accurate.  Furthermore, in the forecast horizon years, where Amtrak is trying to show what Acela (and other rail) ridership would grow to with alternative investment programs, it is reasonable to assume that Amtrak would provide relatively optimistic (i.e. higher) estimates, as higher estimates are more likely to convince Congress to provide the funding that would be required for such investments.

The Amtrak figures would in any case provide a suitable comparison to what SCMAGLEV’s future ridership might be.  The Amtrak forecasts are for 2040, so for the SCMAGLEV forecasts I interpolated to produce an estimate for 2040 assuming a constant rate of growth between the forecast SCMAGLEV ridership in 2030 and that for 2045.  Both the NEC FUTURE and SCMAGLEV figures include the stop at BWI.

    Forecasts of SCMAGLEV (DEIS) vs. Acela (NEC FUTURE) Ridership between Baltimore and Washington, Annual Trips in 2040 

Alternative

SCMAGLEV Trips

Acela Trips

Ratio

No Action

22,761,428

26,177

870 times as much

Alternative 1

22,761,428

26,779

850 times as much

Alternative 2

22,761,428

29,170

780 times as much

Alternative 3

22,761,428

31,291

727 times as much

Sources:  SCMAGLEV trips interpolated from figures on forecast ridership in 2030 and 2045 (Camden Yards) in Table 4.2-3 of DEIS.  Acela trips from NEC FUTURE Final EIS, Volume 2, Appendix B.08.

The Acela ridership figures are those estimated under various investment scenarios in the rail service in the Northeast Corridor.  NEC FUTURE examined a “No Action” scenario with just minimal investments, and then various alternative investment levels to produce increasingly capable services.  Alternative 3 (of which there were four sub-variants, but all addressing alternative investments between New York and Boston and thus not affecting directly the Washington-Baltimore route) would upgrade Acela service to the extent that it would go between Baltimore and Washington in just 20 minutes.  This would be very close to the 15 minutes for the SCMAGLEV.  Yet even with such a comparable service, the SCMAGLEV DEIS is forecasting that its service would carry 727 times as many riders as what Amtrak has forecast for its Acela service (in a scenario where there is no SCMAGLEV).  This is complete nonsense.

To be clear, I would stress again that the forecast future Acela ridership figures are a scenario under various possible investment programs by Amtrak.  The investment program in Alternative 3 would upgrade Acela service to a degree where the Baltimore – Washington trip (with a stop at BWI) would take just 20 minutes.  The NEC FUTURE study forecasts that in such a scenario the Baltimore-Washington ridership on Acela would total a bit over 31,000 trips in the year 2040.  In contrast, the DEIS for the SCMAGLEV forecasts that there would in that year be close to 23 million trips taken on the similar SCMAGLEV service, requiring 15 minutes to make such a trip.  Such a disparity makes no sense.

C.  How Could the Forecasts be so Wrong?

A well-known consulting firm, Louis Berger, prepared the ridership forecasts, and their “Final Ridership Report” dated November 8, 2018, referenced above, provides an overview on the approach they took.  Unfortunately, while I appreciate that the project sponsor provided a link to this report along with the rest of the DEIS (I had asked for this, having seen references to it in the DEIS), the report that was posted had significant sections redacted.  Due to those redactions, and possibly also limitations in what the full report itself might have included (such as summaries of the underlying data), it is impossible to say for sure why the forecasts of SCMAGLEV ridership were close to three orders of magnitude greater than what ridership has been and is expected to be on comparable Acela service.

Thus I can only speculate.  But there are several indications of what may have led the SCMAGLEV estimates to be so out of line with ridership on a service that is at least broadly comparable.  Specifically:

1)  As noted above, there were apparent problems in assembling existing data on rail ridership for the Baltimore-Washington market, in particular for the Acela.  The ridership numbers for the Acela in the DEIS were more than eight times higher in their base year (2017) than what Amtrak had in an only slightly earlier base year (2013).  The ridership numbers on Amtrak Regional trains (for Baltimore-Washington riders) were closer but still substantially different:  409,671 in Table D.4-45 of the DEIS (for 2017), vs. 172,151 in NEC FUTURE (for 2013).

Table D.4-45 states that its source for this data on rail ridership is a Table 3-10 in the Final Ridership Report of November 8, 2018.  But as noted previously, such a table is not there – it was either never there or it was redacted.  Thus it is impossible to determine why their figures differ so much from those of Amtrak.  But the differences for the Acela figures (more than a factor of eight) are huge, i.e. close to an order of magnitude by itself.  While it is impossible to say for sure, my guess (as noted above) is that the Acela ridership numbers in the DEIS included travelers whose trip began, or would end, in destinations north of Baltimore, who then traveled through Baltimore on their way to, or from, Washington, DC.  But such travelers are not part of the market the SCMAGLEV would serve.

2)  In modeling the choice those traveling between Baltimore and Washington would have between SCMAGLEV and alternatives, the analysts collapsed all the train options (Acela, Amtrak Regional, and MARC) into one.  See page 61 of the Ridership Report.  They create a weighted average for a single “train” alternative, and they note that since (in their figures) MARC ridership makes up almost 90% of the rail market, the weighted averages for travel time and the fare will be essentially that of MARC.

Thus they never looked at Acela as an alternative, with a service level not far from that of SCMAGLEV.  Nor do they even consider the question of why so many MARC riders (67.5% of MARC riders in 2045 if the Camden Yards option is chosen – see page D-56 of Appendix D-4 of the DEIS) are forecast to divert to the SCMAGLEV, but are not doing so now (nor in the future) to Acela.  According to Table D-45 of Appendix D.4 of the DEIS, in their data for their 2017 base year, there are 28 times as many MARC riders as on Acela between downtown Baltimore and downtown Washington, and 20 times as many with those going to and from the BWI stop included.  Evidently, they do not find the Acela option attractive.  Why should they then find the SCMAGLEV train attractive?

3)  The answer as to why MARC riders have not chosen to ride on the Acela almost certainly has something to do with the difference in the fares.  A round-trip on MARC costs $16 a day.  A round trip on Acela costs, according to the DEIS, an average of $104 a day.  That is not a small difference.  For someone commuting 5 days a week and 50 weeks a year (or 250 days a year), the annual cost on MARC would be $4,000 but $26,000 a year on the Acela.  And it would be an even higher $30,000 a year on the SCMAGLEV (based on an average fare of $120 for a round trip), and $40,000 a year ($160 a day) at peak hours (which would cover the times commuters would normally use).  Even for those moderately well off, $40,000 a year for commuting would be a significant expense, and not an attractive alternative to MARC with its cost of just one-tenth of this.

If such costs were properly taken into account in the forecasting model, why did it nonetheless predict that most MARC riders would switch to the SCMAGLEV?  This is not fully clear as the model details were not presented in the redacted report, but note that the modelers assigned high dollar amounts for the time value of money ($31.00 to $46.50 for commuters and other non-business travel, and $50.60 to $75.80 for business travel – see page 53 of the Ridership Report).  However, even at such high values, the numbers do not appear to be consistent.  Taking a SCMAGLEV (15 minute trip) rather than MARC (60 minutes) would save 45 minutes each way or 1 1/2 hours a day.  Only at the very high end value of time for business travelers (of $75.80 per hour, or $113.70 for 1 1/2 hours) would this value of time offset the fare difference of $104 (using the average SCMAGLEV fare of $120 minus the MARC fare of $16).  And even that would not suffice for travelers at peak hours (with its SCMAGLEV fare of $160).

But there is also a more basic problem.  It is wrong to assume that travelers on MARC treat their 60 minutes on the train as all wasted time.  They can read, do some work, check their emails, get some sleep, or plan their day.  The presumption that they would pay amounts similar to what some might on average earn in an hour based on their annual salaries is simply incorrect.  And as noted above, if it were correct, then one would see many more riders on the Acela than one does (and similarly riders on the Amtrak Regional trains, that require about 40 minutes for the Washington to Baltimore trip, with an average fare of $34 for a round trip).

There is a similar issue for those who drive.  Those who drive do not place a value on the time spent in their cars equal to what they would earn in an hourly equivalent of their regular salary.  They may well want to avoid traffic jams, which are stressful and frustrating for other reasons, but numerous studies have found that a simple value-of-time calculation based on annual salaries does not explain why so many commuters choose to drive.

4)  Data for the forecasting model also came in part from two personal surveys.  One was an in-person survey of travelers encountered on MARC, at either the MARC BWI Station or onboard Penn Line trains, or at BWI airport.  The other was an online internet survey, where they unfortunately redacted out how they chose possible respondents.

But such surveys are unreliable, with answers that depend critically on how the questions are phrased.  The Final Ridership report does not include the questionnaire itself (most such reports would), so one cannot know what bias there might have been in how the questions were worded.  As an example (and admittedly an exaggerated example, to make the point) were the MARC riders simply asked whether they would prefer a much faster, 15 minute, trip?  Or were they asked whether they would pay an extra $104 per day ($144 at peak hours) to ride a service that would save them 45 minutes each way on the train?

But even such willingness to pay questions are notoriously unreliable.  An appropriate follow-up question to a MARC rider saying they would be willing to pay up to an extra $144 a day to ride a SCMAGLEV, would be why are they evidently not now riding the Acela (at an extra $88 a day) for a ride just 15 minutes longer than what it would be on the SCMAGLEV.

One therefore has to be careful in interpreting and using the results from such a survey in forecasting how travelers would behave.  If current choices (e.g. using the MARC rather than the Acela) do not reflect the responses provided, one should be concerned.

5)  Finally, the particular mathematical form used to model the choices the future travelers would make can make a big difference to the findings.  The Final Ridership Report briefly explains (page 53) that it used a multinomial logit model as the basis for its modeling.  Logit functions assign a continuous probability (starting from 0 and rising to 100%) of some event occurring.  In this model, the event is that a traveler going from one travel zone to another will choose to travel via the SCMAGLEV, or not.  The likelihood of choosing to travel via the SCMAGLEV will be depicted as an S-shaped function, starting at zero and then smoothly rising (following the S-shape) until it reaches 100%, depending on, among other factors, what the travel time savings might be.

The results that such a model will predict will depend critically, of course, on the particular parameters chosen.  But the heavily redacted Final Ridership Report does not show what those parameters were nor how they were chosen or possibly estimated, nor even the complete set of variables used in that function.  The report says little (in what remains after the redactions) beyond that they used that functional form.

A feature of such logit models is that while the choices are discrete (one either will ride the SCMAGLEV or will not), it allows for “fuzziness” around the turning points, that recognize that between individuals, even if they confront a similar combination of variables (a combination of cost, travel time, and other measured attributes), some will simply prefer to drive while some will prefer to take the train.  That is how people are.  But then, while a higher share might prefer to take a train (or the SCMAGLEV) when travel times fall (by close to 45 minutes with the SCMAGLEV when compared to their single “train” option that is 90% MARC, and by variable amounts for those who drive depending on the travel zone pairs), how much higher that share will be will depend on the parameters they selected for their logit.

With certain parameters, the responses can be sensitive to even small reductions in travel times, and the predicted resulting shifts then large.  But are those parameters reasonable?  As noted previously, a test would have been whether the model, with the parameters chosen, would have predicted accurately the number of riders actually observed on the Acela trains in the base year.  But it does not appear such a test was done.  At least no such results were reported to test whether the model was validated or not.

Thus there are a number of possible reasons why the forecast ridership on the SCMAGLEV differs so much from what one currently observes for ridership on the Acela, and from what one might reasonably expect Acela ridership to be in the future.  It is not possible to say whether these are indeed the reasons why the SCMAGLEV forecasts are so incredibly out of line with what one observes for the Acela.  There may be, and indeed likely are, other reasons as well.  But due to issues such as those outlined here, one can understand the possible factors behind SCMAGLEV ridership forecasts that deviate so markedly from plausibility.

D.  Conclusion

The ridership forecasts for the SCMAGLEV are vastly over-estimated.  Predicted ridership on the SCMAGLEV is a minimum of two, and up to three, orders of magnitude higher than what has been observed on, and can reasonably be forecast for, the Acela.  One should not be getting predicted ridership that is more than 100 times what one observes on a comparable, existing (and thus knowable), service.

With ridership on the proposed system far less than what the project sponsors have forecast, the case for building the SCMAGLEV collapses.  Operational and maintenance costs would not be covered, much less any possibility of paying back a portion of the billions of dollars spent to build it, nor will the purported economic benefits follow.

However, the harm to the environment will have been done.  Even if the system is then shut down (due to the forecast ridership never materializing), it will not be possible to reverse much of that environmental damage.

The US very much needs to improve its public transit.  It is far too difficult, with resulting harm both to the economy and to the population, to move around in the Baltimore-Washington region.  But fixing this will require a focus on the basic nuts and bolts of operating, maintaining, and investing in the transit systems we have, including the trains and buses.  This might not look as attractive as a magnetically levitating train, but will be of benefit.  And it will be of benefit to the general public – in particular to those who rely on public transit – and not just to a narrow elite that can afford $120 fares.  Money for public transit is scarce.  It should not be wasted on shiny new toys.

Jobs Due to Biden’s Infrastructure Plan: What is Being Discussed is Not What You Think

A.  Introduction

Politicians have always been eager to announce that a program they have proposed will “create jobs”.  The Biden administration is no exception.  Indeed, President Biden has titled his $2.2 trillion proposal to rebuild America’s infrastructure the “American Jobs Plan”.  And all this is understandable, given the politics.  You would be forgiven, however, for assuming that what is being discussed on the additional jobs that would follow from Biden’s infrastructure proposals has something to do with jobs such as those depicted in the picture above.  They don’t.  The numbers on “new jobs created” that are being bandied about are on something else entirely.

There has also been some confusion on how many jobs that might be.  In remarks made on April 2, soon after his initial announcement of the proposed $2.2 trillion infrastructure initiative, Biden said:  “Independent analysis shows that if we pass this plan, the economy will create 19 million jobs — good jobs, blue-collar jobs, jobs that pay well.”  The estimate is from an analysis made by Mark Zandi, Chief Economist of Moody’s Analytics (a subsidiary of Moody’s, the bond credit rating agency).  Zandi is a well-respected economist, who was an economic advisor to John McCain during his 2008 campaign for the presidency and who has advised both Democrats and Republicans.

The 19 million jobs figure is an estimate made by Zandi and his team at Moody’s Analytics of how many more jobs there would be in the US (or, more precisely, non-farm employees) in 2030 as compared to the average number in 2020, in a scenario where Biden’s infrastructure plan is approved as proposed and then implemented.  But it is important to note that this is an estimate of the total number of jobs that “the economy will create” over the decade if the plan is passed (which is what Biden specifically said), and not an estimate of the extra number of jobs that can be attributed to the American Jobs Plan itself.  But it would be easy to miss this distinction.  The Moody’s Analytics estimates are that the number of jobs in the economy would rise between 2020 and 2030 by 19.0 million if the plan is passed as proposed, but by 16.3 million if only the covid-relief plan (Biden’s $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan) is passed (as it has been), and by 15.7 million in a scenario where neither plan was passed.  Thus in the Moody’s Analytics forecasts, the number of jobs in 2030 would be 2.7 million higher than otherwise if the infrastructure plan is now passed (on top of the extra 0.6 million if only the covid-relief plan were passed).

But it is easy to misstate these distinctions, and some of the administration appointees discussing the proposal with the press at first did so.  In particular, Pete Buttigieg, the Transportation Secretary, and Brian Deese, the head of the National Economic Council in the White House, at first used wording that implied that the full 19 million additional jobs would be due to the infrastructure plan itself.  They later clarified that they had misspoke, and that the Moody’s Analytics estimates were of 2.7 million additional jobs due to the infrastructure plan.  However, this did not keep various news media fact-checkers (including at CNN and at the Washington Post) from taking them to task on it (and for the Washington Post to award Biden “two Pinocchios” in their fact-checking scoring system for being, in their view, misleading).

One can question whether this is quibbling over language that was not fully clear.  But what is of far greater importance is that it misses the fundamental question of what any of these employment forecasts (whether of 19 million, or 2.7 million, or 0.6 million from the $1.9 trillion covid-relief plan) actually mean.  Keep in mind that they are all estimates of how many more people will be employed in 2030 compared to the number employed in 2020, or in a comparison of one scenario for 2030 compared to another.  They are specifically not estimates of the number of jobs of primarily construction workers who would be employed as a direct result of the new infrastructure investments being built.  Yet the wording of Biden, stating that these would be well-paying blue-collar jobs, would appear to indicate that that is what he had in mind when citing the figures.

Furthermore, if the job figures were intended to refer to the blue-collar construction workers who would be hired to build these projects, it does not make much sense to base a comparison on 2030.  By that point the infrastructure plan would be essentially over, with just a small residual amount still to be spent as the program is tailing off (of the $2.2 trillion total, just $81 billion in 2030 and a final $35 billion in 2031 would remain to be spent in the Moody’s estimates).  Few construction workers would still be employed on those projects by that point.  Rather, what may be of interest is not some relatively small change in the overall number of people employed at some end-point, but rather the number of person-years of employment of such workers during the full period of the infrastructure plan.  But the Moody’s estimates are specifically not that.

This then brings up the question of what is Moody’s in fact estimating?  That will be the focus of this blog post.  It is not the number of jobs in construction that will be created as a result of the new work on infrastructure, as these will be down to a fairly minor level by 2030.  As we will see, it is rather an estimate resulting from some secondary aspects of the Moody’s model, and it is not even clear whether the differences were intended to be meaningful.

To start, this post will review how estimates of future employment are traditionally made – for example by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  In brief, they are based on population estimates and on forecasts of what share of different population groups will seek to be part of the labor force (the labor force participation rates), with then the assumption that the economy will be at full employment at that future date.  The full employment assumption is made not because the forecaster is confident the economy will in fact be at full employment in that forecast year.  Rather, they do not really know what the short-term conditions will be in that future year, and assuming full employment is just for setting a benchmark.  Unemployment depends on how successful monetary and fiscal policies would have been in that future year to bring the economy to full employment.  Such policies are short-term, depend on the immediate situation, and we have no way of knowing now (in 2021) what shocks or surprises the economy will be facing in 2030.

With this the case, why is Moody’s forecasting any difference at all in the 2030 employment numbers?  The differences are in fact not large when compared to what overall employment will be in that year.  But there is some, and we will discuss why that is.

The post will then look at what one might say on jobs in the intervening years.  While Moody’s has produced year-by-year estimates, its approach for those years (after the next couple of years, as they forecast the economy moves to full employment) is fundamentally similar to what they assume for 2030.  What Moody’s specifically did not do in its analysis was try to estimate the direct number of jobs (or more precisely, person-years of employment) of those employed on the infrastructure projects in Biden’s plan.  Someone will likely do that at some point, but it was not done here.  The question I will then look at it is whether this should be seen as “job creation”.  I will argue that it would be more appropriate to look at it as job shifting rather than job creation, as the total number of jobs in the economy (the number employed) will likely not be all that much different.  And there is nothing wrong with that.  The primary objective, after all, is to build and maintain our badly needed infrastructure.  And on the employment that would follow, providing more attractive jobs that workers will seek to shift into is a good thing.  But the total number employed may not change, and if that is the metric one tries to use, one will likely be disappointed.  Many, including politicians, are often confused about this.

None of this should be taken to imply that the infrastructure plan is not warranted.  It desperately is, as will be discussed in the penultimate section of this post.  The US has underinvested in public infrastructure for decades, and what we have is an embarrassment compared to what is seen in Europe or East Asia.  And it has direct implications for productivity.  Truck drivers are not productive when they are sitting in traffic jams due to our poor highways.  But it is wrong to assess the value of an infrastructure investment program by some estimate of the number of jobs created.  Yes, there will be workers employed on the projects, in likely well-paid jobs.  But that should not be the objective – better public infrastructure should be the objective, achieved as efficiently as possible.  A focus on “jobs created” is instead likely to lead to confusion, as it has with the Moody’s numbers.

We will then end with a short summary and conclusions section.

Finally, note that the version of Biden’s infrastructure plan examined by Zandi and his team was estimated to cost $2.2 trillion over ten years.  However, one will see references to Biden’s plan as costing $2.0 trillion, or $2.3 trillion, or some other amount.  The final amount will depend, of course, on whatever Congress approves, but for consistency I will focus here on the plan as assessed by Zandi, at an estimated cost of $2.2 trillion.

B.  Forecasting Future Employment Levels

Yogi Berra purportedly said:  “It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future”.  Whether he actually said that is not so clear, but it is certainly true.  And this is especially true of predictions of future employment.  But some things are more predictable than others, and the trick is to make use of factors that change only slowly over time.

In particular, population forecasts for periods of a decade or so are relatively reliable.  Those in a particular age bracket now will be ten years older a decade from now, and all one needs then to adjust for are mortality rates (which are known and change only slowly over time) and net migration rates (which are relatively small in magnitude).  Thus the Census Bureau can produce fairly reliable population forecasts for periods of a decade, and can provide these for groups broken down by age bracket as well as sex, race, and ethnicity.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics starts from such Census Bureau forecasts to produce its projections of the labor force and employment.  The BLS does this annually, with the most recent such projections from September 2000 covering the period 2019 to 2029.  The BLS takes the Census Bureau forecasts for the adult population (age 16 and above), with these broken up into age groups (mostly 10-year groups, i.e. aged 25 to 34, 35 to 44, etc.) and by sex, with overriding checks based on race (white, black, other) and ethnic (Hispanic and non-Hispanic) classifications.  For each of these groups, it estimates, based on a statistical analysis of historical trends, what its labor force participation rate can be expected to be in the projection year.  The labor force participation rate is the share of the population within each group who choose to be part of the labor force (i.e. either employed or, if unemployed, seeking a job).  Labor force participation rates change only slowly over time (as was discussed in this earlier post on this blog), so this is a reasonable approach for estimating what the labor force might be in a decade’s time.

Employment will then be the labor force minus the number who are unemployed.  But there is no way to know beyond the next few years what the unemployment rate might then be.  It will depend on what shocks or surprises there might have been to the economy at that time, and these are by definition not predictable.  If they were, they would not be surprises.  While active monetary and fiscal policy would then seek to bring unemployment down to just frictional levels, how long this will take depends on many factors, including political ones.  And the problem is one that can only be addressed in the near term, as it depends on when the shock came. Thus the Fed’s Board of Governors meets as a group every six weeks throughout the year to monitor the situation, and to decide based on what they know at the time whether to tweak monetary policy through some instrument (normally short-term interest rates, which they may adjust up or, when they can, down, to affect growth).

There is thus no way to know now, in 2021, what the rate of unemployment will be in 2030.  For this reason, to set a benchmark to which comparisons under different scenarios can be made, the BLS and others following this approach assume the economy will be operating at full employment in that projection year.  That is, the benchmark sets unemployment at some specific, low, rate to reflect just frictional unemployment.  While there has been debate on what that specific rate might be (different analysts generally peg it at between 4 and 5% currently), a specific rate would be chosen for the comparisons.  Employment will then be equal to the labor force in that forecast year minus the number unemployed at this assumed rate of unemployment.

[MInor technical note:  The employment figure arrived at in this way will be employment as measured at the individual level, and will include the self-employed as well as on-farm employment.  It will also count as one person employed even if the individual holds multiple jobs.  The employment figures normally cited (and used by Moody’s) are of non-farm payroll employment, which comes from surveys of establishments, excludes the self-employed and on-farm employment, and counts each job even if one person might hold more than one job (as the establishment will only know who they employ, and will not know if some of their employees might hold second jobs).  But the differences due to these factors are small, and adjustments can be made.]

Thus, for any given set of forecast population figures (by age group, etc.), employment will follow from the labor force participation rate and the assumed rate of frictional unemployment (i.e. unemployment when the economy is assumed to be operating at full employment).  Forecast employment in any future year under different scenarios will therefore only differ if either the labor force participation rate, or the unemployment rate (or both), differ for some reason.

C.  The Moody’s Employment Scenarios for 2030

Moody’s Analytics examined three scenarios for 2030 (and the path to it):  A base case where neither the infrastructure plan of Biden nor the covid-relief plan of Biden existed, a scenario where only the covid-relief plan was in place, and a scenario where both are in place.  In the first (base case) scenario it forecasts that employment in the US would rise to 157.9 million in 2030 from an average of 142.2 million in 2020, or an increase of 15.7 million.  In the scenario with only the covid-relief plan, Moody’s forecasts that employment in 2030 would then total 158.5 million, or 0.6 million more than in the base case.  And in the scenario where the infrastructure plan is also passed and implemented, Moody’s forecasts that employment in 2030 would total 161.2 million, or 2.7 million more than in the scenario with only the covid-relief plan passed and 19.0 million more than average total employment in 2020.

But why would employment levels in 2030 differ at all between these scenarios?  As discussed above, they can only differ if labor force participation rates differ or the assumed unemployment rates in that forecast year differ.  (The basic population numbers for that year should certainly not differ.)  In the Moody’s numbers they both do, but it is not clear why.

It is in particular difficult to understand why Moody’s allowed the assumed unemployment rates in 2030 to differ across their scenarios.  The scenario with just the covid-relief plan, which will be over by 2023 at the latest, should in particular not have an impact on the unemployment rate in 2030.  But in the Moody’s figures it does, albeit by only a minor amount (with unemployment at 4.5% in 2030 in the base scenario, and 4.4% in the scenario with the covid-relief plan).

The difference is larger in the scenario with both the covid-relief plan and the infrastructure plan.  Moody’s forecasts that unemployment in 2030 would then be just 3.8%, or well less than the 4.5% rate in the base scenario.  Why would that be?  While there would still be a small amount of spending under the infrastructure plan in 2030 (Moody’s uses a figure of $81 billion in its scenario), the impact of such spending in that year would be small (just 0.2% of forecast GDP in that year) and would in any case have been diminishing over time as the infrastructure plan was being phased down.  That is, the reductions in spending under the infrastructure plan in the outer years, relative to what they would have been a few years before, would (if not offset by other actions) be deflationary at that point, not expansionary.  But regardless of whether Biden’s infrastructure plan had been passed in 2021 or not, one would assume that fiscal and monetary policy would have sought in that future year (2030) to bring the economy to full employment, at whatever the assumed rate of (frictional) unemployment that it then is. There is no rationale for assuming the rate of unemployment in 2030 will differ across the scenarios.

The other difference in the Moody’s forecasts for 2030 under the different scenarios is in the labor force participation rates.  One can work out from the numbers Moody’s provided in its document (coupled with the BLS numbers for the adult population) that the labor force participation rate would be 58.5% in the base scenario, 58.7% in the scenario where only the Biden covid-relief package was passed, and 59.3% if the Biden infrastructure plan is also passed.  (More precisely, these are the Moody’s figures for non-farm payroll employment as a share of the population, not the overall labor force, with the small differences noted above between those two concepts).  Compared to the scenario of the covid-relief plan only, two-thirds (66%) of the extra 2.7 million in employment in 2030 is due to the higher labor force participation rates Moody’s forecasts for that year, and one-third (34%) is due to its forecast of a lower unemployment rate in that year.

Why should the labor force participation rate be higher in 2030 if Biden’s infrastructure plan is passed?  One could postulate a connection, but it would be tenuous and it is not clear if this was in fact intended by Moody’s or was just an outcome following from other relationships in its model.  I do not know enough about the structure of its model to say.  But one can speculate that the model may have linked the labor force participation rate in a forecast year to real wages in that year, with a higher real wage leading to a higher labor force participation rate.  Furthermore, the model might link greater infrastructure investment (or greater investment generally) to higher productivity, and higher productivity to higher wages.  In that case, the higher investment might lead, by such a route, to a higher labor force participation rate.  But this would require estimation of the responses in a series of steps, each of which might be tenuous.  It is difficult to forecast how much economy-wide productivity might rise as a result of such investment; difficult to forecast how much real wages would rise if productivity rises (real wages have been flat since around 1980, even though overall productivity rose by almost 80%); and difficult to forecast how much a rise in real wages might then raise the labor force participation rate.

But this is conceivable.  Whether it was an intended relationship in the Moody’s model is not so clear.  Such models are large and complicated, with a focus on particular issues.  Certain results might then follow, but those constructing the model might not have paid much attention to such outcomes when constructing the model, as the focus was on something else.

In any case, one has to be careful in interpreting the results as implying there would be 2.7 million additional jobs “created” in 2030 as a consequence of the Biden infrastructure plan.  There would, in the model, be 2.7 million more people employed, but this would mostly be due to a higher proportion of the population seeking employment in that year (a higher labor force participation rate).  And assuming an economy at full employment in that year, the additional number seeking employment would translate into that additional number being employed.  But it would be a stretch to interpret this as the infrastructure plan “creating” those additional jobs.  Rather, a higher share of the population are looking for work (a higher labor force participation rate), and are assumed to be able to find it.

D.  The Jobs Directly Created by the Infrastructure Plan

The Biden infrastructure plan would certainly create a huge number of jobs while the infrastructure is being built.  There would be jobs such as depicted in the photo at the top of this post, and with $2.2 trillion being spent there would be a large number of them (even with a share of the $2.2 trillion being spent in high priority areas outside of what is traditionally considered “hard” infrastructure, such as for labor training and health infrastructure).

These would, however, be jobs for a fixed period.  Once the particular projects are finished, those jobs would end.  Thus one should think of these as being so many person-years of employment (employment of one person for one year).  These are not permanent jobs being “created”, but rather workers being employed for a period of time to build a project or to complete a specific maintenance or repair task (e.g. repaving a road).

While not permanent jobs, it would still be important to have good estimates of how many there would be.  Moody’s did not do that, nor was it their intention, but one needs to be clear about that.  It will be important, however, that there be a serious effort at some point to work out such estimates, and I would guess that someone in government is working on this now.  They are needed precisely because there will be a large number who will be employed on these infrastructure projects, and workers with the necessary skills for such work are limited, in part because the US has so woefully underinvested in its infrastructure in recent decades (as will be discussed in the next section below).  It will thus be important to pay attention to the phasing of the individual projects, both over time and geographically, to ensure there will be sufficient capacity (both in terms of the workers needed and the firms that manage such projects) to build the projects at a given place and at a particular time.  It does not help much that there might be workers with the requisite skill in New York, say, when the need is for a project in California.

This will therefore need to be worked out, and I suspect it will be.  This will also guide what workforce development and training needs there will need to be, and the BLS routinely provides such estimates (at least at a broad, economy-wide, level).  But while it is correct to term jobs (or more precisely person-years of jobs) as being “created” under such an infrastructure plan, this does not necessarily mean that the total number of jobs in the economy will be higher.  If the economy is at full employment (and the labor force participation rate otherwise unchanged), the total number employed in the economy will be unchanged.  It is just that some share of those employed will be working on these infrastructure projects.  And that means fewer will be working in other jobs.

That is not a bad thing.  While the overall number employed will be the same, there will be jobs in the infrastructure projects which will have been attractive enough (either due to higher wages that they pay or for some other reason) to draw workers to those jobs.  Those who shift to those new jobs will then be better off, which is good.  Furthermore, the workers shifting to those new jobs would then have left positions that others may find attractive enough to move into (due to a higher wage, or whatever).  Thus there would be shifts across the economy.  Some less attractive jobs would cease to be filled, with employers forced to learn how to make do with less, but that is how competition works.

It is thus not correct to assert the total number employed in the economy will be higher as a consequence of the infrastructure investment plan (aside from during an initial few years as the economy moves to full employment – and Moody’s forecasts that this will be complete by 2022 with the covid-recovery and infrastructure plans enacted and even by 2024 without them).  The total number employed in such forecasts will be largely the same with or without the plans.  But that does not mean they are not without value to workers.  There will be new jobs to be filled, which will need to be attractive enough to draw workers to them.  And that helps workers.

E.  Public Infrastructure Investment in the US

Public infrastructure in the US is an embarrassment.  And it has a direct impact on productivity.  As was noted before, a truck driver sitting in a traffic jam is not terribly productive.  Similarly, exporters of soybeans who have to wait weeks to ship their product due to inadequate capacity at the ports cannot be terribly competitive in global markets (and will have to accept a price cut in order to sell their product).  And so on.

The major reason public infrastructure in the US is so poor is that the US has simply underinvested in it.  Using a broad definition of all government investment excluding that for the military, as a share of GDP, one has (calculated from BEA NIPA statistics):

Government investment peaked in the mid-1960s (as a share of GDP) and has declined ever since.  In gross terms it has been lower in recent years than in any time since the early 1950s.  Net of depreciation, it has been a good deal lower over the last half-decade (to 2019 – the 2020 figure is not yet available) than it has ever been in the last 70 years at least.  (And note that the blip up in the GDP share in 2020 was not because public investment rose.  The rate of growth of gross government investment in 2020 was in fact less than in 2019 and about the same as in 2018.  Rather it was because GDP collapsed in 2020, in the last year of the Trump administration, which pushed the share higher.)

What is of most interest for the state of public infrastructure is such investment net of depreciation.  That is shown as the curve in red in the chart, and it has fallen from a peak of 3.0% of GDP in 1966 to just 0.7% of GDP in recent years (up to 2019), a fall of 77%.  And at such a pace of adding to the net stock of public capital (infrastructure), the stock of such capital as a share of GDP will be falling.  By simple arithmetic, the ratio will be falling if the stock of that capital as a share of GDP is greater than the net investment share of GDP (0.7% here) divided by the rate of growth of nominal GDP.  Taking a nominal growth rate for GDP of, say, 4% (i.e. a real growth rate of 2% and a growth in prices of 2%), then the stock of public capital as a share of GDP will fall if the current stock of that capital is 17.5% of GDP or more (where 17.5% is equal to 0.7% / 4%).  The stock of public capital will certainly be well more than that in any modern economy, including the US.  And that underinvestment is why our highways are becoming increasingly subject to traffic jams, for example.  Our infrastructure is simply not keeping up.

Major public investment will be needed to reverse this, and the Biden infrastructure plan will be a start.  To put things in perspective, I have taken what would be spent annually under the Biden Plan (as estimated by Moody’s), as a share of GDP, and added this to a base amount where I simply assume other government investment in gross terms will remain at the average share it was between 2013 and 2019 (when it was quite steady at about 2.65% of GDP).  The figures for real GDP used for these calculations were those forecast by Moody’s under the scenario that the Biden infrastructure plan goes ahead, with these converted to nominal GDP (for the shares) using the forecast GDP deflators of the Congressional Budget Office.  Spending under the Biden Plan alone would start at 0.5% of GDP in 2023, rise to a peak of 1.3% of GDP in 2025, and then fall to 0.2% of GDP in 2030 and 0.1% in 2031.  Adding these figures to a base level of 2.65%, one would have:

A $2.2 trillion infrastructure investment plan is certainly large.  But the chart puts this in perspective.  Even with such an investment program, public investment would still not rise to as high as it was in the mid-1960s, nor would it last nearly as long.  Public investment had been relatively high (compared to later periods) from the mid-1950s to around 1980 – almost a quarter-century.  The $2.2 trillion Biden plan would raise public investment, but only for about eight years.  A question that will need to be addressed later is what happens after that.  Reverting to the recent, low, levels of infrastructure investment, would eventually lead back to the problems we have now.

F.  Summary and Conclusions

Politicians will always tout the jobs that will be “created” if their programs are approved.  If they didn’t, they likely would not hold office for long.  President Biden is no exception.  And the administration has cited independent estimates made by Mark Zandi’s team at Moody’s Analytics to say that Biden’s “American Jobs Plan” would indeed create a large number of jobs.  They cite Moody’s estimates that the number of jobs in 2030 would be 19 million higher than in 2020 if the infrastructure plan (as well as the covid-relief plan) are approved, and 2.7 million higher in 2030 if that infrastructure plan is approved as compared to a scenario where it is not.

These are, indeed, the Moody’s numbers.  But one should be careful in the interpretation of what they in fact mean, and Moody’s can be criticized for not being fully clear on this.  These are not jobs, generally in construction, that would follow directly from the infrastructure investment program (which should be counted as person-years of employment in any case, as such jobs are not permanent).  Rather, what Moody’s has done has been to use its model of the US economy to examine what overall employment levels would be in 2030 under the various scenarios.  It found that the number employed would be 2.7 million higher in 2030 (1.7% of forecast employment in that year) in the scenario with the infrastructure plan as compared to a scenario without it.  One can calculate that roughly two-thirds of this would be due to a higher labor force participation rate, and one-third due to a lower unemployment rate in that year.

It is not clear, however, why forecasts of either of those two variables – participation rates and the unemployment rate – should differ at all across the scenarios.  I would not be surprised if these were simply unintended consequences in a complex model.  In any case the differences in employment in that forecast year of 2030 are small, as one would expect.  Furthermore, by 2030 the infrastructure plan would be winding down, with only small residual amounts remaining to be spent.

During the course of the 2020s, however, a very significant number of people will be employed on these infrastructure investments.  They will be employed for limited periods until the projects are completed (and hence should be counted in person-years of employment), but this would still be significant.  It will be important to estimate not just how many will be employed and for what periods, but also what skills will be required and where and when they will be required.  This is probably now being done somewhere in government.  But Moody’s did not attempt to do that.

And while such jobs, mostly in construction, can be correctly termed as “created” under the infrastructure investment plan, this does not necessarily mean the overall number of people employed in the economy will be higher.  Unless labor force participation rates would then be higher for some reason (and it is difficult to see why that would be the case) or the unemployment rate is lower (which it cannot be if the economy is already at full employment), the overall number employed in the economy will be unchanged.  What would happen, rather, would be shifts in the job structure, not in the number of jobs overall.  Some workers would shift into the construction jobs needed to build the infrastructure, and others would shift into the jobs these workers had occupied before.  That is all good – the new jobs will need to be more attractive in terms of pay and/or for other reasons for workers to shift to them – but the total number employed (the total number of “jobs”) would largely be the same.

The public infrastructure is certainly needed.  The US has been underinvesting in its public infrastructure for decades, and when account is taken for depreciation it is clear that the net stock of public capital has not kept up with the overall growth of the economy.  That is why roads, for example, are now so often jammed.  The Biden Plan would bring public investment up to levels not seen for decades, although still not matching (even at $2.2 trillion) the public investment levels of the 1960s as a share of GDP.  It is also a time-limited program, which would phase down in the second half of the 2020s.  At some point, this will need to be addressed.  Bringing public investment levels back down to the far from adequate levels of recent decades will lead to the same problems again.  But that will likely be an issue that will not be seriously considered until the next presidential term.

Lower Life Expectancy in a State is Correlated with a Higher Share Voting for Trump

A lower life expectancy in a state is associated with a higher share in the state voting for Trump.  The chart above shows the simple correlation, using state-wide averages, between the life expectancy in a state and Trump’s share of the vote in that state in the 2020 presidential election.  States where life expectancy is relatively low saw, on average, a higher share of their population voting for Trump.  Life expectancy was especially low in a set of mostly Southern states that also had a high share voting for Trump (the bottom right corner of the chart).

The figures on life expectancy come from a recently issued set of estimates produced by the CDC.  The CDC estimates are geographically highly detailed, providing estimates down to the census tract level, but I have only used here the overall state-wide averages.  Due to their fine level of geographic detail, the CDC estimates are averaged over several years (2010 to 2015) to smooth out year-to-year statistical noise.  But life expectancy figures generally change only slowly over time (2020 was an exception, due to Covid-19), so figures for 2010-15 will provide a good estimate of what should be considered normal for life expectancy currently (i.e. with the exception of the Covid-19 impact).  The presidential election results are from Wikipedia, where the Trump share is his share in the overall vote in each state (including third party and other minor candidates).

The correlation is a strong one.  The regression equation (shown in the chart) for the relationship has an R-squared of 0.45.  This means that if one simply knew the life expectancy in a state, one could predict 45% of the variation in the share across the states that would vote for Trump.  This is high for such a simple cross-section relationship.  The negative slope of the equation (-0.11) means that every percentage point increase in the share of the vote for Trump is associated with a 0.11 year lower life expectancy.  Or put another way, a state with a life expectancy that is one year less than in another is associated with an expected 9 percentage point higher share of those voting for Trump (where 9 is roughly equal to 1 / 0.11).

Why this correlation?  Note that it is not saying that a high or low life expectancy in itself would necessarily be driving a tendency to vote for Trump or not.  Rather, a number of factors that enter into the determination of life expectancy are quite possibly also factors in common with the views of Trump supporters.  Life expectancy depends on personal factors and decisions (smoking, diet and exercise, obesity, vaccinations, whether to wear a mask to protect oneself and others to reduce the spread of a deadly disease), as well as on decisions made by state and local governments chosen by that electorate   (such as on access to health care, e.g. whether Medicaid should be available for the poor).  Life expectancy also depends on income levels and for any given average income level on income inequality.

And it will depend on the social norms of the region, such as car driving habits (speeding) and access to guns.  Of the factors reducing life expectancy in the US between 2014 and 2017 (mostly offsetting factors that would have, by themselves, led to a higher life expectancy) unintentional injuries accounted for just over half (50.6%) while suicides and homicides accounted for a further 15% (suicide 7.8% and homicide 7.5%).  That is, these non-medical factors accounted for two-thirds of the factors that had a negative impact on life expectancy in this period.

Few would question that better health is better than poorer health.  The high correlation seen here between life expectancy and the degree of Trump support suggests that there are significant commonalities in the various states between behaviors (both personal and social) that lead to poorer health outcomes and support for Trump.