Contribution to GDP Growth of the Change in Inventories: Econ 101

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An update to this post, looking at the issue from a different perspective, is available here.

This is the first post in a series that I will label “Econ 101”.  Their purpose will be to explain some economic concept that might generally not be clear to many, yet often appears (and often incorrectly) in news reports or other items that readers of this blog might see.  This first Econ 101 post is on how changes in private inventories enter into the National Income and Product (GDP) accounts, where there is often confusion on the contribution of rising or falling inventories to the growth of GDP.

In the most recent (December 22) release by the government of the GDP accounts in the third quarter of 2011, growth in overall GDP was an estimated (and disappointing) 1.8%. But many news reports stated that private inventories fell, and that had these inventories not changed, GDP growth would have been 1.4% points higher, or a more respectable 3.2%.  Yet when one looks at the underlying GDP figures issued by the BEA (the Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce), one sees that the change in private inventories was essentially zero (and in fact was slightly positive).  If inventories did not fall, why did many commentators state that a fall in inventories reduced GDP growth in the quarter?

The confusion arises because while the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) accounts measure the flow of production (how much was produced during some period of time), and the flow of how much was then sold (e.g. for consumption or investment), inventories are a stock, and it is the change in the stock of inventories that enters into the GDP accounts.  GDP is the flow of goods and services produced in the economy, and these goods and services are then sold for various purposes, including private consumption, private fixed investment, government consumption and investment, and exports, with imports also a supply of goods that can be sold.  But goods produced in some period will not necessarily match goods sold in that same period.  The difference is accounted for by either a rise or a fall in inventories.  Hence the change in the stock of inventories, when added to final sales (with imports entering as a negative), will equal total goods and services produced, which is GDP.

From one period to the next, we are normally interested in how much GDP rose or fell in that period compared to the previous one.  And we are interested in seeing how much of that growth in GDP will match up with and can be accounted for by growth of consumption, investment, and other elements of final sales.  These demand components are important, particularly in the economy as it is now.  With high unemployment and production well less than capacity, production of goods and services is driven by the demand for them.  Hence one is looking at the change in consumption or fixed investment or government expenditures from one period to the next.  And as the balancing item between GDP production and final sales, one would now be looking at the change in the change in inventories.

The term “the change in the change in inventories”  is a mouthful, and not often seen in news reports (indeed, I have never seen it used).  But that is what then leads to the confusion.  In the third quarter of 2011 (in the estimates released by the BEA on December 22), the change in private inventories was essentially zero, as noted above.  But there had been some positive growth in private inventories in the second quarter of 2011. Hence, the change in the change in inventories, going from something positive to essentially zero, was negative.  That is, if inventories had continued to increase in the third quarter of 2011 as much as they had in the second quarter, GDP growth would not have been 1.8% but rather would have been 3.2%.  The change in the change in inventories meant GDP growth was 1.4% points less than what it otherwise would have been.

The point can perhaps best be illustrated by some simple numerical examples.  Suppose for some fictitious economy, that GDP (the production of goods and services) is initially 1000 (in, say, billions of dollars), while the total of final sales (for consumption, fixed investment, and so on) is 950.  With production of 1000 and sales of 950, inventories will increase by 50.  Assume the stock of inventories at the start of the period is 500, so the stock will total 550 (50 more) by the end of the period.  The figures are as in this table:

Period 1 Period 2 Change % Change
GDP 1000 1050 +50 5%
  Change in Inventories  50  80 +30 3.0% points
  Final Sales 950 970 +20 2.0% points
Stock of Inventories:
    Start 500 550
    End 550 630
In the second period, suppose that production (GDP) increases by 50, or 5%, to 1050, while final sales only grow by 20, to 970.  The difference between production and sales must accumulate in inventories, so the change in inventories will now be 80.  Therefore, the change in the change in inventories will be 30 ( =80-50), and the contributions to the 5% growth in GDP will be 2.0% points from the change in final sales, and 3.0% points from the change in the change in inventories.  It is also worth noting that the stock of inventories has now grown to 630 by the end of the second period, which is substantially higher as a share of GDP or of final sales than it was at the start of period 1.  Hence, there is reason to assume that producers will likely scale back production (GDP) in the near future as long as final sales growth remains so sluggish, as there is likely little reason to accumulate even more unsold inventories on the shelves.
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The second example will illustrate the case where inventories continue to rise, but at a slower pace than in the first period:
Period 1 Period 2 Change % Change
GDP 1000 990 -10 -1%
  Change in Inventories  50  20 -30 -3.0% points
  Final Sales 950 970 +20 +2.0% points
Stock of Inventories:
    Start 500 550
    End 550 570
In this example, final sales still grows by 20 to 970.  But producers here have scaled back production to just 990, or 1% below what it had been, with inventories now growing by just 20 rather than the 80 of the first example.  The change in inventories is still positive (at +20), but the change in the change in inventories is now negative, at -30.  The contributions to the -1% growth in GDP growth is made up of +2.0% points from final sales, and -3.0% points from the change in the change in private inventories.
As a final example, we will look at a case where the change in private inventories is negative.
Period 1 Period 2 Change % Change
GDP 1000 1050 +50 5%
  Change in Inventories -50 -20 +30 +3.0% points
  Final Sales 1050 1070 +20 +2.0% points
Stock of Inventories:
    Start 500 450
    End 450 430
Final sales once again grows by 20, although now from 1050 to 1070.  Sales is greater than production in each period, and inventories are drawn down by 50 in the first period and by 20 in the second period.  But while the change in inventories is negative in each period, that change is less negative in the second period than it is in the first.  That is, the change in the change in inventories is a positive 30, and this accounts for 3.0% points of the 5% growth in GDP.  It is also valuable to note that with inventories falling in each period, the total stock of inventories by the end of the second period is getting fairly low, so it is reasonable to expect that producers will aim to replenish inventories in future periods, with this then acting as a spur to growth.
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Such swings in inventories are often important when economic growth is turning around, as at the start of a recovery from a downturn, or at the start of a downturn following a boom.  An example is seen at the end of the most recent recession, in the middle of 2009. The economy was in a state of collapse in 2008, the last year of the Bush Administration, and this fall carried over into the first half of 2009.  This downturn was then halted and reversed as a result of the policies implemented at the start of the Obama Administration. GDP was falling at a huge 8.9% annual rate in the last quarter of 2008, and at a still very high 6.7% rate in the first quarter of 2009.  Growth was then still negative, but at only a 0.7% rate, in the second quarter of 2009, and then started to grow at a 1.7% rate in the third quarter, and at a 3.8% rate in the fourth quarter.
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The change in private inventories was negative in each quarter throughout this period. Specifically, private inventories fell by $200.5 billion in the second quarter of 2009, fell again by $197.1 billion in the third quarter, and fell again by a further $66.1 billion in the fourth quarter.  But the change in the change in private inventories was positive in the third and fourth quarters (while negative in each, they were becoming less negative), and this then accounted for a positive 0.2% points of the 1.7% growth in GDP in the third quarter, and a strong 3.9% points of the 3.8% growth in the fourth quarter (when final sales in fact declined slightly, accounting for a -0.1% contribution to growth in that period).
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To summarize:  As everyone knows from their first Econ 101 class in Macroeconomics, GDP is equal to Consumption + Investment + Government Spending + Net Exports (Exports minus Imports), where total Investment is equal to Fixed Investment plus the Change in Inventories.  The change in GDP will therefore equal the change in Consumption + the change in Investment + the change in Government Spending + the change in Net Exports, where the change in Investment will equal the change in Fixed Investment plus the change in the Change in Inventories.
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Republican Tax Plans: Part 2

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In a post on December 26, I presented the average tax rates that would follow from the tax plan proposals of several of the main Republican candidates.  These were radical proposals, and would move America from the progressive tax structure it has always had (even under Reagan and Bush), to regressive taxes where the rich would pay at a lower rate than the middle class or (in the case of Cain) even the poor.

The calculations were done by the Tax Policy Center, a joint program of The Urban Institute and Brookings, and I simply presented their results graphically.  At the time of my December 26 post, the Tax Policy Center had only worked out (using their Microsimultation tax model:  see my earlier post) the implications of the proposals of Herman Cain, Rick Perry, and Newt Gingrich.  They have now (as of January 5) also worked out the implications of what Mitt Romney has proposed.  These tax rates are added in the diagram above (in brown).

As I noted in my earlier post, Romney’s proposals are in the same direction as those of Gingrich and Perry, but less extreme.  His plan would still lead to major reductions in the tax rates for the rich, especially the super-rich, although not to as low a rate as what Cain, Perry, and Gingrich have proposed.  And the overall tax rates would at least remain somewhat progressive, in contrast to the proposals of the others, but substantially less progressive than what they would be under either the current law (where the Bush tax cuts are allowed to expire as currently scheduled) or even what they would be if the Bush tax cuts are extended.  Under Romney’s proposal, those earning less than $30,000 per year (the very poor) would in fact pay more than they would should the Bush tax cuts be extended, while those earning between $30,000 and $50,000 would pay the same as under Bush.  But above $50,000, the richer one gets the less one would pay under Romney’s plan compared to what one would pay under Bush (and even less compared to what one would pay should the Bush tax cuts not be extended).

With the lower tax rates under Romney, especially for the rich, overall tax revenues would of course fall.  The figures calculated by the Tax Policy Center indicate revenues would be $600 billion less under Romney’s proposal in 2015 alone.  The ten year loss (where ten year figures are what are being used in the fiscal deficit discussions) would be more than ten times this, i.e. more than $6 trillion.  Although a bit less than half the loss under the cannot-be-serious Gingrich plan (which would lose $1.28 trillion in 2015 alone, or a loss that could not be covered even if one cut all federal government discretionary expenditures to zero), Romney never indicates what he would do to make up for this $600 billion annual loss in revenues.  Yet he repeatedly states in his campaign that it is critical to cut the fiscal deficit.

Romney claims to be a good businessman, but a plan that cuts tax revenues by $600 billion a year, equal to close to half of all government discretionary expenditure (including the military), is not serious.

A Comprehensive Mortgage Refinancing Program

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Introduction

The US economy is stuck, with only weak growth.  While the 2008 economic collapse was stopped and then partially reversed through a number of bold government programs (including TARP, the Troubled Asset Relief Program launched under Bush, and the Obama stimulus package), the economy is now growing at too slow a rate to see a significant and sustained reduction in the still high rate of unemployment anytime soon.  The economy is operating far below potential, with a consequent huge loss in what living standards could be.  And the personal human cost of high unemployment is severe in itself.

A primary reason for this continued slow growth is the badly functioning housing market.  Housing prices (see this post) built up in a bubble in the middle of the last decade, reaching a peak in early 2006, and then collapsed.  With the collapse of that bubble, losses built up in US banks and in the US financial system more broadly, leading most spectacularly to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.  The TARP program as well as very aggressive actions by the US Federal Reserve Board succeeded in stabilizing the banks.  But homeowners also lost when the housing price bubble burst, with many now owing more on mortgages than the current value of the mortgaged house itself.

These mortgage holders cannot refinance at the lower interest rates now available on the market, unless they can come up with cash at the time of the refinancing to pay off the balance of the old mortgage in excess of what their new mortgage could be (now normally only 80% of the current home value).  If they do not have such cash, they must struggle to pay the mortgage at the old, higher, interest rates that were obtained when they bought their house during the bubble years (or when they may have refinanced at that time to a higher mortgage amount, or taken out a home equity line of credit on the then higher home value).  Similarly, they cannot sell their house and move to a new location (perhaps in pursuit of a new job opportunity) without bringing cash to the table at the time of closing.

Hence such homeowners remain stuck.  As a consequence, the housing market is not performing as it normally would.  To be blunt, the housing markets, and as a consequence the economy more generally, are constipated.  Economists refer to this as a balance sheet recession, as households (in this case) face financial obligations (their mortgages) in excess of the value of the assets they hold (their homes).  Households hunker down, and try to service their expensive mortgages while trying to save enough to get out of their negative net worth position.  But this can take a long time, and meanwhile the overall economy stagnates.  Japan suffered such a balance sheet recession following the bursting of its asset bubble in 1989 (although for Japan the problem was centered in the corporate sector).  It took more than a decade to recover from this, and to a degree the problem in Japan continues.

One can take a fatalistic approach and say there is not much that can be done.  The Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, in an interview with the Wall Street Journal published in its November 21, 2011, edition, appears to take this view.   Asked by the interviewer: “Which happens first?  The economy picks up and housing recovers, or a bottoming and slight recovery in housing helps the economy?”  Geithner responded:  “You can’t engineer a recovery in housing that can lift the broader economy.  It has to be the other way around.”

If true, this would be unfortunate, as the economy will not recover as long as housing is in difficulty.  The purpose of this note is to set out a program which, while ambitious, would be feasible, and which would help unlock those households now facing mortgages that are greater than their homes are worth, and with this unlock the housing markets and the economy more generally.  The scale of the program, as will be detailed below, would be similar in scale to TARP and related programs, which succeeded in stabilizing the banks.  There is a need now to stabilize the households who have similarly suffered from the bursting of the housing bubble, with a similar commitment.

I have labeled the proposal the Comprehensive Mortgage Refinancing Program (CMRP).  The first section below will present the basics of the program, through a simple numerical example.  The section that follows will then elaborate on some of the specifics in how it would work.  I will then present the numbers on how many mortgages would be eligible and the savings these homeowners would enjoy, and aggregate figures on the total costs.  Finally a concluding section will discuss the impact on each of the various entities that would be affected (the households, the lenders, and government), and how each would benefit from the program.  There is a shared interest by each in participating, but leadership by government will be necessary to make it happen.

CMRP in Summary

The program would be built around a government loan (not a grant) to the home owners to allow the mortgage balance to be brought down to 80% of the current estimated home value.  Specifically, all household borrowers with a mortgage balance in excess of 80% of their current home value could participate, if they choose.  It would not be compulsory.  If they do, the house would be appraised, and their existing mortgage balance would be refinanced at a 4% interest rate (approximately the current market rate for 20 or 30 year fixed rate mortgages), for 80% of the home value by the existing mortgage holders and for the remaining amount as a loan on the same terms from the government.  Should the home owner decide to sell his property, perhaps some years hence, the mortgage holders would be repaid (as long as the home is sold for more than the mortgage, which was set at 80% of the value of the home when the program was launched).  The government would be repaid half of any gain above the 80% (half in order to preserve an incentive for the home owner to try to get a good price), while the remaining amount would be treated as a personal loan on the same terms, to be repaid over time.

There are many details still to be covered, but it would be helpful first to present this with a simple numerical example.  Assume that the current value of the home is $200,000, but that the mortgage on it is $250,000.  In common usage, the homeowner is “underwater” by $50,000.  Eighty percent (80%) of the home value is $160,000.  Under CRMP, the mortgage would be refinanced with the existing mortgage holder (or holders, if there is a second lien or a home equity line) providing a new 30 year mortgage at 4% on the $160,000, while the government would provide a loan on the same terms (4%, 30 years) of $90,000.

If the house is then sold for $200,000, the $160,000 mortgage would be paid off, while the government would receive $20,000 (half the difference between the sale price and the $160,000 mortgage), with the remaining $70,000 balance on the government loan to be repaid on the same terms (30 years, 4%) as if it were now a personal loan.  The homeowners could take out the $20,000 and use it as a downpayment on a new home, or could prepay the government if they wish.

Elaboration on the Program

Some of the specifics:

  1. The lender with the first lien on the home (and normally the largest single lender) would cover all the closing costs involved (including the cost of the appraisal by an independent professional firm, chosen by the government) as well as all the administrative costs involved both initially and over time.  No points would be charged on the new mortgage either.  The lenders will benefit greatly by this program, and can absorb such costs.
  2. The program would only be for households where the mortgage is for their principal residence.  The program is not designed to rescue businessmen or others who speculated on a continual rise in home prices during the bubble, nor for the lenders to such speculators.
  3. The program is also not designed for borrowers who cannot cover the debt service on these loans.  It is designed for those households who are servicing their debt, perhaps with difficulty but servicing it nevertheless.  They will gain as the new mortgage terms will be at 4%, versus the higher rates that they currently pay (probably normally in the 6 to 7% range, as these rates were typical during the bubble, or possibly even higher if they took out loans at low initial rates which then stepped up after a few years to higher rates).  There are, unfortunately, also households who cannot afford the homes they moved to even at a 4% rate.  Such cases need to be addressed on an individual basis, where there will be foreclosures as well as major losses to the mortgage holders who made such irresponsible loans.  Other programs exist to help in such cases, but this is not the objective of the proposed CRMP.
  4. The new loans from the government ($90,000 in the example) would be for 30 years at a fixed 4% rate, with the same level payments as for a 30 year fixed rate mortgage.  But one might include an incentive to pre-pay such loans, so that they do not last for decades unless truly needed.  One might include an automatic increase in the rate by say 1% point in year 10, 1% point again in year 15, and so on.  Even with a modest 2% annual inflation in home prices on average from their current level, prices would be 22% higher in 10 years and 35% higher in 15 years.  Homeowners could refinance at that point with a regular commercial mortgage, if beneficial to them, and repay the government obligation.
  5. The seniority of the creditors (i.e. the holders of the first lien, the second lien, any home equity credit lines, etc.) would be kept as they are now.  In the initial refinancing to 80% of the current home value (i.e. to the $160,000 in the example, from the $250,000 initial exposure), each lender will have a proportional reduction in their exposure.  But then if the house is sold for less than $160,000 (or whatever the current mortgage balance would be at some future date, after some period of repayment), there would be losses taken by these mortgage holders, in the order of their seniority as now.  That is, the mortgage holder with a first lien would be paid first, then those with a second lien, and so on.  The holders of these second liens and home equity lines will still benefit a great deal under this program, as the government has in effect already paid them the difference between the initial total mortgage exposure and the 80% home value ($90,000 in the example).  Plus there will not be further losses unless home prices fall by a further 20% from where they are now (as the new mortgages will be 80% of the current value).  But to the extent there are such further major losses, they will bear this.

The Overall Magnitude

An important question to address is what might be the scale of such a program, in terms of the amounts to be refinanced and what the government share of this would be.  The best data from which one can compute this is provided by CoreLogic, a private firm that provides analytical and consulting services on real estate.  They maintain a comprehensive state-by-state data base with estimates of the numbers of mortgages that are underwater, and by how much.  The figures can be worked out from numbers quoted in their most recent press release, available here.

Specifically, CoreLogic estimates that as of the third quarter of 2011, 22 million mortgage borrowers in the US have loans which are greater than 80% of their current home values.  This would define the pool of potential participants under CRMP.  Of the 22 million, CoreLogic estimates that 10.7 million face a mortgage loan greater than 100% of their current home value (i.e. are underwater), with 6.3 million of these having only a first lien on the home, while the remaining 4.4 million have a first lien as well as a second lien (or more).

For the 6.3 million underwater with only a first lien, the average mortgage balance was $222,000, and they were underwater by an average of $52,000, thus implying that their average estimated home value was $170,000.  For the 4.4 million with also a second or other liens, the average mortgage balance was $309,000, and they were underwater by an average of $84,000, implying an average estimated home value of $225,000.  I assumed that the average home value of those 11.3 million with loans between 80 and 100% of their home value, was the same as the weighted average of the homes underwater (equal to about $192,600), and that on average the mortgage balance outstanding on these homes was halfway between the 80 and 100% bounds.

From these numbers, one can calculate that the total mortgage balance outstanding in the US in excess of 100% of the underlying home value, is $699 billion.  In addition, a further $630 billion is outstanding on the mortgage amounts between 80 and 100% of the home values (including all of the 22 million homes with mortgages in excess of 80% of the home values).  Hence the total amount that the government might possibly need to lend, if there is 100% participation by all such eligible mortgage borrowers, would be $1,329 billion.  And the amounts that the lenders would need to provide (for the uniform 80% mortgages) would be $3,390 billion, down from their current exposure of $4,719 billion (where the government share makes up the difference).

These would be the maximum exposures.  However, it is doubtful that 100% of home mortgage borrowers would participate.  The reasons would be various, but would include the requirement that only mortgages on principal personal residences would be eligible.  In addition, CoreLogic noted that in its data, only 69% of the 22 million home mortgage borrowers with outstanding loans greater than 80% of their current home value, have mortgages at interest rates of 5% or more.  It would be these home owners, with high interest rate mortgages, who would gain the most from participation in the proposed program.

While it is impossible to say with any certainty how many mortgage borrowers would choose to participate (a reasonable guess might be somewhere in the 50 to 75% range), for the purposes here, I will assume that 69% do.  Therefore, the outstanding loans to be made by the government to the households would total $917 billion (69% of $1,329 billion), while the new 80% mortgages from the private lenders would total $2,339 billion (69% of $3,390 billion).

A $917 billion program from the government to benefit homeowners and unlock the housing market is of course huge.  But it is similar in scale to the potential exposure the government took on under TARP and related programs to stabilize the banking system.  TARP itself was approved for up to $700 billion, although substantially less was in the end used.  Similar US Federal Reserve Board support to AIG and to JP Morgan for the Bear Stearns purchase totaled $140 billion.  There has also been approved purchases by the US Treasury of equity in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac of up to $400 billion.   These programs have thus totaled $1,240 billion, plus there were a number of smaller programs.

But it should also be noted that while the potential government losses totaled this $1,240 billion, the actual losses so far have been small.  The US Fed has not lost anything on its programs, including programs that provided massive liquidity support to the banks.  The current estimate of the net cost of TARP to the government is only $19 billion, mostly on programs to support housing where recovery of the funds was never anticipated.  The Government in fact made a significant profit on TARP funds lent to the banks.

Indeed, the main anticipated cost to government of these programs to stabilize the financial system is expected to come from losses in the support provided to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  The Congressional Budget Office expects that these losses will total $389 billion over the next ten years.  To the extent the CRMP proposal being made here is implemented, these losses to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would likely be reduced.

One also needs to note that while the government would make loans to the home owners of an estimated $917 billion, these loans would be made at an interest rate of 4% initially (and then possibly bumped up by a percentage point in years 10, 15, and so on, until the loans are paid off).  But the current cost of a 10-year US Treasury bond is less than 2.0%  (indeed only 1.90% as of this writing).  Thus the US Treasury will be earning a positive spread on these loans, where one should note that all administrative expenses under this program would be covered by the primary mortgage lender.  But there will still be defaults, and it is not possible to predict with any certainty how large these will be.

Overall, however, the positive spread the government will earn on the loans that are repaid, plus the savings in terms of reduced losses by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, make it possible that the final net cost to government will be small, as it was on TARP.  Plus there will be the broader benefits to the economy from a program to unlock the housing markets, which will in turn lead to more tax revenue to the government.

Finally, the individual home owners will benefit from the lower interest rates on the refinanced mortgages.  While no portion of the loan is being forgiven, they will now pay at a uniform 4% rate rather than the higher rates they are paying currently.  The savings to them will depend on what their current mortgage rates are, and these will vary.  The rates will also be higher on second liens and on home equity lines than on mortgages holding a first lien, and will vary based on whether they have fixed or floating rate loans, step-up payments due, and so on.

But to illustrate, for an average mortgage outstanding of $214,400 (the weighted average in the CoreLogic data cited above), and assuming their current interest rate is 6 1/2% on a 20 year fixed rate loan, the savings would be $6,900 per year in moving to a 30 year fixed rate loan at 4%.  This is a savings of 36%, and would total $152 billion (about 1% of GDP) for all the households.  This in itself would provide a substantial boost to the economy, as much of this will likely be spent.  And for the households that are underwater, and who have second liens and/or home equity lines in addition to a first mortgage, where the average mortgage is $309,000, the savings would be $9,950 per year.

Conclusion:  The Impact on Each Party

It is important to recognize that each of the major groups involved in CRMP would benefit from its implementation:

  1. The home owners who cannot now refinance their mortgage because the mortgage is greater than 80% of the current value of their home, will be able to refinance at 4%, the current market rate.  They will not only realize regular monthly savings compared to what they currently often have to struggle to pay, but they will also be able to sell their house, should they now wish, perhaps to move to a different part of the country to pursue a job opportunity.  This will also help unlock the housing market, with attendant broader benefits to all the home owners in the country.
  2. Mortgage lenders would with CRMP face fewer mortgage defaults and losses from foreclosures.  And losses from foreclosures are normally much more than simply the excess of the mortgage amount over the estimated current home value, as foreclosed homes typically sell at a significant further discount, plus there are substantial legal and other costs in going through the foreclosure process.  Hence they will welcome a government program where the government provides a personal loan to cover the amount of the mortgage in excess of 80% of the current home value.  It is true that such lenders would prefer the home owners to continue to pay at the above market interest rates of perhaps 6 1/2% or so that they are locked into, but they also recognize that many such borrowers will soon choose to walk away from these mortgage commitments.
  3. And while the Federal Government will take on substantial new debt to fund the loans it will make, the net cost in the end is likely to be small.  It will lend the funds at a positive spread, and while there will be costs from defaults, government will also gain from lower losses incurred by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  There will also be higher tax revenues from a better functioning economy, due to a better functioning housing market and as consumer spending rises in a sustainable way.

But while a program such as CRMP makes sense, it is difficult to see in the current political environment that something of this nature will be implemented.   The country’s vision has become too narrow, with no willingness to take bold actions.  As a result, it is much more likely that one will see the slow and unsteady recovery typical of balance sheet recessions where little is done to cure the underlying structural problems.