The Growing Inequality in Wealth in the US, Part 2 – Wealth of Income Groups

Chart 1

A.  Introduction

This is the second in a series of posts on the extreme, and growing, inequality in the distribution of wealth in the US.  The first post discussed the basic figures on the distribution of wealth – from households with the least to those with the most – and how the inequality in that distribution has grown over time.  It also discussed the source of the data used – the Distributional Financial Accounts (DFA) of the Federal Reserve Board – and some of the unavoidable limitations in that data.

The distribution examined in that post was that of wealth across households, with the households ranked by their level of wealth (more precisely their net worth, but the terms will be used interchangeably).  In what was publicly released, the DFA provided figures on assets and liabilities held by the bottom 50% of households ranked by their net worth, the 50 to 90%, the 90 to 99%, the 99.0 to 99.9%, and the top 0.1%.

The DFA data also provides estimates on the net worth of households grouped by other characteristics.  One – which will be examined in this post – is the net worth of households when ranked by their level of income rather than by their level of wealth.  There are similarities between the two, but also some interesting differences.  The household groups in the data released by the Fed provide the assets and liabilities held by the poorest 20% by income, the 20 to 40%, the 40 to 60%, the 60 to 80%, the 80 to 99%, and the top 1%.  This corresponds to the categories of households often provided in government statistics and used by analysts when reviewing the distribution of income.

By construction, the distribution of wealth will be most extreme when households are ranked by their wealth.  The distribution will be less extreme when households are ranked by any other criterion, including income.  But it is interesting to see how closely they correspond to each other, as conventional thinking typically assumes lower-income households will also have low wealth, while the most wealthy households have the highest incomes.  We will see that while this is basically true for high-income households (at least for the top 1%), there are significant differences for the bottom half of households.

Section B below will first review the basic story on the distribution of wealth across households when households are ranked by income.  The pattern is broadly similar to that discussed in the earlier post for the distribution when households are ranked by their net worth.  That is, the distributions in both are highly unequal and have become more so over time.  But there are also some differences.

Section C examines the top 1%, comparing those households when ranked by their net worth to the households in the top 1% when ranked by their income.  While the wealth of the top 1% when households are ranked by income is lower than when ranked by wealth (necessarily so, by construction), the difference was about 20 to 30% less throughout the period.  They moved together over time and were broadly similar.  The richest households by income were – not surprisingly – generally the richest households in terms of wealth.

Section D then examines the distribution at the other end of the distribution.  Unfortunately, the closest comparison that can be made is of the net worth of the bottom 40% when households are ranked by their income to the net worth of the bottom 50% when households are ranked by their net worth.  But even in such a comparison, we will see that the average net worth of the bottom 40% by income is three to four times higher than the average net worth of the bottom 50% by wealth – and by more during the years surrounding the economic and financial collapse of 2008/09.  Again, by construction, it will always be higher.  What is surprising is that it was so much higher.  This has some important policy implications.  The bottom half of the population by income will – in many cases – hold a significant amount of wealth.  While substantially less than the wealth held by richer households, the assets of those in the bottom half (by income) are primarily equity in owner-occupied homes and investments that they likely intend to use for retirement.  This is wealth that, in most cases, one would likely not want to make subject to significant taxation.

B.  Real Net Worth per Household, When Households are Ranked by Income

The chart at the top of this post shows how real wealth per household has grown over time for household groups ranked by income.  It is broadly similar in nature to the charts in the earlier post in that they show the rich grew far richer while growth was far more modest for those not in the top 1%.  Keep in mind in any comparison to the charts in the earlier post that the DFA data had figures on the wealth of the top 0.1% when households are ranked by their wealth, while the top group for households when ranked by income was only the top 1%.  The top 0.1% were far richer than the “merely” top 1%.  Section C below will focus on a comparison of the top 1% in both.

As before, given the scale required to show how net worth has grown for the richest group (the top 1% here), it is hard to see what the change was for the other groups.  Leaving out the top 1%, the figures for the bottom 99% grew as follows:

Chart 2

There was substantial growth for the 80 to 99% group, but growth was much more modest for the bottom 80%.

Looking at the growth in real net worth per household of each group relative to their respective levels at the start of the data series in the third quarter of 1989, we have:

Chart 3

As was the case for households ranked by their net worth, those at the top of the distribution (the top 1% here) saw the greatest gains, with still substantial – but less – gains for the next group below (the 80 to 99% here).  Real net worth grew, but by less than the overall average, for those in the bottom 80% by income.

On average across all of the households (the thick black line in the chart), real net worth per household was 2.3 times higher in 2026Q2 than what it was in 1989Q3.  This is, of course, the same as that shown in Chart 4 of the earlier post, as the average across all households will be the same regardless of how the households are ranked.

Around this average, the real net worth of households in the top 1% grew to almost 3.6 times as high as what it was for that group in 1989Q3.  The 80 to 99% group saw their real net worth grow to be about 2.5 times as high.  But the bottom 80% did less well than the overall average.  The growth in real net worth of the bottom 40% and the 40 to 60% grew to be only about 1.4 to 1.5 times as high as initially.  This is similar to the growth in real GDP per household over the period, which by 2026Q2 was 1.47 times as high as its level in 1989Q3. That is, the wealth of the bottom 60% grew broadly in line with GDP growth.  For the top 1%, it grew by much more.

C.  The Top 1%

To no one’s surprise, the rich have done well.  The DFA data unfortunately does not present estimates for the wealth of the top 0.1% for households ranked by income – unlike what they provided for households ranked by their wealth.  But one can combine categories, and calculate the figures for the top 1% for both rankings.  That is, one can combine the nominal wealth figures of the top 0.1% and the 99.0 to 99.9% groups when ranked by wealth, divide by the total households in the two groups, and then adjust for inflation.

The figures on the real net worth per household for the top 1% of households when ranked by wealth or when ranked by income are then:

Chart 4

As noted before, by construction the figures on the wealth of the top 1% will always be higher when households are ranked by wealth than when they are ranked by any other criterion, including income.  One sees that in the chart above.  But it is striking that the wealth of the top 1% of households when ranked by income closely follows the pattern seen for the wealth of the top 1% when households are ranked by wealth, and is uniformly about 20 to 30% below.

The similarity is also clear in more detailed figures available in the DFA on the major assets, liabilities, and hence net worth of the two groups (where this table reflects some aggregation of a more detailed breakdown in the data the DFA makes available):

2026Q2 per Household – in $thousands

Top 1% by Income

Top 1% by Wealth

A.  Total Assets

$35,763

$45,524

1) Real Estate

$4,675

$4,939

2) Consumer durables

$686

$860

3) Bank deposits & Money Mkt

$2,984

$3,909

4) Bonds/Loans

$1,489

$1,912

5) Equities

$23,732

$30,922

6) Retirement Accts

$1,755

$2,400

7) Other

$440

$582

B. Total Liabilities

$1,128

$881

1) Home mortgages

$791

$422

2) Consumer credit

$130

$121

3) Other

$207

$338

C.  Net Worth

$34,635

$44,643

o/w Net Real Estate

$3,884

$4,517

Minimum Income/Wealth per Household (in 2022Q3)

$1,198

$11,007

The similarities here, and the correlation seen in Chart 4 above, suggest they are close to the same groups.  They are not exactly the same – if they were, then the two curves in Chart 4 would be on top of each other and the assets and liability figures in the table would be the same.  But they are similar, and there is clearly substantial overlap in households whether ranked by highest income or by greatest wealth.

This is not the case, however, for households in the bottom half of the distribution.

D.  The Bottom Half

Those in the lower income strata have not fared so well.  The DFA figures for the real net worth per household of the bottom 20% when ranked by income, the 20 to 40%, and all in the bottom 40% are:

Chart 5

The growth has been limited as well as volatile.  There was in particular a substantial plunge from a peak in 2007 due to the collapse that began in 2008 in both home and equity prices.  The economic recovery was then slow as a Republican Congress forced through budget cuts despite an economy that had not yet fully recovered.

Chart 5 shows average real net worth per household for all those in the bottom 40% when ranked by income in addition to those in the bottom 20% or in the 20 to 40%.  The bottom 40% is, of course, midway between the two.  The bottom 40% when ranked by income is the closest we can get for a comparison to the bottom 50% when households are ranked by their wealth.  It is not ideal, as the bottom 40% will leave out those in the 40 to 50%, but those figures are not provided separately in the DFA data released.  If they were added in, they would raise the average net worth of the group, as one would expect the wealth of those in the 40 to 50% bracket (by income) would be higher than that of those in the bottom 40%.

But a comparison of the bottom 40% by income to the bottom 50% by wealth is still of interest:

Chart 6

The average net worth of the bottom 40% of households ranked by income is always far above the average net worth of the bottom 50% when ranked by wealth:  typically three to four times as high (and much more, as a ratio, in the years following the 2008/09 economic and financial collapse).  The most recent figures (for the second quarter of 2026) are that the average net worth of the bottom 40% of households ranked by income was about $232,000, versus an average of just $63,000 when ranked by wealth.

Breaking this down into the average holdings of each group of the major categories of assets and liabilities (and hence net worth), one has:

2026Q2 per Household – in $thousands

Bottom 40% by Income

Bottom 50% by Wealth

A.  Total Assets

$276

$152

1) Real Estate

$114

$71

2) Consumer durables

$29

$32

3) Bank deposits & Money Mkt

$30

$12

4) Bonds/Loans

$7

$1

5) Equities

$47

$8

6) Retirement Accts

$40

$19

7) Other

$9

$8

B. Total Liabilities

$45

$89

1) Home mortgages

$24

$47

2) Consumer credit

$19

$39

3) Other

$2

$3

C.  Net Worth

$232

$63

o/w Net Real Estate

$91

$25

Household count

54.1 million

67.6 million

Maximum Income/Wealth per Household (in 2022Q3)

$54

$241

The bottom 40% by income hold significantly more real estate (especially net of mortgages), as well as funds invested in equities, in retirement accounts, and in short-term money market assets and bank deposits.  The holdings of consumer durables are similar, and the bottom 50% ranked by wealth have greater mortgage obligations on their real estate assets.  They also owe a good deal more in consumer credit obligations.

The picture that emerges is that a substantial share of the households with limited net worth (as ranked by their net worth) may be relatively young households with well-paying jobs who have not yet accumulated significant wealth.  They own real estate but have a high mortgage, and they borrow significantly against consumer credit.  (Note that consumer credit includes student loans as well as car loans and credit card debt.)

The bottom 40% of households ranked by income, in contrast, hold more in real estate (particularly net of mortgages), more in retirement accounts, and more in other investment assets.  This would be consistent with those households being older on average and possibly already in retirement.  Their income is relatively modest, but they hold significant wealth that they are using in their retirement (or expect to use, if not yet retired).

This will be discussed further in a later post on policy implications.  The aim here is to focus on the data.  But it indicates the need to be careful in designing any policy where wealth might be taxed.  One would want to ensure that households of modest income are not unintentionally burdened.

E.  Conclusion

The distribution of wealth is not the same as the distribution of income.  One cannot casually assume a one-to-one correspondence between income and wealth holdings.  While it is not too much out of line at the upper end of the respective distributions, for the bottom half of the population there is significant divergence.  For the bottom half, there are substantial effects possibly resulting from the normal process where one starts out with few assets and a low net worth, but where net worth is then built up over one’s working years to be used when retired.

The upper end is different.  The average wealth of those in the top 1% of households when ranked by their net worth overlaps substantially with the average wealth of the top 1% of households when ranked by income.  Taxation of income or of wealth for such groups will then have a similar incidence.

The policy implications will be discussed in an upcoming post.

Slower GDP Growth and a Rising Trade Deficit Under Trump: An Update

Chart 1

This post will provide a short update to the earlier post on the weakening of GDP growth since Trump took office in January 2025, with attendant signs of the economy overheating.  The BEA released on October 29 its initial estimate (its “advance estimate”) of GDP growth in the third quarter of 2026, and earlier, on September 30, it released revisions to the GDP accounts for the past five years – a regular updating that it does annually.

The updated GDP estimates released on September 30 indicate real GDP grew marginally faster in the six quarters leading up to the second quarter of 2026 (i.e. over the course of Trump’s presidential term), with growth at an annual rate of 2.1% versus 1.9% estimated before.  Growth in the second quarter of 2026 was somewhat faster than earlier estimated for that quarter alone (at an annual 2.2% rate versus 1.5% estimated before).  And the recently released figures for growth in the third quarter of 2026 show estimated growth in the quarter of a robust 3.4% at an annual rate.

While these revisions and new estimates have been positive, they are also modest and have not changed the basic story on the slowdown in growth during Trump’s presidential term.  The story remains one where AI-linked investments have been driving the growth that there is; overall growth has nonetheless slowed since Biden was in office; and growth in the entire rest of the economy not part of the AI-linked investments has slowed especially sharply.

Furthermore, while the growth in GDP (a measure of what the economy has produced, i.e. supply) has slowed, demand has grown significantly faster – especially in 2026.  That has led to the need to import more and/or export less, i.e. to an increase in the trade deficit.  That deficit has now hit a record high level.

This illustrates well the fundamental fallacy and confusion in the argument made by Trump and his officials that high tariffs will reduce the nation’s trade deficit, and indeed bring it all the way (they assert) to zero.  As discussed in the earlier post on the Trump economy (and analytically in this post from 2018, during Trump’s first presidential term), the fundamental determinant of the foreign trade balance of an economy is the balance between aggregate supply and aggregate demand (what an economy produces versus what those in the economy purchase), or equivalently in terms of the savings/investment balance.  Tariffs may affect which specific items are purchased and from which countries, but they do not play a direct role in the balance between aggregate supply and aggregate demand.

To start, the chart at the top of this post shows the growth in GDP in the updated estimates on a rolling 7-quarter basis (the number of quarters Trump has been in office) from late 2023 to now.  In the seven quarters leading up to the end of Biden’s term in office, real GDP grew at an annual rate of 3.0%.  In the seven quarters since Trump took office, it slowed to 2.3%.

Furthermore, much of this growth was directly tied to the boom in AI-linked investments – investments which became significant in 2025 and rose more sharply in 2026.  The GDP accounts provide estimates of private fixed investment in information processing equipment, in software, and in research and development.  While such investments will cover more than that linked to AI, much of the increase in those investments in the last two years has been due to the investments made to develop and operate the new AI systems (e.g. in new data centers).  They still leave out associated investments for those data centers, such as for additional power generation, water supplies, and other needed inputs, leading to an underestimation of AI-linked investment.  But part of what will be needed for such AI-linked investments will also be imported (such as high-end semiconductor chips) rather than domestically supplied.  As discussed in the earlier post, a rough estimate is that perhaps 15% of what is spent is supplied by imports.

Based on this 15% estimate, real GDP in all of the economy other than that directly linked to investments in the new AI systems fell from a rate of 2.9% in the seven quarters leading up to the end of Biden’s term, to just 1.2% since Trump took office.  That is a fall of almost 60%.

There are a number of reasons for this, as discussed in the earlier post.  One is that private fixed investment in everything other than investments supporting the AI boom has gone down:

Chart 2

While such investments have stabilized so far in 2026, they are still 8% lower in real terms than what they were in the fourth quarter of 2024, at the end of Biden’s term.  Trump’s policies have simply been bad for investment.  While total private fixed investment is now 10% higher than where it was at the end of 2024, this is only because AI-linked investments are 30% higher.

While growth in aggregate supply has slowed, growth in domestic demand has exceeded it, especially in 2026:

Chart 3

Domestic final demand has grown more rapidly than supply, especially in this second year of Trump’s presidential term.  As discussed in the earlier post, GDP is a measure of supply.  Final sales to domestic purchasers can exceed what is domestically supplied (i.e. GDP), but only by importing more, by exporting less, or by drawing down on existing inventories.  In the second quarter of 2026, the gap was filled in part by a substantial drawdown of inventories.  However, that led to low inventory working levels, and in the third quarter of 2026 they were not (and likely could not be) drawn down further.  Indeed, inventories were replenished modestly.

This left the gap to be filled by importing more or exporting less.  There was some of both.  Real imports rose at an annual rate of 19.7% while real exports fell at an annual rate of 5.7%.  The result was a larger trade deficit:

Chart 4

The trade balance as estimated in the NIPA accounts fell to a record deficit (in current dollar terms) in the quarter:  a deficit of $1.22 trillion.  This is marginally higher than the previous record in the first quarter of 2025, when importers accelerated their purchases in order to stock up before Trump raised tariffs.  That then led to lower imports in the rest of 2025 as those stocks were drawn down.  But now in 2026, imports have grown to record high levels due to the imbalance between aggregate demand and aggregate supply.

This is an indication of an economy that is overheating.  Supply is not keeping up with demand, leading to the need to import more and export less.  Drawing down inventories was an additional source of supply in 2025 and in the first half of 2026, but appears now to no longer be an option.

Trump does not understand that tariffs do not have a direct effect on this overall balance.  And evidently none of his advisors are willing to explain that to him (assuming they understand the point themselves).

But Trump frequently does like to say that he has been number one in numerous areas.  He can now truthfully say that under no previous president has the trade deficit been as high as it is now – well into the second year of his current term.

The Growing Inequality in Wealth in the US, Part 1 – Basic Facts

Chart 1

A.  Introduction

The extreme, and growing, inequality in wealth ownership in the US has been receiving increasing attention.  In its most recent annual listing of the 400 most wealthy Americans (from September 15, 2026), Forbes estimates that 15 individuals (and their immediate families) each have a wealth of $100 billion or more, seven have a wealth of $200 billion or more, and the top one – Elon Musk – had a wealth (as of the date of publication) of over $900 billion.  Concern with such concentration of wealth has also grown as a number of these ultra-wealthy individuals have become increasingly politically active, using their wealth in ways that can determine election outcomes and overwhelm basic democratic institutions.  This became especially evident in the 2024 presidential election, with consequences that are now clear.

This post, and several to follow, will review the basic data that estimate the inequality in wealth holdings and how that inequality has grown in recent decades.  This first post will look at wealth per household (more precisely net worth, but the terms will be used interchangeably) with the households ranked by their level of wealth from least to most:  the bottom 50%, the 50 to 90%, the 90 to 99%, the 99.0 to 99.9%, and the top 0.1%.

The chart at the top of this post shows how that net worth has grown (in real terms) over the last several decades.  Because of the immense wealth of the top 0.1% – whose average net worth grew to over $200 million per household – it is hard to see on the chart the average wealth of the bottom 99% of the population.  Their net worth is just too small.  Charts below will split out the bottom 99% to show their histories, but the point is that the disparity between the top 0.1% and the rest is so large that – other than for the top 1% – their average holdings disappear on the scale of the chart.

The post will first discuss in Section B below the data for these estimates.  They were calculated from data estimated by staff at the Federal Reserve Board and released as its Distributional Financial Accounts.  This source is widely considered the best set of estimates on household wealth available for the US.  These are, of course, estimates, however, and while the best available, it is important still to recognize their limitations.  Wealth is difficult to estimate, for both conceptual and practical reasons.

Section C will then present the basic estimates of per-household wealth (net worth) when grouped by households ranked by the wealth they hold.  The figures going back to 1989Q3 for all five groups the Fed distinguishes are as in the chart at the top of this post, and charts will then be provided also for the bottom 99% (and its sub-groups) and for the bottom 50%.  Each has a story to tell.

Section D examines how the wealth estimates have changed over time in real terms and per household relative to what they were in the earliest period in this data series (1989Q3).  Inequality was already high in 1989, but then grew much more.  Section E will decompose the figures for average overall wealth, linking their increase to the growth in GDP over the period, to the increasing share of profits in GDP (at the expense of wages), and to the increase in how that wealth is valued as a multiple of the profits the owners of the assets are entitled to.

Section F will conclude.  Future posts will examine other aspects of wealth holdings, using the same Fed data, including on wealth holdings when households are ranked by their income levels rather than their wealth levels, and on wealth holdings at the same age for different generations – i.e. for Baby Boomers compared to generations before and after.  A final post will then examine what might – or might not – be done through policy to address these issues.

B.  The Fed’s Distributional Financial Accounts

The measurement of wealth is not at all straightforward, and poses both conceptual and practical issues.  This is in contrast to the measurement of incomes.  For incomes, there are actual market transactions where firms earn revenues from what they sell.  Out of those revenues the firms pay a portion for the inputs used and for the wages of their employees, with the remainder then being the gross profits that will cover taxes, the interest they pay on their debt, and their investment costs (counted as depreciation).  What remains is their net profits.  All of these transactions (other than depreciation) are measurable in cash being transferred and can be observed.

The measurement of wealth is different.  Wealth is the value that others would be willing to pay for the assets owned.  That is not observed and can only be estimated.  Guessed may be a better term.  It is also in a fundamental sense socially determined, as the measured value of the wealth is not inherent in the asset itself, but rather an estimate of what others – given the state of the economy, their expectations of what the future might be, the availability of financing, and other such factors – might be willing to pay for the asset.  The transfer of the asset does not take place, however, and hence cannot be observed in the manner that incomes are observed.  The value can only be estimated as a hypothetical.

Thus if someone is willing to pay twice as much for an asset (perhaps real estate, or a company, or whatever) than what it was valued at the previous day, the owner of the asset would be richer.  His wealth would be greater.  But nothing fundamental has changed in the economy; the assets are all the same as before.  Only the valuation has changed.

In the face of such issues, statisticians do the best they can.  They need to make assumptions about what others might be willing to pay for the assets.  And they can assemble data on transfers of assets that have recently taken place and hence can be observed, where those assets may be similar – to a greater or lesser degree – to those they are trying to value.  This can inform – to some extent – the valuations they assign to assets that did not change hands.

The calculations discussed in this post (and those that follow in this series) are based on data assembled by staff at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in Washington, DC, and specifically its Distributional Financial Accounts (DFA).  The DFA estimates are published quarterly, usually about 11 weeks after the end of each calendar quarter.  The accounts for the second quarter of 2026 were released on September 18, and provide estimates for wealth held by households as of the end of the quarter, i.e. on June 30.

The DFA data sets include quarterly data going back to the third quarter of 1989, but were only first produced starting in 2019.  They are based on a combination of two other data sets produced by staff at the Fed Board of Governors, the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) – a survey undertaken once every three years –  and the quarterly Financial Accounts of the United States (FA).

The SCF is a survey of households undertaken on behalf of the Fed where household assets and liabilities are recorded in detail, along with household income and characteristics of the household such as the age, education, race, and similar of its members.  Because of this, the Fed can then produce estimates of wealth not simply of households in general, but also of households categorized by their income, their age, education, and/or race, and similar.

A representative sample of households across the country is chosen for the SCF, along with an oversampling of higher-income households in order to get meaningful sample sizes of the more wealthy households that hold a substantial share of household wealth.

The response rate of the general sample is reasonably good – at about 70% – but that for the oversampled wealthy households is only 10%.  This may lead to biases in the results.  While it would not matter if the wealthy households not responding were random (one could then simply start with a sample size ten times larger), it is likely that the relatively more wealthy households within that group are less likely to respond.  The share of the nation’s wealth held by the most wealthy would then be underestimated.  Despite this possible bias in the estimates, we will see below that the share held by the most wealthy groups is nonetheless extremely high.

A point to note is that the SCF specifically excludes any sampling of the extremely wealthy households on the Forbes 400 list of richest Americans.  This might be due to privacy concerns, or simply the recognition that they would be unlikely to respond to the SCF survey even if asked.  However, the DFA accounts specifically add them back in, with assets and liabilities either obtained from Forbes or drawn from the same sources used by Forbes.  The net worth of the top 400 is significant.  In the most recent September 2026 ranking, their total net worth came to $8 trillion.  The DFA estimate of the net worth of the top 0.1% of households as of June 30, 2026, was $28 trillion.  Thus the top 400 alone account for 29% of the total wealth of the group, even though they account for less than 0.3% of the approximately 135,000 households in the top 0.1%.

The SCF is, as noted, conducted only once every three years.  To arrive at the quarterly estimates, the Fed staff use the quarterly Financial Accounts of the United States (FA) data to estimate how the wealth holdings of the households in the groupings analyzed may have changed quarter to quarter.  The FA accounts date back to 1955, and were formerly called the Flow of Funds Accounts.  They track – for the nation as a whole – both the stocks and flows of capital assets (both real and financial) in all their forms across economic sectors such as households, businesses, governments, and financial intermediaries.  They are normally released ten weeks after the end of the quarter, and present financial flows during that quarter along with end-of-period stocks.

The DFA estimates combine the triennial SCF estimates on wealth holdings of categories of households with the quarterly FA estimates of total assets and liabilities held by households in the country as a whole.  But this is not always a simple scaling, for several reasons.  For a full discussion, see this chapter from a NBER conference held in March 2020 (and published in 2022) where Fed staff describe in some detail how the then new DFA accounts were assembled.

Arriving at household holdings of wealth – both assets and liabilities – consistent with national-level estimates of the totals of such assets and liabilities in the economy is not always straightforward.  A couple of examples illustrate this.

One is the accounting of the assets backing up commitments to retirees in defined benefit pension plans.  The SCF does not attempt to include at the household level the assets held in such schemes.  Workers expect they will receive a pension of some amount, which will be tied to how many years they ended up working for the firm and what their final income was (often averaged over some period, such as their final three years).  They will have little idea what assets are being invested to back up those commitments.  But at the national level, the assets of the company pension plans backing up those commitments have been invested and are reflected in the totals in the FA accounts.

To resolve this, the DFA makes an estimate of what a household’s share of the assets held by the pension fund managers would be given the characteristics of the households.  For those who are already retired and are receiving such a pension, plus for those who expect to receive a pension at a certain level based on their past employment with some firm, they calculate the present discounted value (which will depend on their age) of their expected future pension benefits.  They then subtract those present value totals from the assets of the defined benefit pension plans at the national level to arrive at a figure for the pensions of workers still employed, who will start to receive pension benefits once they retire at some future date. They use a similar approach for the determination of the value at the household level of wealth held indirectly in annuity schemes and in life and other insurance plans.  This approach can be easily criticized, but is probably the best that can be done.

As another example of the type of assumptions they had to make, there is an issue with how equity in privately held businesses as well as closely-held corporate entities should be valued.  The SCF reported figures based on the household responses for both the cost basis of such equity and for what the households believed the market value would be.  Aggregated to the national level, the market value estimates were well above the totals in the FA accounts while the cost basis estimates were well below.  However, the average of the two turned out to be close, so they used that.

It should be noted that while estimates are made of the value to the household of the assets held (directly or indirectly) in their defined benefit pension plans as well as their defined contribution plans (401k’s, IRAs, and so on) and annuities from insurers, the DFA accounts do not include the implicit value of their Social Security retirement (and other) benefits.  But the value of those Social Security commitments are significant, and especially so (as a share of their total wealth) for lower-income households.

To illustrate, a standard rule-of-thumb in retirement calculations is to spend each year no more than 4% of the balance of assets held in the retirement accounts at the time of retirement.  The remaining assets will continue to grow in value, but at that 4%, retirees are unlikely to outlive the savings they had to cover retirement.  Based on this, one can calculate the assets that would be required in a private pension savings account to cover benefits equal to those paid by Social Security.

As of December, 2025, the average monthly benefits paid to retirees, along with the average paid to the bottom 50% of retirees and top 50%, were:

Average Monthly Benefit

Annual Equivalent

Capital-Value Using 4% Rule

All Retired Workers

$2,071

$24,854

$621,350

Bottom 50%

$1,338

$16,060

$401,505

Top 50%

$2,813

$33,761

$844,017

Source:  Calculated from data at Social Security – Beneficiaries by benefit level.  For December 2025.

To cover the average benefit to retirees of $2,071 per month, assets of over $620,000 would have been needed if one followed the 4% rule.  For the bottom 50% of retirees (bottom 50% of the recipients of Social Security benefits), it would have been over $400,000, and over $840,000 for the top 50%.  These could be counted as part of household wealth (assuming Social Security keeps to its commitments – which certainly can be done but will require Congress to act).

These are significant amounts.  As will be discussed in the following section below, the average net worth as of June 30, 2026, of the bottom 50% of households (as ranked by their net worth) is only $63,000 in the DFA figures.  For those in the 50 to 90% percentile, the average net worth was $988,000.

At the same time, keep in mind that the assets required by the 4% rule to match what Social Security is paying retirees would be the assets as of the year they retire and start collecting Social Security retirement benefits.  Any individual builds up this entitlement to benefits over their working life, and thus the equivalent value when they are younger would be proportionally less.  Similarly, retirement assets will be drawn down during the years one is retired, so the equivalent assets as one ages after retirement will then also be less.

However, the important point is that Social Security could be seen as a significant addition to household wealth, and especially so for the least wealthy.  The DFA could have included that implicit wealth (with then a suitable adjustment in the treatment of the Social Security Trust Account in the federal government accounts) just as they did for private defined contribution pension plans, but chose not to.

I have given these examples to make clear that the wealth figures really are estimates, where those estimates need to be based on assumptions that can be questioned.  The approach taken is probably the best that has been done to estimate the distribution of wealth in the US, but the limitations should not be forgotten.

C.  Real Net Worth per Household, Stratified by Rank in Terms of Net Worth

There is extreme disparity in the distribution of wealth in the US.  Specific figures by category of household may provide a better sense of this, along with the ownership of the types of assets of each group.  As of the end of the second quarter of 2026:

2026Q2 per Household – in $thousands

Bottom 50%

50 to 90%

90 to 99%

99.0 to 99.9%

Top 0.1%

A.  Total Assets

$152

$1,153

$5,906

$27,454

$205,938

1) Real Estate

$71

$429

$1,240

$3,876

$14,377

2) Consumer durables

$32

$71

$158

$347

$5,413

3) Bank deposits & Money mkt accts

$12

$113

$583

$2,345

$17,790

4) Bonds/Loans

$1

$24

$214

$1,066

$9,418

5) Equities

$8

$180

$2,412

$17,164

$153,056

6) Retirement accts

$19

$304

$1,210

$2,234

$3,873

7) Other

$8

$30

$90

$421

$2,012

B. Total Liabilities

$89

$164

$346

$732

$2,200

1) Home mortgages

$47

$126

$280

$373

$857

2) Consumer credit

$39

$33

$43

$92

$383

3) Other

$3

$5

$23

$267

$960

C.  Net Worth

$63

$988

$5,559

$26,722

$203,738

o/w Net Real Estate

$25

$303

$959

$3,503

$13,520

Source:  Calculated from the data at Fed Board of Governors, Distributional Financial Accounts.  Downloaded September 18, 2026.

Households are ranked here by their net worth – from those with the least (and indeed negative) net worth to those with the most.  The DFA shows the totals held in categories for the bottom 50% of households, for those ranked between 50 and 90%, between 90 and 99%, between 99.0 and 99.9%, and for the top 0.1%, along with the number of households in each group (so one can calculate the per household averages).  As of the end of 2026Q2, there were approximately 135 million households in the US, so the bottom 50% covered the 67.5 million with the least net worth, and then so on to the top 0.1% with approximately 135,000 households.

The DFA data (in what is made publicly available) identify 15 categories of assets and 5 categories of liabilities.  The table above aggregates some of these into broader categories of interest.  The figures shown here are rounded to thousands, and for the reasons discussed in the preceding section of this post, need to be taken as approximate estimates.

Keep in mind also that these are averages over the households in each of the given categories.  The minimum net worth to be included in the categories (in 2022Q2 – the date of the most recent SCF survey used for this categorization) was $240,000 for the 50 to 99% group, $2.1 million for the 90 to 99% group, $11.0 million for the 99.0 to 99.9% group, and $46 million for the top 0.1%.

Also keep in mind that the categories cover individuals of all ages.  The trends over time do not follow the experience of any given individual, who might start out their working life with a very low net worth – and thus is in the bottom 50% of households – but who then accumulates wealth as they grow older and ends up in one of the wealthier groups.  Rather, the figures on the wealth holdings over time are for those in each of the groups (the bottom 50%, the 50 to 90%, and so on) at each point in time.

Furthermore, because the distribution of net worth is highly skewed to the right – both overall and within each category of net worth – the average holdings of a group will be greater than the median holdings.  That is, the median holding – the net worth where half of the households in the group hold less and half hold more – will be less than the averages shown in this table.  Since the DFA files released by the Fed only show total holdings (in nominal terms) and the number of households in each group, one can calculate averages but not medians.

The one exception where a median can be found is the dividing line in net worth between the bottom 50% of households and the next group up (the 50 to 90%).  As noted above, that dividing line in 2022Q2 was $240,000.  Since 50% of households have a net worth less than this, that will be the median for the nation as a whole.  But the average net worth of households in the nation as a whole was $1,043,000 as of the end of 2022Q2.  The average is more than four times the median.  As of the end of 2026Q2, the average net worth was $1,373,000.  (The figures in this paragraph are all in current price terms.)

But even with the qualifiers on the impact of age and the difference between the average and the median due to the skewness of the distributions, I still find it mind-boggling that the DFA estimates indicate that the top 0.1% – 135,000 households in the US – have on average a net worth as of the end of June 2026 of $203.7 million.

The chart at the top of this post shows how the average net worth of households ranked by their wealth percentile has grown since 1989Q3.  To allow for meaningful comparisons over time, these have been adjusted for inflation using the CPI-U index – the most commonly used consumer price index measure in the US.  They are expressed in terms of the prices of 2026Q2.

The average net worth of the top 0.1% of wealth-holders rose from $45.2 million in 1989Q3 (in prices of 2026Q2) to $203.7 million as of the end of 2026Q2.  The substantial increase in wealth of those in the 99.0 to 99.9% group can also be seen in the chart (from $9.4 million on average at the start to $26.7 million now).  But the scale of the chart is such that what happened for those in the bottom 99% is not clear.

Limiting the chart to just the groups in the bottom 99%, one has:

Chart 2

The average net worth of the 90 to 99% group rose over the period from $2.5 million to $5.6 million as of the end of 2026Q2.  The average net worth for the 50 to 90% group rose from $524,000 to $988,000.

The line for the bottom 50% is still not clear, so in a chart on its own:

Chart 3

The path is far from steady:  While average net worth for the bottom 50% rose over the full period from $41,200 to $63,300, it fell to a low of just $6,400 in 2010Q4 as a result of the 2008/09 economic and financial crisis.  This primarily reflected the crash in real estate values – assets which account for a disproportionate share of the wealth of the bottom 50%.  The average net value of their real estate wealth (i.e. the value of their real estate assets less that owed on home mortgages) was a negative $15,850 at the end of 2010.

Furthermore, while their net worth then recovered, it did not recover fully until 2020.  The average net worth of the bottom 50% was $44,500 in 2005Q4, and an even higher $50,500 in 2000Q3 near the end of the Clinton presidency.  But as of the end of the third quarter of 2016 (September 30, just before the November election that Trump won), the average net worth of the bottom 50% was only $25,600.  This was only half of what it had been 16 years before.  The disquiet and concern on economic prospects among many in the bottom half of the population should not be surprising.

There is tremendous inequality in net worth across households.  As of mid-2026, the bottom half had an average net worth of only $63,300.  The average net worth of the top 0.1% was over $200 million.  That is over 3,200 times as much.

D.  Inequality is Not Just High, But Also Has Grown

The disparities are gigantic.  But the disparities aren’t only huge:  they’ve grown.  Taking the net worth of each group as a ratio to their level in 1989Q3 (with all in real terms per household), one has:

Chart 4

The real net worth per household of the top 0.1% at the end of 2026Q2 grew to be 4.5 times what it was at the end of 1989Q3.  That of those in the 99.0 to 99.9% stratum was 2.8 times as high.  And so on to the bottom 50%, where it was 1.53 times as high.  The wealthier the group to start, the greater the growth in their wealth over the period.

There was no necessity for this.  Indeed, until around 2005, there were times when the relative growth in the net worth of less wealthy groups grew by more than that of some of the more wealthy groups.  But over extended periods, they did not.

But it is also not terribly surprising.  The more affluent can invest in riskier assets, and over extended periods such assets will generally achieve a higher rate of return.  The returns on riskier assets are subject to greater volatility, but over time their higher growth will win out.  This is aside from advantages the wealthy can engineer for themselves through their advantageous capacity to intervene in political processes and decision-making.

E.  Decomposing the Growth in Overall Wealth

The average real value of wealth per household in the US as a whole has gone up substantially over this time period.  It is shown as the thick line in black in Chart 4, and is – as one would expect – in the middle of the increases recorded for the various groups.  Overall net worth (in real terms and per household) in 2026Q2 was 2.34 times higher than what it was in 1989Q3.

What accounts for this?  To start, GDP has grown, but as we will see, the value of wealth has grown by far more.  Breaking this down, the rise has been due to a combination of real GDP growth, an increase in the share of GDP going to earnings on assets (profits), and a higher valuation multiple being placed on those earnings.

To start, profits grew as a share of GDP while the share of wages fell:

Chart 5

Gross profits (i.e. including depreciation allowances) rose from 36.4% of Gross Domestic Product as of the end of 1989Q2 to 43.6% as of the end of 2026Q2 – an increase (relative to the 36.4% share at the start) of almost 20%.  The share paid to employees (wages) fell from 55.4% of GDP to 50.3%.  As lower income groups are more dependent on wages for their income rather than profits, that fall in the wage share is significant.

[Side note:  The shares of wages plus profits in the chart do not add up to 100% of GDP.  The difference primarily reflects indirect taxes (such as excise taxes on fuels and tobacco, tariffs on imports, state and local property taxes, and more).  Indirect taxes are not counted as being paid out of wages or profits (direct income taxes are), and hence constitute a third category of income in the National Income and Product Accounts.  Those taxes have totaled a steady 6 to 7% of GDP throughout this period (except for a short period in 2020-2021 when they fell with the fall in spending due to Covid), and hence do not affect the trends seen for the wage and profit shares.

There will also be variation in the “statistical discrepancy” – the name the BEA uses for the difference between the estimated values of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross Domestic Income (GDI).  GDP and GDI should in principle be identical, as the value of all that is produced (GDP) will be someone’s income (GDI).  The statistical discrepancy is small – less than +/- 2% of GDP – but varies over time.  Wages, profits, and indirect taxes are estimated in the GDI accounts, and will sum to 100% of GDI.  But they are expressed here as shares of GDP, which, while close, will not sum to 100% of GDP due to the statistical discrepancy.]

A “valuation multiple” can next be defined as the ratio of wealth (i.e. net worth) for the country as a whole to the profits being earned.  It is akin to a price/earnings ratio often used in valuation measures of equity.  The valuation multiple over this period also rose:

Chart 6

The valuation multiple rose from 9.9 in 1989Q3 to 13.1 in 2026Q2 – an increase of 33%.  But it fluctuated a lot.  It rose to 11.9 in 2007, fell to as low as 9.6 in 2012 following the economic and financial collapse of 2008/2009, and then rose again.  It reached 13.6 in the last quarter of 2021, fell to 12.0 in 2022Q3, and ended at 13.1.

An astute observer might note that the gross profits being assessed here (as a share of GDP in Chart 5, and then as the denominator in the ratio in Chart 6) are the overall profits in the economy.  The corresponding wealth being valued based on those profits is then the wealth held by households.  Will this coincide with the total wealth in the economy as a whole?  The answer is that it will be close, although not exact.  The Fed’s Financial Accounts of the United States (FA), discussed in Section B above, estimates that the aggregate wealth of the US economy as of the end of 2026Q2 was $181.0 trillion (Table S1.b). The Fed’s Distributional Financial Accounts (DFA) estimate the aggregate wealth of households as of the end of 2026Q2 was $185.7 trillion.

These are close to each other but not the same for several reasons.  One is that some of the estimation methods and definitions are different in the DFA accounts than those in the FA accounts, as discussed in Section B above.  But they are close because the ownership of most assets and liabilities is ultimately attributed to households in the DFA.  Households may hold assets directly (such as homes), or via their ownership of equity in both corporate and non-corporate businesses, or their ownership of financial assets (e.g. deposits in banks, or direct ownership of bonds).  These account for most assets in the economy.

The main exception will be government assets – including federal, state, and local government assets.  These totaled $23.1 trillion as of the end of 2026Q2 in the FA accounts.  But largely offsetting this is the net claims on US assets by foreign entities.  These totalled $20.7 trillion, leaving a small net difference.  Coupled with definitional and estimation differences, the total net worth of all US households is reasonably close to the net assets of the economy as a whole and adequate for the purposes here.

Putting this together:  GDP per household rose in real terms, profits rose as a share of GDP, and the valuation multiple assigned to those profits also rose:

Chart 7

Putting numbers on this, real GDP per household rose by 47.2% over the period, profits as a share of GDP rose by 19.7%, and the valuation multiple rose by 32.7%.  Multiplying this out, the result is:  1.472 x 1.197 x 1.327 = 2.338.  That is, as of 2026Q2, overall real net worth per household rose to 2.338 times what it was in 1989Q3.  That corresponds to the line in blue in Chart 7, as well as the identical line for households as a whole in Chart 4 above (the thick black line).

Decomposed in this way, one sees that the increase in real GDP per household was the largest single factor behind the increase in overall wealth (with its increase of 47.2%).  The economy is producing more now than before.  The increase in the valuation multiple (by 32.7%) was the second most important factor.  Higher valuations are being assigned to assets for any given level of current profits.  And these were then amplified by profits growing as a share of GDP (by 19.7%).  All three were significant, and together led to wealth that is now valued at 2.338 times (i.e. 133.8% higher than) what it was in 1989Q3.

In stable conditions, one would expect wealth to grow in line with the growth in GDP.  But it increased by substantially more over the past 37 years because an increasing share of the income being generated in the economy (GDP) is going to profits rather than wages, and because the value being placed on the assets for a given level of profits (the valuation multiple) has also increased.  Together, they led to an increase in the value placed on that wealth for any given level of GDP by almost 59% (since 1.197 x 1.327 = 1.588).  A good question is why, but that is a topic for a separate discussion.

F.  Conclusion

Overall real wealth per household has grown significantly over the almost 37 years covered by this data series.  Adjusting for inflation using the CPI, it is now 2.338 times what it was at the start in 1989Q3.

But its distribution is highly skewed.  Ranking households by their net worth, the average net worth of the bottom 50% of households was an estimated $63,300 as of 2026Q2.  The average in the 50 to 90% group was an estimated $988,200.  In contrast, the average net worth of the top 0.1% was an estimated $203.7 million, and that in the 99.0 to 99.9% range was $26.7 million.

The disparities were already huge in 1989Q3 – the earliest period in this data series.  But those disparities then grew, with the estimated real net worth per household of the top 0.1% growing to 4.5 times what it was at the start, and that of the 99.0 to 99.9% growing to 2.8 times what it was at the start.  In contrast, while the real net worth per household of the bottom 50% grew, it grew to just 1.53 times what it was at the start.  It also fluctuated widely, and for 13 years (from 2007 to 2020) was less than what it was in 1989Q3.  This was primarily due to depressed values for their net real estate assets.  The value of those assets collapsed in 2007/08, remained depressed for several years, and recovered only slowly.  And real estate accounts for a high share of the net worth of the bottom 50%.

The purpose of this post has been to provide some of the basic figures on the distribution of wealth in the US and to describe how the underlying basic data were estimated by the Fed.  Future posts will examine other aspects of the distribution of wealth, including its distribution when groups are classified by income rather than their wealth holdings, and how wealth accumulation has changed across generations.  A final post will discuss what might be done to address these disparities.