The Impact of Increasing the Minimum Wage on Unemployment: No Evidence of Harm

Minimum Wage vs. Unemployment Rates, 1950-Jan 2013

Minimum Wage vs. Ratio of Unemployment Rates, 1950-Jan 2013

A.  Introduction

In his State of the Union speech last month, President Obama called for a rise in the federal minimum wage from the current $7.25 per hour to a new rate of $9.00 per hour.  This would be a 24% increase, but would still mean that someone working full time, 40 hours per week, 52 weeks a year (no vacation), would earn only $18,720 a year.  Such a full time worker would still be earning well less than the current federal poverty line for a family of four of $23,050 per year.  The proposed increase is modest.

Republican leaders nonetheless immediately denounced the proposal, asserting that raising the minimum wage would hurt, not help, the poor, as they would lose their jobs.  They assert that instead of seeing an increase in their wage, the minimum wage workers would be fired.  And unlike in many other areas (such as the impact of fiscal policies) the Republican leadership here is making an argument that one would find in an introductory economics course.  Elementary economics would indeed argue that in perfectly competitive markets, an increase in the minimum wage would lead to such workers losing their jobs rather than being paid more.

B.  Have Increases in the Minimum Wage Led to Higher Unemployment of Such Workers in the Past?

But what is the evidence?  If increases in the minimum wage lead to such workers being fired, one would see higher unemployment among such workers very quickly in the months following each increase in the minimum wage in the past.  The graphs above show what in fact has happened.

The first graph shows the federal mandated minimum wage since 1950, in real inflation adjusted terms (using the CPI), plus the unemployment rates for all workers and separately for workers aged 16 to 24.  The data comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, but was downloaded for convenience from FRED, the Federal Reserve Economic Data web site maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  The unemployment rate for workers aged 16 to 24 is shown separately as one would expect that increases in the minimum wage would increase unemployment especially sharply in that group, if the assertion is correct that increases in the minimum wage lead to such workers losing their jobs.  Approximately 51% of the hourly wage workers earning the minimum wage are in this 16 to 24 age group.

First of all, it is worth noting that the minimum wage, when adjusted to reflect general inflation, is a good deal lower now than a half century ago.  It reached a high (in prices of January 2013) of $10.82 in February 1968, and lows of $6.02 in March 1990 and $5.75 in June 2007.  It averaged close to $9.00 an hour over the twenty-five years of 1957-81 (inclusive), and is only $7.25 currently (almost 20% less).  The Obama proposal is modest, as he has only asked Congress to bring it back to that $9.00 an hour, the rate of a half century ago.

But does one see in the history that increases in the minimum wage lead to a jump in unemployment rates, particularly of the young (and decreases in the minimum wage leading to lower unemployment rates)?  Actually, no.  Unemployment rates do fluctuate a good deal, as they depend on macro conditions in the economy.  But it is hard to see any obvious jump in unemployment rates in the months following the sporadic increases in the real minimum wage we have had over the last more than 60 years.

It is also worth noting that due to the politics of the minimum wage, and the resistance of conservatives and businessmen to higher rates, increases in the minimum wage have been generally infrequent and then relatively large in percentage terms.  This thus provides good material for a test of whether increases in the minimum wage lead quickly to jumps in the unemployment rate (particularly of the young).  Yet one does not see it.

Any relationship might be hard to recognize in part because of the independent rises and falls in unemployment rates due to macro conditions.  The second graph therefore charts the real minimum wage along with a line that shows the ratio of the unemployment rate of those aged 16 to 24 to the unemployment rate for the entire labor force.  This ratio exploits the fact that a relatively high share (about 51%, as noted above) of minimum wage workers are young.  Thus, if it is in fact true that increases in the minimum wage will lead those making the minimum wage to become unemployed, the higher share of such workers in the ages 16 to 24 category will lead to an increase in that ratio.

But the graph does not show such a relationship.  While the real minimum wage has seen many sudden changes, the ratio of unemployment rates often does not then change, and in fact sometimes moves in a direction that is the opposite of what those opposed to increases in the minimum wage would predict.  The one possible exception appears to be a blip seen following the February 1968 increase in the minimum wage.  But this blip occurs in fact four months later (in June 1968; the time scale is compressed as the chart covers 63 years) and then drops back.  But one also sees that the steady decline in the real minimum wage during the 1980s in the Reagan years was accompanied by a rise in the ratio (the opposite of what they would predict), and that the ratio then declined (instead of rising) when the minimum wage was finally moved up in 1990 and 1991.  Similarly, increases in 2007-09 were accompanied by  a decline in the ratio.  One could pick out other examples, but basically what is shown is that there is no systematic pattern.

C.  More Rigorous Work on the Impact on Employment from Raising the Minimum Wage Also Shows No Harm

Graphs such as these are, however, simplistic.  While looking at the history is of interest, and should show at least some indication that increases in the minimum wage will lead to higher unemployment (especially of the young) if the minimum wage critics were correct, there is much more going on in the economy which should be taken into account.  Fortunately there have been rigorous studies that do this, and they too have found that the impact of increases in the minimum wage (of the magnitude historically seen) on unemployment rate is either non-existent or small.  Some studies have indeed found that increases in the minimum wage have reduced unemployment.

The seminal paper that launched the modern literature on the impact of the minimum wage was co-authored by economists David Card (of University of California, Berkeley) and Alan Krueger (then of Princeton, and now Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors in the White House).  Card and Krueger controlled for extraneous effects that might be going on in the economy at the time a minimum wage is increased, by exploiting the fact that states may have separate minimum wage requirements from the federal requirements, and that states change their minimum wages at different times.  Specifically, they looked at employment in fast food establishments along the border between New Jersey and Pennsylvania on an occasion when New Jersey raised its minimum wage while there was no change in Pennsylvania.  They found no negative employment impact from New Jersey’s action.  Indeed, there might have been a small positive impact on employment following the increase in New Jersey’s minimum wage.

The Card and Krueger study, while rigorous, was limited as it looked at only one instance of a change in the minimum wage, and the impact on only one industry.  But more recent studies, following a similar approach, have extended the Card-Krueger work to many more cases.  A particularly comprehensive recent example is a paper by the economists Arindrajit Dube, William Lester, and Michael Reich.  Like Card-Krueger, they too found that increases in the minimum wage that have been periodically enacted in the US at the state level have not had a negative impact on employment of minimum wage workers.  And since changes at the state level would presumably have a bigger impact than changes at the national level (as jobs could in principle shift across state lines), there is no reason to believe the impact of a federally mandated change would be negative.

There is of course much more work on this issue, and a paper by John Schmitt issued last month provides a good summary of where the literature stands.  Less technical reviews of the issues and what economists have found are available here and here.  There are, of course, economists who would disagree, but the preponderance of the work done so far has found little or no evidence that increases in the minimum wage that we have seen in the past have led to decreases in employment of such workers.  Indeed, some studies have found that increases in the minimum wage increases employment.

D.  Why Does Standard Economic Theory Get This Wrong?

The real world evidence matters more than the theory.  But why would standard elementary economic theory appear to have gotten this wrong?  The truth is that there are many matters in the real world that do not behave as one might predict based purely on an economic abstraction.  Unemployment exists, for example, even though economic theory would predict that in a world of perfect competition, with full information and no transactions costs, and many other conditions, we should only see full employment.   But the assumptions of abstract economic models might well not apply in critically important ways once one faces the specifics of a particular issue.  That is why real world testing is important, as well as examination of the underlying assumptions and abstractions.

In the case of employment of workers at or close to the minimum wage, there are many reasons why the predictions of pure economic theory might well not apply.  Such labor markets are far from the perfect competition ideal.  There is a different balance of bargaining and other power between the employer and the potential minimum wage employee; the information available to each side of the transaction (on how productive the worker might be, and what his or her alternatives are) will differ; workers once they are in a job gain a good amount of job specific knowledge and abilities (not only on how to do the specific job, but also how best to work in a team with the specific colleagues there, where things are kept, and a million other details); that due to such job specific knowledge and imperfect information on who else might be available in the market, there will be substantial transactions costs incurred when an employee quits a job or is fired and a new one must be hired; and more.  Standard theory predicts that workers (in a perfect market) will be paid the value of their marginal product, but it can be difficult even to know what the marginal product of a specific worker might be when they work, as they typically do, in a team with others.  And one finds in the real world that wages are typically paid according to seniority and according to some hierarchy, rather than according to some strictly measured marginal productivity.

Good economists are therefore not surprised that markets in the real world can act quite differently from how the simple models might predict.  And they therefore accept as quite possible the finding of the real world empirical studies that increases in the minimum wage, such as those observed in the past, might well not have led to jumps in unemployment of workers earning the minimum wage.

E.  Conclusion

Full time workers in minimum wage jobs are poor, despite their evident willingness to work.  Even if the minimum wage is raised to $9.00 an hour from the current $7.25 an hour, as Obama has proposed, these working poor will still be earning well less than poverty line income.  And bringing the minimum wage to $9.00 an hour will only bring it back to where it was more than a half century ago.  Real GDP per capita has more than doubled over this period.  Yet minimum wage workers are currently earning 20% less.

Rigorous empirical studies do not show that increasing the minimum wage by an amount such as this will lead to an increase in unemployment of such workers.  Nor does one see such an increase in unemployment in a more casual examination of the evidence, such as in the graphs above.  While the poor need more assistance than just from this, increasing the minimum wage as Obama has proposed would certainly be an important help.

The Republican Campaign to Shift the Blame for the Sequester To Obama: If You Don’t Want It, Pass a Simple Bill To End It

John Boehner Obamaquester

It appears increasingly likely that the Congressionally mandated severe and across-the-board budget cuts, known as the sequester, will begin on March 1.  Serious negotiations are not underway, Congress is only back in session now after having been gone for most of the past two weeks, and public statements are not focused on negotiating an agreement but rather on shifting blame.  Should the sequestration budget cuts go into effect, not only will critical federal functions be suspended, but the sudden cuts in spending levels will likely push the country back into recession.  As was noted in an earlier posting on this blog, cuts in Government spending were already the primary cause for a fall in GDP in the fourth quarter of 2012 (according to the initial estimate, which may be revised).  More broadly, had government spending been allowed to rise following the 2008 downturn as it had during the Reagan presidency following the 1981 downturn, we would now likely be at full employment.

The situation is serious, but the new assertion by the Republican leadership that the sequester is there only at the insistence of Obama is almost farcical.  As part of this campaign, Speaker Boehner has staged events for the cameras such as that pictured above, behind a podium labeled with the hashtag “#Obamaquester”, and in front of a clock marked as “Countdown to #Obamaquester”.  Boehner is now asserting that the sequester is only there due to “the president’s demand”, and he refers to the cuts as “the president’s sequester”.

Even some of Boehner’s Republican colleagues find it absurd to try to blame Obama for the sequester.  For example, Representative Justin Amash, a conservative Republican from Michigan (who voted against the bill that set up the sequester mechanism) said:  “I think it’s a mistake on the part of Republicans to try to pin the sequester on Obama.  It’s totally disingenuous.  The debt ceiling deal in 2011 was agreed to by Republicans and Democrats, and regardless of who came up with the sequester, they all voted for it.  So, you can’t vote for something and, with a straight face, go blame the other guy for its existence in law.”

With these new assertions from Boehner and similar assertions from colleagues such as Congressman Paul Ryan (the Republican Chair of the Budget Committee in the House), it may be of interest to review briefly the history of how the sequester mechanism came to be:

  1. The sequester’s origin came from the strategic decision by the key Republicans in Congress in early 2011 to use the routinely required authorization to raise the public debt ceiling as leverage to force through drastic cuts in the budget.  Eric Cantor, the then new Republican House Majority Leader, was the principal architect and proponent of the strategy, which he proposed in January 2011 at a closed-door retreat of Republican congressional members in Baltimore.  He was soon stating publicly that the Republican controlled Congress should not approve an increase in the debt ceiling without drastic spending cuts.  
  2. What this meant was that they would hold the economy hostage to their budget demands, as a refusal to raise the debt ceiling would force the US to default on its debt.  While speeches and pontificating are routine whenever Congress has had to approve an increase in the nominal public debt ceiling, never before had such demands been attached to this approval.
  3. And default on the US public debt would be serious.  US Treasury Bonds are held as risk-free assets both in the US and around the world, and are indeed the foundation of the modern international monetary system.  The impact of default on such assets cannot be predicted with certainty, as it has never happened before, but the consequences could quite possibly throw the global economy into a downturn that would make the 2008 collapse look mild. 
  4. [As an aside:  While I am not a lawyer, the constitutionality of a refusal by Congress to raise the debt ceiling (and hence force a default on the public debt) looks to me to be questionable.  The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution (passed in 1866, following the American Civil War) reads in its Section 4:  “The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned.”  In their oath of office, Congressmen pledge to uphold the Constitution.  They cannot then take actions (or defer taking action) which would violate the Constitution by forcing a direct default on the public debt.  However, as noted above, I am not a lawyer, and obtaining such Congressional approval for increases in the debt ceiling has been customary since substantial borrowing needs developed during World War I.]
  5. As the country was coming increasingly close to breaching the existing debt ceiling in July 2011, negotiations were underway at many levels in Washington.  I will not try to review them all here, but the most senior were direct negotiations between Obama and Speaker Boehner.  These talks broke up when Boehner was not able to convince his Republican congressional colleagues to support an approach that included even a relatively small share of revenue increases along with larger expenditure cuts.  In fact, Boehner had to reverse himself twice from tentative agreements he had reached with the President, as he could not get backing from sufficient numbers of his Republican colleagues in Congress.  At the time, Boehner stated publicly that the President had negotiated in good faith.  But in his op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal this month, Boehner now says the opposite, and asserts the talks failed because the President had reversed his position.
  6. As the deadlines approached and it became clear that agreement would not be possible on a specific set of spending cuts and revenue increases, Jack Lew, then the head of the Office of Management and Budget in the White House (and soon likely to be US Treasury Secretary), suggested consideration of a mechanism that had been used in the 1980s, in budgetary negotiations during the Reagan term.  In its final form and as passed by Congress, the mechanism established a Joint Committee made up of 12 members of the Senate and Congress (split evenly between Republicans and Democrats), who would by a certain date (November 21, 2011) develop a plan to achieve $1.2 trillion in deficit reduction (over 9 years) through a combination of spending cuts and revenue increases.  If the Joint Committee could not reach agreement, an automatic cut in spending of $109 billion per year over nine fiscal years (FY2013-21) would be required, split evenly between Defense and non-Defense programs.  These automatic across-the-board cuts were known as the “sequester”, and were deliberately crude and draconian to serve as an inducement to the Joint Committee to reach an agreement on more palatable means to achieve a similar reduction in the deficit.
  7. The mandate of the Joint Committee was to reach agreement on measures that would reduce the deficit by $1.2 trillion over ten years.  Such measures could include both spending reductions and revenue increases.  And the revenue increases could be achieved not only by raising tax rates, but also by closing tax loopholes, cutting expenditures that are implemented via tax subsidies, and/or broadening the tax base.  But the Joint Committee never reached an agreement, as Republicans refused to agree to any revenue measures at all.
  8. At the time, Boehner, Paul Ryan, and other Republicans praised the sequester mechanism as a means to force what they were seeking.  Boehner famously said in a CBS interview on August 1, 2011, that he had gotten “98%” of what he wanted.  Ryan emphasized and praised the sequester mechanism in an interview on Fox News on August 1.  Following his recent reversal now to criticize the sequester, a YouTube video was even put together showing a series of Ryan statements over the years in favor of sequester mechanisms (including this one specifically) and statutory spending caps.  And a Power Point presentation put together by Boehner when he made the case to his Republican colleagues to vote in favor of the bill that established the sequestration mechanism, makes clear his approval of it at the time.
  9. Obama, in sharp contrast, had always wanted a clean bill authorizing an increase in the public debt ceiling, without additional conditions added on.  It is indeed rather absurd to think that Obama would want to see a bill passed that would deliberately tie his hands.  Obama had proposed alternative approaches to reducing the deficit, including in his FY2013 budget (in great detail) and during the negotiations with Boehner.  Obama still stands by these proposals.  But while the Republicans assert that Obama has not offered any such plans, the issue is rather that the Republicans have rejected the plans Obama has offered.
  10. Jack Lew only suggested the option of the sequester mechanism as a fallback if no agreement is reached, late in the negotiations when it became clear that agreement on a specific set of spending cuts and revenue increases would not be possible.  But Obama and Lew would have greatly preferred a clean bill without any such conditions.  It is absurd to say, as Boehner now does, that the sequester mechanism is there only because it was something Obama “insisted upon in August 2011”.

The automatic sequester will cut government expenditures by $85.3 billion over the remainder of the fiscal year, from March 1 to September 30, 2013.  If nothing is done, there would be further cuts of $109.3 billion in each of the next eight fiscal years to FY2021.  The $85.3 billion cut over seven months would be equal to roughly 1% of the seven month GDP.  With a multiplier of two, this would by itself drive down GDP by 2% from what it would be otherwise.  The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the US economy is producing at about 5 1/2% below what it potentially could be producing at full employment.  An additional 2% reduction would be significant.

Agreement is difficult in Washington, particularly in the current political environment.  But if Boehner, Ryan, and others now hold to the view that the sequester is a bad idea, there is a simple solution.  All that they would need to do would be to pass a simple bill which revokes it.  Obama would certainly sign it.  The budgetary mechanism would then revert to the standard process, and that standard process could be followed to determine whether certain public expenditures should be cut and by how much, and whether revenues should be increased by closing loopholes, cutting tax subsidies, raising rates, or some other approach.

But there is nothing that requires the sequester mechanism.  If Boehner, Ryan, and the others do not want it, they can pass a simple bill to end it.

Government Spending During Obama’s First Term – The Facts

Govt 2 During Presidential Terms - Cons & Invest, 1953-2012

A.  Introduction

Republicans continue to assert that government spending has exploded under Obama.  It is a myth.  Depending on which specific measure of government spending is used, such expenditures have either fallen during Obama’s presidency or have increased at one of the lowest rates in the last six decades.

This myth is unfortunately important as conservative politicians continue to use it aggressively to push for drastic cuts in government spending, despite the damage such cuts have done to the economic recovery.  And drastic government spending cuts loom with the rapidly approaching deadline of March 1 when the automatic across-the-board sequester budget cuts will enter into force, unless Congress pulls back from the brink before then with new legislation.  Yet as of this writing, Congress is on vacation, and there is little sign that any agreement will be reached by March 1.  An already weak economy (GDP fell by 0.1% in the fourth quarter of 2012 largely due to government spending cuts in that quarter), will almost certainly be driven into decline if the sequester spending cuts happen.

Yet Republican leaders continue to assert big increases in government spending during Obama’s presidential term are the source of the economy’s problems.  A recent example was in the formal Republican response (by Senator Rubio of Florida) to Obama’s State of the Union address.  Rubio asserts that the rise in government under Obama is the cause of our weak economy, and that our problems would be solved by cutting government spending.  But government spending has not risen as he asserts.

B.  Government Consumption and Investment Expenditures

Government consumption and investment expenditures have in fact fallen during Obama’s presidential term.  It is the first such fall in 40 years.  And such government spending rose fastest in this period during the presidential terms of Reagan and George W. Bush.

The graph above shows the growth rates for government spending on consumption and investment as recorded in the National Income and Product Accounts (often referred to as the GDP accounts) published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the Department of Commerce.  Such government spending accounts for one component of GDP (along with private consumption, private investment, and exports less imports).  It encompasses all direct spending by government on goods and services, and does not include government transfer payments (which will be considered below).  We now have such data for the full four calendar years of Obama’s presidential term, and can compare the record during Obama’s term to that during previous presidential terms.

Earlier posts on this blog have noted that such fiscal spending has in fact been falling for much of Obama’s term, and that this has acted as a drag on the recovery (see here, here, here, and here).  The now complete data for the full four years of Obama’s first presidential term shows that such government spending fell sharply in both 2011 and 2012, and that while there was growth in 2009 with the stimulus package, the average rate of growth over the full four years of Obama’s term has been negative.  Such government spending is now less than when he took office.

This government spending (all figures in real, inflation adjusted, terms) fell at an average annual rate of 0.2% during Obama’s term.  This fall can be contrasted with the substantial increases during George W. Bush’s two terms, and the even larger increases during Reagan two terms.  (See the graph above, and the table at the bottom of this post provides the specific numbers.)  The only comparable performance to Obama in recent decades was the growth of close to zero during Clinton’s first term.  One would have to go back 40 years, to Nixon’s 1969-72 presidential term, before one again sees a fall in government spending as one had under Obama.  There was also a fall during Eisenhower’s first term, as spending fell sharply in 1954 and 1955 following the end of the Korean War in 1953.

It should be noted that there is certainly no reason to aim for zero growth of government spending over the long term.  Over the sixty years from 1952 to 2012, real GDP grew at a 3.0% annual rate, so real government spending could also grow at a 3.0% annual rate and leave the spending we do as a society for public goods such as infrastructure, education, defense, and so on, at a constant share of GDP.  And it is interesting to note that despite the Republican complaints on government spending, the only periods when government spending grew at a 3% rate or faster over the last 60 years were during the first George W. Bush term, the second Reagan term, the Kennedy/Johnson and Johnson terms, and almost the second Eisenhower term (growth then at a 2.8% annual rate).

The average rate of growth of government spending for goods and services over the full 60 year period was indeed only 1.9% a year in real terms, and hence such government spending as a share of GDP has fallen.  This is the fundamental reason our infrastructure is falling apart and our public services are so poor compared to that found elsewhere among the richer countries of the world.

C.  Total Government Spending, including Transfers

One can reasonably argue that a better measure of government spending is not simply that which enters directly into the GDP accounts (expenditures by government directly on goods and services), but which includes also expenditures by government on transfer payments.  Transfer payments are made by government to others, without goods or services provided in return.  They are mostly to households (such as for Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, unemployment insurance, and similarly), but include also subsidies to corporate and business entities (such as for agricultural subsidies, energy subsidies, and similarly) as well as interest payments on public debt.  There are also significant transfer payments between levels of government (e.g. federal to state, federal to local, and state to local), but these are netted out for spending at all government levels (but federal transfers will be included when federal spending alone is discussed below).

By this measure as well, the rate of growth of government spending during the Obama term has been one of the lowest in decades:

Govt During Presidential Terms - Total Spending, 1953-2012The rate of growth of such government spending during Obama’s first term was just 1.5% a year, with absolute falls in 2011 and 2012.  This is well below the growth during the two terms of George W. Bush, the term of George H. W. Bush, and the two terms of Reagan.  And it is noteworthy that this slow overall growth in total government expenditures during Obama’s term was achieved despite the collapsing economy and resulting high unemployment that Obama inherited on taking office.  The collapsing economy Obama confronted automatically drove up expenditures on unemployment insurance, food stamps, and other safety net programs, all of which count as government transfer programs.  Hence (and along with spending from the stimulus package) there was a sharp peak in 2009, with this increase critical to stopping and then reversing the economic collapse.  But this was then followed by a sharp fall in government spending soon thereafter, which slowed the recovery.

The only comparable periods of such slow growth in total government spending in the last 60 years were during the two Clinton terms and the Nixon term, while such spending was flat during the first Eisenhower term, when Korean War spending ended.

D.  Federal Government Spending Only

The analysis so far has covered expenditures at all levels of government – federal, state, and local.  It is such expenditures which matter in terms of impact on the economy.  And consolidation makes sense as transfers from the federal level cover a substantial share of expenditures that are then carried out by state and local governments.  However, if one wants to focus more narrowly on government expenditures where the role of the president is more direct, then a case can be made to focus exclusively on expenditures at the federal level.  The president is still not omnipotent, as expenditures will depend on budgets passed by the Congress as well as on laws that established programs many years before (such as Social Security or Medicare) .  But the influence of the president will be more direct when focused on federal only expenditures.

Here again, growth in government expenditures during Obama’s term in office has been one of the lower ones of recent decades, and in particular well below the growth seen under Bush or Reagan.  First, for government direct spending on goods and services:

Govt During Presidential Terms - Fed only Cons & Invest, 1953-2012Such expenditures grew at an annual rate of 1.3% over Obama’s term, with out right reductions in 2011 and 2012.  In contrast, such expenditures grew at rates of 5.5% in George W. Bush’s first term and 2.9% in his second, and at rates of 4.6% in Reagan’s first term and 3.8% in his second.  Yet Republicans assert that Obama must be blamed for a rapid expansion in government spending over his term, while Reagan and Bush are praised for their promises to cut government.

In sharp contrast to the increases under Reagan and George W. Bush, federal government expenditures on consumption and investment were cut sharply during Clinton’s first term (at a rate of -2.9% a year), and were basically flat during Clinton’s second term.  There is no basis for the attack that such spending increases at explosive rates under Democrats.

One can similarly look at federal government total spending, including transfers (to households and businesses, and also here transfers from the federal level to the state or local levels):

Govt During Presidential Terms - Fed only Total Spending, 1953-2012

Here again, the growth under Obama has been moderate, with growth at a rate of just 2.7% a year, despite the consequences for mandated expenditures in programs such as unemployment insurance and food stamps that resulted from the economic collapse that Obama inherited.  And despite the weak economy (and indeed contributing importantly to that weakness), federal government total expenditures fell in 2011 and 2012.

Furthermore, growth in such expenditures were higher during the the two terms of George W. Bush, during the term of George H. W. Bush, and during the two terms of Reagan.  They were significantly slower during the two Clinton terms.  Here again, there is no basis for the assertion made by Republicans that Democrats are responsible for sharp growth in government spending, while the Republican presidents have kept it low.

E.  Conclusion

It is important to know the facts when making statements asserting that government spending has exploded under Obama, with this then asserted as the cause of the slow recovery.  In fact, the opposite is true, with government spending either falling during the term of Obama’s presidency or rising at a slower rate than seen in recent Republican presidential terms.  This has then diminished demand for goods and services, and hence has slowed a recovery where the problem is lack of demand to make use of currently underemployed resources (with high unemployment as well as low capital utilization rates).

What has been high in recent years is not government spending, but rather the fiscal deficits.  But these have been high due both to the 2008 economic collapse and slow recovery (which diminished tax revenues and raised certain government expenditures, such as for unemployment insurance), but more importantly to lower tax rates stemming from a series of tax cuts enacted over the last decade (starting with the Bush tax cuts of 2001 and 2003) and continuing into the Obama term.  The size and impact of these tax cuts were discussed in a previous posting on this blog.  These tax cuts reduced government revenues and, along with the impact of the downturn, account for most of the resulting fiscal deficit.  The problem is not high government spending, as government spending has either not grown or has grown only slowly.  The problem, rather, is low government revenue.

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Table of Data, and Technical Notes

The specific numbers on four-year growth rates by presidential terms going back to Reagan are presented in the following table:

real average annual growth rates Obama Bush II Bush  I Clinton II Clinton I Bush Reagan II Reagan I
2009-12 2005-08 2001-04 1997-00 1993-96 1989-92 1985-88 1981-85
A)  All Levels of Govt
  1)  Direct Spending -0.2% 1.4% 3.0% 2.4% 0.2% 1.9% 4.2% 2.4%
  2)  Total Spending 1.5% 2.9% 3.1% 1.8% 1.2% 3.2% 3.7% 3.9%
B)  Federal Govt only
  1)  Direct Spending 1.3% 2.9% 5.5% 0.1% -2.9% 0.4% 3.8% 4.6%
  2)  Total Spending 2.7% 4.0% 4.0% 0.9% 0.8% 3.0% 3.0% 4.5%

Direct spending is all government spending directly on the purchases of goods and services.  Such spending is for either government consumption or for government investment, and is the government spending presented in the standard GDP accounts.  Government investment is in gross investment terms (i.e. estimated depreciation is not subtracted).  The price deflator used is as estimated by the BEA in the GDP accounts.

Total spending is direct spending by government on goods or services plus transfer payments.  Inter-governmental transfers (e.g. from the federal to the state level, state to local, or federal to local) are netted out in the figures for spending at all government levels together, but federal transfers to state or local governments are counted when federal only spending is calculated.  Transfer payments are mostly to households (such as for Social Security, Medicare, unemployment compensation, food stamps, and so on), but also include transfers to businesses (such as for agricultural subsidies and energy subsidies) and interest payments on public debt.  Since most are to households, these transfer payments were deflated using the personal consumption deflator estimated by the BEA in the GDP accounts.