New Home Sales Remain Abysmal, But The Potential Should Be Recognized

New home sale figures for October, recently released, remain abysmally low at just 307,000 sales at an annual rate.  They have fluctuated within only a narrow range over the past year, with no clear trend and no signs to be encouraged by.  What is more interesting is the longer term context.

New home sales in the US fluctuate a good deal, but around a rising trend of 1.0% a year (calculated from a regression over the 1980 to 2010 data).  They reached a fairly stable level of approximately 900,000 housing units a year between 1998 and 2001.  But there was then a bubble between 2002 and 2006, reaching a peak of almost 1,300,000 in 2005, and then crashing to a bit over 300,000 in 2010 and 2011, where it now seems to have leveled off.

Only 300,000 new home sales a year is abysmal and a major drag on the economy.  It is only one-third of the 900,000 level of the early part of the last decade, and less than one-quarter of the levels reached in the bubble years.  But it should also be noted that people need homes, and that that need grows over time due to population growth.  The trend 1.0% growth found in the data is consistent with this.  And with new home construction now far below trend, it will be a significant spur to the economy if and when housing construction recovers.  Brad DeLong has made a similar point in his blog a number of times.  Here is one such post.

Keeping things simple and conservative, let’s assume that new home sales will, for the purposes here and over periods of time, on average equal the number of new homes constructed.  All are eventually sold, with very few exceptions.  And while there are figures available for new housing starts, these are consistently higher than sales for reasons that are not clear, but may reflect homes never completed.  Using the 900,000 units sold a year between 1998 and 2001 as a reasonable norm, and for simplicity not even allow for a rising trend in this figure, one can calculate the excess over the bubble years 2002 to 2006 (the area in blue in the graph) and then the shortfall that has developed over 2007 to 2011 and continues (the area in red).  Based on the figures underlying the graph, the excess during the bubble was 1.1 million units, while the shortfall in the subsequent bust through 2011 was 2.2 million units.  There is therefore now a net shortfall in housing supply of 1.1 million, as the excess over 2002 to 2006 has been more than worked off.  And as long as new home sales and construction remain at only 300,000 a year, that shortfall (relative to a 900,000 per year norm) will be growing by 600,000 housing units a year.

This suggests that a major pent-up demand for homes has built up.  It has not been resolved due to continued problems in the housing market and especially in the housing finance market, with many mortgages underwater and hence do not move, mortgages that remain hard to get by potential new buyers, an overhang of houses not sold, and a foreclosure process that has not worked well.  The market remains close to frozen.

But if these housing market problems could be resolved, so that construction could revert to its previous norms, the stimulus to the economy would be huge.  Assuming simply a return to construction of 900,000 units a year (and hence ignoring what would likely be an overshooting of this for a few years to make up for the net shortfall of recent years), implies construction of an additional 600,000 units a year.  At the average new home price of $221,800 in 2010, the aggregate value of such homes would be $133 billion per year.  This is just short of 1% of GDP.  Most of this would add to GDP as there is some, but only limited, “leakage” through some inputs that are imported (housing lumber, fuel for trucks, etc.).

But there will also be indirect multiplier effects, especially in the current depressed economy.  A reasonable estimate of the multiplier on housing construction would be 2 to 3.  A return of new home construction to previous levels would therefore add 2 to 3% of GDP. With actual GDP currently about 5% below potential GDP (estimate for end 2011 by the Congressional Budget Office, page 12), such an addition from housing construction would bring the economy about half-way back to where it needs to be.  But this will not happen until the market for homes and for home mortgage financing begins to function reasonably well.

GDP Growth in the Recovery Remains Slow, But Policies Are Not Holding Back Business Investment

GDP growth in the economic recovery from the 2008 collapse remains weak.  The recently released GDP figures for the second quarter of 2011 (second revision, from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the Department of Commerce), revises downward the growth estimate to 2.0% from the previous estimate of 2.5% (all figures are quarter on quarter growth, seasonally adjusted at annual rates).  While still positive, and better than earlier in the year, such growth is insufficient to bring down the still high unemployment to a significant degree.

Four points:

  1. The overall GDP growth rate would have been 1.55% points higher (i.e. a more decent 3 1/2%) if the change in private inventories had remained the same as it had been in the second quarter of 2011.  Over time, the contribution to GDP growth from inventory accumulation is on average close to zero, so one would expect that over the next couple of quarters this will switch back to positive from negative to balance out desired inventories.  Note that the contribution to the growth in GDP in any period is the change in the change in private inventories.  Private inventories did not fall in the third quarter of 2011:  they merely failed to grow as fast as they had in the second quarter.  I will try to prepare a methodology note discussing this arithmetic at some point in the future, and post it in the Econ 101 section of this blog.  (Update:  It is now posted here.)
  2. Obama has been strongly criticized by Republicans that his policies have been anti-business, and hence have led business not to invest, with this then resulting in the disappointing growth of GDP.  But the figures do not support this.  Business investment has in fact been quite good, as seen in the figure above, with growth of 15% in the most recent quarter, and generally quite strong growth since the beginning of 2010.  This is especially surprising as capacity utilization (as estimated by the US Fed) is still only 78% of potential capacity (and while never at 100%, this figure will be at around 85% when the economy is close to full capacity utilization).  Business is investing even with the current excess in capacity.
  3. An economic headwind that has been hurting growth, starting in late 2010 and then into 2011, has been the fall in government demand.  This has principally been from cutbacks in state and local governments.  If government demand had simply not been cut, GDP growth would have been about half a percentage point higher than what it was from simply the direct impact of the government cut-backs, and even higher if multiplier effects are included.
  4. And, perhaps stating the obvious, while Obama is now being blamed for the downturn, the critics need to be reminded that the sharp collapse in output came in 2008.  This was then turned around in 2009, after Obama took office, with growth since.  The growth has not been fast enough, and the economy remains well below its potential capacity, but reverting to the previous policies is the last thing one should do.