We Have a Revenue Problem: The Fiscal Accounts Would be Sustainable with a Modest Increase in Taxes

Chart 1

A.  Introduction

The previous post on this blog showed how far federal government debt will rise as a share of GDP as a consequence of the “One Big Beautiful Bill Act” (OBBBA).  The Senate version of the bill was accepted in full by the House and was signed into law by Trump on July 4.  The bill will add $4.0 trillion to public debt in the decade to FY2034, increasing that debt from 98% of GDP as of the end of FY2024 to 126% of GDP by the end of FY2034 (up from the 117% of GDP if the bill had not been passed).

Such numbers on the debt (which would have been astounding just a few years ago, before Trump’s first term in office) might lead some to conclude that rising public debt is now inevitable – that nothing can be done to avoid it.  And some might conclude they should therefore get what they can as fast as they can from bills such as the OBBBA.  The result was a bill laden with numerous special interest provisions for a favored few, and with tax cuts principally of benefit to those with high incomes.

The path is unsustainable and would eventually lead to financial collapse.  But a rising path for the debt ratio is also not inevitable.  A modest increase in federal revenues (2% of GDP or more) along with reversal of the OBBBA would lead to that ratio not just stabilizing, but falling in the decades to come.  The chart at the top of this post shows what the impact would be of a given increase in federal revenues, expressed as a share of GDP, above that in the baseline in the most recent (March 2025) Long-Term Budget Projections of the Congressional Budget Office (the CBO).  This CBO forecast was made prior to the OBBBA being passed, so a first step would be reversal of that act in order to return to that earlier baseline for revenues.

The paths are smooth as they follow the trends under the specified assumptions.  In reality they will of course fluctuate along with the business cycle of economic downturns and upturns.  Right now we do not know when those will occur, but the objective here is simply to illustrate what the longer-term trends would be.

A 3% of GDP revenue increase (plus reversal of the OBBBA) would be a modest target to meet.  To put this in perspective, an extra 3% of GDP of federal revenues in FY2025 would have brought federal revenues (as a share of GDP) back to where they were in FY2000.  This was the last year of the Clinton Administration, and growth was strong, the unemployment rate was the lowest since the 1960s, and the fiscal accounts were in surplus.  But then revenues were cut (as a share of GDP) following the tax cuts of Bush (in 2001 and 2003) and Trump (in 2017).

One can also compare government revenues as a share of GDP of the US to what it is in comparator countries in Europe and elsewhere.  The US is an extreme outlier, with far lower fiscal revenues than what other countries raise – countries with living standards for the general population that many in the US envy.  If other countries can raise such fiscal revenues, one has to wonder why opponents assert it would be devastating for the US economy.

This post will first examine the impact higher federal revenues would have on the path of the federal debt to GDP ratio over the coming decades.  It would not take much. To provide a better understanding of why that is so, it will also look at the basic math behind it.  The section that follows will then look at what government revenues (as a share of GDP) are in the US compared to the share in comparator countries.  A higher (and indeed always far higher) government revenue share in those countries has not meant a reduction in their standard of living.  In many – perhaps all – cases, those living standards for the general population are in fact seen as superior.  Those countries typically also enjoy public infrastructure that is not the embarrassment seen in much of the US.  The section will also look at the economic conditions in the US in 2000, when government revenues were 3% of GDP higher than what they are now.  The economy was performing well in 2000 (and better than it ever has since), and there is no reason why the US could not return to such a level of tax revenue collection.

The section that follows will then discuss some of the criticisms made against raising more in government revenue.  Those arguments (such as that higher tax rates will lead workers to drop out of the labor force, that corporations would invest less, and hence that tax cuts will pay for themselves) are not supported by the evidence.  Nor do the theoretical arguments made in favor of tax cuts stand up.

Mathematically, an alternative to increasing federal revenues would be to reduce federal expenditures.  All else equal, that would also reduce the deficit.  But we can thank Trump for demonstrating that that will not work.  We have seen via the OBBBA that cuts in federal expenditures are not easy to find.  The most severe cuts will be to the Medicaid program – with an expected reduction in expenditures of $1.04 trillion over ten years.  The CBO estimates that those cuts will lead to 11.8 million losing their Medicaid coverage.

Yet the just over $1.0 trillion reduction in federal government expenditures on Medicaid will amount to less than 0.3% of GDP over the period.  With cuts to other programs (such as food stamps), the total cuts were still just 0.3% of GDP after rounding.  The cuts would have had to have been ten times as high to get to a federal expenditure reduction of 3% of GDP.  The authors of the OBBBA searched desperately for expenditures to cut in order to reduce the impact of the OBBBA on the fiscal deficit, and failed to find enough to suffice to cover even one-tenth of what would be needed to get to 3% of GDP.  And the ones they did make will have severe consequences for the poor.

In addition to the lessons from the search under the OBBBA to try to find cuts in federal expenditures to offset what will be lost in lower tax revenues – and failing – there is also now the failure of the effort by Musk and DOGE.  Despite savage cuts to critically valuable government programs (from medical research to the weather service), the federal government has spent (as of July 10) over $300 billion more since Inauguration Day than it did in the same period in 2024.  DOGE had a stated aim that it would cut federal spending by $2 trillion per year.  It never got remotely close.

But what I will refer to as the Musk/DOGE cuts (totaling $190 billion as of July 13, they claim) have had important consequences.  Funds and government staff positions have been cut from medical research, basic science, overseas aid, and the weather service, along with much more.  These cuts have had consequences, as will be discussed below.

What is needed to stop the upward spiral in federal debt relative to GDP is not complicated.  There is a need for more revenues – revenues that have been repeatedly slashed by the tax cuts of Bush in 2001 and 2003, Trump in 2017, and now Trump again.

But while the answer is simple, that does not mean it will happen.  In the current political environment – and as seen with the OBBBA rammed through Congress with only Republican votes – a return to a more sane fiscal policy cannot be expected anytime soon.

B.  The Increase in Government Revenues Needed to Bring Down the Debt to GDP Ratio

The chart at the top of this post shows what the path of the federal debt to GDP ratio over the next three decades would be (with the path since 1980 included for context), for alternative additions to federal revenues expressed as a share of GDP.  The base path is that calculated by the CBO in its Long-Term Budget Outlook issued last March.  This forecast was made prior to the OBBBA, so a first step in all of the scenarios would be to reverse that costly new law.  And the basic story is clear:  With more federal revenues – and not that much more – the debt to GDP ratio would fall.  Federal revenues include all sources of revenue to the federal government, but more than 99% of these are tax revenues.

Relative to the March 2025 (i.e. pre-OBBBA) estimates of the CBO, additional federal revenues of 2% of GDP would lead to a federal debt to GDP ratio that is broadly stable and in fact declining a bit.  Additional revenues of 3% of GDP would put it on a clear downward path, which would be steeper at 4% of GDP in additional revenues, and would be so steep at 5% of GDP that federal debt would fall to zero by 2055 if sustained.  As noted, all these paths would now also require that the OBBBA be reversed.

The pattern is consistent with each step up in federal revenues as a share of GDP.  But what might be surprising to many is that additional revenues of just 2% of GDP (before the OBBBA) would suffice to stabilize the federal debt to GDP ratio.  The overall fiscal deficit will exceed 6% of GDP this fiscal year (6.2% of GDP in the January 2025 CBO forecast).  But the nation would not need anything close to that in deficit reduction to stabilize the debt to GDP ratio.

To see why, one needs to look at the basic math behind this.  It is not that complex, and there are only a few parameters involved.  One is the growth rate of nominal GDP (in total, not per capita, terms).  This can be split up into the growth rate of real GDP and the rate of inflation (specifically inflation as measured by the GDP deflator, but price indices in general move similarly).  Another is the average nominal rate of interest on government debt (US Treasuries), which also implies some average real rate of interest given the rate of inflation.

A last, and key, variable is what economists call the primary deficit in the fiscal accounts.  While not often mentioned in news reports, it is key to understanding the dynamics of the debt to GDP ratio.  The primary deficit is simply total federal government revenues minus total federal government expenditures, other than expenditures for the payment of interest on public debt.  The overall deficit is then the primary deficit minus interest payments on the public debt.

Currently, the federal debt to GDP ratio is very close to 100%.  The 100% figure is not a factor in the dynamics (as will be discussed below), but provides a starting point.  One can use any units, and for convenience I will assume GDP equals $100 (billions of dollars or whatever) and that therefore federal debt also equals $100.  Assume, then, that the growth in real GDP is 2% per annum, that the rate of inflation is 2% per annum, and that therefore the growth in nominal GDP is basically 4% per annum (ignoring interaction effects; it would be 4.04% if one did not).  Assume also a nominal interest rate of 4%, and hence a real interest rate of 2% (again ignoring the same interaction effects).

The primary deficit is then key.  Suppose that it is equal to zero.  The overall fiscal deficit would then be the nominal interest due.  Nominal interest would be 4% times debt outstanding, or 4% x $100 = $4.  Thus the overall deficit would be $4, which would have to be covered by borrowing.  Debt at the start of the next period would then be $100 + $4 = $104.

Nominal GDP in the denominator of the ratio would also have grown.  With a nominal growth rate of 4% per annum, GDP in the next period would also be $104 = 1.04 x $100.  With debt at $104 and GDP at $104, the debt to GDP ratio would be unchanged in that next period at $104 / $104 = 100% once again.  One can continue with the same calculations for further periods.  With these GDP growth rates, interest rates, and a primary deficit of zero, the debt to GDP ratio would be stable.

It does not matter that the debt to GDP ratio started out at 100%.  Suppose it were 50% instead (e.g. debt of $50 with GDP still at $100), along with a primary deficit of zero.  Interest due would then be $2 ( = 4% of $50), and the overall deficit would be $2.  Debt in the next period would then be $50 + $2 = $52.  GDP would once again have grown to $104 (with the 4% nominal growth), and the debt to GDP ratio would be $52 / $104 = 50% again.  It is unchanged.

More generally, when the rate of growth in GDP matches the rate of interest (both either in real terms or in nominal terms), then with a primary deficit of zero, the debt to GDP ratio will be stable.  The debt to GDP ratio will fall if GDP growth exceeds the rate of interest when the primary deficit is zero, and will rise if the rate of interest exceeds the rate of GDP growth.  Or, as one can see in this simple arithmetic, if the primary deficit is, for example, 1% of GDP, then the debt to GDP ratio will be stable if the rate of growth of GDP is 1% point higher than the rate of interest.  And if the primary balance is in surplus by 1% of GDP, then the debt to GDP ratio will be stable even if the rate of growth of GDP is 1% below the rate of interest.

This is all basically just arithmetic and can be calculated with a simple spreadsheet.  What matters, then, are the actual figures in the CBO forecasts.  In the underlying data for the CBO’s Long-Term Budget Outlook of last March (where all the figures can be found at this CBO page), the CBO forecasts that over the 2025 to 2055 period, real GDP will grow at an average annual rate of 1.6% and nominal GDP at a 3.7% rate.  The GDP deflator grows at a 2.0% average rate.  The average interest rate on all outstanding public debt held by the public is forecast to average 3.6% per annum in nominal terms and 1.5% per annum in real terms.

Thus the growth rate of GDP (1.6% per annum in real terms and 3.7% in nominal terms) is close to the average interest rate on outstanding public debt (1.5% in real terms and 3.6% in nominal terms).  With this, a primary deficit of zero will yield a basically stable public debt to GDP ratio.  In the CBO March 2025 budget outlook, the primary deficit is forecast to average very close to 2.0% of GDP over the period 2025 to 2055 as a whole, coming down from 3.0% of GDP in FY2025 to 2.1% for the remainder of the decade and then 1.8% or 1.9% in the outer decades.

Thus an increase in federal revenues of 2% of GDP (plus reversal of the OBBBA) would bring the primary deficit to zero.  With real GDP growing at close to the same rate as the average interest rate on the debt, the debt to GDP ratio would be stable.  With an increase in federal revenues of more than 2% of GDP, the primary balance would be in surplus, and at these growth rates and interest rates, the debt to GDP ratio will fall.  All that is as shown in the chart at the top of this post.

Some might note that all this assumes the rate of growth of GDP and the level of interest rates are unchanged in each year in the various scenarios.  This is correct.  But whether GDP growth will then be faster or slower, and/or interest rates higher or lower, in the various scenarios is debated.  This will be discussed in section D below.

C.  Comparator Countries Raise Far More in Government Revenues than the US, as the US Itself Also Has in the Past

Would it be impossible to increase government revenues by, say, 3% of GDP?  One might start by looking at what other countries – comparable to the US in income – are able to do:

Chart 2

The figures here were assembled by the IMF and are for total government revenues at all levels of government (central/federal, state/provincial, and local) in order for the figures to be comparable across countries.

The US collects far less in government revenues as a share of GDP than do comparator nations.  In 2023, government revenues totaled 29% of GDP in the US.  The closest nation to the US in this list was Australia, at 36% of GDP – 7% points higher.  It was 38% for the UK (9% points higher), an average of 47% for all the European nations on this list (18% points higher), and over 50% of GDP in Belgium, Denmark, and France.

Those other countries have done well.  Living standards are high, and public infrastructure is typically far better than in the US (where it is often an embarrassment).  If all those countries are doing well, it is difficult to see the basis for the assertion that a modest rise in government revenues in the US (of, say, 3% of GDP) would be so problematic.

One can also look at some specific indicators.  Critics of higher taxes assert they would lead to a lower supply of labor (as they claim people would choose to work less when facing a higher tax rate) and a lower supply of capital assets (as they claim corporations and other business entities would invest less when facing higher tax rates).

But neither appears to be a problem in comparator countries.  Labor force participation rates in these comparator countries are – with one exception – all higher than in the US:

Chart 3

The data are from the OECD (where figures across countries are based on comparable definitions).  The US rate was 79.3%, and the only country with a lower rate than this was Italy (at 74.4%).  The participation rates were higher in all the other countries, and often substantially higher.  The rate was almost 90% in Sweden, despite government revenues 17.6% points of GDP higher than in the US.  Social policy is a far stronger determinant of labor force participation than tax policy.

Higher taxes are also not associated with lower investment.  Investment in the comparator countries are all higher than in the US with two exceptions:

Chart 4

The chart shows gross fixed capital formation (i.e. investment) as a share of GDP in the set of countries in 2023, the most recent year with complete coverage in the OECD data.  The US was at 21.4% of GDP.  The UK was less at 17.6% and the Netherlands marginally less at 20.4%.  The rates were higher in all the other countries, and they were higher despite collecting far higher tax revenues as a share of GDP.

In sum, I would not suggest that the US go to taxes at the level of France, nor even Australia.  But to argue that the US cannot “afford” to raise tax revenues by 2 or 3 or 4% of GDP is belied by the ability of other countries – with comparable incomes and arguably a better standard of living for most of the population – to raise far more than that.  And there is little indication that labor force participation or capital investment are diminished even with government revenue collections that are far greater (as a share of GDP) than what they are in the US.

One can also look at the experience of the US itself.  Government revenues (federal only now) reached 20.0% of GDP in FY2000 – the last year of the Clinton administration.  After repeated tax cuts, it was only 17.1% of GDP in FY2024.  That is, the US was able to raise federal revenues in FY2000 that were almost 3% of GDP higher than what they were in FY2024.

The economy did not suffer when those higher revenues were collected.  Real GDP grew by 4.1% in 2000, and at a 4.5% rate in the four years of Clinton’s second term.  It has not grown faster than that for any four-year period since then, and only once for any individual year since then (in 2021, under Biden with the recovery from the Covid downturn).  This is despite the tax cuts of Bush and Trump.

Nor did the tax cuts help investment.  Real private fixed investment grew at a 8.8% rate in the four years ending in 2000 and real private fixed nonresidential investment (i.e. investment by businesses) grew at a 10.2% rate in the four years ending in 2000.  Neither has grown at such rates in any four-year period since then, despite the repeated tax cuts of Bush and Trump.

The labor market was also strong.  The unemployment rate fell to 3.8% at one point in 2000 (and was 3.9% still at the end of the year) – the lowest unemployment rate for the US up to that time since the 1960s.  Total nonfarm employment grew at a 2.2% rate in 2000 and total private nonfarm employment grew at a 2.1% rate.  Both were faster than in any subsequent year until 2021-23 during the Biden administration.  The four-year growth (in annualized terms) ending in 2000 was 2.5% for total employment and 2.6% for private employment.  Both were faster than in any subsequent four-year period until the four years ending in 2024 in the Biden administration.

So can the US do well with taxes set to raise an extra 3% of GDP?  Certainly.  Other countries do not suffer despite raising far higher government revenues as a share of GDP, and the US itself raised that much in additional government revenues in 2000.  What is basically needed is a reversal of the repeated tax cuts of Bush in 2001 and 2003, Trump in 2017, and now Trump again in 2025.  The government debt to GDP would not now be at 100% of GDP, rising on a trajectory for it to go ever higher for the foreseeable future (if the financial markets allow it), if government revenues were increased by just a few percentage points of GDP.

D.  Some Critiques

a.  Republican arguments for tax cuts are not supported by historical evidence nor by theory

A standard Republican argument since Reagan is that tax cuts will spur growth, as they claim labor will choose to work longer hours and businesses will invest more.  They have also argued that real wages would rise as a consequence of this higher investment.  Indeed, Republicans have argued repeatedly – starting with the Reagan tax cuts of 1981 – that tax cuts will increase growth by so much that they will “pay for themselves”.  That is, they asserted that GDP and incomes would rise by so much that total tax collected would rise rather than fall.  The arguments were repeated for the Bush tax cuts of 2001 and 2003, for the Trump tax cuts of 2017, and have been made once again for the OBBBA.

However, this never turned out to be true.  See earlier posts on this blog that examined the impact of the Reagan and Bush tax cuts (which found they were not a boost to employment nor to growth, but did increase fiscal deficits); examined whether the Reagan tax cuts led to higher real wages (they did not); examined the record of Trump’s first term compared to that of Obama and Biden (which found that despite the tax cuts of 2017, growth was slower during Trump’s first term than under Obama and Biden even before the 2020 Covid crisis, that employment growth was substantially less, and business investment was no higher); and looked at what happened to corporate profit taxes following the sharp cut in corporate tax rates in 2017 (they fell in half, which should not be surprising but is counter to the argument that they would “pay for themselves”).  Another post showed that if the government revenues lost due to the 2017 tax cuts under Trump were directed instead to the Social Security Trust Fund, Social Security would remain fully funded for the foreseeable future, rather than being depleted by 2034.   What was lost in the 2017 tax cuts alone was huge.

One should also not forget that the highest marginal income tax rates in the US in the 1950s (when Eisenhower was president) were 91 or 92%.  Rates at even those levels did not crush the economy.

History does not, therefore, provide support for the argument that the tax cuts of Reagan, Bush, and Trump led to higher growth, employment, or real wages.

Aside from the empirical evidence of history, the arguments that lower taxes will spur increased work effort and business investment are also mistaken at a theoretical level.  As presented in another earlier post on this blog, the argument on labor supply is flawed as it fails to recognize that there will be income effects (and much more) as well as substitution effects when taxes on wage income change.

The Republican argument is that when one taxes wages, labor will work less as their after-tax return will be less.  This is a substitution effect.  But as is taught in any introductory Econ 101 course, there are income effects as well.  They work in the opposite direction, as people work to achieve a certain standard of living as well as sufficient savings for retirement.  There are also social (e.g. availability of childcare) as well as legal factors (e.g. a standard 40-hour workweek) that are probably as important, if not more important.  And as discussed in Section C above, labor force participation rates in the US are less – in some cases substantially less – than in comparator countries with far higher taxes than in the US.

The argument against profit taxes is also flawed.  The argument is that when profits are taxed at a lower rate, businesses will invest more.  But that is not so clear (in addition to not being seen in the evidence).  Businesses invest in the expectation of making a profit.  A share of those profits are then paid in taxes.  If the tax rate on profits is reduced, that does not mean that an investment that would otherwise be a loss (be unprofitable) will then become profitable.  Rather, the lower tax rate on profits will mean that the businesses will retain a higher share of the profits on investments that are profitable.  Such taxes – when properly structured as a tax on profits – will not turn a profitable investment into a loss.

This is the case when firms choose to invest whenever they expect to earn a profit, including possibly only a small profit.  Mathematically, it will be different if firms will only invest in the expectation that they will earn some minimum rate of return – called the hurdle rate.  The tax rate on profits can then matter as the taxes will reduce the after-tax rate of return to less than what it was before taxes.  For investments on the margin (there may not be many), taxes could then lead to an after-tax rate of return below the hurdle rate.  Investments that are expected to generate a very high before-tax rate of return will not be affected, as the after-tax rate of return would still be above the hurdle rate.  Nor would they affect investments expected to generate a low before-tax rate of return.  Such investments would not be done in any case.

In terms of the numbers, the impact of taxes on profits within the relevant range for the rate of return is not substantial.  While this will depend to some degree on the specific pattern of returns as well as the lifetime of the investment, an increase in the tax rate on corporate profits from the current 21% by 3% points to 24% will generally reduce the after-tax rate of return by only a percentage point or less.  That is, if the hurdle rate is 10.0%, the increase in the tax on corporate profits by 3% points will only matter for investments with an expected rate of return of between 10.0% and 11.0%.  There will not likely be many investments in this narrow relevant range.  Those who make decisions on corporate investments also know that they can rarely predict the rate of return on some investment so accurately that this would matter.

The increase in the tax rate on corporate profits from 21% to 24% would be for the headline rate.  Due to numerous measures in the tax code, what corporations actually pay is much less.  Using BEA figures in the NIPA accounts, corporations only paid an average tax of 12.8% on corporate profits in 2024.  An increase in this to 15.8% would have close to the same impact as an increase from 21% to 24% on the rate of return on potential investments:  It would reduce the return by a percentage point or less.  Hence, it would only matter for investments with an expected rate of return only marginally above the company’s hurdle rate.

As with labor supply, one should also not presume that only narrow economic factors matter.  Social factors can also matter, where businesses look at what others are doing (and do not want to be left behind), “animal spirits” matter, and investment decisions are based on far more relevant considerations than whether the tax rate on any profits that are made (if profits are made) are somewhat higher or somewhat lower.

b.  Interest rates can be expected to be lower than otherwise when the fiscal accounts are on a sustainable path, and GDP growth would then rise not fall

Raising tax revenues by 3% of GDP or more can in fact be expected to lead to an increase – not a decrease – in the rate of growth of GDP.

The US fiscal accounts are on an unsustainable course with the ever-rising public debt to GDP ratio.  The US Treasury needs to borrow the funds necessary to cover the annual deficit (as well as to roll over all the debt coming due in each period), and lenders will become increasingly cautious as debt rises on a path of steadily increasing debt relative to GDP.  As they become increasingly cautious, they will only lend the funds needed if they are given a higher interest rate.

Putting the fiscal accounts on a path with a falling public debt to GDP ratio will avoid this.  Interest rates would then fall to less than what they would have been with an ever-rising debt to GDP ratio.  Lower interest rates can then be expected to spur investment.  The scenarios in the chart at the top of this post all assume fixed values in each year for interest rates as well as GDP (those in the CBO’s baseline scenario of last March).  But a more complete analysis would account for both the lower cost to the US Treasury of the consequent lower interest rates and an increase in the rate of growth in GDP (as a result of increased private investment) when the fiscal accounts are placed on a sustainable path.  Both would then lead to a more rapid fall in the public debt to GDP ratios than presented in the chart at the top of this post.

c.  We now know from OBBBA and Musk/DOGE that cutting federal expenditures by the amount needed to put the fiscal accounts on a sustainable path is not possible

Mathematically, the fiscal deficit would also be reduced and the public debt to GDP ratio would fall if, instead of increasing federal revenues by, say, 3% of GDP, federal expenditures were cut by 3% of GDP.  But while mathematically true (under the assumptions that interest rates, GDP growth, and other such factors are then unchanged), what we have seen with the OBBBA and with the failure of the Musk/DOGE campaign are the high costs of trying to cut government expenditures by even a small fraction of what would be needed.  Their efforts have shown that cutting federal expenditures by the 3% of GDP target considered above is simply not feasible.

To start with the OBBBA:  The CBO estimates that the bill in its final form (as passed by the Senate, then by the House, and signed by Trump) will reduce federal revenues by $4.5 trillion over the ten years of FY2025 to FY2034.  Most of this loss in revenue is from tax cuts primarily of benefit to the rich.  To try to reduce the impact this would have on the federal deficit, Republican leaders in both the House and the Senate strenuously sought to find significant federal expenditures they could cut.  The final bill, as passed, cut expenditures over the ten years by a net of $1.2 trillion.  Planned expenditures were increased for certain Republican priorities – specifically about $150 billion for the military and about $190 billion for anti-immigrant measures (funding for prisons, the border wall, and similar, and including for the Coast Guard) – while targeted programs for the poor were cut severely.

The main program cut was Medicaid, with an expected reduction in federal costs of $1.04 trillion over the ten years.  There were also cuts to the food stamps program (SNAP) and other health care programs with a focus on the poor (such as CHIP – the Children’s Health Insurance Program).  Medicaid expenditures would be cut by making enrollment more bureaucratically difficult as well as by reductions in the federal share of costs covered.

The CBO has estimated that the Medicaid measures alone will lead to 11.8 million fewer people being covered by Medicaid.  (This 11.8 million estimate is hard to find, but is presented in a footnote on the Summary page of the spreadsheet with CBO’s cost estimate of the Senate version of the OBBBA.  The spreadsheet can be found here.  The 11.8 million figure is an update of a 10.9 million estimate for the original House-approved version of the bill, and reflects changes that the Senate added to what became the final version of the OBBBA.)

This cut to Medicaid coverage has been strongly criticized.  The program is only for the poor, and 11.8 million is a massive number.  Much of the “cost savings” will also prove to be a false savings at the national level, as many of those denied health insurance cover can be expected to end up in much more expensive hospital treatment both for routine treatment and for treatment when their health condition has worsened to the point that only a hospital will suffice.  In addition, some of the federal savings will come from shifting costs to the states.

Despite the severe impacts on the poor, the estimated $1.04 trillion reduction in federal expenditures over the ten years only comes to less than 0.3% of GDP over the period.  Cuts would need to be ten times as high to get to 3% of GDP in federal expenditure reductions.  Republicans in the House and the Senate were only able to find a net of $0.2 trillion in other expenditure reductions (after the increases for the military and for anti-immigrant measures), bringing the total cut in expenditures to $1.2 trillion, or 0.34% of GDP over the ten years.

If they could have found more to cut, they would have.  The fact that they could not is telling.

The cuts orchestrated by Elon Musk and the DOGE group he established (all with the strong backing of Trump) also failed.  Musk said they would be able to cut “at least” $2 trillion in federal expenditures out of the $6.5 billion budget of Biden (which was actually $6.75 billion in FY2024).  This was, of course, always nonsense.  On the DOGE website (as of July 13, when I accessed this) they claim on their “wall of receipts” that they have achieved “savings” of $190 billion.  That is less than one-tenth what Musk claimed they would easily do.

And the $190 billion figure itself is certainly wrong.  While the documentation provided was far from adequate for most of the line items they listed, analysts nonetheless found numerous errors in many of the costs DOGE claimed to have saved.  A prominent, and obvious, early example was a claim of saving $8 billion on one canceled contract when it was in fact an $8 million contract (this was later corrected).  But analysts have also found that some contracts were counted twice or even three times, that savings were claimed on contracts that had already expired or been canceled during Biden’s term, that they confused what would be spent on certain contracts with certain caps, that iffy guesses were made on savings on contracts that had not yet been awarded, and more.  The figures were also wrong as they mixed one-time asset sales with expenditure reductions, savings over multiple years as if they had all been saved in this year, and other basic accounting mistakes.

The actions of the Musk/DOGE group have also led to higher costs being incurred.  For example, key government personnel who had been fired (such as a group of nuclear safety experts) then had to be rehired (or alternative personnel hired), and certain contracts that had been canceled had to be renewed (at a higher cost due to the disruption).

The cuts made have also not had a noticeable effect on overall federal government expenditures.  As of July 10 (the most recent date in the data as I write this), federal expenditures in 2025 under the Trump administration have been $300.5 billion higher since Inauguration Day than they were over the same period in 2024 under Biden.

There have been cuts – some of them drastic for individual agencies (such as USAID, which has been completely dismantled) – but even $190 billion in cuts (an inflated figure, as discussed above) would only amount to 0.6% of GDP.  It is also clear that the cuts have not reflected cuts in “waste, fraud, and abuse” despite assertions that they have.  Musk/DOGE never even examined whether waste, fraud, or abuse was present.  Rather, they cut where it was easy to do. An example has been the blanket firing of staff on probation.  Newly hired government staff, and staff who have been promoted, will typically be on probation for their first year (sometimes longer).  They can be readily fired with limited rights to appeal, and thus were easy targets for dismissal by the DOGE team.  But recently promoted staff were promoted because they were good performers, and they are precisely the staff the government should want to keep.

There have also been and will be costs from government work not done.  The clearest will be lower tax revenues collected as a consequence of major cuts in the IRS budget and its staff.  Already as of the end of March, the IRS had lost close to one-third of its auditor staff and 11% of its overall staff, with an objective of going to a cut of half of all staff.  The loss of auditor staff is particularly costly.  A group of researchers – primarily at Harvard – estimated from IRS data that audits on average generate $2.17 in additional revenue for every $1 spent.  The return is much higher for audits of high-income taxpayers, with an average return of $6.3 for every $1 spent on audits of those in the top 0.1% of income.  And if one includes an estimate of the resulting deterrence effect in future years for the individuals involved and for those who see what was done, the return is $36 per $1 spent for the richest 0.1%.  This would be seen by anyone in the private sector as a tremendous return on investment.  But it has been treated as rather something to cut if one wants to make it easier for the top 0.1% to cheat on their taxes.

The IRS cuts, especially of the audit staff, will lead to a major reduction in federal revenues, thus widening – not narrowing – the fiscal deficit.  An estimate by the Yale Budget Lab (a program at Yale University) concluded that if half of the IRS staff are dismissed, the federal government would lose $395 billion in tax revenues in the next ten years and a net of $350 billion once $45 billion in IRS cost “savings” are taken out.

It is also worth noting that due in part to constraints on the IRS limiting its ability to ensure all taxes due are paid, the US lost an estimated $696 billion in tax revenue in 2022.  That was 2.7% of GDP that year.  Just collecting that would have led to an increase in federal revenues of close to the 3% target discussed above.  It will of course never be possible to collect 100% of what is due, but it is clear that much more could be done by properly funding the IRS.  Instead, Musk and his DOGE group have slashed IRS funding and staff.

The Musk/DOGE cuts have also slashed funding for medical research and basic science research, and for agencies such as USAID, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA – where the National Weather Service resides), and others.  There will be damage from this, although some will be difficult to assess.  It will be impossible, for example, to point with any certainty to a specific medical cure that will not now be found due to the cuts in medical research.

But we do know that medical research in the past has been critical to cures we now have to forms of cancer, to heart disease, and much more.  Two prominent economists (David Cutler and Ed Glaeser, both Professors of Economics at Harvard) recently arrived at a very rough estimate of what the cost would be to the nation if Trump’s proposed cut in the NIH budget (of 43%, with a resulting cut in NIH supported research of 33%) is approved and sustained.  Based on the past relationship between NIH supported medical research, resulting therapies, and their impact on life expectancy, they estimated that $20 billion proposed cut in the NIH budget (adding up to $500 billion over a 25 year time horizon), would lead (conservatively) to a loss to the nation of $8.2 trillion from the reduced life expectancy.  That is, the loss would be $16 for each $1 reduction in funded medical research.

Or take the case of USAID.  Musk was absolutely gleeful in early February when he announced that he had “spent the weekend feeding USAID into the wood chipper”.  Later in the month he waved around a chainsaw in celebration of the funding that had been slashed as he posed on stage in black clothes and dark sunglasses at the Conservative Political Action Conference.

The end of USAID and its programs will have a brutal impact on many in the countries where it provided assistance.  While the Musk/DOGE did not examine the effectiveness of USAID before feeding it “into the wood chipper”, a recently published peer-reviewed article in the medical journal The Lancet did.  The researchers examined the impact of USAID programs on mortality in the period 2001 to 2021, and concluded that those programs led to 92 million lives being saved (with a two standard deviation uncertainty band of 86 million to 98 million).  They also looked at the resulting reduction in mortality from specific causes such as tuberculosis, HIV/AIDs, maternal mortality, and more.  And based on their findings, they concluded that unless the funding cuts announced for the USAID programs in the first half of 2025 are reversed, deaths will rise in the countries affected by 14 million in the years to 2030 (and then continue).  Of those deaths, 4.5 million will be deaths of children under the age of five.

For a specific example of the impacts in the US itself, we have just seen the tragedy of the flooding in Texas on the night of July 4.  As of July 13, 129 are confirmed dead, including 36 children in Kerr County alone (mostly from Camp Mystic, a Christian camp for girls).  An estimated 170 remain missing.  No one has been found alive since July 4.

Questions have been raised on whether the Musk/DOGE cuts in the staff and budget of the National Weather Service may have played a role in this tragedy being as bad as it has been, and on whether changes at FEMA have delayed its ability to respond on a timely basis to the destruction from the floods.

The National Weather Service (NWS) has lost about 17% of its staff (a loss of about 600 staff members) from the Musk/DOGE cuts.  Five former leaders of the NWS (in both Republican and Democratic administrations) released a public letter in May warning that such cuts could lead to loss of life.  Cuts in the NWS budget have also forced it to cut back on the information it gathers on the weather, such as cuts in the daily number of balloons it launches (previously twice a day at 100 sites) to obtain information on atmospheric temperatures, humidity, and wind speed.

What is not clear is whether those cuts led to a lack of adequate warning of the flooding.  Local officials have stated that more rain came down than was forecast, which led to more severe flooding than expected.  Other observers have stated that the forecasts were as good as one could expect.  The two NWS offices responsible for this region in central Texas (San Antonio and San Angelo) were operating, however, with 10 vacancies out of 33 positions for meteorologists on staff.  Most importantly, the position for the meteorologist responsible for communication with local officials was vacant.  The long-time member of the staff responsible for this took one of the early-retirement buy-out packages offered as part of the Musk/DOGE cuts.

The forecast of a flash flood happening may have been as good as one could expect given the circumstances.  But if the danger was not adequately conveyed to local authorities on a timely basis, a tragedy could still follow.  And the NWS apparently recognizes from experience the need for a position with a professional meteorologist responsible for such communications.

There have also been concerns raised with the slow response of FEMA to the flooding.  FEMA search and rescue teams did not reach the site of the disaster until a week after the disaster, having been told by FEMA to mobilize only five days after the flooding.  In flooding in the Appalachians early this year, the teams reached the sites within 12 hours.  FEMA also did not answer two-thirds of the calls to its disaster assistance line, after having laid off hundreds of contractors who had been responsible for answering such calls at the close of business on July 5 (when their contracts expired).  Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem – the cabinet office responsible for FEMA – asserted this was not true.  But documents reviewed by The New York Times indicate otherwise.

Earlier this year, Trump had said he wanted FEMA to “go away”.  Noem indicated in March that she was going to “eliminate” FEMA.  The cost of degrading FEMA capacity is now becoming clear, however.

E.  Summary and Conclusion

An ever-rising public debt to GDP ratio is not inevitable.  Nor is it sustainable.  And it would not take much to reverse it.  An increase in federal revenues of just 2% of GDP (and reversal of the OBBBA tax cuts) would lead to a debt to GDP ratio that is broadly stable, while a larger increase would lead the ratio to decline.

An increase of 3% of GDP in federal revenues would be modest.  Comparator countries collect far more; the next lowest country (Australia) collects 7% points of GDP more in government revenues than the US does.  And the US itself collected 3% points of GDP more in federal government revenues in FY2000 at the end of the Clinton administration than it did in FY2024.

The arguments that have been made that higher tax rates will lead to slower growth (and lower tax rates to faster growth) are not supported by the historical evidence nor by theory.  Rather, it was the tax cuts of Bush in 2001 and 2003, and of Trump in 2017, that have led to the unsustainable rise in the public debt to GDP ratio.  The just passed OBBBA will make this even worse.

We have seen this story before.  A post on this blog from 12 years ago (with a title that also begins with “We Have a Revenue Problem …”) showed that the federal debt to GDP ratio would have fallen over time had the Bush tax cuts of 2001 and 2003 (then up for renewal) been allowed to expire.  This assumed, of course, that there would also never have been the Trump tax cuts of 2017 and now in 2025.  The analysis of the current post has arrived at a conclusion that is essentially the same.  Our nation is on an unsustainable fiscal path not because too much is being spent, but because of the repeated tax cuts of Bush and Trump.

While government expenditures are not to blame for our unsustainable fiscal condition, cuts in expenditures of a sufficient magnitude (such as 3% of GDP) would mathematically also reduce the debt ratio, taking all else as equal.  But cuts of such a magnitude are simply not possible.  Republicans sought strenuously to find programs to cut as part of the OBBBA to offset some of the impact on the deficit of the tax cuts that were their priority.  In the end, the major program they cut was Medicaid.  But those cuts amounted to less than 0.3% of GDP – only one-tenth of what one would need for 3% of GDP.  Even with the cuts to food stamps and other programs targeted for the poor, the total net reduction in expenditures was still only 0.3% of GDP within round-off.

The Musk/DOGE cuts have also not been anywhere close to the $2 trillion that Musk claimed he could easily do.  The current claim is that $190 billion has been cut, but that figure is itself inflated by dodgy accounting.  And even $190 billion is just 0.6% of GDP.

Important programs have certainly been cut by the Musk/Doge group, and thousands of federal government staff have lost their jobs.  But the costs of those cuts are becoming evident.  The US is losing much of what had made it great.

Reversing the direction of the public debt to GDP ratio is not impossible, nor even complicated.  There is a need for more federal revenues.  But in the current political environment, it is doubtful anything will soon be done.

What GDP Means: A Not Terribly Surprising Lack of Understanding by Elon Musk and Trump’s Secretary of Commerce

Update, March 28, 2025:  The BEA released on March 27 its initial estimate of GDP as measured from wage and profit income for the fourth quarter of 2024.  The BEA labels this, to avoid confusion, Gross Domestic Income – GDI.  In principle, it should be the same as GDP but will differ as data from different sources are used to estimate both; see the discussion in the post below.  The BEA also released its initial estimate for the fourth quarter of 2024 of value-added produced by sector, from which one can calculate growth in production by private industries and in production by government.  The two together sum to GDP.  Charts 1 and 3 in the post and related text have been updated to reflect these new estimates.

Economic growth was strong in the last quarter of 2024 – the last full quarter of the Biden administration.  Real GDP grew at a 2.4% annual pace when estimated from demand-side measures, and at a substantially faster 4.5% pace when estimated from income-side measures (i.e. GDI).  Growth in the average of the two measures – GDI and GDP – was 3.5%.  This is exceptionally strong.  And price inflation was modest, with growth in the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) price deflator of 2.4% at an annual rate, and 2.6% in the core PCE price deflator.

Along with an unemployment rate of just 4.0% (as of January), Trump has inherited an extremely strong economy from Biden.  We will now see what develops.

 

A. Introduction

On February 28, Elon Musk posted on his social media site X the comment:

“A more accurate measure of GDP would exclude government spending.

Otherwise, you can scale GDP artificially high by spending money on things that don’t make people’s lives better.”

Two days later, on March 2, Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick followed up on this and said in an interview on Fox News:

“You know that governments historically have messed with GDP.  They count government spending as part of GDP.  So I’m going to separate those two and make it transparent.”

These statements reveal a lack of understanding of what GDP means by two of the most prominent officials (or in Musk’s case, a non-official official) in the Trump administration – both key players on economic issues.  While that lack of understanding is not surprising – how GDP is defined is a technical issue – what is worrying is that these prominent Trump appointees would assert this with confidence and without bothering to check first with experts whether it was in fact true.  Such arrogance is unfortunately now the norm in this administration.

Lutnick’s assertion that “governments have historically messed with GDP” (in fact they have not) is also worrisome as it looks like preparation for the Trump administration to do precisely that.  GDP estimates are prepared by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), a bureau in the Department of Commerce now headed by Lutnick.  Also, just a few days before his confused statement on GDP Lutnick disbanded the standing external technical advisory committee that advised the BEA on how GDP estimates might be improved.  Committee members were professionals at universities and in industry who were specialists on these issues.  They were not paid and only had their travel costs covered when meetings were called.  At the same time, Lutnick also disbanded several similar committees of unpaid specialists advising the Census Bureau – also part of the Department of Commerce.

The concern is that Lutnick is setting things up precisely to “mess with” how GDP is estimated.  The concern is that he could very well order the BEA to manipulate the standard methodology and estimation process to come up with figures that make it look like the economy is in less trouble than it in fact is in the coming years of Trump’s second presidential term.

Musk and Lutnick do not appear to realize that GDP – which stands for Gross Domestic Product – is a measure of the market value of all the economy produces in a given period (normally expressed in annualized terms).  Gross Domestic Product is a measure of production; production that takes place domestically (i.e. within the nation’s borders); and in gross terms (meaning without depreciation of capital taken out).  The BEA also produces estimates with depreciation subtracted – which it calls Net Domestic Product or NDP – but less attention is paid to those figures as depreciation is especially hard to estimate, both conceptually and in practice.

The aim of the GDP measure is thus to arrive at an estimate of how much the nation’s economy is producing.  How that production is used is not the purpose of the measure, and there is no assessment of whether that use should be considered “good” or “not so good”.  But it is disparaging to assert (as Musk and Lutnick have) that the services that the government provides – such as the services of the school teacher pictured above – are worthless and hence should not be counted.

Those statements of Musk and Lutnick do, however, provide a “teachable moment”.  Many others – including some in the news media – are also confused about what GDP means and signifies.  This post will seek to sort through those confusions.  The first section below will review what GDP means and how it is estimated.  Those are two separate things.  Lutnick and Musk are conflating what GDP is designed to measure (i.e. production) with one way in which GDP may be estimated (from the demand side, by estimating how that production is used).  The BEA in fact estimates GDP in three different ways, with this serving to provide also cross-checks on the estimates.  In principle, GDP as estimated by each of the three methods should be the same.  But one is dealing with real-world data, there will always be statistical noise, and hence by using three different approaches the BEA can arrive at a more robust overall estimate.

Lutnick also asserted there is a lack of transparency in the GDP figures, in that the BEA includes figures on government spending in GDP.  This is confused and it is also defamatory to assert that the BEA is anything other than transparent.  The BEA issues each month regularly updated figures not just on GDP but also on much else in what is more formally called the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA).  In these, the BEA provides estimates on all sorts of aggregates with and without government spending.  While Lutnick and Musk are not clear about what they are seeking, one guess is that they are looking for a figure on domestic production that excludes whatever is produced directly by government (such as the services of the public school teacher pictured above).  But the BEA in fact provides this:  It is called Value-Added by Private Industries.  The BEA provides estimates of this for each calendar quarter and in both real and nominal terms.  Charts below will show (using the published BEA figures) what growth would have been whether measured by GDP as defined or by a measure of growth that excludes government-produced services.

We will also look at some simple measures of the productivity of federal government workers over time.  The calculations are of necessity rough, but if one counts only the management of federal discretionary expenditures, the growth in federal worker productivity in fact matched (over the period 1997 to 2023) the growth in overall labor productivity in the economy.  And if one includes also the management of mandatory spending (entitlement programs such as Social Security and Medicare), federal worker productivity has grown far faster than overall labor productivity in the economy.  These estimates should not be taken too seriously, as there is no way to assess how well-managed the programs are.  But in simple but crude terms, there is no evidence that growth in federal worker productivity has lagged what the rest of the economy has achieved.  Indeed, by one measure it was far better.

The post will end with some final comments.  While I am sure Musk and Lutnick do not realize it, their notion of what GDP should and should not include is in many respects similar to concepts used in the Material Balances System of national accounts (also called the Material Product System) developed in the 1930s by Gosplan in Stalin’s USSR.  It was then used (by command – there was no choice here) in the communist countries of Eastern Europe up until 1990.  Those systems excluded the concept of certain services as contributing to production, similar to what Musk and Lutnick are advocating now.  It was built on the concept from Karl Marx of productive and unproductive labor, with Musk and Lutnick asserting that certain labor (those employed in government) is unproductive.

It is ironic that senior figures in the Trump administration appear to be advocating for a system similar in nature to that developed in Stalin’s USSR.  We know that that did not end well.

B.  The Meaning of GDP versus How GDP is Estimated

GDP – Gross Domestic Product – is a measure of the market value of what the economy is producing.  That is not the same concept as what the economy is using.  While statisticians can make use of data on how output is being used in order to arrive at an estimate of what was produced, confusion on this point appears to have led to the error Musk and Lutnick made.  While what they did mean is not fully clear, they mistakenly asserted that eliminating one of the uses of output (that by government) would yield “a more accurate measure of GDP” (as Musk put it in the quote above).  That is not correct.  It would no longer be GDP.

The confusion – which others have made as well – stems from how GDP is estimated.  The BEA (and also the international standard on national account concepts) estimates GDP in three different ways.  The three should in principle yield the same figure for GDP (after some minor adjustments to reflect indirect taxes and subsidies).  But with real-world data, the three estimates will normally differ only by some – hopefully small – amount.  The three approaches will serve, however, as cross-checks on each other, and can flag that there is an issue if one of the estimates differs significantly from the others.

An earlier post on this blog discussed those three methods for estimating GDP.  Readers may wish to read that post (which covers also how recessions are identified and formally declared) for a more complete discussion.  And for a much more detailed review, they may refer to Chapter 2 of the NIPA Handbook issued by the BEA.  But briefly, GDP is estimated by:

a)  The initial, and most widely viewed, estimate of GDP comes not from estimates of what is produced, but rather from how that production is used.  As those who have studied any economics know, GDP will be equal to the sum of Personal Consumption, Private Investment, Government Consumption and Investment, and Net Exports (i.e. Exports less Imports).  This holds not because Personal Consumption and the other uses of GDP are themselves producers of GDP (although some commentators often imply that), but rather because Private Investment includes investment in inventory accumulation.  Whatever is produced and not sold will accumulate in inventories, and with this as a balancing item one can go from the sum of all the uses of output to what production itself was.

It is a simple trick, but often misunderstood.  It allows the BEA to arrive at a fairly good estimate of how much production (GDP) grew in any calendar quarter just one month after the end of each quarter.  The BEA formally calls this its “Advance Estimate” of GDP, although many refer to it as the first or initial estimate of GDP.  It is then revised a month later (to produce the “Second Estimate”), and again a month after that (to produce the “Third Estimate”), as more complete data become available to the BEA.

The components of demand are also interesting and important in themselves.  They provide figures on what happened to personal consumption, fixed as well as inventory investment, and the other demand components of GDP.  To many, these figures on spending are of more interest than what happened in a particular sector of production.  And perhaps more importantly, in a modern economy production itself is largely driven by what producers can sell.  As Keynes taught us, production cannot be taken as a given at some “full employment” level, but rather will respond to what producers believe they can sell at a price that will cover their costs.

If, as Musk and Lutnick appear to be saying (again, they are not fully clear), the use of production by government (or some portion of that use) were to be subtracted from GDP, then the sum of what is used in the economy will no longer match what is produced by the economy.  That simple identity will no longer hold.

b)  GDP is also estimated by summing up the incomes (wages and profits) generated by the act of production.  This is based primarily on data obtained by the BLS from its monthly survey of business establishments (the Current Employment Statistics – or CES – survey; most commonly known for the monthly employment estimates it provides); from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) also of the BLS and with more detail on earnings; from the Quarterly Financial Report (QFR) of the Census Bureau (that obtains, for a sample of business firms, statistics on their financial positions and profits); and from a range of other sources to fill in the gaps (e.g. on farm incomes).

The value of all that is produced in the economy will accrue as someone’s income.  Thus by arriving at an estimate of aggregate incomes, the BEA will have a second approach to estimating GDP.  Those incomes include wages and other compensation paid to labor (e.g. health insurance, pension contributions, and such) plus the profits (or gross margin) accruing to the owners of the firms.  Since GDP is a gross concept (meaning before any deduction for depreciation of capital), the profit concept will be profits before any deduction for depreciation allowances.

The BEA does not try to provide an estimate of GDP by this approach in its Advance (first) Estimate of GDP released one month after the end of each quarter.  It does not yet have sufficient data to do this.  Rather, its first estimate is only (normally) provided with its Second Estimate of the GDP accounts two months after the end of each quarter.  At that time it issues a revised estimate of its demand-side estimate of GDP, and its initial estimate of GDP as arrived at from its income-side figures.  To avoid confusion, it calls this estimate Gross Domestic Income (GDI) rather than GDP, although in principle they should be the same.  But in the real world, the GDP and GDI figures will differ by some (hopefully small) amount, and to be fully transparent, the BEA shows this difference with the label of “Statistical Discrepancy”.  The BEA also provides a figure for the simple average of the GDP (demand-side) and GDI (income-side) estimates.  Many professionals take the quarterly changes in that simple average to be a better estimate of what growth has been in the economy – better than either GDP or GDI alone.

[Side note:  The initial GDI estimates are normally provided at the time of the Second Estimate of the GDP accounts, i.e. two months following the end of each quarter.  But the figures for the fourth quarter of the year are an exception, as extra time is allowed for businesses to complete their end-of-year accounting.  Thus the initial GDI estimates for the fourth quarter of each year are not released in late February but rather in late March.]

It is not clear what would happen to this GDI estimate should the BEA be required by Lutnick (its boss) to not count government spending (or some portion of government spending) in its GDP estimates.  Not only do government workers (civil servants) earn incomes, but wages are paid and profits are earned on the production of what government purchases.  While it would be straightforward (although silly) to exclude wages earned by government workers from the total incomes earned in society, it would be far more difficult to try to cancel out wages and profits earned on production sold to government.  But unless one did that, GDI would no longer match up with the concept of GDP that Musk and Lutnick appear to be calling for.

c)  The third approach the BEA uses to estimate GDP is to estimate directly what each sector in the economy produces and then add it up.  This is, however, the most difficult.  Hence the initial estimate of GDP in this way is not issued until the third month following the end of each calendar quarter (at which time the BEA issues also a second set of revised estimates of GDP from the demand side and a first set of revised estimates of GDP from the income side (i.e. GDI).  And while in principle this direct production-side estimate of GDP should match the other two estimates of GDP, the BEA does not publish what they arrived at for overall GDP from that production-side estimate.  Rather, for whatever reason (possibly limited confidence in the adequacy of the data they have at the time, or to avoid confusion by the public) the BEA scales their sector-by-sector estimates of production to match their (twice-revised) demand-side estimate of GDP.

To avoid double-counting, only the value that is added in each sector is counted (“value-added”).  The value-added in a sector of production is the gross revenues from the sale of what is produced minus what that sector purchases from other sectors – which are called intermediate inputs.  Thus, for example, the value-added of a bakery will equal the revenues of the bread that it sells less the cost of the inputs it had purchased – the flour, energy, water, and other ingredients it used.  A portion of that value-added is paid to the workers in wages and other compensation, and what is left is the gross margin or profits (the BEA uses the term “gross operating surplus”) of the bakery.  And for Gross Domestic Product (as opposed to Net National Product), it will be the profits before any deduction for depreciation.

Adding up value-added across all sectors of the economy should then match GDP as estimated from the demand side and GDP (GDI) as estimated from the income side.  But a question that then arises is how do they estimate value-added by the part of government that does not sell its output on the market?  While government enterprises (such as the Post Office, government-owned public utilities such as water companies, certain toll roads, and similarly) are an exception, they are a relatively small share of what government does.  A similar issue arises for non-profits who do not sell what they provide.

For what is called “general government” (government excluding government enterprises), as well as non-profits who do not sell what they provide on the market, the BEA follows standard international guidelines and sets the value-added of such entities to equal what it pays in wages and other compensation to government workers plus an estimate of what depreciation was on the capital assets of the government (or the non-profits).  The estimated depreciation is added in order to make these figures comparable to the figures for value-added in the sectors where goods and services are sold in the market.

Adding value-added estimated in this way for general government (and non-profits) to the figures for value-added in the sectors of the economy that sell in the markets (including by government enterprises), will then yield an estimate for GDP that in principle will match both GDP as estimated from the demand side (how the production was used, including for any inventory accumulation) and from the income side (wages and profits).

A generous interpretation of the comments of Musk and Lutnick is that they would exclude the counting of any value from the services that government itself provides when measured in the way described above.  That does not appear to be the case, but it is a possible interpretation and would indeed make more sense than excluding government spending (or some portion of government spending) from the demand side estimate of GDP.  That is, under this interpretation of Musk and Lutnick, the BEA would be instructed to provide an estimate of all that is produced in the economy excluding that provided by government.

But the BEA already publishes precisely such a figure.  It is the sum of value-added across all of the private sectors of the economy (which the BEA labels “Private Industries”).  Quarterly estimates on this are provided in the table titled “Gross Domestic Product by Industry Group” which is part of their publication of the Third Estimates of GDP, released three months following the end of each quarter.  The contribution to GDP from Private Industries plus the contribution from Government sums to their overall estimate of GDP.  The BEA is fully transparent on this.

What difference would it make if we assume Musk and Lutnick are referring to this concept of production as a measure of how the economy is performing?  The next section will examine this.

C.  Growth in GDP Compared to Growth in Private Production

How much would growth differ if it were measured based on the figures the BEA provides (and has been providing for many years) on private production as opposed to GDP?  There would be some difference, but not all that much.  What may be interesting is that, at least during recent presidential terms, growth in private production has been consistently higher than growth in overall GDP – although not by a substantial amount.  That is, growth in government production has been kept constrained through tight budgets, which has kept overall GDP growth below the growth in private production.  This is the opposite of the assertions of Musk and Lutnick that government spending has been some kind of artificial boost to the recorded figures on GDP growth.

It is interesting to compare the figures on growth by presidential term.  Comparing that under Biden and in Trump’s first term:

Chart 1

The plain lines show the levels of real GDP compared to what it was in the first quarter of each presidential term, while the lines of the same color but with symbols show what real growth was in private production (what the BEA labels Private Industries).  Private production was consistently somewhat higher, although not by much.  In terms of growth rates, real GDP grew at a 1.7% rate during Trump’s first term and at a rate of 2.8% during Biden’s.  Growth in 2020 was hurt, of course, due to the Covid crisis, and Trump’s mismanagement of the crisis made it worse than it would have been.  Private production grew at a faster rate for both presidents:  at a 1.9% rate under Trump and a substantially higher 3.0% rate under Biden.

One can draw a similar chart for Obama’s two terms in office:

Chart 2

The same pattern holds, with growth in private production faster than the growth in GDP as a whole.  The four-year growth rates were 1.8% and 2.25% for GDP in Obama’s two terms, and 2.1% and 2.5% for private production.

Since GDP is the sum of output of private industries and of government (both in value-added terms, as discussed in Section B above), the implication is that the growth in government value-added was slower than the growth in private value-added in each of these four presidential terms.  This is not surprising, as government growth has been kept constrained by tight budgets limiting what government was allowed to do.

Presidents – together with Congress – are responsible for government spending at the federal level.  Examining this, growth in federal government production (in value-added terms) was indeed flat or modest in each of the terms of Biden and Obama.  But it grew quickly under Trump:

Chart 3

Note that this federal production under Trump was already growing rapidly well before the start of the special programs passed by Congress in response to the Covid crisis.  Those special programs began only in the second quarter of 2020 – quarter #13 of his term in office.  They were also largely transfer programs, and hence separate from what would be counted in government value-added.  They do not explain the rapid growth in government during Trump’s first term in office, in contrast to the only modest growth, or even zero growth (in Obama’s second term), in federal programs when the Democrats were in office.

With this growth in federal production under Trump, why do we still see a substantially greater growth in private production than in overall GDP during Trump’s term (Chart 1 above)?  The reason is that government value-added as a component of GDP will include not only production by the federal government, but also production by state and local governments.  Furthermore, state and local level government production accounts for about two-thirds (68% in 2023) of overall government production (in value-added terms) in the US.  Federal programs account only for one-third.  And value-added in the state and local government sector fell at a 0.5% annual rate during Trump’s term in office, thus holding down overall government value-added despite the sharp rise in federal spending under Trump.

D.  Growth in Federal Worker Productivity Over Time

Musk and Lutnick also assert that government civil servants are unproductive whose contribution should not be counted in GDP.  It is, however, difficult to come up with a good measure of their contribution.  What metric would one use?

While it is difficult to come up with some absolute measure, one can conceive of a measure of the efficiency with which civil servants have, over time, managed their basic work.  Most of the work of federal civil servants is in the management and oversight of government-funded contracts or of federal transfer programs.  Examples of the first (discretionary government spending) include the management of contracts for medical research, or to buy tanks and planes for the military, or via state and local governments for the building of public infrastructure.  Examples of the second (mandatory government spending) include Social Security and Medicare.

There will be a dollar value associated with all such programs.  A crude measure of growth in federal government worker productivity would be how the dollar value of the contracts they have managed has changed over time – in real terms – per federal worker.  Relative to 1997 (the earliest year possible with a consistent series for all the data required), federal spending (in real terms) managed per federal worker has increased substantially:

Chart 4

Two curves are shown for federal government spending per federal worker (where only federal civilian workers are included; active duty military is excluded).  One counts discretionary government spending only, and excludes mandatory spending (for programs such as Social Security and Medicare) as well as interest on government debt and wages of the federal workers themselves.  This curve is shown here in blue.  While there have been substantial fluctuations, as of 2023 it was almost 50% higher than what it was in 1997.  And as of 2023, the increase was almost exactly the same as the increase in productivity for the economy as a whole, i.e. of real GDP per worker.

An alternative measure would include federal spending on mandatory programs in addition to spending on discretionary programs.  These are highly efficient programs, with administrative spending by government entities far below what is seen at private entities managing similar programs.  As was shown in an earlier post on this blog, the administrative cost of private health insurance is on average five times more expensive than the administrative cost for Medicare health insurance.  And administrative costs paid on an average 401(k) retirement accounts are more than an order of magnitude higher than the administrative costs of the Social Security system.  As discussed in another earlier post on this blog, the administrative costs of managing the Social Security system are only 0.5% of the benefits paid out each year.  In contrast, the annual cost of the fees paid out to private accounting and financial institutions on a 401(k) is generally between 2 and 3% of the outstanding balance in the 401(k) account.  The government designed programs are large, simple, and far more efficiently managed than private programs for similar matters.

Including these (and other) mandatory federal programs along with federal discretionary spending, the dollar values of the spending managed per federal worker doubled between 1997 and 2023 (see Chart 4).  This was far greater than the almost 50% increase in real GDP per worker in the economy as a whole.  It spiked even higher in 2020 and 2021 due to the massive Covid relief programs of those years.

This metric cannot assess how well federal workers are managing these programs in absolute terms.  But in terms of the effectiveness (in dollar costs per federal worker) with which they are being managed, federal worker productivity has grown substantially over the past quarter century.

E.  Concluding Comments – Similarities with the Material Product System of National Accounts of the USSR

While I am pretty sure Musk and Lutnick did not have it in mind when they asserted that “GDP” would be better measured by excluding the value of what government workers provide (or government spending in general), their proposal has parallels with the national accounts system developed by Gosplan in the 1930s in Stalin’s USSR.  That system – called the Material Product System (or also Material Balance Planning) – placed a value only on the production of material goods and not of certain services.  The concept for overall output in this system was not GDP but rather what the system defined as Net Material Product (NMP).  In contrast to GDP, NMP excluded the value of what it called “non-productive” services, which in that system included government services as well as health care, education, housing, passenger (but not freight) transport, financial services, and more.

Gosplan developed their system of national accounts based on the concept from Marx of productive and unproductive labor.  Only the production of material goods was viewed as productive, while labor used in the production of non-material goods was unproductive.  Thus whatever was provided by the latter should be excluded from their concept of overall output – i.e. excluded from their NMP.

I doubt that Musk and Lutnick were trying to follow some version of these Marxist concepts in their assertion that “GDP” should exclude the value of what government provides.  But the parallels are interesting.  The Material Product System of national accounts was used in the USSR and then in the post-war period in the Communist countries of Eastern Europe until 1990.  As we know, that did not end well.  One of the problems was that with their system of national accounts, they did not have a good view of what was in fact happening in their economies as conditions deteriorated over the decades.

There will be basic inconsistencies as well in trying to exclude one component of GDP in the integrated NIPA accounts, claiming that government does not contribute to GDP.  The three-way equality of GDP based on how production is used, the wage and profit income generated in production, and the value-added produced in all sectors of the economy, will then no longer hold.

A generous interpretation of Musk and Lutnick would be that they are calling for national income accounts that would count in GDP only the value of what is produced in private activities, i.e. excluding government.  One could do this, but it would no longer be GDP.  Rather, one would then have simply the sum of value-added across all private industries.  But if that is what they want, the BEA already provides it.

Not understanding national income accounting is, of course, minor in comparison to what Trump and his administration have done since taking office in January.  The disregard of basic laws and indeed the Constitution, the firing for no cause of thousands of civil servants and the closure of agencies established by Congress, and the vindictiveness of Trump’s attacks – and his willingness to use raw government power – on American media, universities, law firms, and individuals who have criticized him, are all of far greater consequence.

But the confident assertions of Musk and Lutnick on what should count in GDP is a further example of the self-confident arrogance of this administration.

Maintaining Social Security Benefit Payments Once the Trust Fund is Depleted Will NOT Increase the Government Deficit

A.  Introduction

As many are aware, based on the most recent forecast and if nothing is done, the Social Security Trust Fund is expected to be fully depleted by 2035.  Under current law that sets the operating rules for the Social Security system, benefit payments made to retirees and the disabled would then have to be scaled back to a level that would match the Social Security taxes being paid into the system each year.  This would mean a reduction of about 16% (based on current forecasts) from the payments that retirees and other beneficiaries of the system would have otherwise received in 2035.

That would be catastrophic.  Retirees and others depend on their monthly Social Security checks, and slashing those by 16% would mean a dramatic fall in the living standards of many.  In the aggregate, the cut in payments would amount to about 1% of GDP.  Even if one were to ignore the impact on the retirees who depend on their Social Security checks, a sudden scaling back of those payments by 1% of GDP could very well throw the economy into a recession.

What would happen if Congress were instead to fund that shortfall through the regular federal budget?  The amount is certainly large, at 1% of GDP or, in terms of the GDP forecast for 2035, about $425 billion.  How much would the federal deficit (and federal borrowing needs) then increase relative to what it would have been before the Trust Fund was depleted?

The answer is:  Nothing.  None.  Zero.  Zilch.  Nada.  Not a dime.

There would be no impact on the deficit.  Government borrowing in the financial markets would be exactly the same as before.  It is true that the deficit would fall if Social Security payments were slashed by 16% from one day to the next.  Leaving aside the resulting disruption this would cause for the economy – as a sudden cut in payments of 1% of GDP would certainly depress output and increase unemployment – the fiscal deficit would indeed be smaller if Social Security payments were reduced.  But compared to what it was the day before the Trust Fund was depleted, keeping up the Social Security payments in their promised amounts by covering this through the regular federal budget would have no impact on the deficit nor on federal borrowing needs.

Many may not realize this, and I have not seen a discussion of this point in the media or in other accounts of what might happen when the Social Security Trust Fund is depleted.  To be honest, I had not really thought this through before myself, and had operated on the (incorrect) assumption that maintaining Social Security benefit payments at their scheduled levels once the Trust Funds had been depleted would add to the federal deficit and borrowing requirements.  But it would not.  That is important, but I have not seen any discussion of it nor its policy implications.

This post will examine how the Social Security Trust Fund works, its history over the last half-century and its prospects, and briefly on why it is now expected to be depleted by about 2035.  The mechanics of the Social Security Trust Fund operations will then be examined in the context of the federal fiscal accounts, showing why it is an accounting mechanism but one that does not itself affect the federal fiscal deficit nor the federal government’s borrowing needs in the markets.  It will be seen that maintaining Social Security benefit payments as currently scheduled and promised in 2035 and after would not add to the deficit nor to government borrowing needs.  Some of the policy implications will then be considered.

But before starting, some of the terms should be clarified.  My references to the “Social Security Trust Fund” (or simply “Trust Fund”) are to the combined Old Age Security (OAS) and Disability Insurance (DI) trust funds.  Formally these are two separate trust funds, but they are commonly combined and referred to as the OASDI Trust Fund.  Payments from Social Security taxes have on more than one occasion (most recently in 2016 to 2018) been shifted between the OAS and DI accounts as a short-term fix when one of the funds was getting close to depletion (the DI fund in the 2016 to 2018 case).  In reports, the OAS and DI funds are often aggregated as if there were one OASDI fund, and I will treat them that way here as well.

Also, the more formal name for the taxes that go into the Social Security accounts is FICA (for Federal Insurance Contributions Act) taxes.  FICA taxes are applied on wages (i.e. not on other earnings) at current rates for the worker and the employer together of 10.6% for the OAS and 1.8% for the DI accounts – a total of 12.4%.  While these are formally “paid” half by the worker and half by the employer, all analysts agree that these payments in fact all come out of the worker’s wages.  The tax applies up to a ceiling on wage earnings of $168,600 in 2024, after which the tax rate is zero.  In addition, there are also FICA taxes of 2.9% for Medicare Hospital Insurance (with no ceiling on wage earnings).  The Medicare funding will not be addressed here, and when I refer to “Social Security taxes” I will be referring to the 12.4% for the OAS and DI trust funds (OASDI together).

B.  How the Social Security Trust Fund Works

Each year, there are workers who are paying Social Security taxes on their wages (at the 12.4% rate) and retirees (and other Social Security recipients, such as spouses, dependents, and the disabled) who are receiving benefit payments from Social Security.  The taxes paid go into the Social Security Trust Fund and the benefit payments made are drawn out of it.  When the tax payments going in are greater than the current benefit payments going out, the excess accumulates in the Trust Fund.  And in those years when the tax payments in are less than the current benefit payments out, the Trust Fund redeems a share of its assets to cover the difference.

The Trust Fund is invested in specially issued US Treasury obligations – essentially special US Treasury bonds.  The Trust Fund earns interest on those US Treasury holdings at a rate set by law to equal the weighted average yield observed in the markets as of the last business day of the prior month on US Treasury bonds that are not due or callable for 4 years or more.  That interest is added to the Trust Fund.  The Trust Fund also receives income taxes paid by certain retirees on their Social Security benefits (from retirees with incomes above a certain threshold).  There are also some other, generally minor, transfers to the Trust Fund.

The resulting accumulated balances in the Social Security Trust Fund, as of the end of each year and expressed as a share of GDP of the year, are shown in the chart at the top of this post.  It has varied over time, and one can see that the Trust Fund came close to being depleted before – in the early 1980s.  Before that, the Social Security system had been managed in a more ad hoc way, with benefit levels, eligibility, tax rates, the income ceiling on which Social Security taxes were due, and more frequently adjusted by Congress.  Indexing for inflation was only introduced in the 1970s.

By 1981, the forecast was that the Social Security Trust Fund would be fully depleted by 1983.  In response, President Reagan with Congress appointed a commission in 1981 chaired by Alan Greenspan (and subsequently usually referred to as the Greenspan Commission) to provide recommendations for what would return the system to viability.  The Commission issued its recommendations in early 1983, with a combination of higher tax rates, adjustments to benefit levels, an increase in the retirement age for full eligibility, and numerous more minor changes.  Congress approved these in 1983.

The Greenspan Commission recommendations were based on forecasts of what changes would be needed to lead to the Trust Fund remaining solvent (i.e. not depleted at any point) for at least 75 years.  Starting in 1982, the 75 years would carry the forecasts through to 2057.  This did not mean that the Trust Fund would be brought to zero in the 75th year, but rather that it would still be solvent at that point.  They did not try to look beyond that.

Knowing that the large Baby Boom generation was then in its prime working-age years and that they would be retiring starting around 2010, the changes were designed so that the Trust Fund would be built up in the 1980s, 90s, and 2000s, and then begin to be used to pay out benefits on a net basis as the Baby Boomers retired.  This produced the large “hump” seen in the chart at the top of this post with the Trust Fund growing from less than 1% of GDP to 17 1/2% of GDP in 2009, after which it began to decline.

The decline as a share of GDP was planned.  However, under the forecasts of the Greenspan Commission in 1983, the Trust Fund would not have been fully depleted by 2035.  While it is often stated in the media that this is a consequence of the Baby Boomers reaching retirement age and of longer life expectancies, that is not in fact true.  The Greenspan Commission was well aware of how many Baby Boomers would be reaching retirement age in those years – they had already been born.  And the issue is not whether life expectancies have been rising, but whether life expectancies have been rising by more than what the Greenspan Commission assumed in their forecasts.  And it has not.  Indeed, life expectancy in the US has actually been decreasing since 2014 (and then plummeted in 2020/21/22 due to Covid), is well below that enjoyed in comparable countries, and is well below what the Greenspan Commission forecast.

As was discussed in an earlier post on this blog, the Social Security Trust Fund is now expected to be depleted well before the Greenspan Commission anticipated not because of the Baby Boomers nor because of life expectancies growing longer, but rather because the Greenspan Commission did not anticipate that wage inequality would grow so dramatically following Reagan.  This matters, because it led a higher share of wage earnings to be drawn above the ceiling on which Social Security taxes are paid, where they are not taxed at all.  The Greenspan Commission’s assumption that the share of wages that would be subject to tax would remain where it was (at about 90% of total wages) was not unreasonable at the time, as that share had remained fairly steady in the post-World War II period up to the early 1980s.  But then it deteriorated sharply in the subsequent decades.

Due to that increase in wage income inequality, the Trust Fund is now forecast to be depleted in 2035.  In my earlier post on this issue, I calculated that had the share of wages subject to Social Security taxes remained at the 90% share (and taking into account what this would also mean for higher benefit payments for the high-income wage earners who would then still be paying into the system), the Trust Fund would have been forecast to last until 2056.  The calculations assumed that all else would then be as it was historically when my forecasts were made in 2016, or as the Social Security then forecast in the years from 2016 onwards.

But wage inequality rose in the decades since 1983 and the Social Security Trust Fund is now expected to run out by 2035.  Under the current law that governs the Social Security system, Social Security benefits would then be scaled back to a level that would match amounts being paid into the Trust Fund by the workers in those years.  This would require a scaling back of benefits of about 16% based on current forecasts.  This would be devastating for many.  In a biennial report issued by the Social Security Administration (last issued in 2016 with data for 2014 – it appears the Trump administration stopped it, and it has not been restarted), it was estimated that Social Security benefits accounted for 100% of the income of 20% of the population aged 65 or older, and for 90% or more of the income of a third of the population.  Saying that again, one-third of Americans aged 65 or older depend on Social Security for 90% or more of their income.

Furthermore, not only do a high share of those over 65 depend on their Social Security checks for almost all of their income in their old age, but the checks themselves are not that high.  As of June 2024, the average monthly benefit was only $1,781, or $21,372 on an annual basis.  And most of those who especially depend on their Social Security checks also receive well less than these average payments.

A high share of those aged 65 or older in the US depend critically on Social Security.  A sudden cut of 16% would be devastating.

C.  Federal Borrowing Before and After the Trust Fund is Depleted   

As described above, when the amount being paid into the Social Security Trust Fund in Social Security taxes exceeds what is being paid out in Social Security benefits, the excess is invested in interest-earning US Treasury obligations.  That excess will reduce what the US Treasury will need to borrow from the markets to cover whatever the federal deficit might be from all of its other revenues less expenditures (i.e. everything other than from Social Security revenues and expenditures).  The Social Security Trust Fund will, in such years, be built up as it was from 1983 to 2009.

The opposite happens in years when Social Security tax revenues fall short of what Social Security is paying out in benefits.  In those years, the Social Security system will redeem a portion of the US Treasury obligations it holds and from this receive the cash it needs to pay the scheduled benefits.  When it does this, the US Treasury will then need to borrow in the markets the amount required to cover the US Treasury obligations that the Social Security system has redeemed.  That is, as the Social Security Administration redeems a share of the US Treasury obligations that it holds in the Trust Fund, the Treasury will need to issue new debt to the public to obtain the cash it needs to pay to Social Security for those redemptions.

Now suppose the Trust Fund has been fully depleted, and it no longer holds any balance of US Treasury obligations.  This is the forecast for what will be faced in 2035.  It no longer has US Treasury obligations that it can redeem.  Under the current law for the Social Security system, it would then be required to scale back benefit payments to the amount it is then receiving from Social Security taxes being paid by those then working.  The current forecast is that this would require a scaling back of 16%.  (Note that this is not 100%, as some people appear to believe.  Social Security is not being shut down in some kind of “bankruptcy”.  Rather, Social Security payments would continue – just not at the scheduled benefit levels.)

But what would happen in terms of federal government borrowing requirements if, instead of scaling back benefits by 16%, the government instead funded those payments in full from the general budget?  The amount would be far from small, at a forecast 1% of GDP to cover that 16% shortage.  But what would then happen to what the US Treasury would need to borrow from the public?

The answer is nothing.  There would be no change at all.  As explained above, when the funds come out of the Social Security Trust Fund holdings of US Treasury obligations, the Treasury will need to borrow from the public whatever is redeemed by the Trust Fund.  That is where the cash comes from.  When the Trust Fund no longer has any holdings of the US Treasury obligations, then the cash needed to cover the 16% Social Security payment gap from the general budget will be exactly the same.  That is, the amount the US Treasury will need to borrow from the public will be the same whether it needs the cash to cover redemptions of US Treasury obligations from the Trust Fund, or to cover the 16% gap in what is needed to pay Social Security benefits in full.

The fiscal deficit will also be the same, whether the full Social Security payments are made out of redemptions from the Trust Fund or are made out of transfers from the general government budget.  Social Security taxes (i.e. FICA taxes) are included as revenues going to the government, the same as personal income taxes or other sources of government revenues.  Similarly, payments for Social Security benefits are treated as government expenditures – whether or not they are covered by redemptions from the Social Security Trust Fund.

To illustrate with numbers from FY2023 (and using the recent, June 2024, budget figures from the Congressional Budget Office), and expressed as a share of GDP:  Outlays for the Social Security system (for retirees and their dependents, as well as for the disabled) was 5.0% of GDP.  Payroll taxes for Social Security (the 12..4% on wages) was 4.4% of GDP, leaving 0.6% of GDP to be obtained by drawing down the Social Security Trust Fund.  This accounted for part of the overall fiscal deficit in FY2023 of 6.3% of GDP.  If the 0.6% of GDP gap had been covered by direct fiscal transfers from the general government budget instead of by redemptions from the Social Security Trust Fund, the overall fiscal deficit (6.3% of GDP) as well as government borrowing requirements (whether to fund the deficit or to cover the Trust Fund redemptions) would have been the same.

(Note:  I have left out here the relatively much smaller amounts coming from the transfer of income tax revenues arising from taxation of Social Security benefits in households meeting certain income thresholds, and the interest earned on Trust Fund assets during the year.  These are both covered elsewhere in the fiscal accounts.)

It is in this sense that it is accurate to describe Social Security as a “pay-as-you-go” system.  While it is not always clear what is being referred to when speakers refer to Social Security as pay-as-you-go (different speakers appear to be referring to different things), it would be accurate to say that this is the case from the point of view of the government’s fiscal accounts and of its borrowing requirements in the markets.  What Social Security pays out in benefits in any given year will match what Social Security obtains as revenues in that year (primarily from the Social Security share of the FICA taxes) plus what is provided to the system from the US Treasury.  Whether those amounts transferred from the US Treasury are matched by a drawdown on the Treasury obligations in the Social Security Trust Fund, or come directly from the budget, the overall fiscal deficit as well as the Treasury’s borrowing requirements in the market will be the same.

D.  Policy Implications and Conclusion

Recognizing this, what does it imply for what should be done in 2035 (or whenever the Social Security Trust Fund is fully depleted)?  Under current law, and what is repeatedly stated in the media, is that scheduled Social Security benefit payments would have to be scaled back drastically (by about 16% in the current forecasts).  If that is done, that would indeed be a disaster for many given their dependence on the Social Security checks they receive.

But as explained above, there would be no impact on the deficit, nor on government borrowing requirements, if the scheduled benefit payments were kept in full and not scaled back from the scheduled levels, but rather with the gap covered instead by appropriations from the regular budget.  Congress could approve this if they wished.

Seen in this perspective, the question then becomes how best to fund the Social Security system along with all other government programs in the budget.  One should not restrict consideration only to adjustments in the payroll taxes that are currently tied to the Social Security system, nor to possible reductions in benefit levels by, for example, raising the normal retirement age.  Consideration should thus be given to possible other changes in the overall tax system – for example in personal income taxes and/or corporate income (profit) taxes.  The payroll tax is regressive, with a flat 12.4% on wages (and only wages) and only up to a ceiling ($168,600 in 2024).  Greater reliance on progressive income taxes is an attractive alternative to a regressive payroll tax.

One should therefore take a more holistic view as to what the tax system should be and not treat the issue as one for Social Security taxes in isolation.  While there could very well be political advantages to defining a trust fund for Social Security into which certain taxes are paid and from which benefit payments are then made, one should recognize that fundamentally this is only presentation.  Covering a portion of the Social Security benefit payments through the general budget, and hence through the overall system of income and other taxes, could well be preferred to exclusive reliance on payroll taxes.

Note also there is precedent for this.  Medicare taxes are also paid on wages (at a 2.9% rate, but with no ceiling on the wages subject to tax) and go into a trust fund, plus there are direct monthly premia paid for Medicare coverage.  However this funding does not suffice to cover all of what Medicare now costs.  The difference is made up by direct fiscal transfers.  It is certainly a major government expense, but no one argues Medicare payments should be limited to whatever is paid in Medicare taxes and premia.

As noted, sustaining payments once the Social Security Trust Fund has been fully depleted would require a change in the law that governs the Social Security system.  That law has been changed numerous times in the past, and could certainly be changed on this.  The real problem is that with Congressional gridlock, obtaining approval for such a change may well be difficult.  Republicans have been opposed to Social Security ever since its origin in the Social Security Act of 1935 under Roosevelt.  As Social Security became popular and demonstrated its success in reducing poverty among the elderly, that political criticism became less overt but has remained.  And those opposed to Social Security will likely use the imminent prospect of the Trust Fund being depleted by 2035 as an opportunity to scale the system back.  A reduction in expenditures of 1% of GDP would be huge.

But as examined above, maintaining Social Security benefit payments at scheduled levels once the Trust Fund is depleted would have no fiscal effects in itself.  Government revenues, expenditures, and borrowing requirements would be the same the day after the Trust Fund was depleted as it was the day before.